Free will

====Free will as lack of physical restraint====
Most "classical compatibilists", such as [[Thomas Hobbes]], claim that a person is acting on the person's own will only when it is the desire of that person to do the act, and also possible for the person to be able to do otherwise, ''if the person had decided to''. Hobbes sometimes attributes such compatibilist freedom to each individual and not to some abstract notion of ''will'', asserting, for example, that "no liberty can be inferred to the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe{{sic}}<!-- sic, that is how Hobbes wrote it; don't change to "do". -->."<ref name="Hobbes">Hobbes, T. (1651) ''Leviathan'' [http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm Chapter XXI.: "Of the liberty of subjects"] (1968 edition). London: Penguin Books.</ref> In articulating this crucial proviso, [[David Hume]] writes, "this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains."<ref name="Hume">Hume, D. (1740). ''A Treatise of Human Nature'' Section VIII.: "[http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm Of liberty and necessity]" (1967 edition). [[Oxford University Press]], Oxford. {{ISBN|0-87220-230-5}}</ref> Similarly, [[Voltaire]], in his ''[[Dictionnaire philosophique]]'', claimed that "Liberty then is only and can be only the power to do what one will." He asked, "would you have everything at the pleasure of a million blind caprices?" For him, free will or liberty is "only the power of acting, what is this power? It is the effect of the constitution and present state of our organs."