Philosophy

== Methods ==
{{main|Philosophical methodology}}
Methods of philosophy are ways of conducting philosophical inquiry. They include techniques for arriving at philosophical knowledge and justifying philosophical claims as well as principles used for choosing between competing theories.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|McKeon|2002|loc=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/religion/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/methodology-philosophy Lead Section, § Summation ]}} |2={{harvnb|Overgaard|D'Oro|2017|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-companion-to-philosophical-methodology/introduction/03C3CBE35E1E1FD54E29AD2D5E1C4D48 1, 4–5]|loc=Introduction}} |3={{harvnb|Mehrtens|2010|loc=[https://meiner.de/enzyklopadie-philosophie-14071.html Methode/Methodologie]}} }}</ref> A great variety of methods have been employed throughout the history of philosophy. Many of them differ significantly from the methods used in the [[natural sciences]] in that they do not use experimental data obtained through measuring equipment.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Daly|2010|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=wilaDwAAQBAJ Introduction]|p=9}} |2={{harvnb|Williamson|2020}} |3={{harvnb|Ichikawa|2011}} }}</ref> The choice of one's method usually has important implications both for how philosophical theories are constructed and for the arguments cited for or against them.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Overgaard|D'Oro|2017|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-companion-to-philosophical-methodology/introduction/03C3CBE35E1E1FD54E29AD2D5E1C4D48 1, 3–5]|loc=Introduction}} |2={{harvnb|Nado|2017|pp=[https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40961-017-0116-8 447–449, 461–462]}} |3={{harvnb|Dever|2016|loc=[https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199668779-e-34 3–6]}} }}</ref> This choice is often guided by epistemological considerations about what constitutes philosophical [[evidence]].<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Daly|2010|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=wilaDwAAQBAJ Introduction]|pp=9–11}} |2={{harvnb|Overgaard|D'Oro|2017|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-companion-to-philosophical-methodology/introduction/03C3CBE35E1E1FD54E29AD2D5E1C4D48 3]|loc=Introduction}} |3={{harvnb|Dever|2016|pp=[https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199668779-e-34 3–4]|loc=What Is Philosophical Methodology?}} }}</ref>

Methodological disagreements can cause conflicts among philosophical theories or about the answers to philosophical questions. The discovery of new methods has often had important consequences both for how philosophers conduct their research and for what claims they defend.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Daly|2015|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_1 1–2, 5]|loc=Introduction and Historical Overview}} |2={{harvnb|Mehrtens|2010|loc=[https://meiner.de/enzyklopadie-philosophie-14071.html Methode/Methodologie]}} |3={{harvnb|Overgaard|D'Oro|2017|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-companion-to-philosophical-methodology/introduction/03C3CBE35E1E1FD54E29AD2D5E1C4D48 1, 3–5]|loc=Introduction}} }}</ref> Some philosophers engage in most of their theorizing using one particular method while others employ a wider range of methods based on which one fits the specific problem investigated best.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Williamson|2020}} |2={{harvnb|Singer|1974|pp=420–421}} |3={{harvnb|Venturinha|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Td3BAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA76 76]}} |4={{harvnb|Walsh|Teo|Baydala|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8JxcAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA68 68]}} }}</ref>

Conceptual analysis is a common method in analytic philosophy. It aims to clarify the meaning of concepts by analyzing them into their component parts.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Eder|Lawler|van Riel|2020|pp=915}} |2={{harvnb|Shaffer|2015|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/26602327 555–556]}} |3={{harvnb|Audi|2006|loc=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/philosophy-and-religion/philosophy/philosophy-terms-and-concepts/philosophy § Philosophical Methods]}} }}</ref> Another method often employed in analytic philosophy is based on [[common sense]]. It starts with commonly accepted beliefs and tries to draw unexpected conclusions from them, which it often employs in a negative sense to criticize philosophical theories that are too far removed from how the average person sees the issue.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Ichikawa|2011}} |2={{harvnb|Reynolds|2010|pp=[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9191.2010.00361.x 231–232]}} |3={{harvnb|EB Staff|2007}} }}</ref> It is similar to how [[ordinary language philosophy]] approaches philosophical questions by investigating how ordinary language is used.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Mehrtens|2010|loc=[https://meiner.de/enzyklopadie-philosophie-14071.html Methode/Methodologie]}} |2={{harvnb|Parker-Ryan|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Introduction}} |3={{harvnb|EB Staff|2022}} }}</ref>

