Richard Nixon

==== Soviet Union ====
[[File:Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon talks in 1973.png|thumb|Nixon with Brezhnev during the Soviet leader's trip to the U.S., 1973]]

Nixon used the improving international environment to address the topic of nuclear peace. Following the announcement of his visit to China, the Nixon administration concluded negotiations for him to visit the Soviet Union. The President and First Lady arrived in Moscow on May 22, 1972, and met with [[Leonid Brezhnev]], the [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary of the Communist Party]]; [[Alexei Kosygin]], the [[Premier of the Soviet Union|Chairman of the Council of Ministers]]; and [[Nikolai Podgorny]], the [[List of heads of state of the Soviet Union|Chairman]] of the [[Presidium of the Supreme Soviet]], among other leading Soviet officials.{{sfn|BBC|1972-05-22}}

Nixon engaged in intense negotiations with Brezhnev.{{sfn|BBC|1972-05-22}} Out of the summit came agreements for increased trade and two landmark arms control treaties: [[SALT I]], the first comprehensive limitation pact signed by the two superpowers,{{sfn|Nixon Library, President}} and the [[Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty]], which banned the development of systems designed to intercept incoming missiles. Nixon and Brezhnev proclaimed a new era of "peaceful coexistence". A banquet was held that evening at the [[Kremlin]].{{sfn|BBC|1972-05-22}}

Nixon and Kissinger planned to link arms control to détente and to the resolution of other urgent problems through what Nixon called "[[Linkage (policy)|linkage.]]" David Tal argues:
{{blockquote|The linkage between strategic arms limitations and outstanding issues such as the Middle East, Berlin and, foremost, Vietnam thus became central to Nixon's and Kissinger's policy of détente. Through the employment of linkage, they hoped to change the nature and course of U.S. foreign policy, including U.S. nuclear disarmament and arms control policy, and to separate them from those practiced by Nixon's predecessors. They also intended, through linkage, to make U.S. arms control policy part of détente{{nbsp}}... His policy of linkage had in fact failed. It failed mainly because it was based on flawed assumptions and false premises, the foremost of which was that the Soviet Union wanted strategic arms limitation agreement much more than the United States did.<ref>David Tal, " 'Absolutes' and 'Stages' in the Making and Application of Nixon's SALT Policy." ''Diplomatic History'' 37.5 (2013): 1090–1116, quoting pp 1091, 1092. Nixon himself later wrote, "[W]e decided to link progress in such areas of Soviet concern as strategic arms limitation and increased trade with progress in areas that were important to us—Vietnam, the Mideast, and Berlin. This concept became known as linkage." {{cite book|author=Richard Nixon|title=RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UyfcLYY9F0gC&pg=RA1-PT388|year=1978|page=346|publisher=Simon and Schuster|isbn=978-1-4767-3183-4}}{{Dead link|date=March 2024 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>}}

Seeking to foster better relations with the United States, China and the Soviet Union both cut back on their diplomatic support for North Vietnam and advised Hanoi to come to terms militarily.{{sfn|Gaddis|pp=294, 299}} Nixon later described his strategy:
{{blockquote|I had long believed that an indispensable element of any successful peace initiative in Vietnam was to enlist, if possible, the help of the Soviets and the Chinese. Though rapprochement with China and détente with the Soviet Union were ends in themselves, I also considered them possible means to hasten the end of the war. At worst, Hanoi was bound to feel less confident if Washington was dealing with Moscow and Beijing. At best, if the two major Communist powers decided that they had bigger fish to fry, Hanoi would be pressured into negotiating a settlement we could accept.{{sfn|Nixon|1985|pp=105–106}}
}}
In 1973, Nixon encouraged the [[Export–Import Bank of the United States|Export-Import Bank]] to finance in part a trade deal with the Soviet Union in which [[Armand Hammer]]'s [[Occidental Petroleum]] would export [[phosphate]] from Florida to the Soviet Union, and import Soviet [[ammonia]]. The deal, valued at $20 billion over 20 years, involved the construction of two major Soviet port facilities at [[Odessa]] and [[Ventspils]],<ref>{{cite news|last=Smith|first=Hedrick|date=June 29, 1974|title=OCCIDENTAL SIGNS DEAL WITH SOVIET|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1974/06/29/archives/occidental-signs-deal-with-soviet-4-contracts-are-activated-in-a.html|access-date=December 6, 2021|issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{cite news|date=November 29, 1981|title=THE RIDDLE OF ARMAND HAMMER|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/29/magazine/the-riddle-of-armand-hammer.html|access-date=December 6, 2021|issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref name="Rich">{{cite news|last=Rich|first=Spencer|date=October 4, 1979|title=Soviets Dumping Ammonia, ITC Says|language=en-US|newspaper=Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1979/10/04/soviets-dumping-ammonia-itc-says/4d53c7fa-6c89-470b-b8f0-5aced1b92513/|access-date=December 7, 2021|issn=0190-8286}}</ref> and a pipeline connecting four ammonia plants in the greater [[Volga]] region to the port at Odessa.<ref name="Rich"/> In 1973, Nixon announced his administration was committed to seeking [[most favored nation]] trade status with the USSR,<ref>{{cite news|date=October 5, 1973|title=NIXON IN APPEAL ON SOVIET TRADE|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1973/10/05/archives/nixon-in-appeal-on-soviet-trade-urges-congress-to-include.html|access-date=December 7, 2021|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> which was challenged by Congress in the [[Jackson–Vanik amendment|Jackson-Vanik Amendment]].<ref>{{cite book|last=Herring|first=George C.|url=https://archive.org/details/fromcolonytosupe00herr|title=From Colony to Superpower; U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776|date=2008|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-507822-0|pages=804}}</ref>

During the previous two years, Nixon had made considerable progress in U.S.–Soviet relations, and he embarked on a second trip to the Soviet Union in 1974.{{sfn|Black|p=963}} He arrived in Moscow on June 27 to a welcome ceremony, cheering crowds, and a state dinner at the [[Grand Kremlin Palace]] that evening.{{sfn|Black|p=963}} Nixon and Brezhnev met in [[Yalta]], where they discussed a proposed mutual defense pact, détente, and [[MIRV]]s. Nixon considered proposing a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but he felt he would not have time to complete it during his presidency.{{sfn|Black|p=963}} There were no significant breakthroughs in these negotiations.{{sfn|Black|p=963}}