Apartheid

== International relations during apartheid ==
{{International opposition to Apartheid}}
{{Main|Foreign relations of South Africa during apartheid}}

=== Commonwealth ===
South Africa's policies were subject to international scrutiny in 1960, when [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom|British Prime Minister]] [[Harold Macmillan]] criticised them during his [[Wind of Change (speech)|Wind of Change]] speech in [[Cape Town]]. Weeks later, tensions came to a head in the [[Sharpeville massacre]], resulting in more international condemnation. Soon afterwards, [[Prime Minister of South Africa|Prime Minister]] [[Hendrik Verwoerd]] announced a [[1960 South Africa referendum|referendum]] on whether the country should become a republic. Verwoerd lowered the voting age for Whites to eighteen years of age and included Whites in [[South West Africa]] on the roll. The referendum on 5 October that year asked Whites; "Are you in favour of a Republic for the Union?", and 52% voted "Yes".<ref>{{cite web|title=Apartheid part 06|url=http://www.okbuy.eu/info-apartheid-part-06/|author=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.-->|date=19 September 2017|website=Prime okbuy.eu search gizmo|language=en-US|access-date=27 May 2020|archive-date=3 July 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200703144915/http://www.okbuy.eu/info-apartheid-part-06/|url-status=live}}</ref>

As a consequence of this change of status, South Africa needed to reapply for continued membership of the [[Commonwealth of Nations|Commonwealth]], with which it had privileged trade links. [[India]] had become a [[republic within the Commonwealth]] in 1950, but it became clear that African and South and Southeast Asian member states would oppose South Africa due to its apartheid policies. As a result, South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth on 31 May 1961, the day that the Republic came into existence.

=== United Nations ===
{{blockquote|We stand here today to salute the United Nations Organisation and its Member States, both singly and collectively, for joining forces with the masses of our people in a common struggle that has brought about our emancipation and pushed back the frontiers of racism.| [[Nelson Mandela]], address to the United Nations as South African President, 3 October 1994<ref>[https://www.un.org/en/events/mandeladay/apartheid.shtml Nelson Mandela] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170620051301/http://www.un.org/en/events/mandeladay/apartheid.shtml |date=20 June 2017 }} United Nations</ref>}}

The apartheid system as an issue was first formally brought to the [[United Nations]] attention, in order to advocate for the Indians residing in South Africa. On 22 June 1946, the Indian government requested that the discriminatory treatment of Indians living in South Africa be included on the agenda of the first General Assembly session.<ref name="autogenerated2">{{Citation |title=Remarks at memorial ceremony for Nelson Mandela, Johannesburg, 10 December 2013|date=16 December 2016|doi = 10.18356/c18bc974-en}}</ref> In 1952, apartheid was again discussed in the aftermath of the Defiance Campaign, and the UN set up a task team to keep watch on the progress of apartheid and the racial state of affairs in South Africa. Although South Africa's racial policies were a cause for concern, most countries in the UN concurred that this was a domestic affair, which fell outside the UN's jurisdiction.<ref>Ampiah, Kweku (1997). ''The dynamics of Japan's relations with Africa: South Africa, Tanzania and Nigeria.'' CRC Press. p. 147.</ref>

In April 1960, the UN's conservative stance on apartheid changed following the [[Sharpeville massacre]], and the [[United Nations Security Council|Security Council]] for the first time agreed on concerted action against the apartheid regime. [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 134|Resolution 134]] called upon the nation of South Africa to abandon its policies implementing racial discrimination. The newly founded United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid, scripted and passed [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 181|Resolution 181]] on 7 August 1963, which called upon all states to cease the sale and shipment of all ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa. This clause was finally declared mandatory on 4 November 1977, depriving South Africa of military aid. From 1964 onwards, the US and the UK discontinued their [[Arms industry|arms trade]] with South Africa. The Security Council also condemned the Soweto massacre in [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 392|Resolution 392]]. In 1977, the voluntary UN arms embargo became mandatory with the passing of [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 418|Resolution 418]]. In addition to isolating South Africa militarily, the United Nations General Assembly, encouraged the boycotting of oil sales to South Africa.<ref name="autogenerated2"/> Other actions taken by the United Nations General Assembly include the request for all nations and organisations, "to suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges with the racist regime and with organisations or institutions in South Africa which practise apartheid".<ref name="autogenerated2"/> Illustrating that over a long period of time, the United Nations was working towards isolating the state of South Africa, by putting pressure on the Apartheid regime.

After much debate, by the late-1980s, the United States, the United Kingdom, and 23 other nations had passed laws placing various trade sanctions on South Africa. A [[disinvestment from South Africa]] movement in many countries was similarly widespread, with individual cities and provinces around the world implementing various laws and local regulations forbidding registered corporations under their jurisdiction from doing business with South African firms, factories, or banks.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/antia.htm|title=Summary of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act|publisher=[[United States Congress]]|access-date=22 February 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110722054047/http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/guide/antia.htm|archive-date=22 July 2011|url-status=dead}}</ref>

=== Catholic Church ===
[[Pope John Paul II]] was an outspoken opponent of apartheid. In 1985, while visiting the [[Netherlands]], he gave an impassioned speech at the [[International Court of Justice]] condemning apartheid, proclaiming that "no system of apartheid or separate development will ever be acceptable as a model for the relations between peoples or races."<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20130309014419/http://articles.latimes.com/1985-05-13/news/mn-9935_1_afrikaners Pope Attacks Apartheid in Speech at U.N. Court] ''[[Los Angeles Times]]'', 13 May 1985</ref> In September 1988, he made a pilgrimage to countries bordering South Africa, while demonstratively avoiding South Africa itself. During his visit to [[Zimbabwe]], he called for economic sanctions against the South African government.<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/17/world/pope-s-south-africa-visit-honors-2-vows.html Pope's South Africa Visit Honours 2 Vows] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170314082754/http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/17/world/pope-s-south-africa-visit-honors-2-vows.html |date=14 March 2017 }} ''[[The New York Times]]'', 13 May 1995</ref>

