Ontological argument Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ==Criticisms and objections== ===Gaunilo<!--linked from 'Gaunilo of Marmoutiers'-->=== One of the earliest recorded objections to Anselm's argument was raised by one of Anselm's contemporaries, [[Gaunilo of Marmoutiers]]. He invited his reader to conceive an island "more excellent" than any other island. He suggested that, according to Anselm's proof, this island must necessarily exist, as an island that exists would be more excellent.<ref name="Problems and arguments">{{cite book | title=Philosophical problems and arguments: an introduction | publisher=Hackett Publishing | year=1992 | pages=[https://archive.org/details/philosophicalpro00corn/page/254 254]–256 | isbn=978-0-87220-124-8 | url=https://archive.org/details/philosophicalpro00corn | url-access=registration | quote=gaunilo. | last1=Cornman | first1=James W. | last2=Lehrer | first2=Keith | last3=Sotiros Pappas | first3=George}}</ref> Gaunilo's criticism does not explicitly demonstrate a flaw in Anselm's argument; rather, it argues that if Anselm's argument is sound, so are many other arguments of the same [[logical form]], which cannot be accepted.<ref>{{Cite book| first=John | last=Cottingham | title=Descartes | isbn=978-0-631-15046-6 |page=62 | year=1986 | publisher=Blackwell Publishing}}</ref> He offered a further criticism of Anselm's ontological argument, suggesting that the notion of God cannot be conceived, as Anselm had asserted. He argued that many [[theism|theists]] would accept that God, by nature, cannot be fully comprehended. Therefore, if humans cannot fully conceive of God, the ontological argument cannot work.<ref>{{cite book | title=God, reason and theistic proofs | publisher=Edinburgh University Press | author=Davis, Stephen T. | year=1997 | pages=27–28 | isbn=978-0-7486-0799-0 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=n4zqh10IXXsC&q=gaunilo&pg=PA28}}</ref> Anselm responded to Gaunilo's criticism by arguing that the argument applied only to concepts with [[Metaphysical necessity|necessary existence]]. He suggested that only a being with necessary existence can fulfill the remit of "that than which nothing greater can be conceived". Furthermore, a contingent object, such as an island, could always be improved and thus could never reach a state of perfection. For that reason, Anselm dismissed any argument that did not relate to a being with necessary existence.<ref name="Problems and arguments" /> Other parodies have been presented, including the devil [[corollary]], the no devil corollary and the extreme no devil corollary. The devil corollary proposes that a being than which nothing worse can be conceived exists in the understanding (sometimes the term lesser is used in place of worse). Using Anselm's logical form, the parody argues that if it exists in the understanding, a worse being would be one that exists in reality; thus, such a being exists. The no devil corollary is similar, but argues that a worse being would be one that does not exist in reality, so does not exist. The extreme no devil corollary advances on this, proposing that a worse being would be that which does not exist in the understanding, so such a being exists neither in reality nor in the understanding. [[Timothy Chambers]] argued that the devil corollary is more powerful than Gaunilo's challenge because it withstands the challenges that may defeat Gaunilo's parody. He also claimed that the extreme no devil corollary is a strong challenge, as it "underwrites" the no devil corollary, which "threatens Anselm's argument at its very foundations".<ref>{{cite book | title=Arguing About Gods | publisher=Cambridge University Press | author=Oppy, Graham | year=2006 | isbn=978-0-521-86386-5}}</ref> ===Thomas Aquinas=== [[Thomas Aquinas]], while proposing [[Quinque viae|five proofs]] of God's existence in his ''[[Summa Theologica]]'', objected to Anselm's argument. He suggested that people cannot know the nature of God and, therefore, cannot conceive of God in the way Anselm proposed.<ref>{{cite book | title=Ontological Arguments and Belief in God | publisher=Cambridge University Press | author=Oppy, Graham | year=2007 | pages=122–123 | isbn=978-0-521-03900-0 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qg0spmMuC98C&q=ontological+argument+thomas+aquinas&pg=PA122}}</ref> The ontological argument would be meaningful only to someone who understands the essence of God completely. Aquinas reasoned that, as only God can completely know His essence, only He could use the argument.<ref>{{Cite web |title=SUMMA THEOLOGIAE: The existence of God (Prima Pars, Q. 2) |url=https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm |access-date=2023-11-17 |website=www.newadvent.org}}</ref> His rejection of the ontological argument led other Catholic theologians to also reject the argument.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title=The Existence of God |encyclopedia=The Catholic Encyclopedia |url=http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608b.htm#IBf |access-date=2007-01-19 |last=Toner |first=P. J.}}</ref> ===David Hume=== [[File:David Hume.jpg|thumb|upright=0.7|right|David Hume reasoned that an ontological argument was not possible.]] Scottish philosopher and empiricist [[David Hume]] argued that nothing can be proven to exist using only ''a priori'' reasoning.<ref name="Stanford Hume">{{cite web | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-religion/ | title=Hume on Religion | publisher=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=4 October 2005 | access-date=2011-10-16 | author=Russell, Paul}}</ref> In his ''[[Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion]]'', the character Cleanthes proposes a criticism: {{Quote|...there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments ''a priori''. