Vietnam War

===American ground war===
{{See also|Buddhist Uprising}}
[[File:Vietcongsuspect.jpg|thumb|A Marine from [[1st Battalion, 3rd Marines]], moves a suspected Viet Cong during a search and clear operation held by the battalion {{Convert|15|mi|km|0}} west of [[Da Nang Air Base]], 1965.]]

On 8 March 1965, 3,500 [[United States Marine Corps|U.S. Marines]] were landed near [[Da Nang]], South Vietnam.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|246–247}} This marked the beginning of the American ground war. U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment.<ref>{{Cite web |date=17 October 2002 |title=Generations Divide Over Military Action in Iraq |url=http://www.people-press.org/2002/10/17/generations-divide-over-military-action-in-iraq |publisher=Pew Research Center|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20221121005317/https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2002/10/17/generations-divide-over-military-action-in-iraq/|archive-date=21 November 2022}}</ref> The Marines' initial assignment was the defense of [[Da Nang Air Base]]. The first deployment of 3,500 in March 1965 was increased to nearly 200,000 by December.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|349–351}} The U.S. military had long been schooled in offensive warfare. Regardless of political policies, U.S. commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited to a defensive mission.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|349–351}}

General [[William Westmoreland]] informed Admiral [[U. S. Grant Sharp Jr.]], commander of U.S. Pacific forces, that the situation was critical.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|349–351}} He said, "I am convinced that U.S. troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the NLF (Viet Cong)".<ref>United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, vol. 4, p. 7.</ref> With this recommendation, Westmoreland was advocating an aggressive departure from America's defensive posture and the sidelining of the South Vietnamese. By ignoring ARVN units, the U.S. commitment became open-ended.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|353}} Westmoreland outlined a three-point plan to win the war:
* Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. (and other allies) forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.
* Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would end when the enemy had been worn down, thrown on the defensive, and driven back from major populated areas.
* Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of twelve to eighteen months following Phase 2 would be required for the final destruction of enemy forces remaining in remote base areas.<ref>United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, vol. 5, pp. 8–9.</ref>

The plan was approved by Johnson and marked a profound departure from the previous administration's insistence that the government of South Vietnam was responsible for defeating the guerrillas. Westmoreland predicted victory by the end of 1967.<ref>United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, vol. 4, pp. 117–19. and vol. 5, pp. 8–12.</ref> Johnson did not, however, communicate this change in strategy to the media. Instead he emphasized continuity.<ref>''Public Papers of the Presidents, 1965.'' Washington, DC Government Printing Office, 1966, vol. 2, pp. 794–99.</ref> The change in U.S. policy depended on matching the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong in a contest of [[attrition warfare|attrition]] and [[morale]]. The opponents were locked in a cycle of [[Conflict escalation|escalation]].<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|353–354}} The idea that the government of South Vietnam could manage its own affairs was shelved.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|353–354}} Westmoreland and McNamara furthermore touted the [[Body count#Vietnam War|body count]] system for gauging victory, a metric that would later prove to be flawed.<ref name=Mohr>{{Cite news |last=Mohr |first=Charles |date=16 May 1984 |title=McNamara on Record, Reluctantly, on Vietnam |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/16/us/mcnamara-on-record-reluctantly-on-vietnam.html|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404185613/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/16/us/mcnamara-on-record-reluctantly-on-vietnam.html|archive-date=April 4, 2023}}</ref>

[[File:Vietnamese villagers suspected of being communists by the US Army - 1966.jpg|thumb|left|upright|Peasants suspected of being Viet Cong under detention of U.S. Army, 1966]]

The American buildup transformed the South Vietnamese economy and had a profound effect on society. South Vietnam was inundated with manufactured goods. Stanley Karnow noted that "the main PX [Post Exchange], located in the Saigon suburb of [[Cholon, Ho Chi Minh City|Cholon]], was only slightly smaller than the New York [[Bloomingdale's]]{{Nbsp}}..."<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|453}}

Washington encouraged its [[Southeast Asia Treaty Organization|SEATO]] allies to contribute troops. Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|556}} all agreed to send troops. South Korea would later ask to join the [[Many Flags]] program in return for economic compensation. Major allies, however, notably the [[NATO]] countries of Canada and the United Kingdom, declined Washington's troop requests.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Church |first=Peter |title=A Short History of South-East Asia |date=2006 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-470-82481-8 |page=193}}</ref>