=== Organisation for African Unity ===
{{See also|Lusaka Manifesto}}

The [[Organisation of African Unity]] (OAU) was created in 1963. Its primary objectives were to eradicate colonialism and improve social, political and economic situations in Africa. It censured apartheid and demanded sanctions against South Africa. African states agreed to aid the liberation movements in their fight against apartheid.<ref name=geld>Geldenhuys, Deon (1990). ''Isolated states: a comparative analysis.'' Cambridge University Press. p. 274.</ref> In 1969, fourteen nations from Central and East Africa gathered in [[Lusaka]], [[Zambia]], and formulated the ''[[Lusaka Manifesto]]'', which was signed on 13 April by all of the countries in attendance except [[Malawi]].<ref>Royal African Society (1970). ''African affairs, Volumes 69–70.'' Oxford University Press. p. 178.</ref> This manifesto was later taken on by both the OAU and the United Nations.<ref name=geld />

The [[Lusaka Manifesto]] summarised the political situations of self-governing African countries, condemning racism and inequity, and calling for Black majority rule in all African nations.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Hall | first1 = Richard | year = 1970 | title = The Lusaka Manifesto | journal = African Affairs | volume = 69 | issue = 275| pages = 178–179 | doi=10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a095995}}</ref> It did not rebuff South Africa entirely, though, adopting an appeasing manner towards the apartheid government, and even recognizing its autonomy. Although African leaders supported the emancipation of Black South Africans, they preferred this to be attained through peaceful means.<ref>Rubin, Leslie; Weinstein, Brian (1977). ''Introduction to African politics: a continental approach.'' Praeger. p. 128.</ref>

South Africa's negative response to the Lusaka Manifesto and rejection of a change to its policies brought about another OAU announcement in October 1971. The ''Mogadishu Declaration'' stated that South Africa's rebuffing of negotiations meant that its Black people could only be freed through military means, and that no African state should converse with the apartheid government.<ref>Klotz, Audie (1999). ''Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid.'' Cornell University Press. p. 77.</ref>

=== Outward-looking policy ===
In 1966, [[B. J. Vorster]] became Prime Minister. He was not prepared to dismantle apartheid, but he did try to redress South Africa's isolation and to revitalise the country's global reputation, even those with Black majority rule in Africa. This he called his "Outward-Looking" policy.<ref>{{cite book|last=Pfister|first=Roger|title=Apartheid South Africa and African States: From Pariah to Middle Power, 1962–1994|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YABvZRghzkAC&pg=PA39|year=2005|publisher=I.B.Tauris|isbn=978-1-85043-625-6|access-date=25 March 2016|archive-date=11 May 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160511164931/https://books.google.com/books?id=YABvZRghzkAC&pg=PA39|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Beck|first=Roger B. |title=The History of South Africa|url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780313307300|url-access=registration|page=[https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780313307300/page/151 151]|year=2000|publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group|isbn=978-0-313-30730-0|access-date=25 March 2016}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Ndlovu|first=Sifiso Mxolisi|title=The Road to Democracy in South Africa: 1970–1980|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JGE-XB5QlD8C&pg=PA616|volume=2|year=2004|publisher=Unisa Press|isbn=978-1-86888-406-3|chapter=The ANC's Diplomacy and International Relations|access-date=13 August 2015|archive-date=10 November 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151110183749/https://books.google.com/books?id=JGE-XB5QlD8C&pg=PA616|url-status=live}}</ref>

Vorster's willingness to talk to African leaders stood in contrast to Verwoerd's refusal to engage with leaders such as [[Abubakar Tafawa Balewa]] of [[Nigeria]] in 1962 and [[Kenneth Kaunda]] of [[Zambia]] in 1964. In 1966, he met the heads of the neighbouring states of [[Lesotho]], [[Swaziland]] and [[Botswana]]. In 1967, he offered technological and financial aid to any African state prepared to receive it, asserting that no political strings were attached, aware that many African states needed financial aid despite their opposition to South Africa's racial policies. Many were also tied to South Africa economically because of their migrant labour population working down the South African mines. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland remained outspoken critics of apartheid, but were dependent on South African economic assistance.

[[Malawi]] was the first non-neighbouring country to accept South African aid. In 1967, the two states set out their political and economic relations. In 1969, Malawi was the only country at the assembly which did not sign the Lusaka Manifesto condemning South Africa's apartheid policy. In 1970, Malawian president [[Hastings Banda]] made his first and most successful official stopover in South Africa.

Associations with Mozambique followed suit and were sustained after that country won its sovereignty in 1975. Angola was also granted South African loans. Other countries which formed relationships with South Africa were [[Liberia]], [[Ivory Coast]], Madagascar, [[Mauritius]], Gabon, [[Zaire]] (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and the [[Central African Republic]]. Although these states condemned apartheid (more than ever after South Africa's denunciation of the Lusaka Manifesto), South Africa's economic and military dominance meant that they remained dependent on South Africa to varying degrees{{clarify|date=September 2014}}.

