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Do not fill this in! == Leadership of China == === Establishment of the People's Republic of China === [[File:Mao Proclaiming New China.JPG|thumb|left|Mao declares the founding of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949]] Mao proclaimed the [[Proclamation of the People's Republic of China|establishment of the People's Republic of China]] from the [[Tiananmen|Gate of Heavenly Peace]] (Tian'anmen) on 1 October 1949, and later that week declared "The Chinese people have stood up" ({{zh|labels=no|c=中国人民从此站起来了}}).<ref>{{cite book |quote=The phrase is often mistakenly said to have been delivered during the speech from the Gate of Heavenly Peace, but was first used on September 21, at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, then repeated on several occasions |editor-last=Cheek |editor-first=T. |title=Mao Zedong and China's Revolutions: A Brief History with Documents |location=New York |publisher=[[Palgrave Macmillan]] |year=2002 |page=125 |isbn=978-0312256265}}</ref> Mao went to Moscow for long talks in the winter of 1949–50. Mao initiated the talks which focused on the political and economic revolution in China, foreign policy, railways, naval bases, and Soviet economic and technical aid. The resulting treaty reflected Stalin's dominance and his willingness to help Mao.<ref>{{cite journal |first=Odd Arne |last=Westad |title=Fighting for Friendship: Mao, Stalin, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950. |journal=Cold War International History Project Bulletin |volume=8 |number=9 |date=1996 |pages=224–236}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |first=Robert C. |last=North |title=The Sino-Soviet Agreements of 1950 |journal=Far Eastern Survey |volume=19 |number=13 |date=1950 |pages=125–130 |doi=10.2307/3024085 |jstor=3024085}}</ref> Mao's views as a Marxist were strongly influenced by Lenin, particularly with regard to the [[vanguardism]].<ref name=":10">{{Cite book |last1=Cai |first1=Xiang |url= |title=Revolution and its narratives: China's socialist literary and cultural imaginaries (1949-1966) |last2=蔡翔 |date=2016 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |others=Rebecca E. Karl, Xueping Zhong, 钟雪萍 |isbn=978-0-8223-7461-9 |location=Durham |pages=100 |oclc=932368688}}</ref> Mao believed that only the correct leadership of the Communist Party could advance China into socialism.<ref name=":10" /> Conversely, Mao also believed that mass movements and mass criticism were necessary in order to check the bureaucracy.<ref name=":10" /> [[File:Mao and Jiang Qing 1946.jpg|thumb|Mao with his fourth wife, [[Jiang Qing]], called "Madame Mao", 1946]] === Korean War === Mao pushed the Party to organise campaigns to reform society and extend control. These campaigns were given urgency in October 1950, when Mao made the decision to send the [[People's Volunteer Army]], a special unit of the [[People's Liberation Army]], into the [[Korean War]] and fight as well as to reinforce the armed forces of North Korea, the [[Korean People's Army]], which had been in full retreat. The United States placed a trade embargo on the People's Republic as a result of its involvement in the [[Korean War]], lasting until [[Richard Nixon]]'s improvements of relations. At least 180 thousand Chinese troops died during the war.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.china.org.cn/china/2010-06/28/content_20365659.htm |title=180,000 Chinese soldiers killed in Korean War |website=china.org.cn |access-date=28 November 2019}}</ref> Mao directed operations to the minutest detail. As the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), he was also the Supreme Commander in Chief of the PLA and the People's Republic and Chairman of the Party. Chinese troops in Korea were under the overall command of then newly installed Premier [[Zhou Enlai]], with General [[Peng Dehuai]] as field commander and political commissar.<ref name="Burkitt">{{Cite book |last1=Burkitt |first1=Laurie |last2=Scobell |first2=Andrew |last3=Wortzel |first3=Larry M. |author3-link=Larry Wortzel |title=The lessons of history: The Chinese people's Liberation Army at 75 |publisher=[[Strategic Studies Institute]] |pages=340–341 |year=2003 |isbn=978-1584871262 |url=http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf |access-date=14 July 2009 |archive-date=5 February 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120205072610/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf |url-status=dead}}</ref> === Social reform === During the [[Chinese Land Reform|land reform campaigns]], large numbers of landlords and rich peasants were beaten to death at mass meetings organised by the Communist Party as land was taken from them and given to poorer peasants, which significantly reduced [[economic inequality]].{{sfn|Short|2001|pp=436–437}}<ref>{{cite book |last=Scheidel |first=Walter |author-link=Walter Scheidel |title=The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |year=2017 |isbn=978-0691165028 |url=http://press.princeton.edu/titles/10921.html |page=226 |quote="In Zhangzhuangcun, in the more thoroughly reformed north of the country, most "landlords" and "rich peasants" had lost all their land and often their lives or had fled. All formerly landless workers had received land, which eliminated this category altogether. As a result, "middling peasants," who now accounted for 90 percent of the village population, owned 90.8 percent of the land, as close to perfect equality as one could possibly hope for."}}</ref> The [[Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries|Campaign to Suppress Counter-revolutionaries]]{{sfn|Kuisong|2008}} targeted bureaucratic bourgeoisie, such as compradors, merchants and Kuomintang officials who were seen by the party as economic parasites or political enemies.<ref>{{cite book |first=Steven W. |last=Mosher |title=China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality |publisher=[[Basic Books]] |date=1992 |isbn=0465098134 |pages=72–73}}</ref> In 1976, the [[United States Department of State|U.S. State Department]] estimated as many as a million were killed in the land reform, and {{formatnum:800000}} killed in the counter-revolutionary campaign.<ref>{{cite book |first=Stephen Rosskamm |last=Shalom |title=Deaths in China Due to Communism |publisher=Center for Asian Studies [[Arizona State University]] |date=1984 |isbn=0939252112 |page=24}}</ref> Mao himself claimed that a total of {{formatnum:700000}} people were killed in attacks on "counter-revolutionaries" during the years 1950–1952.<ref>{{Harvnb|Spence|1999}}{{Page needed|date=January 2013}}. Mao got this number from a report submitted by Xu Zirong, Deputy Public Security Minister, which stated {{formatnum:712000}} counter-revolutionaries were executed, {{formatnum:1290000}} were imprisoned, and another {{formatnum:1200000}} were "subjected to control.": see {{Harvnb|Kuisong|2008}}.