The U.S. and its allies mounted complex [[search and destroy]] operations, designed to find enemy forces, destroy them, and then withdraw, typically using war [[helicopters]]. In November 1965, the U.S. engaged in its first major battle with the PAVN, the [[Battle of Ia Drang]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Galloway |first=Joseph |date=18 October 2010 |title=Ia Drang – The Battle That Convinced Ho Chi Minh He Could Win |url=http://www.historynet.com/ia-drang-where-battlefield-losses-convinced-ho-giap-and-mcnamara-the-u-s-could-never-win.htm |access-date=2 May 2016 |publisher=Historynet|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230322083652/https://www.historynet.com/ia-drang-where-battlefield-losses-convinced-ho-giap-and-mcnamara-the-u-s-could-never-win/?f|archive-date=March 22, 2023}}</ref> The operation was the first large scale helicopter air assault by the U.S., and first to employ [[Boeing B-52 Stratofortress]] strategic bombers in a tactical support role.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|284–285}} These tactics continued in 1966–1967 with operations such as [[Operation Masher|Masher]], [[Operation Thayer|Thayer]], [[Operation Attleboro|Attleboro]], [[Operation Cedar Falls|Cedar Falls]], and [[Operation Junction City|Junction City]]. However, the PAVN/VC insurgents remained elusive and demonstrated great tactical flexibility. By 1967, the war had generated large-scale internal refugees, numbering nearly 2.1&nbsp;million in South Vietnam, with 125,000 people evacuated and rendered homeless during Operation Masher alone,<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Ward |first1=Geoffrey C. |title=The Vietnam War: An Intimate History |last2=Burns |first2=Ken |date=5 September 2017 |publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group |isbn=978-1-5247-3310-0 |page=[{{GBurl|id=i4KyDQAAQBAJ|q=125}} 125] |language=en |quote=By the end of the year, more than 125,000 civilians in the province had lost their homes{{Nbsp}}...}}</ref> which was the largest search and destroy operation in the war up to that point.{{Citation needed|date=June 2022}} Operation Masher would have negligible impact, however, as the PAVN/VC returned to the province just four months after the operation ended.<ref name="Ward">{{Cite book |last1=Ward |first1=Geoffrey C. |title=The Vietnam War: An Intimate History |last2=Burns |first2=Ken |date=2017 |publisher=Alfred A. Knopf |isbn=978-0-307-70025-4}}</ref>{{Rp|153–156}} Despite the continual conductance of major operations, which the Viet Cong and PAVN would typically evade, the war was characterized by smaller-unit contacts or engagements.<ref name="GS">{{Cite book |title=The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition), Volume 4 |at=Section 4, pp. 277–604 |chapter=Chapter 2, US Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965–1968 |access-date=12 June 2018 |chapter-url=https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon4/pent9.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190626210700/https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon4/pent9.htm |archive-date=26 June 2019 |url-status=dead |via=International Relations Department, Mount Holyoke College}}</ref> Up to the war's end, the Viet Cong and PAVN would initiate 90% of large firefights, of which 80% were clear and well-planned operations, and thus the PAVN/Viet Cong would retain strategic initiative despite overwhelming US force and fire-power deployment.<ref name=GS/> The PAVN and Viet Cong had furthermore developed strategies capable of countering U.S. military doctrines and tactics (see [[NLF and PAVN battle tactics]]).

Meanwhile, the political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilize with the coming to power of prime minister Air Marshal [[Nguyễn Cao Kỳ]] and figurehead chief of state, General [[Nguyễn Văn Thiệu]], in mid-1965 at the head of a military junta. This ended a series of coups that had happened more than once a year. In 1967, Thieu became president with Ky as his deputy, after rigged elections. Although they were nominally a civilian government, Ky was supposed to maintain real power through a behind-the-scenes military body. However, Thieu outmanoeuvred and sidelined Ky by filling the ranks with generals from his faction. Thieu was also accused of murdering Ky loyalists through contrived military accidents. Thieu, mistrustful and indecisive, remained president until 1975, having won a [[1971 South Vietnamese presidential election|one-candidate election in 1971]].<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|706}}

[[File:NARA 111-CCV-529-CC38112 Ronald A. Payne checking tunnel entrance Operation Cedar Falls 1967.jpg|thumb|A US "[[tunnel rat]]" soldier prepares to enter a Viet Cong tunnel.]]

The Johnson administration employed a "policy of minimum candor"<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|18}} in its dealings with the media. Military information officers sought to manage media coverage by emphasizing stories that portrayed progress in the war. Over time, this policy damaged the public trust in official pronouncements. As the media's coverage of the war and that of the Pentagon diverged, a so-called [[credibility gap]] developed.<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|18}} Despite Johnson and Westmoreland publicly proclaiming victory and Westmoreland stating that the "end is coming into view",<ref>{{Cite news |title=TWE Remembers: General Westmoreland Says the "End Begins to Come Into View" in Vietnam |language=en |work=Council on Foreign Relations |url=https://www.cfr.org/blog/twe-remembers-general-westmoreland-says-end-begins-come-view-vietnam |access-date=12 June 2018|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230605025020/https://www.cfr.org/blog/twe-remembers-general-westmoreland-says-end-begins-come-view-vietnam|archive-date=June 5, 2023}}</ref> internal reports in the ''[[Pentagon Papers]]'' indicate that Viet Cong forces retained strategic initiative and controlled their losses. Viet Cong attacks against static US positions accounted for 30% of all engagements, Viet Cong/PAVN ambushes and encirclements for 23%, American ambushes against Viet Cong/PAVN forces for 9%, and American forces attacking Viet Cong emplacements for only 5% of all engagements.<ref name=GS/>

{| class="wikitable"
|+Types of Engagements, From Department of Defence Study 1967<ref name=GS/>
!TYPE OF ENGAGEMENTS IN COMBAT NARRATIVES
!Percentage of
Total Engagements
!Notes
|-
|Hot Landing Zone. VC/PAVN Attacks U.S. Troops As They Deploy
|12.5%
| rowspan="3" |Planned VC/PAVN Attacks
Are 66.2% Of All Engagements
|-
|Planned VC/PAVN Attack Against US Defensive Perimeter
|30.4%
|-
|VC/PAVN Ambushes or Encircles A Moving US Unit
|23.3%
|-
|Unplanned US Attacks On A VC/PAVN Defensive Perimeter,
Engagement A Virtual Surprise To US Commanders
|12.5%
|Defensive Posts Being Well Concealed
or VC/PAVN Alerted or Anticipated
|-
|Planned US Attack Against Known
VC/PAVN Defensive Perimeter
|5.4%
| rowspan="2" |Planned US Attacks Against
VC/PAVN Represent 14.3%

Of All Engagements
|-
|U.S. Forces Ambushes Moving VC/PAVN Units
|8.9%
|-
|Chance Engagement, Neither Side Planned
|7.1%
|
|}