=== Sports and culture ===
{{Main|Sporting boycott of South Africa|Rugby union and apartheid}}

====Beginning====
South Africa's isolation in sport began in the mid-1950s and increased throughout the 1960s. Apartheid forbade multiracial sport, which meant that overseas teams, by virtue of them having players of different races, could not play in South Africa. In 1956, the [[International Table Tennis Federation]] severed its ties with the all-White South African Table Tennis Union, preferring the non-racial South African Table Tennis Board. The apartheid government responded by confiscating the passports of the Board's players so that they were unable to attend international games.

====Isolation====
====Verwoerd years====
In 1959, the non-racial South African Sports Association (SASA) was formed to secure the rights of all players on the global field. After meeting with no success in its endeavours to attain credit by collaborating with White establishments, SASA approached the [[International Olympic Committee]] (IOC) in 1962, calling for South Africa's expulsion from the Olympic Games. The IOC sent South Africa a caution to the effect that, if there were no changes, they would be barred from competing at the [[1964 Summer Olympics|1964 Olympic Games]] in [[Tokyo]]. The changes were initiated, and in January 1963, the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC) was set up. The Anti-Apartheid Movement persisted in its campaign for South Africa's exclusion, and the IOC acceded in barring the country from the 1964 Olympic Games. South Africa selected a multi-racial team for the next Olympic Games, and the IOC opted for incorporation in the [[1968 Summer Olympics|1968 Mexico City Olympic Games]]. Because of protests from AAMs and African nations, however, the IOC was forced to retract the invitation.

[[File:Hamilton2.jpg|thumb|Protests against the 1981 Springbok tour of New Zealand]]
Foreign complaints about South Africa's bigoted sports brought more isolation. Racially selected New Zealand sports teams toured South Africa, until the 1970 [[All Blacks]] rugby tour allowed [[Māori people|Maori]] to enter the country under the status of "honorary Whites". Huge and widespread protests occurred in [[1981 South Africa rugby union tour of New Zealand|New Zealand in 1981]] against the [[Springboks|Springbok]] tour{{snds}}the government spent $8,000,000 protecting games using the army and police force. A planned All Black tour to South Africa in 1985 remobilised the New Zealand protesters and it was cancelled. A "rebel tour"{{snds}}not government sanctioned{{snds}}went ahead in 1986, but after that sporting ties were cut, and New Zealand made a decision not to convey an authorised rugby team to South Africa until the end of apartheid.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/culture/1981-springbok-tour |title=The 1981 Springbok rugby tour{{snds}}A country divided |work=NZ History |publisher=[[Ministry for Culture and Heritage]] |location=New Zealand |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081220020649/http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/culture/1981-springbok-tour |archive-date=20 December 2008 |url-status=live}}</ref>

====Vorster years====
On 6 September 1966, Verwoerd was fatally stabbed at Parliament House by parliamentary messenger [[Dimitri Tsafendas]]. [[John Vorster]] took office shortly after, and announced that South Africa would no longer dictate to the international community what their teams should look like. Although this reopened the gate for international sporting meets, it did not signal the end of South Africa's racist sporting policies. In 1968, Vorster went against his policy by refusing to permit [[Basil D'Oliveira]], a Coloured South African-born cricketer, to join the English cricket team on its tour to South Africa. Vorster said that the side had been chosen only to prove a point, and not on merit. D'Oliveira was eventually included in the team as the first substitute, but the tour was cancelled. Protests against certain tours brought about the cancellation of a number of other visits, including that of an England rugby team touring South Africa in 1969–70.

The first of the "White Bans" occurred in 1971 when the Chairman of the Australian Cricketing Association{{snds}}[[Don Bradman|Sir Don Bradman]]{{snds}}flew to South Africa to meet Vorster. Vorster had expected Bradman to allow the tour of the Australian cricket team to go ahead, but things became heated after Bradman asked why Black sportsmen were not allowed to play cricket. Vorster stated that Blacks were intellectually inferior and had no finesse for the game. Bradman, thinking this ignorant and repugnant, asked Vorster if he had heard of a man named [[Garry Sobers]]. On his return to [[Australia]], Bradman released a short statement: "We will not play them until they choose a team on a non-racist basis."<ref>[https://www.smh.com.au/news/cricket/the-day-apartheid-was-hit-for-six/2008/08/22/1219262525329.html The Day Apartheid Was Hit For Six] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151025110914/http://www.smh.com.au/news/cricket/the-day-apartheid-was-hit-for-six/2008/08/22/1219262525329.html |date=25 October 2015 }}. ''The Sydney Morning Herald''.</ref> Bradman's views were in stark contrast to those of Australian tennis great [[Margaret Court]], who had won the [[grand slam (tennis)|grand slam]] the previous year and commented about apartheid that "South Africans have this thing better organised than any other country, particularly America" and that she would "go back there any time."<ref>{{cite news|title = Margaret Court: astounding champion who found God and lost the respect of a nation|url = https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/jun/03/margaret-court-astounding-champion-who-found-god-and-lost-the-respect-of-a-nation|work = [[Guardian Australia]]|first = Russell|last = Jackson|access-date = 7 November 2019|date = 3 June 2017|archive-date = 7 November 2019|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20191107090021/https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/jun/03/margaret-court-astounding-champion-who-found-god-and-lost-the-respect-of-a-nation|url-status = live}}</ref>

In South Africa, Vorster vented his anger publicly against Bradman, while the African National Congress rejoiced. This was the first time a predominantly White nation had taken the side of multiracial sport, producing an unsettling resonance that more "White" boycotts were coming.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dreamcricket.com/community/blogs/cover_points/archive/2008/08/23/bradman-s-perfection.aspx |title=Bradman's Perfection |publisher=DreamCricket |access-date=19 June 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110710151045/http://www.dreamcricket.com/community/blogs/cover_points/archive/2008/08/23/bradman-s-perfection.aspx |archive-date=10 July 2011 |url-status=dead }}</ref>
Almost twenty years later, on his release from prison, Nelson Mandela asked a visiting Australian statesman if Donald Bradman, his childhood hero, was still alive (Bradman lived until 2001).

