Reason

==Traditional problems raised concerning reason==
Philosophy is often characterized as a pursuit of rational understanding, entailing a more rigorous and dedicated application of human reasoning than commonly employed. Philosophers have long debated two fundamental questions regarding reason, essentially examining reasoning itself as a human endeavor, or philosophizing about philosophizing. The first question delves into whether we can place our trust in reason's ability to attain [[knowledge]] and [[truth]] more effectively than alternative methods. The second question explores whether a life guided by reason, a life that aims to be guided by reason, can be expected to lead to greater [[eudaimonia|happiness]] compared to other approaches to life.

===Reason versus truth, and "first principles"===
{{See also|Truth|First principle|Nous}}
Since [[classical antiquity]] a question has remained constant in philosophical debate (sometimes seen as a conflict between [[Platonism]] and [[Aristotelianism]]) concerning the role of reason in confirming [[truth]]. People use logic, [[deductive reasoning|deduction]], and [[inductive reasoning|induction]] to reach conclusions they think are true. Conclusions reached in this way are considered, according to Aristotle, more certain than sense perceptions on their own.<ref>{{cite book|author=Aristotle|title=[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]|at=[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0051%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D981b 981b]|language=grc|quote=τὴν ὀνομαζομένην σοφίαν περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑπολαμβάνουσι πάντες: ὥστε, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ὁ μὲν ἔμπειρος τῶν ὁποιανοῦν ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν εἶναι δοκεῖ σοφώτερος, ὁ δὲ τεχνίτης τῶν ἐμπείρων, χειροτέχνου δὲ ἀρχιτέκτων, αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν μᾶλλον.|trans-quote=...what is called Wisdom is concerned with the primary causes and principles, so that, as has been already stated, the man of experience is held to be wiser than the mere possessors of any power of sensation, the artist than the man of experience, the master craftsman than the artisan; and the speculative sciences to be more learned than the productive.}}</ref> On the other hand, if such reasoned conclusions are only built originally upon a foundation of sense perceptions, then our most logical conclusions can never be said to be certain because they are built upon the very same fallible perceptions they seek to better.<ref>{{cite book|author=Aristotle|title=[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]|at=[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0051%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D1009b 1009b]|language=grc|quote=ποῖα οὖν τούτων ἀληθῆ ἢ ψευδῆ, ἄδηλον: οὐθὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον τάδε ἢ τάδε ἀληθῆ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως. διὸ Δημόκριτός γέ φησιν ἤτοι οὐθὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς ἢ ἡμῖν γ᾽ ἄδηλον.|trans-quote=Thus it is uncertain which of these impressions are true or false; for one kind is no more true than another, but equally so. And hence Democritus says that either there is no truth or we cannot discover it.}}</ref>

This leads to the question of what types of [[first principles]], or starting points of reasoning, are available for someone seeking to come to true conclusions. In Greek, "[[first principles]]" are {{transliteration|grc|[[Arche|archai]]}}, "starting points",<ref>{{cite book|author=Aristotle|title=[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]|at=[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0051%3Abook%3D1%3Asection%3D983a 983a]|language=grc|quote=ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν ἐξ ''ἀρχῆς'' αἰτίων δεῖ λαβεῖν ''ἐπιστήμην'' (τότε γὰρ εἰδέναι φαμὲν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὴν ''πρώτην'' αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα ''γνωρίζειν'')|trans-quote=It is clear that we must obtain knowledge of the ''primary'' causes, because it is when we think that we understand its ''primary'' cause that we claim to ''know'' each particular thing.}}</ref> and the faculty used to perceive them is sometimes referred to in Aristotle<ref>{{cite book|author=Aristotle|title=[[Nicomachean Ethics]]|at=[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0053%3Abekker+page%3D1139a 1139b]|language=grc|quote=ἀμφοτέρων δὴ τῶν ''νοητικῶν'' μορίων ἀλήθεια τὸ ἔργον. καθ᾽ ἃς οὖν μάλιστα ἕξεις ἀληθεύσει ἑκάτερον, αὗται ἀρεταὶ ἀμφοῖν|trans-quote=The attainment of truth is then the function of both the ''intellectual'' parts of the soul. Therefore their respective virtues are those dispositions that will best qualify them to attain truth.}}</ref> and Plato<ref>{{cite book|author=Plato|title=[[Republic (Plato)|Republic]]|at=[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0167%3Abook%3D6%3Asection%3D490b 490b]|language=grc|quote=μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοίη|trans-quote=Consorting with reality really, he would beget intelligence and truth, attain to knowledge}}</ref> as {{transliteration|grc|[[nous]]}} which was close in meaning to ''awareness'' or ''[[consciousness]]''.<ref name=StraussProgress>{{cite book|quote=This quest for the beginnings proceeds through sense perception, reasoning, and what they call ''noesis'', which is literally translated by 'understanding' or 'intellect,' and which we can perhaps translate a little bit more cautiously by 'awareness,' an awareness of the mind's eye as distinguished from sensible awareness.|chapter=Progress or Return|title=An Introduction to Political Philosophy: Ten Essays by Leo Strauss|first=Leo|last=Strauss|author-link=Leo Strauss|orig-year=1975|editor-first=Hilail|editor-last=Gilden|location=Detroit|publisher=Wayne State University Press|year=1989}}</ref>