</ref> Because there was a policy to select "at least one landlord, and usually several, in virtually every village for public execution",<ref name="Cambridge history of China">{{cite book |last1=Twitchett |first1=Denis |first2=John K. |last2=Fairbank |author2-link=John K. Fairbank |first3=Roderick |last3=MacFarquhar |author3-link=Roderick MacFarquhar |title=The Cambridge history of China |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-0521243360 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ioppEjkCkeEC&q=at+least+one+landlord,+and+usually+several,+in+virtually+every+village+for+public+execution&pg=PA87 |access-date=23 August 2008 |year=1987 |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> the number of deaths range between 2 million<ref name="Cambridge history of China"/><ref>{{cite book |last=Meisner |first=Maurice |author-link=Maurice Meisner |title=Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic |edition=Third |publisher=Free Press |date=1999 |isbn=0684856352 |page=72 |quote=... the estimate of many relatively impartial observers that there were {{formatnum:2000000}} people executed during the first three years of the People's Republic is probably as accurate a guess as one can make on the basis of scanty information.}}</ref>{{sfn|Kuisong|2008}} and 5 million.<ref>{{cite book |first=Steven W. |last=Mosher |title=China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality |publisher=[[Basic Books]] |date=1992 |isbn=0465098134 |page=74 |quote=... a figure that [[John K. Fairbank|Fairbank]] has cited as the upper range of 'sober' estimates.}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Feigon|2002|p=96}}: "By 1952 they had extended land reform throughout the countryside, but in the process somewhere between two and five million landlords had been killed."</ref> In addition, at least 1.5 million people,{{sfn|Short|2001|p=436}} perhaps as many as 4 to 6 million,{{sfn|Valentino|2004|pp=121–122}} were sent to [[laogai|"reform through labour"]] camps where many perished.{{sfn|Valentino|2004|pp=121–122}} Mao played a personal role in organising the mass repressions and established a system of execution quotas,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/CRF.4.2005/CRF-2005-4_Quota.pdf |title=Mao's "Killing Quotas." Human Rights in China (HRIC). September 26, 2005, at Shandong University |last=Changyu |first=Li |access-date=21 June 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090729194758/http://www.hrichina.org/public/PDFs/CRF.4.2005/CRF-2005-4_Quota.pdf |archive-date=29 July 2009}}</ref> which were often exceeded.{{sfn|Kuisong|2008}} He defended these killings as necessary for the securing of power.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://orpheus.ucsd.edu/chinesehistory/pgp/jeremy50sessay.htm |title=Terrible Honeymoon: Struggling with the Problem of Terror in Early 1950s China |last=Brown |first=Jeremy |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090627092313/http://orpheus.ucsd.edu/chinesehistory/pgp/jeremy50sessay.htm |archive-date=27 June 2009}}</ref> [[File:Mao, Bulganin, Stalin, Ulbricht Tsedenbal.jpeg|thumb|left|Mao at [[Joseph Stalin]]'s 71st birthday celebration in Moscow, December 1949]] The Mao government is credited with eradicating both consumption and production of [[opium]] during the 1950s using unrestrained repression and social reform.<ref name=":4">{{Cite book |last=Bottelier |first=Pieter |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YMhUDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA131 |title=Economic Policy Making In China (1949–2016): The Role of Economists |publisher=[[Routledge]] |year=2018 |isbn=978-1351393812 |pages=131 |language=en |quote=We should remember, however, that Mao also did wonderful things for China; apart from reuniting the country, he restored a sense of natural pride, greatly improved women's rights, basic healthcare and primary education, ended opium abuse, simplified Chinese characters, developed pinyin and promoted its use for teaching purposes. |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref><ref name="McCoy opium" /> Ten million addicts were forced into compulsory treatment, dealers were executed, and opium-producing regions were planted with new crops. Remaining opium production shifted south of the Chinese border into the [[Golden Triangle (Southeast Asia)|Golden Triangle]] region.<ref name="McCoy opium">{{cite web |url=http://www.a1b2c3.com/drugs/opi010.htm |title=Opium History, 1858 to 1940 |first=Alfred W. |last=McCoy |access-date=4 May 2007 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070404134938/http://www.a1b2c3.com/drugs/opi010.htm |archive-date=4 April 2007}}</ref> === Three-anti and Five-anti Campaigns === Starting in 1951, Mao initiated two successive movements in an effort to rid urban areas of corruption by targeting wealthy capitalists and political opponents, known as the [[Three-anti and Five-anti Campaigns]]. Whereas the three-anti campaign was a focused purge of government, industrial and party officials, the five-anti campaign set its sights slightly broader, targeting capitalist elements in general.<ref>{{cite book |first1=John |last1=Fairbank |first2=Merle |last2=Goldman |title=China: A New History |location=Cambridge, MA |publisher=The [[Belknap Press]] of [[Harvard University Press]] |date=2002 |page=349}}</ref> Workers denounced their bosses, spouses turned on their spouses, and children informed on their parents; the victims were often humiliated at [[struggle session]]s, where a targeted person would be verbally and physically abused until they confessed to crimes. Mao insisted that minor offenders be criticised and reformed or sent to labour camps, "while the worst among them should be shot". These campaigns took several hundred thousand additional lives, the vast majority via suicide.{{sfn|Short|2001|p=437}} [[File:Mao dalai lama-1955.jpg|thumb|upright=1.1|Mao and [[Zhou Enlai]] meeting with the [[14th Dalai Lama|Dalai Lama]] (right) and [[Choekyi Gyaltsen, 10th Panchen Lama|Panchen Lama]] (left) to celebrate the [[Losar|Tibetan New Year]], Beijing, 1955]] In Shanghai, suicide by jumping from tall buildings became so commonplace that residents avoided walking on the pavement near skyscrapers for fear that suicides might land on them.<ref>{{cite magazine |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,808241-5,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080318093047/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,808241-5,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=18 March 2008 |title=High Tide of Terror |date=5 March 1956 |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] |access-date=11 May 2009}}</ref> Some biographers have pointed out that driving those perceived as enemies to suicide was a common tactic during the Mao-era. In his biography of Mao, [[Philip Short]] notes that Mao gave explicit instructions in the [[Yan'an Rectification Movement]] that "no cadre is to be killed" but in practice allowed security chief [[Kang Sheng]] to drive opponents to suicide and that "this pattern was repeated throughout his leadership of the People's Republic".{{sfn|Short|2001|p=631}} [[File:Mao Zedong sitting.jpg|thumb|upright|left|Photo of Mao sitting, published in "Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung", ca. 1955]] === Five-year plans of China === Following the consolidation of power, Mao launched the first [[Five-year plans of China|five-year plan]] (1953–1958), which emphasised rapid industrial development. Within industry, iron and steel, electric power, coal, heavy engineering, building materials, and basic chemicals were prioritised with the aim of constructing large and highly capital-intensive plants. Many of these plants were built with Soviet assistance and heavy industry grew rapidly.