In 1971, Vorster altered his policies even further by distinguishing multiracial from multinational sport. Multiracial sport, between teams with players of different races, remained outlawed; multinational sport, however, was now acceptable: international sides would not be subject to South Africa's racial stipulations.

In 1978, Nigeria [[boycott]]ed the [[1978 Commonwealth Games|Commonwealth Games]] because New Zealand's sporting contacts with the South African government were not considered to be in accordance with the 1977 [[Gleneagles Agreement]]. Nigeria also led the 32-nation boycott of the [[1986 Commonwealth Games]] because of UK Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher|Margaret Thatcher's]] ambivalent attitude towards sporting links with South Africa, significantly affecting the quality and profitability of the Games and thus thrusting apartheid into the international spotlight.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://experts.about.com/e/c/co/Commonwealth_Games.htm|title=Commonwealth Games|publisher=About.com|access-date=7 February 2007| archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20060527215130/http://experts.about.com/e/c/co/Commonwealth_Games.htm| archive-date=27 May 2006| url-status=live}}</ref>

====Cultural boycott====
In the 1960s, the Anti-Apartheid Movements began to campaign for cultural boycotts of apartheid South Africa. Artists were requested not to present or let their works be hosted in South Africa. In 1963, 45 British writers put their signatures to an affirmation approving of the boycott, and, in 1964, American actor [[Marlon Brando]] called for a similar affirmation for films. In 1965, the [[Writers' Guild of Great Britain]] called for a proscription on the sending of films to South Africa. Over sixty American artists signed a statement against apartheid and against professional links with the state. The presentation of some South African plays in the United Kingdom and the United States was also vetoed.{{by whom|date=December 2018}}{{citation needed|date=October 2021}} After the arrival of [[TV|television]] in South Africa in 1975, the British Actors Union, [[Equity (trade union)|Equity]], boycotted the service, and no British programme concerning its associates could be sold to South Africa. Similarly, when [[home video]] grew popular in the 1980s, the Australian arm of [[CBS/Fox Video]] (now [[20th Century Fox Home Entertainment]]) placed stickers on their [[VHS]] and [[Betamax]] cassettes which labelled exporting such cassettes to South Africa as "an infringement of copyright".<ref>{{cite web |url=https://vhscollector.com/sites/default/files/vhs/domino-principal-vhs-5-29047.jpg |title=Archived copy |access-date=16 April 2019 |archive-date=16 April 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190416142637/https://vhscollector.com/sites/default/files/vhs/domino-principal-vhs-5-29047.jpg |url-status=live }}</ref> Sporting and cultural boycotts did not have the same effect as economic sanctions,{{Citation needed|date=January 2017}} but they did much to lift consciousness amongst normal South Africans of the global condemnation of apartheid.

=== Western influence ===
{{see also|International sanctions during apartheid}}
[[File:Boycott Apartheid Bus, London, UK. 1989.jpg|thumb|London bus in 1989 carrying the "Boycott Apartheid" message.]]
While international opposition to apartheid grew, the [[Nordic countries]]{{snds}}and [[Sweden]] in particular{{snds}}provided both moral and financial support for the [[African National Congress|ANC]].<ref>International Labour Office (1991). ''Apartheid: Special Report of the Directed General on the Application of the Decoration Concerning the Policy of South Africa.'' [[International Labour Organization]]. p. 46.</ref> On 21 February 1986{{spaced ndash}}a week before he was assassinated{{spaced ndash}}[[Sweden|Sweden's]] Prime Minister [[Olof Palme]] made the [[keynote]] address to the ''Swedish People's Parliament Against Apartheid'' held in [[Stockholm]].<ref>Bangura, Abdul Karim (2004). ''Sweden vs apartheid: putting morality ahead of profit.'' Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. p. 104.</ref> In addressing the hundreds of anti-apartheid sympathisers as well as leaders and officials from the ANC and the [[Anti-Apartheid Movement]] such as [[Oliver Tambo]], Palme declared: "Apartheid cannot be reformed; it has to be eliminated."<ref>Grieg, Charlotte (2008). ''Cold Blooded Killings: Hits, Assassinations, and Near Misses That Shook the World.'' Booksales Inc Remainders. p. 43.</ref>