[[Empiricism]] (sometimes associated with Aristotle<ref>However, the empiricism of Aristotle must certainly be doubted. For example in ''Metaphysics'' 1009b, cited above, he criticizes people who think knowledge might not be possible because, "They say that the impression given through sense-perception is necessarily true; for it is on these grounds that both [[Empedocles]] and Democritus and practically all the rest have become obsessed by such opinions as these."</ref> but more correctly associated with [[Great Britain|British]] philosophers such as [[John Locke]] and [[David Hume]], as well as their ancient equivalents such as [[Democritus]]) asserts that sensory impressions are the only available starting points for reasoning and attempting to attain truth. This approach always leads to the controversial conclusion that [[absolute knowledge]] is not attainable. [[Idealism]], (associated with Plato and his school), claims that there is a "higher" reality, within which certain people can directly discover truth without needing to rely only upon the senses, and that this higher reality is therefore the primary source of truth.

Philosophers such as [[Plato]], [[Aristotle]], [[Al-Farabi]], [[Avicenna]], [[Averroes]], [[Maimonides]], [[Aquinas]], and [[Hegel]] are sometimes said{{By whom|date=September 2023}} to have argued that reason must be fixed and discoverable—perhaps by dialectic, analysis, or study. In the vision of these thinkers, reason is divine or at least has divine attributes. Such an approach allowed religious philosophers such as [[Thomas Aquinas]] and [[Étienne Gilson]] to try to show that reason and [[revelation]] are compatible. According to Hegel, "...the only thought which Philosophy brings with it to the contemplation of [[History]], is the simple conception of reason; that reason is the Sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process."<ref>{{cite book|first=G.W.F.|last=Hegel|title=[[Lectures on the Philosophy of History|''The Philosophy of History'']]|page=9|publisher=Dover Publications Inc.|isbn=0486201120|year=1956|orig-year=1837}}</ref>

Since the 17th century [[rationalist]]s, reason has often been taken to be a [[subjectivity|subjective faculty]], or rather the unaided ability ([[pure reason]]) to form concepts. For [[Descartes]], [[Spinoza]], and [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Leibniz]], this was associated with [[mathematics]]. [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]] attempted to show that pure reason could form concepts ([[time]] and [[space]]) that are the conditions of experience. Kant made his argument in opposition to Hume, who denied that reason had any role to play in experience.