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent. There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no being, whose existence is demonstrable.<ref>{{cite wikisource |title=Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion/Part 9 |last=Hume |first=David |authorlink=David Hume |year=1776}}</ref>|author=David Hume|title=Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion|source=Part 9}} Hume also suggested that, as we have no abstract idea of existence (apart from as part of our ideas of other objects), we cannot claim that the idea of God implies his existence. He suggested that any conception of God we may have, we can conceive either of existing or of not existing. He believed that existence is not a quality (or perfection), so a completely perfect being need not exist. Thus, he claimed that it is not a contradiction to deny God's existence.<ref name="Stanford Hume" /> Although this criticism is directed against a [[Cosmological argument#Argument from contingency|cosmological argument]], similar to that of [[Samuel Clarke]] in his first [[Boyle Lectures|Boyle Lecture]], it has been applied to ontological arguments as well.<ref>{{Cite web| url=http://www.philosophyofreligion.info/theistic-proofs/the-ontological-argument/st-anselms-ontological-argument/hume-on-a-priori-existential-proofs/ | first=Tim | last=Holt | title=The Ontological Argument: Hume on ''a priori'' Existential Proofs}}</ref> ===Immanuel Kant=== [[File:Kant foto.jpg|thumb|upright=0.7|left|Immanuel Kant proposed that existence is not a predicate.]] [[Immanuel Kant]] put forward an influential criticism of the ontological argument in his ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]''.<ref name="KdrV">{{Cite book |last=Kant |first=Immanuel |title=Critique of Pure Reason |publisher=Macmillan and Company Limited |others=Norman Kemp Smith |year=1958 |edition=2nd |location=London, England |pages=500–507 |orig-year=1787}} (first edition, pp. 592–603; second edition, pp. 620–631).</ref> His criticism is primarily directed at Descartes, but also attacks Leibniz. It is shaped by his central [[Analytic–synthetic distinction|distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions]]. In an analytic proposition, the predicate concept is contained in its subject concept; in a synthetic proposition, the predicate concept is not contained in its subject concept. Kant questions the intelligibility of the concept of a necessary being. He considers examples of necessary propositions, such as "a triangle has three angles", and rejects the transfer of this logic to the [[existence of God]]. First, he argues that such necessary propositions are necessarily true only if such a being exists: ''If'' a triangle exists, it must have three angles. The necessary proposition, he argues, does not make the existence of a triangle necessary. Thus he argues that, if the proposition "X exists" is posited, it would follow that, ''if'' X exists, it exists necessarily; this does not mean that X exists in reality.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-metaphysics | title=Kant's Critique of Metaphysics | publisher=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=February 28, 2004| access-date=2011-10-30 | author=Grier, Michelle}}</ref> Second, he argues that contradictions arise only when the predicate is rejected but the subject is maintained and, therefore, a judgement of non-existence cannot be a contradiction, as it denies the subject.<ref name="KdrV" /> Kant then proposes that the statement "God exists" must be analytic or synthetic—the predicate must be inside or outside of the subject, respectively. If the proposition is analytic, as the ontological argument takes it to be, then the statement would be true only because of the meaning given to the words. Kant claims that this is merely a tautology and cannot say anything about reality. However, if the statement is synthetic, the ontological argument does not work, as the existence of God is not contained within the definition of God (and, as such, evidence for God would need to be found).<ref>{{cite book | title=Philosophy for Understanding Theology | publisher=Westminster John Knox Press | year=2007 |page=165 | isbn=978-0-664-23180-4 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Mc5wweqfm-gC&q=kant+%22ontological+argument%22+tautology&pg=PA165 | last1=Allen | first1=Diogenes | last2=Springsted | first2=Eric O.}}</ref> Kant goes on to write, "'being' is evidently not a real predicate"<ref name="KdrV" /> and cannot be part of the concept of something. He proposes that existence is not a predicate, or quality. This is because existence does not add to the essence of a being, but merely indicates its occurrence in reality. He states that by taking the subject of God with all its predicates and then asserting that God exists, "I add no new predicate to the conception of God". He argues that the ontological argument works only if existence is a predicate; if this is not so, he claims the ontological argument is invalidated, as it is then conceivable a completely perfect being doesn't exist.<ref name="IEP" /> In addition, Kant claims that the concept of God is not one of a particular sense; rather, it is an "object of pure thought".<ref name="KdrV" /> He asserts that God exists outside the realm of experience and nature. Because we cannot experience God through experience, Kant argues that it is impossible to know how we would verify God's existence. This is in contrast to material concepts, which can be verified by means of the senses.<ref>{{cite book | title=Kant's doctrine of transcendental illusion | publisher=Cambridge University Press | author=Grier, Michelle | year=2001 |page=258 | isbn=978-0-521-66324-3 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=jjiIyXvOPAwC&q=kant+ontological+argument+%22object+of+pure+thought%22&pg=PA258}}</ref> ===Douglas Gasking=== Australian philosopher Douglas Gasking (1911–1994) developed a version of the ontological argument meant to prove God's non-existence. It was not intended to be serious; rather, its purpose was to illustrate the problems Gasking saw in the ontological argument.