Other Western countries adopted a more ambivalent position. In [[Switzerland]], the [[Swiss-South African Association]] lobbied on behalf of the South African government. The [[Presidency of Richard Nixon|Nixon administration]] implemented a policy known as the [[Tar Baby Option]], pursuant to which the US maintained close relations with the Apartheid South African government.<ref name="Dowdall 2009">{{cite book|last=Dowdall|first=Aaron T.|title=The Birth and Death of a Tar Baby: Henry Kissinger and Southern Africa|date=December 2009|url=https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/10125/research.pdf?sequence=3|access-date=13 August 2012|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160126045231/https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/10125/research.pdf?sequence=3|archive-date=26 January 2016 }}</ref> The [[Presidency of Ronald Reagan|Reagan administration]] evaded international sanctions and provided diplomatic support in international forums for the South African government. The United States also increased trade with the Apartheid regime, while describing the ANC as "a terrorist organisation."<ref>Joseba Zulaika and William Douglass, "Terror and Taboo" (Routledge, 1996), p. 12</ref> Like the Reagan administration, the government of [[Margaret Thatcher]] termed this policy "[[constructive engagement]]" with the apartheid government, vetoing the imposition of UN economic sanctions. U.S. government justification for supporting the Apartheid regime were publicly given as a belief in "[[free trade]]" and the perception of the [[anti-communism|anti-communist]] South African government as a bastion against [[Marxist]] forces in Southern Africa, for example, by the military intervention of South Africa in the [[Angolan Civil War]] in support of right-wing insurgents fighting to topple the government. The U.K. government also declared the ANC a terrorist organisation,<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/or/pr/lond88.html |title=Oliver Tambo interviewed by The Times|date=13 June 1988 |publisher=ANC |access-date=25 September 2012 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080523184111/http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/or/pr/lond88.html |archive-date = 23 May 2008}}</ref> and in 1987 Thatcher's spokesman, [[Bernard Ingham]], famously said that anyone who believed that the ANC would ever form the government of South Africa was "living in [[cloud cuckoo land]]".<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/Mandela/0,,2-7-1507_1389526,00.html |title=Mandela's triumphant walk |date=18 July 2003 |work=News24 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060924042332/http://www.news24.com/News24/South_Africa/Mandela/0%2C%2C2-7-1507_1389526%2C00.html |archive-date=24 September 2006 }}</ref> The [[American Legislative Exchange Council]] (ALEC), a conservative lobbying organisation, actively campaigned against divesting from South Africa throughout the 1980s.<ref>[http://www.democracynow.org/2013/12/11/alecs_institutional_corruption_from_backing_apartheid ALEC's "Institutional Corruption", From Backing Apartheid to Assault on Clean Energy, Public Sector] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170915052126/http://www.democracynow.org/2013/12/11/alecs_institutional_corruption_from_backing_apartheid |date=15 September 2017 }}. ''[[Democracy Now!]]'' 11 December 2013.</ref>

By the late-1980s, with no sign of a political resolution in South Africa, Western patience began to run out. By 1989, a bipartisan [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican]]/[[Democratic Party (United States)|Democratic]] initiative in the US favoured [[Disinvestment from South Africa|economic sanctions]] (realised as the ''[[Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act]]'' of 1986), the release of Nelson Mandela and a negotiated settlement involving the ANC. Thatcher too began to take a similar line, but insisted on the suspension of the ANC's armed struggle.<ref>{{cite web|title=Another Kind of War|author=Mark Phillips and [[Colin Coleman]]|publisher=Transformation|year=1989|url=http://digital.lib.msu.edu/projects/africanjournals/pdfs/transformation/tran009/tran009002.pdf|access-date=25 March 2016|archive-date=18 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121018171230/http://digital.lib.msu.edu/projects/africanjournals/pdfs/transformation/tran009/tran009002.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>

The UK's significant economic involvement in South Africa may have provided some [[Leverage (negotiation)|leverage]] with the South African government, with both the UK and the US applying pressure and pushing for negotiations. However, neither the UK nor the US was willing to apply economic pressure upon their multinational interests in South Africa, such as the mining company [[Anglo American plc|Anglo American]]. Although a high-profile compensation claim against these companies was thrown out of court in 2004,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press468.htm |title=Compensation case against South African miners thrown out |publisher=Minesandcommunities.org |access-date=3 January 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080119221322/http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press468.htm |archive-date=19 January 2008 }}</ref> the [[US Supreme Court]] in May 2008 upheld an appeal court ruling allowing another lawsuit that seeks damages of more than US$400&nbsp;billion from major international companies which are accused of aiding South Africa's apartheid system.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7396040.stm |title=US court allows apartheid claims |work=BBC News |date=12 May 2008 |access-date=3 January 2011 |archive-date=26 July 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080726231602/http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7396040.stm |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Effect of the Cold War ===
===="Total Onslaught"====
[[File:SADF Pamphlet1.PNG|thumb|Apartheid-era propaganda leaflet issued to South African military personnel in the 1980s. The pamphlet decries "Russian colonialism and oppression" in English, Afrikaans and Portuguese.]]
During the 1950s, South African military strategy was decisively shaped by fears of communist espionage and a conventional [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] threat to the strategic Cape trade route between the [[Atlantic Ocean|south Atlantic]] and [[Indian Ocean]]s.<ref name=Berridge>{{cite book|last=Berridge|first=G.R.|title=South Africa, the Colonial Powers and African Defence: The Rise and Fall of the White Entente, 1948–60|date=1992|pages=1–16, 163–164|publisher=Palgrave Books|location=Basingstoke|isbn=978-0333563519}}</ref> The apartheid government supported the US-led [[North Atlantic Treaty Organization]] (NATO), as well as its policy of regional ''[[containment]]'' against Soviet-backed regimes and insurgencies worldwide.<ref name=Lulat>{{cite book|last=Lulat|first=Y.G.M.|title=United States Relations with South Africa: A Critical Overview from the Colonial Period to the Present|date=1992|pages=143–146|publisher=Peter Lang Publishing, Incorporated|location=New York|isbn=978-0820479071}}</ref> By the late-1960s, the rise of Soviet [[client state]]s on the African continent, as well as Soviet aid for militant anti-apartheid movements, was considered one of the primary external threats to the apartheid system.<ref name=Campbell>{{cite book|last=Campbell|first=Kurt|title=Soviet Policy Towards South Africa|date=1986|pages=129–131|publisher=Palgrave-Macmillan|location=Basingstoke|isbn=978-1349081677}}</ref> South African officials frequently accused domestic opposition groups of being communist proxies.<ref name="Devils">{{cite book|last1=Herbstein|first1=Denis|last2=Evenson|first2=John|title=The Devils Are Among Us: The War for Namibia|date=1989|pages=14–23|publisher=Zed Books Ltd|location=London|isbn=978-0862328962}}</ref> For its part, the Soviet Union viewed South Africa as a bastion of [[neocolonialism]] and a regional Western ally, which helped fuel its support for various anti-apartheid causes.<ref name=Shultz>{{cite book|last=Shultz|first=Richard|title=Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices, and Regional Comparisons|url=https://archive.org/details/sovietunionrevo00shul/page/121|url-access=registration|date=1988|pages=[https://archive.org/details/sovietunionrevo00shul/page/121 121–123, 140–145]|publisher=Hoover Institution Press|location=Stanford, California|isbn=978-0817987114}}</ref>