===Reason versus emotion or passion===
{{See also|Emotion|Passion (emotion)}}
After Plato and Aristotle, [[western literature]] often treated reason as being the faculty that trained the passions and appetites.{{citation needed|date=August 2016}} [[Stoic philosophy]], by contrast, claimed most emotions were merely false judgements.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Sharples|first=R. W.|title=The Oxford companion to philosophy|date=2005|publisher=Oxford University Press|others=Ted Honderich|isbn=978-0191532658|edition=2nd|location=Oxford|page=896|oclc=62563098|quote=Moral virtue is the only good an wickedness the only evil... Emotions are interpreted in intellectual terms; those such as distress, pity (which is a species of distress), and fear which reflect false judgements about what is evil, are to be avoided (as also are those which reflect false judgement about what is good, such as love of honours or riches)... They did however allow the wise man such 'good feelings' as 'watchfulness' or kindness the difference being that these are based on sound (Stoic) reasoning concerning what matters and what does not.}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite book|last=Rufus|first=Musonius|title=Concise Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy|date=2000|publisher=Routledge|others=Routledge|isbn=0203169948|location=London|page=863|oclc=49569365|quote=Vice is founded on 'passions': these are at root false value judgements, in which we lose rational control by overvaluing things which are in fact indifferent. Virtue, a set of sciences governing moral choice, is the one thing of intrinsic worth and therefore genuinely 'good'.}}</ref> According to the Stoics the only good is virtue, and the only evil is vice, therefore emotions that judged things other than vice to be bad (such as fear or distress), or things other than virtue to be good (such as greed) were simply false judgements and should be discarded (though positive emotions based on true judgements, such as kindness, were acceptable).<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Citation|last=Baltzly|first=Dirk|title=Stoicism|date=2018|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/stoicism/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Spring 2019|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2021-03-27}}</ref> After the critiques of reason in the early Enlightenment the appetites were rarely discussed or were conflated with the passions.{{citation needed|date=August 2016}} Some Enlightenment camps took after the Stoics to say reason should oppose passion rather than order it, while others like the Romantics believed that passion displaces reason, as in the maxim "follow your heart".{{citation needed|date=August 2016}}

Reason has been seen as cold, an "enemy of mystery and ambiguity",<ref name="Radford and Frazier (2017)">{{cite journal|author-link1=Benjamin Radford|last1=Radford|first1=Benjamin|author-link2=Kendrick Frazier|last2=Frazier|first2=Kendrick|title=The Edge of Reason: A Rational Skeptic in an Irrational World |journal=Skeptical Inquirer |date=January 2017 |volume=41 |issue=1 |page=60}}</ref> a slave, or judge, of the passions, notably in the work of [[David Hume]], and more recently of [[Freud]].{{citation needed|date=August 2016}}

Reasoning that claims the object of a desire is demanded by logic alone is called ''[[Rationalization (making excuses)|rationalization]]''.{{citation needed|date=August 2016}}

[[Rousseau]] first proposed, in his second ''[[Discourse on Inequality|Discourse]]'', that reason and political life is not natural and is possibly harmful to mankind.<ref>{{Citation|last=Velkley|first=Richard|chapter=Speech. Imagination, Origins: Rousseau and the Political Animal|title=Being after Rousseau: Philosophy and Culture in Question|year=2002|publisher=University of Chicago Press}}</ref> He asked what really can be said about what is natural to mankind. What, other than reason and civil society, "best suits his constitution"? Rousseau saw "two principles prior to reason" in human nature. First we hold an intense interest in our own well-being. Secondly we object to the suffering or death of any sentient being, especially one like ourselves.<ref>{{Citation|last=Rousseau|first=Jean-Jacques|chapter=Preface|title=Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men or Second Discourse|publisher=Cambridge University Press|editor=Gourevitch|year=1997|orig-year=1755}}</ref> These two passions lead us to desire more than we could achieve. We become dependent upon each other, and on relationships of authority and obedience. This effectively puts the human race into slavery. Rousseau says that he almost dares to assert that nature does not destine men to be healthy. According to [[Richard Velkley]], "Rousseau outlines certain programs of rational self-correction, most notably the political legislation of the ''[[The Social Contract|Contrat Social]]'' and the moral education in ''[[Emile: or, On Education|Émile]]''. All the same, Rousseau understands such corrections to be only ameliorations of an essentially unsatisfactory condition, that of socially and intellectually corrupted humanity."{{cite quote|date=September 2023}}

This quandary presented by Rousseau led to [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]]'s new way of justifying reason as freedom to create good and evil. These therefore are not to be blamed on nature or God. In various ways, [[German Idealism]] after Kant, and major later figures such [[Nietzsche]], [[Bergson]], [[Husserl]], [[Max Scheler|Scheler]], and [[Heidegger]], remain preoccupied with problems coming from the metaphysical demands or urges of reason.<ref>{{Citation|last=Velkley|first=Richard|chapter=Freedom, Teleology, and Justification of Reason|title=Being after Rousseau: Philosophy and Culture in Question|year=2002|publisher=University of Chicago Press}}</ref> Rousseau and these later writers also exerted a large influence on art and politics. Many writers (such as [[Nikos Kazantzakis]]) extol passion and disparage reason. In politics modern [[nationalism]] comes from Rousseau's argument that rationalist [[cosmopolitanism]] brings man ever further from his natural state.<ref>{{Citation|chapter=Rousseau and the Origins of Nationalism|last=Plattner|first=Marc|year=1997|publisher=University of Chicago Press|title=The Legacy of Rousseau}}</ref>

