Free will

====Theological determinism====
{{Main|Theological determinism}}

[[Theological determinism]] is a form of [[determinism]] stating that all events that happen are pre-ordained, or [[predestination|predestined]] to happen, by a [[monotheism|monotheistic]] [[deity]], or that they are destined to occur given its [[omniscience]]. Two forms of theological determinism exist, here referenced as strong and weak theological determinism.<ref name=JordanTate2004>{{cite book|author1=Anne Lockyer Jordan|author2=Anne Lockyer Jordan Neil Lockyer Edwin Tate|author3=Neil Lockyer|author4=Edwin Tate|title=Philosophy of Religion for A Level OCR Edition|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uBVuNip8qjkC|access-date=22 December 2012|year=2004|publisher=Nelson Thornes|isbn=978-0-7487-8078-5|page=211}}</ref>
* The first one, strong theological determinism, is based on the concept of a [[creator deity]] dictating all events in history: "everything that happens has been predestined to happen by an omniscient, omnipotent divinity."<ref name=Iannone2001>{{cite book|author=A. Pabl Iannone|title=Dictionary of World Philosophy|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7wBmBO3vpE4C|access-date=22 December 2012|year=2001|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=978-0-415-17995-9|page=194|chapter=determinism}}</ref>
* The second form, weak theological determinism, is based on the concept of divine foreknowledge&nbsp;– "because [[God]]'s omniscience is perfect, what God knows about the future will inevitably happen, which means, consequently, that the future is already fixed."<ref name=Huyssteen2003>{{cite book|author=Wentzel Van Huyssteen|title=Encyclopedia of science and religion|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HIcYAAAAIAAJ|access-date=22 December 2012|volume=1|year=2003|publisher=Macmillan Reference|isbn=978-0-02-865705-9|page=217|chapter=theological determinism}}</ref>

There exist slight variations on the above categorisation. Some claim that theological determinism requires [[predestination]] of all events and outcomes by the divinity (that is, they do not classify the weaker version as 'theological determinism' unless libertarian free will is assumed to be denied as a consequence), or that the weaker version does not constitute 'theological determinism' at all.<ref name=VanArragon2010>{{cite book|author=Raymond J. VanArragon|title=Key Terms in Philosophy of Religion|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JyTohO1AMzwC|access-date=22 December 2012|year=2010|publisher=Continuum International Publishing Group|isbn=978-1-4411-3867-5|page=21}}</ref> Theological determinism can also be seen as a form of [[causal determinism]], in which the antecedent conditions are the nature and will of God.<ref name=stanfordmoralresponsibility>{{cite encyclopedia|last=Eshleman |first=Andrew |editor=Edward N. Zalta | title=Moral Responsibility | encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy| edition=Winter 2009 | year=2009 | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/determinism-causal}}</ref> With respect to free will and the classification of theological compatibilism/incompatibilism below, "theological determinism is the thesis that God exists and has infallible knowledge of all true propositions including propositions about our future actions," more minimal criteria designed to encapsulate all forms of theological determinism.<ref name="stanfordincompatibilismarguments"/>

[[File:TheologicalDeterminismXFreeWill.svg|thumb|A simplified [[taxonomy (general)|taxonomy]] of philosophical positions regarding free will and theological determinism<ref name="stanfordforeknowledge" />]]
There are various implications for [[metaphysical libertarianism|metaphysical libertarian]] free will as consequent of theological determinism and its philosophical interpretation.
* Strong theological determinism is not compatible with metaphysical libertarian free will, and is a form of ''hard theological determinism'' (equivalent to theological fatalism below). It claims that free will does not exist, and ''God'' has absolute control over a person's actions. Hard theological determinism is similar in implication to [[hard determinism]], although it does not invalidate [[compatibilism|compatibilist]] free will.<ref name=stanfordforeknowledge /> Hard theological determinism is a form of theological incompatibilism (see figure, top left).
* Weak theological determinism is either compatible or incompatible with metaphysical libertarian free will depending upon one's philosophical interpretation of [[omniscience]]&nbsp;– and as such is interpreted as either a form of hard theological determinism (known as [[theological fatalism]]), or as ''soft theological determinism'' (terminology used for clarity only). Soft theological determinism claims that humans have free will to choose their actions, holding that God, while [[omniscience|knowing their actions before they happen]], does not affect the outcome. God's providence is "compatible" with voluntary choice. Soft theological determinism is known as theological compatibilism (see figure, top right). A rejection of theological determinism (or [[omniscience|divine foreknowledge]]) is classified as theological incompatibilism also (see figure, bottom), and is relevant to a more general discussion of free will.<ref name="stanfordforeknowledge"/>

The basic argument for theological fatalism in the case of weak theological determinism is as follows:
# Assume divine foreknowledge or [[omniscience]]
# [[infallibility|Infallible]] foreknowledge implies destiny (it is known for certain what one will do)
# Destiny eliminates alternate possibility (one cannot do otherwise)
# Assert incompatibility with metaphysical libertarian free will

This argument is very often accepted as a basis for theological incompatibilism: denying either libertarian free will or divine foreknowledge (omniscience) and therefore theological determinism. On the other hand, theological compatibilism must attempt to find problems with it. The formal version of the argument rests on a number of premises, many of which have received some degree of contention. Theological compatibilist responses have included:
* Deny the truth value of [[Problem of future contingents|future contingents]], although this denies foreknowledge and therefore theological determinism.
* Assert differences in non-temporal knowledge (space-time independence), an approach taken for example by [[Boethius]],<ref>{{cite book | author=Boethius | title=The Consolation of Philosophy | chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/theconsolationof14328gut | chapter=Book V, Prose vi}}</ref> [[Thomas Aquinas]],<ref>{{cite book | author=Aquinas, St. Thomas | title=Summa Theologica | chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.126741 | chapter=Ia, q. 14, art 13.| year=1923 }} See [[Summa Theologica]]</ref> and [[C.S. Lewis]].<ref>{{cite book | author=C.S. Lewis | title=Mere Christianity | publisher=Touchstone:New York | year=1980 | page=149}}</ref>
* Deny the Principle of [[Alternative Possibilities|Alternate Possibilities]]: "If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely." For example, a human observer could in principle have a machine that could detect what will happen in the future, but the existence of this machine or their use of it has no influence on the outcomes of events.<ref name=zagzebski1991>{{cite book|author=Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski|title=The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0v9nLMBtGYcC|access-date=22 December 2012|year=1996|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-510763-0|chapter=chapter 6, section 2.1}}</ref>

In the definition of [[compatibilism]] and [[incompatibilism]], the literature often fails to distinguish between physical determinism and higher level forms of determinism (predeterminism, theological determinism, etc.) As such, hard determinism with respect to theological determinism (or "Hard Theological Determinism" above) might be classified as hard incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism (if no claim was made regarding the internal causality or determinism of the universe), or even compatibilism (if freedom from the constraint of determinism was not considered necessary for free will), if not hard determinism itself. By the same principle, metaphysical libertarianism (a form of incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism) might be classified as compatibilism with respect to theological determinism (if it was assumed such free will events were pre-ordained and therefore were destined to occur, but of which whose outcomes were not "predestined" or determined by God). If hard theological determinism is accepted (if it was assumed instead that such outcomes were predestined by God), then metaphysical libertarianism is not, however, possible, and would require reclassification (as hard incompatibilism for example, given that the universe is still assumed to be indeterministic&nbsp;– although the classification of hard determinism is technically valid also).<ref name=VanArragon2010 />