Free will

====Mind–body problem====
{{Main|Mind–body problem}}
{{See also|Philosophy of mind|Dualism (philosophy of mind)|Monism|Physicalism}}
[[File:Frans Hals - Portret van René Descartes.jpg|thumb|upright|[[René Descartes]]]]

The idea of ''free will'' is one aspect of the [[mind–body problem]], that is, consideration of the relation between [[mind]] (for example, consciousness, memory, and judgment) and body (for example, the [[human brain]] and [[nervous system]]). [[Philosophy of Mind|Philosophical models of mind]] are divided into [[Physicalism|physical]] and non-physical expositions.

[[Dualism (philosophy of mind)#Substance dualism|Cartesian dualism]] holds that the mind is a nonphysical substance, the seat of consciousness and intelligence, and is not identical with physical states of the brain or body. It is suggested that although the two worlds do interact, each retains some measure of autonomy. Under cartesian dualism external mind is responsible for bodily action, although unconscious brain activity is often caused by external events (for example, the instantaneous reaction to being burned).<ref name=Peruzzi>See for example: {{cite book |title=Mind and Causality |chapter=Chapter 5: Mental causation and intentionality in a mind naturalizing theory |author=Sandro Nannini |editor=Alberto Peruzzi |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zYEPifPTQK4C&pg=PA75 |pages=69 ''ff'' |isbn=978-1-58811-475-4 |publisher=John Benjamins Publishing |year=2004}}</ref> Cartesian dualism implies that the physical world is not deterministic&nbsp;– and in which external mind controls (at least some) physical events, providing an interpretation of [[incompatibilism|incompatibilist]] free will. Stemming from Cartesian dualism, a formulation sometimes called ''[[Dualism (philosophy of mind)#Interactionism|interactionalist dualism]]'' suggests a two-way interaction, that some physical events cause some mental acts and some mental acts cause some physical events. One modern vision of the possible separation of mind and body is the [[Popper's three worlds|"three-world" formulation]] of [[Karl Popper|Popper]].<ref name=Popper>{{cite book |title=All Life is Problem Solving |chapter=Notes of a realist on the body-mind problem |author=Karl Raimund Popper |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Pa3cZYwdq28C&pg=PA23 |pages=23 ''ff'' |isbn=978-0-415-17486-2 |year=1999 |publisher=Psychology Press |quote=The body-mind relationship...includes the problem of man's position in the physical world...'World 1'. The world of conscious human processes I shall call 'World 2', and the world of the objective creations of the human mind I shall call 'World 3'. |edition=A lecture given in Mannheim, 8 May 1972}}</ref> Cartesian dualism and Popper's three worlds are two forms of what is called [[epistemological pluralism]], that is the notion that different epistemological methodologies are necessary to attain a full description of the world. Other forms of epistemological pluralist dualism include [[psychophysical parallelism]] and [[epiphenomenalism]]. Epistemological pluralism is one view in which the mind-body problem is ''not'' reducible to the concepts of the natural sciences.

A contrasting approach is called [[physicalism]]. Physicalism is a [[philosophical theory]] holding that everything that [[existence|exists]] is no more extensive than its [[physical properties]]; that is, that there are no non-physical substances (for example physically independent minds). Physicalism can be reductive or non-reductive. [[Reductive physicalism]] is grounded in the idea that everything in the world can actually be reduced analytically to its fundamental physical, or material, basis. Alternatively, [[non-reductive physicalism]] asserts that mental properties form a separate ontological class to physical properties: that mental states (such as [[qualia]]) are not ontologically reducible to physical states. Although one might suppose that mental states and neurological states are different in kind, that does not rule out the possibility that mental states are correlated with neurological states. In one such construction, [[anomalous monism]], mental events [[Supervenience|''supervene'']] on physical events, describing the [[emergence]] of mental properties correlated with physical properties&nbsp;– implying causal reducibility. Non-reductive physicalism is therefore often categorised as [[property dualism]] rather than [[monism]], yet other types of property dualism do not adhere to the causal reducibility of mental states (see epiphenomenalism).

[[Incompatibilism]] requires a distinction between the mental and the physical, being a commentary on the incompatibility of (determined) physical reality and one's presumably distinct experience of will. Secondarily, [[metaphysical libertarianism|metaphysical libertarian]] free will must assert influence on physical reality, and where mind is responsible for such influence (as opposed to ordinary system randomness), it must be distinct from body to accomplish this. Both substance and property dualism offer such a distinction, and those particular models thereof that are not causally inert with respect to the physical world provide a basis for illustrating incompatibilist free will (i.e. interactionalist dualism and non-reductive physicalism).

It has been noted that the [[Physical law|laws of physics]] have yet to resolve the [[hard problem of consciousness]]:<ref name=Kalat>
See {{cite encyclopedia |title=The hard problem of consciousness |author=Josh Weisberg |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/hard-con/ |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}} or {{cite encyclopedia |title=Consciousness: §9.9 Non-physical theories |chapter-url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#NonPhyThe |author=Robert Van Gulick |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition) |editor=Edward N. Zalta |date=Jan 14, 2014|chapter=Consciousness |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }}
</ref> "Solving the hard problem of consciousness involves determining how physiological processes such as ions flowing across the nerve membrane ''cause'' us to have experiences."<ref name=Goldstein>
{{cite book |title=Sensation and Perception |author=E. Bruce Goldstein |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2tW91BWeNq4C&pg=PA39 |page=39 |isbn=978-0-495-60149-4 |publisher=Cengage Learning |year=2010 |edition=12th }}
</ref> According to some, "Intricately related to the hard problem of consciousness, the hard problem of free will represents ''the'' core problem of conscious free will: Does conscious volition impact the material world?"<ref name=Baumeister2>{{cite book |title=Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will |chapter=The hazards of claiming to have solved the hard problem of free will |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_t4k_r7-2jgC&pg=PA183 |pages=183, 190–93 |editor1=John Baer |editor2=James C. Kaufman |editor3=Roy F. Baumeister |author1=Azim F Shariff |author2=Jonathan Schooler |author3=Kathleen D Vohs |isbn=978-0-19-518963-6 |year=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press}}
</ref> Others however argue that "[[consciousness]] plays a far smaller role in human life than Western culture has tended to believe."<ref name=illusion>
Quote from {{cite book |chapter-url=https://www.google.com/search?q=consciousness%2Bplays%2Ba%2Bsmaller%2Brole%2Bin%2Bhuman%2Blife+intitle:User+intitle:illusion |title=The user illusion: Cutting consciousness down to size |author=Tor Nørretranders |isbn=978-0-14-023012-3 |chapter=Preface |page= ix |publisher=Penguin Books |year=1998 |edition=Jonathan Sydenham translation of ''Maerk verden'' 1991}}
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