<ref name="grey">{{Cite journal |last=Grey |first=William |year=2000 |title=Gasking's Proof |url=http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/gasking.pdf |url-status=dead |journal=Analysis |volume=60 |issue=4 |pages=368–370 |doi=10.1111/1467-8284.00257 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080407211249/http://www.uq.edu.au/~pdwgrey/pubs/gasking.pdf |archive-date=2008-04-07 |access-date=2006-01-15}}</ref> Gasking asserted that the creation of the world is the most marvellous achievement imaginable. The merit of such an achievement is the product of its quality and the creator's disability: the greater the disability of the creator, the more impressive the achievement. Non-existence, Gasking asserts, would be the greatest handicap. Therefore, if the universe is the product of an existent creator, we could conceive of a greater being—one which does not exist. A non-existent creator is greater than one which exists, so God does not exist. Gasking's proposition that the greatest disability would be non-existence is a response to Anselm's assumption that existence is a predicate and perfection. Gasking uses this logic to assume that non-existence must be a disability.<ref name="grey" /> Graham Oppy criticized the argument, viewing it as a weak parody of the ontological argument. He stated that, although it may be accepted that it would be a greater achievement for a non-existent creator to create something than a creator who exists, there is no reason to assume that a non-existent creator would be a greater being. He continued by arguing that there is no reason to view the creation of the world as "the most marvellous achievement imaginable". Finally, he stated that it may be inconceivable for a non-existent being to create anything at all.<ref name="oppy" /> === William L. Rowe === American philosopher of religion [[William L. Rowe]] notably believed that the structure of the ontological argument was such that it inherently [[Begging the question|begs the question]] of God's existence, that is to say, that one must have a presupposed belief in God's existence in order to accept the argument's conclusion. To illustrate this, Rowe devises the concept of a "unicornex," defined as a "unicorn that actually exists." Note that some possible object is a ''unicorn'', but since in fact ''no unicorns exist'', no possible object is a unicornex. Thus, in order to know that unicornexes are possible, you must know that unicornexes exist. Rowe believes that this is analogous to the ontological argument's conception of God in the formulation of the greatest conceivable being: the greatest conceivable being is an omnipotent, omnipowerful, supremely perfect, ''existing'' being. Nothing in that definition explicitly demonstrates existence, it is simply added on as a necessary philosophical quality in the same sense that the unicornex is given the quality of existence as well. Therefore, to Rowe, there is no way to know the existence of the greatest conceivable being without already knowing that he exists—the definition simply begs the question.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Davis |first=Stephen T. |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/38224686 |title=God, reason and theistic proofs |date=1997 |publisher=W. B. Eerdmans |isbn=0-8028-4450-2 |location=Grand Rapids, Michigan |language=en-us |oclc=38224686}}</ref> ===Coherence of a maximally great being=== In his development of the ontological argument, Leibniz attempted to demonstrate the coherence of a supremely perfect being.<ref name="oppy" /> C. D. Broad countered that if two characteristics necessary for God's perfection are incompatible with a third, the notion of a supremely perfect being becomes incoherent. The ontological argument assumes the definition of God purported by [[classical theism]]: that God is [[omnipotent]], [[omniscient]], and morally perfect.<ref name="IEP">{{cite web|title=Ontological Argument|url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/#H4|author=Himma, Kenneth Einnar|date=16 November 2001|publisher=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|at=Chapter 4, section IV|access-date=2012-01-03}}</ref> [[Kenneth Einar Himma]] claimed that omniscience and omnipotence may be incompatible: if God is omnipotent, then he should be able to create a being with free will; if he is omniscient, then he should know exactly what such a being will do (which may technically render them without free will). This analysis would render the ontological argument incoherent, as the characteristics required of a maximally great being cannot coexist in one being, thus such a being could not exist.<ref name="IEP" /> ===Bertrand Russell=== [[Bertrand Russell]], during his early [[Hegelianism|Hegelian]] phase, accepted the argument; he once exclaimed: "Great God in Boots!—the ontological argument is sound!"<ref>Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, vol. 1, 1967.</ref> However, he later criticized the argument, asserting that "the argument does not, to a modern mind, seem very convincing, but it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies." He drew a distinction between existence and essence, arguing that the essence of a person can be described and their existence still remain in question.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Russell |first=Bertrand |title=History of Western Philosophy |title-link=History of Western Philosophy (Russell) |publisher=[[Simon & Schuster|Touchstone]] |year=1972 |isbn=978-0-671-20158-6 |page=[https://archive.org/details/historyofwestern00russ/page/536 536] |author-link=Bertrand Russell}} (Book 3, Part 1, Section 11).</ref> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page