John F. Kennedy

====Cuban Missile Crisis====
{{main|Cuban Missile Crisis}}
[[File:President Kennedy - signing Cuba Quarantine Proclamation.jpg|thumb|left|upright=0.85|Kennedy signs the [[Cuban Missile Crisis|Proclamation for Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba]] in the Oval Office; {{ca|October 23, 1962}}.]]

In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Khrushchev increased economic and military assistance to Cuba.{{sfn|Giglio|2006|pp=203–205}} The Soviet Union planned to allocate in Cuba 49 [[medium-range ballistic missile]]s, 32 [[intermediate-range ballistic missile]]s, 49 light [[Ilyushin Il-28|Il-28]] bombers and about 100 [[Tactical nuclear weapon|tactical nuclear weapons]].<ref>{{cite book | last = Giglio| first =James|author2=Stephen G. Rabe|title =Debating the Kennedy presidency| url = https://archive.org/details/debatingkennedyp00gigl_480| url-access = limited| publisher = Rowman & Littlefield|year = 2003| page = [https://archive.org/details/debatingkennedyp00gigl_480/page/n45 39]| isbn = 978-0-7425-0834-7}}</ref> The Kennedy administration viewed the growing [[Cuba–Soviet Union relations|Cuba-Soviet alliance]] with alarm, fearing that it could eventually pose a threat to the U.S.{{sfn|Brinkley|2012|pp=113–114}} On October 14, 1962, CIA [[Lockheed U-2|U-2]] spy planes [[Aerial reconnaissance#Cold War|took photographs]] of the Soviets' construction of intermediate-range ballistic missile sites in Cuba. The photos were shown to Kennedy on October 16; a consensus was reached that the missiles were offensive in nature and posed an immediate nuclear threat.{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=345}}

Kennedy faced a dilemma: if the U.S. attacked the sites, it might lead to nuclear war with the Soviet Union, but if the U.S. did nothing, it would be faced with the increased threat from close-range nuclear weapons (positioned approximately 90 mi (140 km) away from the Florida coast).<ref>{{cite web |title=President John F. Kennedy - Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 |url=https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/eyewitness/html.php?section=26#:~:text=On%20October%2016%2C%201962%2C%20President,come%20on%20very%20short%20notice. |website=National Archives |access-date=30 January 2024 |archive-date=September 28, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230928100637/https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/eyewitness/html.php?section=26#:~:text=On%20October%2016%2C%201962%2C%20President,come%20on%20very%20short%20notice. |url-status=live }}</ref> The U.S. would also appear to the world as less committed to the defense of the Western Hemisphere. On a personal level, Kennedy needed to show resolve in reaction to Khrushchev, especially after the Vienna summit.{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=245}} To deal with the crisis, he formed an ad-hoc body of key advisers, later known as [[EXCOMM]], that met secretly between October 16 and 28.{{sfn|Giglio|2006|pp=207–208}}

More than a third of [[U.S. National Security Council]] (NSC) members favored an unannounced air assault on the missile sites, but some saw this as "[[Attack on Pearl Harbor|Pearl Harbor]] in reverse."{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=387}} There was some concern from the international community (asked in confidence) that the assault plan was an overreaction given that Eisenhower had placed [[PGM-19 Jupiter]] missiles in Italy and Turkey in 1958. It also could not be assured that the assault would be 100% effective.{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=388}} In concurrence with a majority vote of the NSC, Kennedy decided on a [[naval blockade]] (or "quarantine"). On October 22, after privately informing the cabinet and leading members of Congress about the situation, Kennedy announced the naval blockade on national television and warned that U.S. forces would seize "offensive weapons and associated materiel" that Soviet vessels might attempt to deliver to Cuba.{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=389}}

[[File:President confers with Attorney General. Attorney General Kennedy, President Kennedy. White House, West Wing Collonade. - NARA - 194239.jpg|thumb|Kennedy confers with Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]]; {{ca|October 1962}}.]]
The U.S. Navy would stop and inspect all Soviet ships arriving off Cuba, beginning October 24. Several Soviet ships approached the blockade line, but they stopped or reversed course.{{sfn|Giglio|2006|p=220}} The OAS gave unanimous support to the removal of the missiles. Kennedy exchanged two sets of letters with Khrushchev, to no avail.{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=390}} UN Secretary General [[U Thant]] requested both parties to reverse their decisions and enter a cooling-off period. Khrushchev agreed, but Kennedy did not.{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=403}} Kennedy managed to preserve restraint when a Soviet missile unauthorizedly downed a U.S. Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Cuba, killing pilot [[Rudolf Anderson]].<ref>{{cite web |title=The World on the Brink: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis |url=https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct27/ |website=John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum |access-date=November 26, 2023 |archive-date=November 24, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231124154618/https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct27/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

At the president's direction, Robert Kennedy privately informed Soviet Ambassador [[Anatoly Dobrynin]] that the U.S. would remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey "within a short time after this crisis was over."{{sfn|Giglio|2006|pp=225–226}} On October 28, Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the missile sites, subject to UN inspections.{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=426}} The U.S. publicly promised never to invade Cuba and privately agreed to remove its Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey, which were by then obsolete and had been supplanted by submarines equipped with [[UGM-27 Polaris]] missiles.{{sfn|Kenney|2000|pp=184–186}}

In the aftermath, a [[Moscow–Washington hotline]] was established to ensure clear communications between the leaders of the two countries.{{Sfn|Herring|2008|p=723}} This crisis brought the world closer to nuclear war than at any point before or after, but "the humanity" of Khrushchev and Kennedy prevailed.{{sfn|Kenney|2000|p=189}} The crisis improved the image of American willpower and the president's credibility. Kennedy's approval rating increased from 66% to 77% immediately thereafter.{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=425}}