In ''[[Descartes' Error]]'', [[Antonio Damasio]] presents the "[[Somatic marker hypothesis|Somatic Marker Hypothesis]]" which states that emotions guide behavior and decision-making. Damasio argues that these somatic markers (known collectively as "gut feelings") are "intuitive signals" that direct our decision making processes in a certain way that cannot be solved with rationality alone. Damasio further argues that rationality requires emotional input in order to function.

===Reason versus faith or tradition===
{{Main|Faith|Religion|Tradition}}
There are many religious traditions, some of which are explicitly [[Fideism|fideist]] and others of which claim varying degrees of [[rationalism]]. Secular critics sometimes accuse all religious adherents of irrationality; they claim such adherents are guilty of ignoring, suppressing, or forbidding some kinds of reasoning concerning some subjects (such as religious dogmas, moral taboos, etc.).<ref>{{Cite book|title=The God Delusion|last=Dawkins|first=Richard|year=2008|publisher=Mariner Books|isbn=978-0618918249|edition=Reprint|language=en|quote=Scientists... see the fight for evolution as only one battle in a larger war: a looming war between supernaturalism on the one side and rationality on the other.|url=https://archive.org/details/goddelusion00dawk_0}}</ref> Though [[theology|theologies]] and [[religion]]s such as [[Monotheism|classical monotheism]] typically do not admit to being [[irrationality|irrational]], there is often a perceived conflict or tension between [[faith]] and [[tradition]] on the one hand, and reason on the other, as potentially competing sources of [[wisdom]], [[law]], and [[truth]].{{r|StraussProgress}}<ref>{{cite book|first=John|last=Locke|chapter=Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct provinces|year=1689|chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.223061/page/n601/mode/2up|title=An Essay concerning Human Understanding|volume=IV}}</ref>