From 1973 onwards, much of South Africa's white population increasingly looked upon their country as a bastion of the [[free world]] besieged militarily, politically, and culturally by Communism and radical [[black nationalism]].<ref name=Onslaught1>{{cite book|last=Potgieter|first=De Wet|title=Total Onslaught: Apartheid's Dirty Tricks Exposed|date=2007|pages=93–95|publisher=Zebra Press|location=Cape Town|isbn=978-1770073289}}</ref> The apartheid government perceived itself as being locked in a proxy struggle with the [[Warsaw Pact]] and by implication, armed wings of black nationalist forces such as [[Umkhonto we Sizwe]] (MK) and the [[People's Liberation Army of Namibia]] (PLAN), which often received arms and training in Warsaw Pact member states.<ref name=Shultz/> This was described as "Total Onslaught".<ref name=Onslaught1/><ref name=Minter>{{cite book|last=Minter|first=William|title=Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique|date=1994|pages=37–49|publisher=Witwatersrand University Press|location=Johannesburg|isbn=978-1439216187}}</ref>

====Israeli arms sales====
Soviet support for militant anti-apartheid movements worked in the government's favour, as its claim to be reacting in opposition to aggressive communist expansion gained greater plausibility, and helped it justify its own domestic militarisation methods, known as "Total Strategy".<ref name=Onslaught1 /> Total Strategy involved building up a formidable conventional military and counter-intelligence capability.<ref name=Onslaught1 /> It was formulated on counter-revolutionary tactics as espoused by noted French tactician [[André Beaufre]].<ref name=Minter /> Considerable effort was devoted towards circumventing [[International sanctions|international arms sanctions]], and the government even went so far as to develop [[South Africa and weapons of mass destruction|nuclear weapons]],<ref>Von Wielligh, N. & von Wielligh-Steyn, L. (2015). ''The Bomb: South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Programme''. Pretoria: Litera.</ref> allegedly with covert assistance from [[Israel]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Brothers in Arms – Israel's secret pact with Pretoria |url=https://www.theguardian.com/israel/Story/0,,1704037,00.html |work=The Guardian |location=UK |date=7 February 2006 |first=Chris |last=McGreal |access-date=3 April 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080725232738/http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0%2C%2C1704037%2C00.html |archive-date=25 July 2008 |url-status=live}}</ref> In 2010, ''[[The Guardian]]'' released South African government documents that revealed an Israeli offer to sell the apartheid regime nuclear weapons.<ref>{{cite news|title=Revealed: how Israel offered to sell South Africa nuclear weapons|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/23/israel-south-africa-nuclear-weapons|work=The Guardian |location=UK |date=24 May 2010|first=Chris|last=McGreal|access-date=24 May 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100525212221/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/23/israel-south-africa-nuclear-weapons|archive-date=25 May 2010 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=The memos and minutes that confirm Israel's nuclear stockpile|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/23/israel-south-africa-nuclear-documents|work=The Guardian |location=UK |date=24 May 2010|first=Chris|last=McGreal|access-date=24 May 2010|archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20100525214324/http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/23/israel-south-africa-nuclear-documents|archive-date=25 May 2010 |url-status=live}}</ref> Israel denied these allegations and claimed that the documents were minutes from a meeting which did not indicate any concrete offer for a sale of nuclear weapons. [[Shimon Peres]] said that ''The Guardian''{{'}}s article was based on "selective interpretation ... and not on concrete facts."<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/25/world/middleeast/25israel.html |work=The New York Times |title=Israel Denies It Offered South Africa Warheads |first=Isabel |last=Kershner |date=24 May 2010 |access-date=14 February 2017 |archive-date=30 June 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170630105745/http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/25/world/middleeast/25israel.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

As a result of "Total Strategy", South African society became increasingly militarised. Many domestic civil organisations were modelled upon military structures, and military virtues such as discipline, patriotism, and loyalty were highly regarded.<ref name="War">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zEQ-Km_KShAC&q=Coventry+Four&pg=PA238|title=War and Society: The Militarisation of South Africa|author=Jacklyn Cock, Laurie Nathan|year=1989|publisher=New Africa Books|isbn=978-0-86486-115-3|pages=36–37, 283–289|access-date=8 November 2020|archive-date=9 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210709201235/https://books.google.com/books?id=zEQ-Km_KShAC&q=Coventry+Four&pg=PA238|url-status=live}}</ref> In 1968, national service for White South African men lasted nine months at minimum, and they could be called up for reserve duty into their late-middle age if necessary.<ref name=Reflections>{{cite book|last1=Potgieter|first1=Thean|last2=Liebenberg|first2=Ian|title=Reflections on War: Preparedness and Consequences|year=2012|pages=70–81|publisher=Sun Media Press|location=Stellenbosch|isbn=978-1-920338-85-5}}</ref> The length of national service was gradually extended to 12 months in 1972 and 24 months in 1978.<ref name="Reflections" /> At state schools, white male students were organised into paramilitary formations and drilled as cadets or as participants in a civil defence or "Youth Preparedness" curriculum.<ref name="War" /> Compulsory military education and in some cases, paramilitary training was introduced for all older white male students at state schools in three South African provinces.<ref name="War" /> These programmes presided over the construction of bomb shelters at schools and drills aimed at simulating mock insurgent raids.<ref name="War" />