<ref>{{Cite web |date=1998 |title=China – Economic policies |url=https://www.britannica.com/place/China/Economic-policies |website=[[Encyclopedia Britannica]] |language=en}}</ref> Agriculture, industry and trade was organised on a collective basis ([[Worker cooperative|socialist cooperatives]]).<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6zJaAAAAYAAJ |title=Doing Business in the People's Republic of China |date=1994 |publisher=Price, Waterhouse |pages=3 |language=en |quote=At the same time, agriculture was organized on a collective basis (socialist cooperatives), as were industry and trade. |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> This period marked the beginning of China's rapid industrialisation and it resulted in an enormous success.<ref>{{Cite web |date=1998 |title=China – The transition to socialism, 1953–57 |url=https://www.britannica.com/place/China/The-transition-to-socialism-1953-57 |website=[[Encyclopedia Britannica]] |language=en}}</ref> Despite being initially sympathetic towards the reformist government of [[Imre Nagy]], Mao feared the "reactionary restoration" in Hungary as the [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956|Hungarian crisis]] continued and became more hardline. Mao opposed the withdrawal of Soviet troops by asking [[Liu Shaoqi]] to inform the Soviet representatives to use military intervention against "Western imperialist-backed" protestors and Nagy's government. However, it was unclear if Mao's stance played a crucial role, if any role, in [[Nikita Khrushchev|Khrushchev]]'s decision to invade Hungary. It was also unclear if China was forced to conform to the Soviet position due to economic concerns and China's poor power projections compared to the USSR. Despite his disagreements with Moscow's hegemony in the [[Eastern Bloc|Socialist Camp]], Mao viewed the integrity of the international communist movement as more important than the national autonomy of the countries in the Soviet sphere of influence. The [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956|Hungarian Revolution]] also influenced Mao's [[Hundred Flowers Campaign]]. Mao decided to soften his stance on Chinese intelligentsia and allow them to express their social dissatisfaction and criticisms of the errors of the government. Mao wanted to use this movement to prevent a similar uprising in China. However, as people in China began to criticize the CCP's policies and Mao's leadership following the Hundred Flowers Campaign, Mao cracked down the movement he initiated and compared it to the "counter-revolutionary" Hungarian Revolution.<ref>{{cite journal |url=https://www.globalpoliticsreview.com/publications/2464-9929_v01_i01_p18.pdf |journal=Global Politics Review |volume=1 |number=1 |date=October 2015 |pages=18–34 |title=The Hungarian Connection: the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and its Impact on Mao Zedong's Domestic Policies in the late 1950s |first=David Tibor |last=Teszar}}</ref> Programs pursued during this time include the Hundred Flowers Campaign, in which Mao indicated his supposed willingness to consider different opinions about how China should be governed. Given the freedom to express themselves, liberal and intellectual Chinese began opposing the Communist Party and questioning its leadership. This was initially tolerated and encouraged. After a few months, Mao's government reversed its policy and persecuted those who had criticised the party, totalling perhaps {{formatnum:500000}},<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Vidal |first=Christine |year=2016 |title=The 1957–1958 Anti-Rightist Campaign in China: History and Memory (1978–2014) |url=https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01306892/document |journal=Hal-SHS}}</ref> as well as those who were merely alleged to have been critical, in what is called the [[Anti-Rightist Movement]]. The movement led to the persecution of at least 550,000 people, mostly intellectuals and dissidents.<ref name="1Mac">{{Cite book |last=MacFarquhar |first=Roderick |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yrkpx6iKq48C&dq=550000+anti-rightist+china&pg=PA82 |title=The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng |date=13 January 1997 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-0-521-58863-8 |language=en |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> Li Zhisui, Mao's physician, suggested that Mao had initially seen the policy as a way of weakening opposition to him within the party and that he was surprised by the extent of criticism and the fact that it came to be directed at his own leadership.<ref>{{Harvnb|Li|1994|pp=198, 200, 468–469}}</ref> === Military projects === United States President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]]'s threats during the [[First Taiwan Strait Crisis]] to use nuclear weapons against military targets in [[Fujian]] province prompted Mao to begin China's nuclear program.<ref name=":172">{{Cite book |last=Crean |first=Jeffrey |title=The Fear of Chinese Power: an International History |date=2024 |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |isbn=978-1-350-23394-2 |edition= |series=New Approaches to International History series |location=London, UK}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=89–90}} Under Mao's [[Two Bombs, One Satellite]] program, China developed the atomic and hydrogen bombs in record time{{Quantify|date=February 2024}} and launched a satellite a few years after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik.<ref name=":022">{{Cite book |last=Jin |first=Keyu |title=The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism |date=2023 |publisher=Viking |isbn=978-1-9848-7828-1 |location=New York |author-link=Keyu Jin}}</ref>{{Rp|page=218}} [[Project 523]] ({{zh |s = 523项目}})<ref name=hsu2006>{{cite journal |last1 = Hsu |first1 = Elisabeth |title = Reflections on the 'discovery' of the antimalarial qinghao |journal = [[British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology]] |year = 2006 |volume = 61 |issue = 6 |pages = 666–670 |doi = 10.1111/j.1365-2125.2006.02673.x |pmid = 16722826 |pmc = 1885105}}</ref> is a [[code name]] for a 1967 secret military project of the [[People's Republic of China]] to find [[antimalarial medication]]s.<ref name="meera">{{cite web |last1 = Senthilingam |first1 = Meera |title = Chemistry in its element: compounds: Artemisinin |url = http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/podcast/CIIEcompounds/transcripts/artemisinin.asp |work = [[Chemistry World]] |publisher = [[Royal Society of Chemistry]] |access-date = 27 April 2015}}</ref> Named after the date the project launched, 23 May, it addressed [[malaria]], an important threat in the [[Vietnam War]]. At the behest of [[Ho Chi Minh]], [[Prime Minister of Vietnam|Prime Minister]] of [[North Vietnam]], [[Zhou Enlai]] convinced Mao Zedong to start the mass project "to keep [the] allies' troops combat-ready", as the [[meeting minutes]] put it. More than 500 Chinese scientists were recruited. The project was divided into three streams.