Religious adherents sometimes respond by arguing that faith and reason can be reconciled, or have different non-overlapping domains, or that critics engage in a similar kind of irrationalism:
; Reconciliation : Philosopher [[Alvin Plantinga]] argues that there is no real conflict between reason and classical theism because classical theism explains (among other things) why the universe is intelligible and why reason can successfully grasp it.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{Cite book|title=Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion, and Naturalism|last=Plantinga|first=Alvin|year=2011|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0199812097|edition=1|language=en}}
|2={{Cite book|title=Natural Signs and Knowledge of God: A New Look at Theistic Arguments|year=2012|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0199661077|edition=Reprint|location=Oxford|language=en}}
}}</ref>
; Non-overlapping magisteria : Evolutionary biologist [[Stephen Jay Gould]] argues that there need not be conflict between reason and religious belief because they are each authoritative in their own domain (or "magisterium").<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{Cite web|url=http://www.stephenjaygould.org/library/gould_noma.html|url-status=usurped|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160425013318/http://www.stephenjaygould.org/library/gould_noma.html|archive-date=2016-04-25|title=Nonoverlapping Magisteria|author=[[Stephen Jay Gould]] |date=1997|website=www.stephenjaygould.org|access-date=2016-04-06|quote=To say it for all my colleagues and for the umpteenth millionth time (from college bull sessions to learned treatises): science simply cannot (by its legitimate methods) adjudicate the issue of God's possible superintendence of nature. We neither affirm nor deny it; we simply can't comment on it as scientists.}}
|2={{Cite book|title=The God Delusion|last=Dawkins|first=Richard|year=2008|publisher=Mariner Books|isbn=978-0618918249|edition=Reprint|language=en|chapter=4|quote=This sounds terrific, right up until you give it a moment's thought. You then realize that the presence of a creative deity in the universe is clearly a scientific hypothesis. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more momentous hypothesis in all of science. A universe with a god would be a completely different kind of universe from one without, and it would be a scientific difference. God could clinch the matter in his favour at any moment by staging a spectacular demonstration of his powers, one that would satisfy the exacting standards of science. Even the infamous Templeton Foundation recognized that God is a scientific hypothesis—by funding double-blind trials to test whether remote prayer would speed the recovery of heart patients. It didn't, of course, although a control group who knew they had been prayed for tended to get worse (how about a class action suit against the Templeton Foundation?) Despite such well-financed efforts, no evidence for God's existence has yet appeared.|chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/goddelusion00dawk_0|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/goddelusion00dawk_0}}
}}</ref> If so, reason can work on those problems over which it has authority while other sources of knowledge or opinion can have authority on the big questions.<ref>{{Cite journal|url=https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=philo&id=philo_2009_0012_0001_0005_0023|url-access=subscription|title=The Meaning of Life as Narrative: A New Proposal for Interpreting Philosophy's 'Primary' Question|first=Joshua W.|last=Seachris|journal=Philo|access-date=2016-04-06|date=April 2009|volume=12|issue=1|pages=5–23|doi=10.5840/philo20091211}}</ref>
; {{lang|la|[[Tu quoque]]}} : Philosophers [[Alasdair MacIntyre]] and [[Charles Taylor (philosopher)|Charles Taylor]] argue that those critics of traditional religion who are adherents of [[Secularity|secular]] [[liberalism]] are also sometimes guilty of ignoring, suppressing, and forbidding some kinds of reasoning about subjects.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{Cite book|title=Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition|year=1991|publisher=University of Notre Dame Press|isbn=978-0268018771|edition=60067th|language=en}}
|2={{Cite book|title=A Secular Age|last=Taylor|first=Charles|year=2007|publisher=The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press|isbn=978-0674026766|edition=1st|language=en}}
}}</ref> Similarly, philosophers of science such as [[Paul Feyerabend|Paul Feyarabend]] argue that scientists sometimes ignore or suppress evidence contrary to the dominant [[paradigm]].
; Unification : Theologian Joseph Ratzinger, later [[Benedict XVI]], asserted that "Christianity has understood itself as the religion of the Logos, as the religion according to reason," referring to {{Bibleverse|John|1}} {{lang|la|Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος}}, usually translated as "In the beginning was the Word (Logos)." Thus, he said that the Christian faith is "open to all that is truly rational", and that the rationality of Western Enlightenment "is of Christian origin".<ref>{{Cite web | first=Joseph|last=Ratzinger|url=http://www.catholiceducation.org/en/culture/catholic-contributions/cardinal-ratzinger-on-europe-s-crisis-of-culture.html | title=Cardinal Ratzinger on Europe's Crisis of Culture|year=2005}}</ref>

Some commentators have claimed that [[Western culture|Western civilization]] can be almost defined by its serious testing of the limits of tension between "unaided" reason and [[faith]] in "[[revelation|revealed]]" truths—figuratively summarized as [[Athens]] and [[Jerusalem]], respectively.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{Cite book|last=Reynolds |first=John Mark|title=When Athens Met Jerusalem: An Introduction to Classical and Christian Thought|year=2009|publisher=IVP Academic|isbn=978-0830829231|publication-place=Downers Grove, Ill.|language=en}}
|2={{Cite journal|title=Athens and/or Jerusalem|journal=Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences|volume=950|issue=1|page=17|last=Pelikan|first=Jaroslav|year=2001|bibcode=2001NYASA.950...17P|doi=10.1111/j.1749-6632.2001.tb02124.x|s2cid=21347905}}
}}</ref> [[Leo Strauss]] spoke of a "Greater [[Western world|West]]" that included all areas under the influence of the tension between Greek rationalism and [[Abrahamic]] revelation, including the [[Muslim]] lands. He was particularly influenced by the [[Islamic philosophy|Muslim philosopher]] [[Farabi|Al-Farabi]]. To consider to what extent [[Eastern philosophy]] might have partaken of these important tensions, Strauss thought it best to consider whether [[dharma]] or [[tao]] may be equivalent to [[Nature (philosophy)|Nature]] ({{transliteration|grc|[[physis]]}} in Greek). According to Strauss the beginning of philosophy involved the "discovery or invention of nature" and the "pre-philosophical equivalent of nature" was supplied by "such notions as 'custom' or 'ways{{'"}}, which appear to be really universal in all times and places. The philosophical concept of nature or natures as a way of understanding {{transliteration|grc|archai}} (first principles of knowledge) brought about a peculiar tension between reasoning on the one hand, and tradition or faith on the other.{{r|StraussProgress}}