From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, [[Military budget|defence budgets]] in South Africa were raised exponentially.<ref name=Minter /> In 1975, [[Ministry of Defense (Israel)|Israeli defence minister]] [[Shimon Peres]] signed a security pact with South African defence minister [[P.W. Botha]] that led to $200&thinsp;million in arms deals. In 1988, Israeli arm sales to South Africa totalled over $1.4&thinsp;billion.<ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.thenation.com/article/banquos-ghost-israeli-foreign-policy/|title=The Banquo's Ghost of Israeli Foreign Policy|journal=[[The Nation]]|date=14 May 2010|last1=Blumenthal|first1=Max|access-date=13 December 2018|archive-date=11 August 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190811024245/https://www.thenation.com/article/banquos-ghost-israeli-foreign-policy/|url-status=live}}</ref> Covert operations focused on espionage and domestic counter-subversion became common, the number of [[special forces]] units swelled, and the [[South African Defence Force]] (SADF) had amassed enough sophisticated conventional weaponry to pose a serious threat to the "[[front-line states]]", a regional alliance of neighbouring countries opposed to apartheid.<ref name=Minter />

==== Foreign military operations ====
{{see also|South African Border War|Raid on Gaborone|Operation Skerwe|Operation Beanbag}}
[[File:SADF-Operations 4.jpg|thumb|right|South African paratroops on a raid in Angola, 1980s]]

Total Strategy was advanced in the context of MK, PLAN, and [[Azanian People's Liberation Army]] (APLA) guerrilla raids into South Africa or against South African targets in South West Africa; frequent South African reprisal attacks on these movements' external bases in [[Angola]], [[Zambia]], [[Mozambique]], [[Zimbabwe]], and [[Botswana]], often involving [[collateral damage]] to foreign infrastructure and civilian populations; and periodic complaints brought before the international community about South African violations of its neighbours' sovereignty.<ref name=Wilkenfeld>{{cite book|last1=Brecher|first1=Michael|last2=Wilkenfeld|first2=Jonathan|title=A Study of Crisis|year=1997|pages=[https://archive.org/details/studyofcrisis0000brec/page/79 79–82, 477]|publisher=University of Michigan Press|location=Ann Arbor|isbn=978-0472087075|url=https://archive.org/details/studyofcrisis0000brec/page/79}}</ref>

The apartheid government made judicious use of [[extraterritorial operation]]s to eliminate its military and political opponents, arguing that neighbouring states, including their civilian populations, which hosted, tolerated on their soil, or otherwise sheltered anti-apartheid insurgent groups could not evade responsibility for provoking retaliatory strikes.<ref name=Wilkenfeld/> While it did focus on militarising the borders and sealing up its domestic territory against insurgent raids, it also relied heavily on an aggressive [[Preemptive war|preemptive]] and [[Counterattack|counter-strike]] strategy, which fulfilled a preventive and deterrent purpose.<ref name=SACP>{{cite book|last1=Sechaba|first1=Tsepo|last2=Ellis|first2=Stephen|title=Comrades Against Apartheid: The ANC & the South African Communist Party in Exile|year=1992|pages=184–187|publisher=Indiana University Press|location=Bloomington|isbn= 978-0253210623}}</ref> The reprisals which occurred beyond South Africa's borders involved not only hostile states, but neutral and sympathetic governments as well, often forcing them to react against their will and interests.<ref name="James">{{cite book|title=A Political History of the Civil War in Angola: 1974–1990|last=James III|first=W. Martin|location=New Brunswick|publisher=Transaction Publishers|year=2011|orig-year=1992|isbn=978-1-4128-1506-2|pages=207–214, 239–245}}</ref>

External South African military operations were aimed at eliminating the training facilities, [[Safe house|safehouses]], infrastructure, equipment, and manpower of the insurgents.<ref name=SACP/> However, their secondary objective was to dissuade neighbouring states from offering sanctuary to MK, PLAN, APLA, and similar organisations.<ref name=SACP/> This was accomplished by deterring the supportive foreign population from cooperating with infiltration and thus undermining the insurgents' external sanctuary areas.<ref name="Zambian">{{cite book|title=Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia|last=Larmer|first=Miles|year=2011|location=Surrey|publisher=Ashgate Publishing Ltd|isbn=978-1409482499|pages=209–217}}</ref> It would also send a clear message to the host government that collaborating with insurgent forces involved potentially high costs.<ref name="Zambian"/>