<ref name="Hao2011">{{cite web | first = Cindy | last = Hao |url=https://www.science.org/content/article/lasker-award-rekindles-debate-over-artemisinins-discovery |title=Lasker Award Rekindles Debate Over Artemisinin's Discovery |website=[[Science (journal)|Science]] |access-date=23 July 2020|date=29 September 2011 }}</ref> The one for investigating [[traditional Chinese medicine]] discovered and led to the development of a class of new antimalarial drugs called [[artemisinin]]s.<ref name="Hao2011" /><ref name="tu2011">{{cite journal |last1 = Tu |first1 = Youyou |title = The discovery of artemisinin (qinghaosu) and gifts from Chinese medicine |journal = Nature Medicine |year = 2011 |volume = 17 |issue = 10 |pages = 1217–1220 |doi = 10.1038/nm.2471 |pmid = 21989013|s2cid = 10021463 }}</ref> Launched during and lasting throughout the [[Cultural Revolution]], Project 523 was officially terminated in 1981. === Great Leap Forward === {{Main|Great Leap Forward}} [[File:Nikita Khrushchev, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh and Soong Ching-ling.jpg|thumb|Mao with [[Nikita Khrushchev]], [[Ho Chi Minh]], and [[Soong Ching-ling]] during a state dinner in Beijing, 1959]] In January 1958, Mao launched the second five-year plan, known as the Great Leap Forward, a plan intended to turn China from an agrarian nation to an industrialised one<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-silence-that-preceded-chinas-great-leap-into-famine-51898077/ |title=The Silence that Preceded China's Great Leap into Famine |last=King |first=Gilbert |website=[[Smithsonian]] |access-date=28 November 2019}}</ref> and as an alternative model for economic growth to the Soviet model focusing on heavy industry that was advocated by others in the party. Under this economic program, the relatively small agricultural collectives that had been formed to date were rapidly merged into far larger [[people's commune]]s, and many of the peasants were ordered to work on massive infrastructure projects and on the production of iron and steel. Some private food production was banned, and livestock and farm implements were brought under collective ownership.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Slatyer |first=Will |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=tprrCQAAQBAJ |title=The Life/Death Rhythms of Capitalist Regimes - Debt Before Dishonour: Timetable of World Dominance 1400-2100 |date=20 February 2015 |publisher=Partridge Publishing Singapore |isbn=978-1-4828-2961-7 |language=en |via=[[Google Books]]|page=509}}</ref> Under the Great Leap Forward, Mao and other party leaders ordered the implementation of a variety of unproven and unscientific new agricultural techniques by the new communes. The combined effect of the diversion of labour to steel production and infrastructure projects, and cyclical [[natural disaster]]s led to an approximately 15% drop in grain production in 1959 followed by a further 10% decline in 1960 and no recovery in 1961.<ref name="Spence1999 p553">{{Harvnb|Spence|1999}}{{Page needed|date=January 2013}}<!-- Book has only 188 pages, so page 553 does not look right --></ref> In an effort to win favour with their superiors and avoid being purged, each layer in the party exaggerated the amount of grain produced under them. Based upon the falsely reported success, party cadres were ordered to requisition a disproportionately high amount of that fictitious harvest for state use, primarily for use in the cities and urban areas but also for export. The result, compounded in some areas by drought and in others by floods, was that farmers were left with little food for themselves and many millions starved to death in the [[Great Chinese Famine]]. The people of urban areas in China were given food stamps each month, but the people of rural areas were expected to grow their own crops and give some of the crops back to the government. The death count in rural parts of China surpassed the deaths in the urban centers. Additionally, the Chinese government continued to export food that could have been allocated to the country's starving citizens.<ref name=":0">{{cite journal |last1=Yushi |first1=Mao |title=Lessons from China's Great Famine |journal=The Cato Journal |date=22 September 2014 |volume=34 |issue=3 |pages=483–491 |id={{Gale|A387348115}} |url=https://www.proquest.com/openview/7453e8c6f7d53a0684e517742c966e39/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=37750}}</ref> The famine was a direct cause of the death of some 30 million Chinese peasants between 1959 and 1962.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Smil |first1=V. |title=China's great famine: 40 years later |journal=[[British Medical Journal|BMJ]] |date=18 December 1999 |volume=319 |issue=7225 |pages=1619–1621 |doi=10.1136/bmj.319.7225.1619 |pmid=10600969 |pmc=1127087}}</ref> Furthermore, many children who became malnourished during years of hardship died after the Great Leap Forward came to an end in 1962.<ref name="Spence1999 p553"/> In late autumn 1958, Mao condemned the practices that were being used during Great Leap Forward such as forcing peasants to do exhausting labour without enough food or rest which resulted in epidemics and starvation. He also acknowledged that anti-rightist campaigns were a major cause of "production at the expense of livelihood." He refused to abandon the Great Leap Forward to solve these difficulties, but he did demand that they be confronted. After the July 1959 [[Lushan Conference|clash at Lushan]] Conference with [[Peng Dehuai]], Mao launched a new anti-rightist campaign along with the radical policies that he previously abandoned. It wasn't until the spring of 1960, that Mao would again express concern about abnormal deaths and other abuses, but he did not move to stop them. Bernstein concludes that the Chairman "wilfully ignored the lessons of the first radical phase for the sake of achieving extreme ideological and developmental goals".<ref name="wilfulness">{{cite journal |last1=Thomas P.|first1=Bernstein |title=Mao Zedong and the Famine of 1959–1960: A Study in Wilfulness |journal=The China Quarterly |date=June 2006 |volume=186 |issue=186 |pages=421–445 |doi=10.1017/S0305741006000221 |jstor=20192620 |s2cid=153728069}}</ref> [[Jasper Becker]] notes that Mao was dismissive of reports he received of food shortages in the countryside and refused to change course, believing that peasants were lying and that rightists and [[kulaks]] were hoarding grain. He refused to open state granaries,<ref name="Becker81">{{Harvnb|Becker|1998|p=81}}</ref> and instead launched a series of "anti-grain concealment" drives that resulted in numerous purges and suicides.{{sfn|Becker|1998|p=86}} Other violent campaigns followed in which party leaders went from village to village in search of hidden food reserves, and not only grain, as Mao issued quotas for pigs, chickens, ducks and eggs. Many peasants accused of hiding food were tortured and beaten to death.