Golda Meir

===Yom Kippur War (1973)===
{{Main|Yom Kippur War}}
[[File:President Nixon, Henry Kissinger and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, meeting in the Oval Office 1973.gif|thumb|US President [[Richard Nixon]] and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir meeting on March 1, 1973, in the Oval Office. Nixon's National Security Advisor [[Henry Kissinger]] is to the right of Nixon.]]
A common criticism of Meir is that she could have avoided the [[Yom Kippur War]] in 1973. For months preceding the attack, Egyptian President [[Anwar Sadat]] made repeated overtures for peace in exchange for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, but these gestures were rebuffed by Meir, who had offered previously to discuss ceding "most of the Sinai", but was not willing to restore the pre-1967 borders, and Egypt had no interest in peace talks under Meir's conditions.<ref name="TOIGM">{{cite web|url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/new-biopic-seeks-to-counter-notion-that-golda-chiefly-to-blame-for-yom-kippur-war/|title='Golda' biopic aims to counter notion that PM was chiefly to blame for Yom Kippur War|work=The Times of Israel|accessdate=28 August 2023|date=26 August 2023}}</ref> As the nation's leader during this short war, her main goal was deciding on the timing of preliminary operations, and providing the IDF with the necessary time and munitions to pull off a victory.<ref>Hagai Tsoref, "Golda Meir's Leadership in the Yom Kippur War." ''Israel Studies'' 23.1 (2018): 50-72.</ref> 

In the days leading up to the Yom Kippur War, Israeli intelligence could not conclusively determine that an attack was imminent. However, on 5 October 1973, Meir received information that Syrian forces were massing on the [[Golan Heights]]. She was alarmed by the reports, and believed that the situation was similar to what preceded the Six-Day War. However, her advisers counseled her not to worry, saying they would have adequate notice before any war broke out. This made sense at the time; after the [[Six Day War]], most in the Israeli intelligence community considered the Arabs unprepared to launch another attack.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Riedel |first1=Bruce |title=Enigma: The anatomy of Israel's intelligence failure almost 45 years ago |url=https://www.brookings.edu/articles/enigma-the-anatomy-of-israels-intelligence-failure-almost-45-years-ago/ |website=Brookings |publisher=Brookings Institution |access-date=29 August 2023 |date=25 September 2017}}</ref> Consequently, although the Knesset passed a resolution granting her power to demand a full-scale call-up of the military (instead of the typical cabinet decision), Meir did not mobilize Israel's forces early. Soon, though, the threat of war became very clear. Six hours before the outbreak of hostilities, Meir met with Minister of Defense [[Moshe Dayan]] and General [[David Elazar]]. While Dayan continued to argue that war was unlikely and favored calling up the air force and only two divisions, Elazar advocated full-scale army mobilization and the launch of a full-scale preemptive strike on Syrian forces.<ref>[http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/9565.html Interview with Abraham Rabinovich: The Yom Kippur War as a Turning Point], History News Network</ref>

On October 6, Meir approved full-scale mobilizing but rejected a preemptive strike, citing concerns that Israel might be perceived as initiating hostilities, which would hurt Israel's access to crucial foreign aid and military support, in particular from the United States, in the resulting conflict. She made it a priority to inform Washington of her decision. U.S. Secretary of State [[Henry Kissinger]] later confirmed Meir's assessment by stating that if Israel had launched a preemptive strike, Israel would not have received the backing of the United States.<ref name=ml/><ref>[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-10.pdf "The October War and U.S. Policy"], National Security Archive, declassified archival records, George Washington University</ref>