The scale and intensity of foreign operations varied, and ranged from small special forces units carrying out raids on locations across the border which served as bases for insurgent infiltration to major conventional offensives involving armour, artillery, and aircraft.<ref name=SACP/> Actions such as [[Operation Protea]] in 1981 and [[Operation Askari]] in 1983 involved both full scale [[conventional warfare]] and a [[counter-insurgency]] reprisal operation.<ref name="Blank">{{cite book|title=Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges|last=Blank|first=Stephen|location=Montgomery |publisher=Air University Press|year=1991|isbn=978-0160293320|pages=223–239}}</ref><ref name=Insurgencies>{{cite book|last=Radu|first=Michael|title=The New Insurgencies: Anti-Communist Guerrillas in the Third World|year=1990|pages=131–141|publisher=Routledge Books|location=Abingdon-on-Thames|isbn=978-0887383076}}</ref> The insurgent bases were usually situated near military installations of the host government, so that SADF retaliatory strikes hit those facilities as well and attracted international attention and condemnation of what was perceived as aggression against the armed forces of another sovereign state.<ref name=Dale>{{cite book|last=Dale|first=Richard|title=The Namibian War of Independence, 1966–1989: Diplomatic, Economic and Military Campaigns|year=2014|pages=74–77, 93–95|publisher=McFarland & Company, Incorporated Publishers|location=Jefferson|isbn=978-0786496594}}</ref> This would inevitably result in major engagements, in which the SADF's [[Expeditionary warfare|expeditionary units]] would have to contend with the firepower of the host government's forces.<ref name=Dale/> Intensive conventional warfare of this nature carried the risk of severe casualties among white soldiers, which had to be kept to a minimum for political reasons.<ref name=SACP/> There were also high economic and diplomatic costs associated with openly deploying large numbers of South African troops into another country.<ref name=SACP/> Furthermore, military involvement on that scale had the potential to evolve into wider conflict situations, in which South Africa became entangled.<ref name=SACP/> For example, South Africa's activities in Angola, initially limited to containing PLAN, later escalated to direct involvement in the [[Angolan Civil War]].<ref name=SACP/>

As it became clearer that full-scale conventional operations could not effectively fulfil the requirements of a regional counter-insurgency effort, South Africa turned to a number of alternative methods. Retributive artillery bombardments were the least sophisticated means of reprisal against insurgent attacks. Between 1978 and 1979 the SADF directed artillery fire against locations in Angola and Zambia from which insurgent rockets were suspected to have been launched.<ref name=Democracy>{{cite book|last=Ndlovu|first=Sifiso Mxolisi|title=The Road to Democracy in South Africa: 1970–1980|year=2006|pages=659–661|publisher=University of South Africa Press|location=Pretoria|isbn=978-1868884063}}</ref><ref name="Borderstrike">{{cite book | first = Willem | last = Steenkamp| title = Borderstrike! South Africa Into Angola 1975–1980 |edition= 2006 |pages= 132–226 | publisher = Just Done Productions| isbn= 978-1-920169-00-8| year = 2006}}</ref> This precipitated several artillery duels with the Zambian Army.<ref name="Borderstrike"/> Special forces raids were launched to harass PLAN and MK by liquidating prominent members of those movements, destroying their offices and safehouses, and seizing valuable records stored at these sites.<ref name=Botswana>{{cite book|last=Dale|first=Richard|title=Botswana's Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa|date=1995|pages=55–59|publisher=Praeger|location=Westport, Connecticut|isbn=978-0313295713}}</ref> One example was the [[Raid on Gaborone|Gaborone Raid]], carried out in 1985, during which a South African special forces team crossed the border into Botswana and demolished four suspected MK safe houses, severely damaging another four.<ref name=Botswana/> Other types of special forces operations included the sabotage of economic infrastructure.<ref name=Emerson1>{{cite book|title=The Battle for Mozambique|last=Emerson|first=Stephen|location=Solihull|publisher=Helio & Co. Ltd|year=2014|isbn=978-1909384927|pages=110–111}}</ref> The SADF sabotaged infrastructure being used for the insurgents' war effort; for example, port facilities in southern Angola's [[Namibe Province|Moçâmedes District]], where Soviet arms were frequently offloaded for PLAN, as well as the railway line which facilitated their transport to PLAN headquarters in [[Lubango]], were common targets.<ref name=Fist>{{cite book|last1=Steyn|first1=Douw|last2=Söderlund|first2=Arné|title=Iron Fist From The Sea: South Africa's Seaborne Raiders 1978–1988|year=2015|pages=203–205, 304–305|publisher=Helion & Company, Publishers|location=Solihull|isbn=978-1909982284}}</ref> Sabotage was also used as a pressure tactic when South Africa was negotiating with a host government to cease providing sanctuary to insurgent forces, as in the case of [[Operation Argon]].<ref name="NYT4">{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/01/world/pretoria-cools-to-us-backed-talks.html|title=Pretoria cools to US-backed talks|work=The New York Times|date=1 June 1985|access-date=7 August 2017|archive-date=22 November 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171122052758/http://www.nytimes.com/1985/06/01/world/pretoria-cools-to-us-backed-talks.html|url-status=live}}</ref> Successful sabotage actions of high-profile economic targets undermined a country's ability to negotiate from a position of strength, and made it likelier to accede to South African demands rather than risk the expense of further destruction and war.<ref name="NYT4"/>

Also noteworthy were South African transnational espionage efforts, which included covert assassinations, kidnappings, and attempts to disrupt the overseas influence of anti-apartheid organisations. South African military intelligence agents were known to have abducted and killed anti-apartheid activists and others suspected of having ties to MK in [[London]] and [[Brussels]].<ref>Purkitt, Helen E.; Burgess, Stephen Franklin (2005). ''South Africa's weapons of mass destruction.'' Indiana University Press. p. 152.</ref><ref>Watson, Wendy (2007). ''Brick by brick: an informal guide to the history of South Africa.'' New Africa Books.</ref>