{{sfn|Becker|1998|p=93}} The extent of Mao's knowledge of the severity of the situation has been disputed. Mao's personal physician, [[Li Zhisui]], said that Mao may have been unaware of the extent of the famine, partly due to a reluctance of local officials to criticise his policies, and the willingness of his staff to exaggerate or outright fake reports.{{sfn|Li|1994|pp=283–284, 295}} Li writes that upon learning of the extent of the starvation, Mao vowed to stop eating meat, an action followed by his staff.{{sfn|Li|1994|p=340}} [[File:Mao Zedong shakes hands with People's commune workers.jpg|thumb|Mao shaking hands with a people's commune farmer, 1959]] Mao stepped down as President of China on 27 April 1959; he retained other top positions such as Chairman of the Communist Party and of the Central Military Commission.<ref name=":5">{{Cite book |last1=Li |first1=Xiaobing |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Fm5BAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA41 |title=Evolution of Power: China's Struggle, Survival, and Success |last2=Tian |first2=Xiansheng |year=2013 |publisher=[[Lexington Books]] |isbn=978-0739184981 |pages=41 |language=en |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> The Presidency was transferred to [[Liu Shaoqi]].<ref name=":5" /> Mao was eventually forced to abandon the policy in 1962, and he lost political power to Liu Shaoqi and [[Deng Xiaoping]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Three Chinese Leaders: Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping |url=http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_leaders.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131211053051/http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_leaders.htm |archive-date=11 December 2013 |access-date=22 April 2020 |website=[[Columbia University]]}}</ref> The Great Leap Forward was a tragedy for the vast majority of the Chinese. Although the steel quotas were officially reached, almost all of the supposed steel made in the countryside was iron, as it had been made from assorted scrap metal in home-made furnaces with no reliable source of fuel such as coal. This meant that proper [[smelting]] conditions could not be achieved. According to Zhang Rongmei, a geometry teacher in rural Shanghai during the Great Leap Forward: "We took all the furniture, pots, and pans we had in our house, and all our neighbours did likewise. We put everything in a big fire and melted down all the metal".{{citation needed|date=August 2021}} The worst of the famine was steered towards enemies of the state.{{sfn|Valentino|2004|p=128}} [[Jasper Becker]] explains: "The most vulnerable section of China's population, around five percent, were those whom Mao called '[[enemies of the people]]'. Anyone who had in previous campaigns of repression been labeled a 'black element' was given the lowest priority in the allocation of food. Landlords, rich peasants, former members of the nationalist regime, religious leaders, rightists, counter-revolutionaries and the families of such individuals died in the greatest numbers."{{sfn|Becker|1998|p=103}} According to official Chinese statistics for [[Five-year plans of China|Second Five-Year Plan]] (1958–1962):"[[Industrial production|industrial output value]] value had doubled; the [[Gross value added|gross value]] of agricultural products increased by 35 percent; [[Steelmaking|steel production]] in 1962 was between 10.6 million tons or 12 million tons; investment in capital construction rose to 40 percent from 35 percent in the First Five-Year Plan period; the investment in capital construction was doubled; and the average income of workers and farmers increased by up to 30 percent."<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AE8zAQAAIAAJ |title=People's Republic of China Yearbook |date=2009 |publisher=[[Xinhua Publishing House]] |volume=29 |pages=340 |language=en |quote=Industrial output value had doubled; the gross value of agricultural products increased by 35 percent; steel production in 1962 was between 10.6 million tons or 12 million tons; investment in capital construction rose to 40 percent from 35 percent in the First Five-Year Plan period; the investment in capital construction was doubled; and the average income of workers and farmers increased by up to 30 percent. |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> At a large Communist Party conference in Beijing in January 1962, dubbed the "[[Seven Thousand Cadres Conference]]", State Chairman Liu Shaoqi denounced the Great Leap Forward, attributing the project to widespread famine in China.<ref name="Chang">{{Harvnb|Chang|Halliday|2005|pp=568, 579}}</ref> The overwhelming majority of delegates expressed agreement, but Defense Minister [[Lin Biao]] staunchly defended Mao.<ref name="Chang"/> A brief period of liberalisation followed while Mao and Lin plotted a comeback.<ref name="Chang"/> Liu Shaoqi and [[Deng Xiaoping]] rescued the economy by disbanding the people's communes, introducing elements of private control of peasant smallholdings and importing grain from Canada and Australia to mitigate the worst effects of famine.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lsHLDAAAQBAJ&q=Liu+Shaoqi+and+Deng+Xiaoping+rescued+the+economy+by+disbanding+the+people's+communes,+introducing+elements+of+private+control+of+peasant+smallholdings+and+importing+grain+from+Canada+and+Australia+to+mitigate+the+worst+effects+of+famine.&pg=PT373 |title=50 Great Military Leaders of All Time |last=Tibbetts |first=Jann |year=2016 |publisher=Vij Books India Pvt Ltd |isbn=978-9385505669 |language=en |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> [[File:Kissinger Mao.jpg|thumb|Mao with [[Henry Kissinger]] and [[Zhou Enlai]], Beijing, 1972]] At the [[Lushan Conference]] in July/August 1959, several ministers expressed concern that the Great Leap Forward had not proved as successful as planned. The most direct of these was Minister of Defence and Korean War veteran General [[Peng Dehuai]]. Following Peng's criticism of the Great Leap Forward, Mao orchestrated a purge of Peng and his supporters, stifling criticism of the Great Leap policies. Senior officials who reported the truth of the famine to Mao were branded as "right opportunists."{{sfn|Becker|1998|pp=92–93}} A campaign against right-wing opportunism was launched and resulted in party members and ordinary peasants being sent to prison labour camps where many would subsequently die in the famine. Years later the CCP would conclude that as many as six million people were wrongly punished in the campaign.{{sfn|Valentino|2004|p=127}} [[File:Mao Zedong with Emperor Haile Selassie I.webp|thumb|Ethiopian Emperor [[Haile Selassie|Haile Selassie I]] with Mao in 1971 after the death of [[Lin Biao]] ]] The number of deaths by starvation during the Great Leap Forward is deeply controversial. Until the mid-1980s, when official census figures were finally published by the Chinese Government, little was known about the scale of the disaster in the Chinese countryside, as the handful of Western observers allowed access during this time had been restricted to model villages where they were deceived into believing that the Great Leap Forward had been a great success. There was also an assumption that the flow of individual reports of starvation that had been reaching the West, primarily through Hong Kong and Taiwan, must have been localised or exaggerated as China was continuing to claim record harvests and was a net exporter of grain through the period. Because Mao wanted to pay back early to the Soviets debts totalling 1.973 billion [[Renminbi|yuan]] from 1960 to 1962,<ref name="Yang Jisheng"/> exports increased by 50%, and fellow Communist regimes in [[North Korea]], [[North Vietnam]] and [[People's Socialist Republic of Albania|Albania]] were provided grain free of charge.