[[File:Trolley Problem.svg|thumb|upright=1.25|alt=Diagram depicting a trolley that is headed towards a group of people. There is an alternate track with only one person and a switch to change tracks.|The [[trolley problem]] is a thought experiment that investigates the moral difference between doing and allowing harm. This issue is explored in an imaginary situation in which a person can sacrifice a single person by redirecting a trolley to save a group of people.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Woollard|Howard-Snyder|2022|loc=§ 3. The Trolley Problem and the Doing/Allowing Distinction}} |2={{harvnb|Rini|loc=§ 8. Moral Cognition and Moral Epistemology}} }}</ref>]]

Various methods in philosophy give particular importance to [[intuition]]s, that is, non-inferential impressions about the correctness of specific claims or general principles.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Daly|2015|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_1 11–12]|loc=Introduction and Historical Overview}} |2={{harvnb|Duignan|2009}} }}</ref> For example, they play an important role in [[thought experiment]]s, which employ [[counterfactual thinking]] to evaluate the possible consequences of an imagined situation. These anticipated consequences can then be used to confirm or refute philosophical theories.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Brown|Fehige|2019|loc=Lead Section}} |2={{harvnb|Goffi|Roux|2011|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/GOFOTV 165, 168–169]}} |3={{harvnb|Eder|Lawler|van Riel|2020|pp=915–916}} }}</ref> The method of [[reflective equilibrium]] also employs intuitions. It seeks to form a [[Coherentism|coherent]] position on a certain issue by examining all the relevant beliefs and intuitions, some of which often have to be deemphasized or reformulated to arrive at a coherent perspective.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Daly|2015|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137344557_1 12–13]|loc=Introduction and Historical Overview}} |2={{harvnb|Daniels|2020|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The Method of Reflective Equilibrium}} |3={{harvnb|Little|1984|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/LITREA-2 373–375]}} }}</ref>

Pragmatists stress the significance of concrete practical consequences for assessing whether a philosophical theory is true.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|McDermid|loc=Lead Section}} |2={{harvnb|Legg|Hookway|2021|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> According to the [[pragmatic maxim]] as formulated by [[Charles Sanders Peirce]], the idea a person has of an object is nothing more than the totality of practical consequences they associate with this object. Pragmatists have also used this method to expose disagreements as merely verbal, that is, to show they make no genuine difference on the level of consequences.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|McDermid|loc=Lead Section, § 2a. A Method and A Maxim}} |2={{harvnb|Legg|Hookway|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 2. The Pragmatic Maxim: Peirce}} }}</ref>

Phenomenologists seek knowledge of the realm of appearance and the structure of human experience. They insist upon the first-personal character of all experience and proceed by suspending theoretical judgments about the external world. This technique of phenomenological reduction is known as "bracketing" or [[Bracketing (phenomenology)|epoché]]. The goal is to give an unbiased description of the appearances of things.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Cogan|loc=Lead Section, § 5. The Structure, Nature and Performance of the Phenomenological Reduction}} |2={{harvnb|Mehrtens|2010|loc=[https://meiner.de/enzyklopadie-philosophie-14071.html Methode/Methodologie]}} |3={{harvnb|Smith|2018|loc=Lead Section, § 1. What Is Phenomenology?}} |4={{harvnb|Smith|loc=Lead Section, § 2.Phenomenological Method}} }}</ref>

[[Methodological naturalism]] places great emphasis on the empirical approach and the resulting theories found in the natural sciences. In this way, it contrasts with methodologies that give more weight to pure reasoning and introspection.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Fischer|Collins|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4VuhCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 4]}} |2={{harvnb|Fisher|Sytsma|2023|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=C83bEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT9 Projects and Methods of Experimental Philosophy]}} |3={{harvnb|Papineau|2023|loc=§ 2. Methodological Naturalism}} }}</ref>