<ref name="Becker81"/> Censuses were carried out in China in 1953, 1964 and 1982. The first attempt to analyse this data to estimate the number of famine deaths was carried out by American demographer Dr. Judith Banister and published in 1984. Given the lengthy gaps between the censuses and doubts over the reliability of the data, an accurate figure is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, Banister concluded that the official data implied that around 15 million excess deaths incurred in China during 1958–61, and that based on her modelling of Chinese demographics during the period and taking account of assumed under-reporting during the famine years, the figure was around 30 million. [[Hu Yaobang]], a high-ranking official of the CCP, states that 20 million people died according to official government statistics.{{sfn|Short|2001|p=761}} [[Yang Jisheng (journalist)|Yang Jisheng]], a former [[Xinhua News Agency]] reporter who had privileged access and connections available to no other scholars, estimates a death toll of 36 million.<ref name="Yang Jisheng">{{cite news |first=Mark |last=O'Neill |url=http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328 |title=A hunger for the truth: A new book, banned on the mainland, is becoming the definitive account of the Great Famine |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120210190821/http://en.chinaelections.org/newsinfo.asp?newsid=18328 |archive-date=10 February 2012 |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |date=6 July 2008}}</ref> Frank Dikötter estimates that there were at least 45 million premature deaths attributable to the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1962.<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/news/maos-great-leap-forward-killed-45-million-in-four-years-2081630.html |title=Mao's Great Leap Forward 'killed 45 million in four years' |last=Akbar |first=Arifa |date=17 September 2010 |access-date=20 September 2010 |location=London |work=[[The Independent]]}}; {{Harvnb|Dikötter|2010|p=333}}</ref> Various other sources have put the figure at between 20 and 46 million.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bramall |first=Chris |date=December 2011 |title=Agency and Famine in China's Sichuan Province, 1958–1962 |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=208 |pages=990–1008 |doi=10.1017/s030574101100110x |s2cid=56200410 |issn=0305-7410|url=https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/13836/1/Bramall_CQ_Dec_2011.pdf }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Wemheuer |first1=Felix |last2=Dikötter |first2=Frank |date=July 2011 |title=Sites of Horror: Mao's Great Famine [with Response] Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962. Frank Dikötter |journal=The China Journal |volume=66 |pages=155–164 |doi=10.1086/tcj.66.41262812 |s2cid=141874259 |issn=1324-9347}}</ref><ref name="maostats">{{cite web |url=http://necrometrics.com/20c5m.htm#Mao |title=Source List and Detailed Death Tolls for the Twentieth Century Hemoclysm |publisher=Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century |access-date=23 August 2008}}</ref> === Split from Soviet Union === {{Main|Sino-Soviet split}} [[File:President Gerald Ford and Daughter Susan Watch as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger Shakes Hands with Mao Tse-Tung.jpg|thumb|U.S. President [[Gerald Ford]] watches as [[Henry Kissinger]] shakes hands with Mao during their visit to China, 2 December 1975]] On the international front, the period was dominated by the further isolation of China. The [[Sino-Soviet split]] resulted in [[Nikita Khrushchev]]'s withdrawal of all Soviet technical experts and aid from the country. The split concerned the leadership of [[world communism]]. The USSR had a network of Communist parties it supported; China now created its own rival network to battle it out for local control of the left in numerous countries.<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor=20029719 |title=Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa |journal=[[Foreign Affairs]] |volume=42 |issue=4 |pages=640–654 |last1=Scalapino |first1=Robert A. |year=1964 |doi=10.2307/20029719}}</ref> Lorenz M. Lüthi writes: "The Sino-Soviet split was one of the key events of the Cold War, equal in importance to the construction of the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Second Vietnam War, and Sino-American rapprochement. The split helped to determine the framework of the Second Cold War in general, and influenced the course of the Second Vietnam War in particular."<ref>{{cite book |first=Lorenz M. |last=Lüthi |title=The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=dl4TRDxqexMC |year=2010 |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |page=1 |isbn=978-1400837625 |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> The split resulted from Khrushchev's more moderate Soviet leadership after the death of Stalin in March 1953. Only Albania openly sided with China, thereby forming an alliance between the two countries which would last until after Mao's death in 1976. Warned that the Soviets had nuclear weapons, Mao minimised the threat. Becker says that "Mao believed that the bomb was a 'paper tiger', declaring to Khrushchev that it would not matter if China lost 300 million people in a nuclear war: the other half of the population would survive to ensure victory".<ref>{{cite book |first=Jasper |last=Becker |title=The Chinese |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oyGtw4cXJjMC&pg=PA271 |year=2002 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |page=271 |isbn=978-0199727223 |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> Struggle against Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism was an important aspect of Mao's attempt to direct the revolution in the right direction.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Garver |first=John W. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0_OuCgAAQBAJ |title=China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China |date=2016 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0190261054 |pages=132 |language=en |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> In the late 1950s, Mao wrote reading notes responding to the Soviet Book ''Political Economy: A Textbook'' and essays (''[[A Critique of Soviet Economics]]'') responding to Stalin's ''[[Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR]].<ref name=":322">{{Cite book |last=Hammond |first=Ken |title=China's Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future |publisher=1804 Books |year=2023 |isbn=9781736850084 |location=New York, NY |pages=}}</ref>''{{Rp|page=51}} These texts reflect Mao's views that the USSR was becoming alienated from the masses and distorting socialist development.<ref name=":322" />{{Rp|page=51}} According to historian Mingjiang Li, Mao deliberately escalated Sino-Soviet diplomatic tensions as part of his attempt to reassert his domestic political power and limit that of his rivals by showcasing his commitment to revolution and his hardline stance against what he deemed Soviet revisionism.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Li |first1=Mingjiang |date=27 October 2010 |title=Ideological dilemma: Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet split, 1962–63 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2010.498822 |journal=[[Cold War History (journal)|Cold War History]] |volume=11 |issue=3 |pages=387–419 |doi=10.1080/14682745.2010.498822 |s2cid=153617754 |access-date=12 February 2023}}</ref> === Third Front === {{Main|Third Front (China)}} After the failure of the Great Leap Forward, China's leadership slowed the pace of industrialization.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Meyskens |first=Covell F. |url= |title=Mao's Third Front: The Militarization of Cold War China |date=2020 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-108-78478-8 |location=Cambridge, United Kingdom |doi=10.1017/9781108784788 |oclc=1145096137 |s2cid=218936313}}</ref>{{Rp|page=3}} It invested more on in China's coastal regions and focused on the production of consumer goods.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=3}} Preliminary drafts of the Third Five Year Plan contained no provision for developing large scale industry in China's interior.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=29}} After an April 1964 General Staff report concluded that the concentration of China's industry in its major coastal cities made it vulnerable to attack by foreign powers, Mao argued for the development of basic industry and national defense industry in protected locations in China's interior.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|pages=4, 54}} Although other key leaders did not initially support the idea, the 2 August 1964 [[Gulf of Tonkin incident]] increased fears of a potential invasion by the United States and crystallized support for Mao's industrialization proposal, which came to be known as the Third Front.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=7}} Following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Mao's own concerns of invasion by the United States increased.<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=Hou |first=Li |title=Building for oil: Daqing and the Formation of the Chinese Socialist State |date=2021 |publisher=[[Harvard University Asia Center]] |isbn=978-0-674-26022-1 |edition= |series=[[Harvard-Yenching Institute]] monograph series |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=100}} He wrote to central cadres, "A war is going to break out. I need to reconsider my actions" and pushed even harder for the creation of the Third Front.<ref name=":12" />{{Rp|page=100}} The secretive Third Front construction involved massive projects including extensive railroad infrastructure like the [[Chengdu–Kunming railway|Chengdu–Kunming line]],<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|pages=153–164}} aerospace industry including satellite launch facilities,<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=218–219}} and steel production industry including [[Panzhihua Iron and Steel]].<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|page=9}} Development of the Third Front slowed in 1966 during the Cultural Revolution, but accelerated again after the [[Sino-Soviet border conflict]] at Zhenbao Island, which increased the perceived risk of Soviet Invasion.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|pages=12, 150}} Third Front construction again decreased after United States President [[1972 visit by Richard Nixon to China|Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to China]] and the resulting rapprochement between the United States and China.<ref name=":02" />{{Rp|pages=225–229}} When Reform and Opening up began after Mao's death, China began to gradually wind down Third Front projects.<ref name=":92">{{Cite book |last1=Marquis |first1=Christopher |url= |title=Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise |last2=Qiao |first2=Kunyuan |date=2022 |publisher=[[Yale University Press]] |isbn=978-0-300-26883-6 |location=New Haven |doi=10.2307/j.ctv3006z6k |jstor=j.ctv3006z6k |oclc=1348572572 |author-link=Christopher Marquis |s2cid=253067190}}</ref>{{Rp|page=180}} The Third Front distributed physical and human capital around the country, ultimately decreased regional disparities and created favorable conditions for later market development.<ref name=":92" />{{Rp|pages=177–182}} === Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution === {{Main|Cultural Revolution}} [[File:1966-11 1966年毛泽东林彪与红卫兵.jpg|thumb|200px|right|A public appearance of Chairman Mao and [[Lin Biao]] among [[Red Guards]], in Beijing, during the [[Cultural Revolution]] (November 1966)]] During the early 1960s, Mao became concerned with the nature of post-1959 China. He saw that the revolution and Great Leap Forward had replaced the old ruling elite with a new one. He was concerned that those in power were becoming estranged from the people they were to serve. Mao believed that a revolution of culture would unseat and unsettle the "ruling class" and keep China in a state of "[[Continuous revolution theory|continuous revolution]]" that, theoretically, would serve the interests of the majority, rather than a tiny and privileged elite.{{sfn|Feigon|2002|p=140}} State Chairman [[Liu Shaoqi]] and General Secretary [[Deng Xiaoping]] favoured the idea that Mao be removed from actual power as China's head of state and government but maintain his ceremonial and symbolic role as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, with the party upholding all of his positive contributions to the revolution. They attempted to marginalise Mao by taking control of economic policy and asserting themselves politically as well. Many claim that Mao responded to Liu and Deng's movements by launching the [[Cultural Revolution|Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution]] in 1966. Some scholars, such as Mobo Gao, claim the case for this is overstated.<ref>For a full treatment of this idea, see {{Harvnb|Gao|2008}}</ref> Others, such as [[Frank Dikötter]], hold that Mao launched the Cultural Revolution to wreak revenge on those who had dared to challenge him over the Great Leap Forward.<ref>Jonathan Mirsky. [http://www.literaryreview.co.uk/mirsky_09_10.html ''Livelihood Issues.''] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100906144248/http://www.literaryreview.co.uk/mirsky_09_10.html |date=6 September 2010 }} [[Literary Review]]</ref> The Cultural Revolution led to the destruction of much of China's traditional cultural heritage and the imprisonment of a huge number of Chinese citizens, as well as the creation of general economic and social chaos in the country. Millions of lives were ruined during this period, as the Cultural Revolution pierced into every part of Chinese life, depicted by such Chinese films as ''[[To Live (1994 film)|To Live]]'', ''[[The Blue Kite]]'' and ''[[Farewell My Concubine (film)|Farewell My Concubine]]''. It is estimated that hundreds of thousands of people, perhaps millions, perished in the violence of the Cultural Revolution.<ref name="maostats"/> This included prominent figures such as Liu Shaoqi.<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/05/cultural-revolution-china/482964/ |title=The Cultural Revolution's Legacy in China |last=Vasilogambros |first=Matt |date=16 May 2016 |work=[[The Atlantic]] |access-date=28 November 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://reviews.history.ac.uk/review/1179 |title=Debating the Cultural Revolution in China |website=Reviews in History |access-date=28 November 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Pye |first=Lucian W. |year=1986 |title=Reassessing the Cultural Revolution |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=108 |issue=108 |pages=597–612 |doi=10.1017/S0305741000037085 |issn=0305-7410 |jstor=653530 |s2cid=153730706}}</ref> When Mao was informed of such losses, particularly that people had been driven to suicide, he is alleged to have commented: "People who try to commit suicide—don't attempt to save them! ... China is such a populous nation, it is not as if we cannot do without a few people."{{sfn|MacFarquhar|Schoenhals|2006|p=110}} The authorities allowed the Red Guards to abuse and kill opponents of the regime. Said [[Xie Fuzhi]], national police chief: "Don't say it is wrong of them to beat up bad persons: if in anger they beat someone to death, then so be it."{{sfn|MacFarquhar|Schoenhals|2006|p=125}} In August and September 1966, there were a reported 1,772 people murdered by the Red Guards in Beijing alone.{{sfn|MacFarquhar|Schoenhals|2006|p=124}} It was during this period that Mao chose [[Lin Biao]], who seemed to echo all of Mao's ideas, to become his successor. Lin was later officially named as Mao's successor. By 1971, a divide between the two men had become apparent. Official history in China states that Lin was planning a military coup or an assassination attempt on Mao. Lin Biao died on 13 September 1971, in a plane crash over the air space of Mongolia, presumably as he fled China, probably anticipating his arrest. The CCP declared that Lin was planning to depose Mao and posthumously expelled Lin from the party. At this time, Mao lost trust in many of the top CCP figures. The highest-ranking Soviet Bloc intelligence defector, Lt. Gen. [[Ion Mihai Pacepa]] claimed he had a conversation with [[Nicolae Ceaușescu]], who told him about a plot to kill Mao with the help of Lin Biao organised by the [[KGB]].<ref name="Pacepa0">{{cite web |url=http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MzY4NWU2ZjY3YWYxMDllNWQ5MjQ3ZGJmMzg3MmQyNjQ= |title=The Kremlin's Killing Ways |author=Ion Mihai Pacepa |work=National Review |date=28 November 2006 |access-date=23 August 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070808171854/http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MzY4NWU2ZjY3YWYxMDllNWQ5MjQ3ZGJmMzg3MmQyNjQ%3D |archive-date=8 August 2007}}</ref> In 1969, Mao declared the Cultural Revolution to be over, although various historians in and outside of China mark the end of the Cultural Revolution—as a whole or in part—in 1976, following Mao's death and the arrest of the [[Gang of Four]].<ref>Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution lasting until 1976: * {{cite web |title=Marxists.org Glossary: Cultural Revolution |url=https://www.marxists.org/glossary/events/c/u.htm |access-date=6 October 2015 |website=[[Marxists Internet Archive]] |publisher=Encyclopedia of Marxism}} * {{cite web |title=The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, 1966–1976 |url=http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/cultrev.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190424130644/http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/cultrev.htm |archive-date=24 April 2019 |access-date=6 October 2015 |website=sjsu.edu |publisher=San José State University Department of Economics}} * {{cite web |last1=Spence |first1=Jonathan |year=2001 |title=Introduction to the Cultural Revolution |url=http://iis-db.stanford.edu/docs/115/CRintro.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160131124840/http://iis-db.stanford.edu/docs/115/CRintro.pdf |archive-date=31 January 2016 |access-date=6 October 2015 |website=iis-db.stanford.edu}} – Adapted from ''[[The Search for Modern China]]''</ref> The Central Committee in 1981 [[Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China|officially declared]] the Cultural Revolution a "severe setback" for the PRC.<ref>"Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China", (Adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 27 June 1981) ''Resolution on CPC History (1949–81).'' (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981). p. 32.</ref> It is often looked at in all scholarly circles as a greatly disruptive period for China.{{sfn|Chirot|1996|p=198}} Despite the pro-poor rhetoric of Mao's regime, his economic policies led to substantial poverty.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ravallion |first=Martin |date=25 January 2021 |title=Poverty in China since 1950: A Counterfactual Perspective |doi=10.3386/w28370 |s2cid=234005582 |url=https://www.nber.org/papers/w28370 |website=National Bureau of Economic Research |series=Working Paper Series |language=en |doi-access=free}}</ref> Estimates of the death toll during the Cultural Revolution, including civilians and Red Guards, vary greatly. An estimate of around 400,000 deaths is a widely accepted minimum figure, according to [[Maurice Meisner]].<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YpV7vbvclfgC&pg=PA354 |title=Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic |edition=3rd |first=Maurice |last=Meisner |page=354 |publisher=Free Press |year=1999 |isbn=978-0684856353 |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> MacFarquhar and Schoenhals assert that in rural China alone some 36 million people were persecuted, of whom between 750,000 and 1.5 million were killed, with roughly the same number permanently injured.{{sfn|MacFarquhar|Schoenhals|2006|p=262}} Historian Daniel Leese writes that in the 1950s, Mao's personality was hardening: "The impression of Mao's personality that emerges from the literature is disturbing. It reveals a certain temporal development from a down-to-earth leader, who was amicable when uncontested and occasionally reflected on the limits of his power, to an increasingly ruthless and self-indulgent dictator. Mao's preparedness to accept criticism decreased continuously."<ref>Daniel Leese, "Mao the Man and Mao the Icon" in {{cite book |editor-first=Timothy |editor-last=Cheek |title=A Critical Introduction to Mao |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ru90WzwzlfYC&pg=PA233 |year=2010 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |page=233 |isbn=978-1139789042 |via=[[Google Books]]}}</ref> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). 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