Richard Nixon

=== Foreign policy ===

{{Main|Foreign policy of the Richard Nixon administration}}

==== China ====
{{Main|1972 visit by Richard Nixon to China}}
{{multiple image
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| image1            = Nixon shakes hands with Chou En-lai.jpg
| caption1          = President Nixon shakes hands with Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]] upon arriving in Beijing, 1972.
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| caption2          = Nixon and Zhou Enlai toast during Nixon's 1972 visit to China.
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Nixon laid the groundwork for his overture to China before he became president, writing in ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'' a year before his election: "There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation."{{sfn|Miller Center}} Among the reasons that Nixon sought to improve relations with China was in the hope of weakening the Soviet Union and decreasing China's support to the North in the Vietnam War.<ref name="Lampton23">{{Cite book |last=Lampton |first=David M. |title=Living U.S.-China relations: From Cold War to Cold War |date=2024 |publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] |isbn=978-1-5381-8725-8 |location=Lanham, MD |page=23 |author-link=David M. Lampton}}</ref> Nixon ultimately used the idea of gaining leverage against the Soviet Union through relations with China to obtain the support of key conservative figures including Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan.<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Minami |first=Kazushi |title=People's Diplomacy: How Americans and Chinese Transformed US-China Relations during the Cold War |date=2024 |publisher=[[Cornell University Press]] |isbn=9781501774157 |location=Ithaca, NY |pages=38}}</ref>

Assisting him in pursuing relations with China was [[Henry Kissinger]], Nixon's [[National Security Advisor (United States)|National Security Advisor]] and future [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]]. They collaborated closely, bypassing Cabinet officials. With relations between the Soviet Union and China at a nadir—[[Sino-Soviet border conflict|border clashes between the two]] took place during Nixon's first year in office—Nixon sent private word to the Chinese that he desired closer relations. A breakthrough came in early 1971, when [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) [[Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party|chairman]] [[Mao Zedong]] invited a team of American table tennis players [[Ping-pong diplomacy|to visit China and play against top Chinese players]]. Nixon followed up by sending Kissinger to China for clandestine meetings with Chinese officials.{{sfn|Miller Center}} On July 15, 1971, with announcements from Washington and Beijing, it was learned that the President would visit China the following February.{{sfn|Ambrose|1989|p=453}} The secrecy had allowed both sets of leaders time to prepare the political climate in their countries for the visit.{{r|Goh-Small}}

In February 1972, Nixon and his wife traveled to China after Kissinger briefed Nixon for over 40&nbsp;hours in preparation.{{sfn|Black|p=778}} Upon touching down, the President and First Lady emerged from [[Air Force One]] and were greeted by Chinese Premier [[Zhou Enlai]]. Nixon made a point of shaking Zhou's hand, something which then-Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] had refused to do in 1954 when the two met in Geneva.{{sfn|PBS, The Nixon Visit}} More than a hundred television journalists accompanied the president. On Nixon's orders, television was strongly favored over printed publications, as Nixon felt that the medium would capture the visit much better than print. It also gave him the opportunity to snub the print journalists he despised.{{sfn|PBS, The Nixon Visit}}

[[File:President Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong.jpg|thumb|left|{{center|[[Mao Zedong]] and Nixon}}]]

Nixon and Kissinger immediately met for an hour with CCP Chairman [[Mao Zedong]] and Premier Zhou at Mao's official private residence, where they discussed a range of issues.{{sfn|Black|pp=780–782}} Mao later told his doctor that he had been impressed by Nixon's forthrightness, unlike the leftists and the Soviets.{{sfn|Black|pp=780–782}} He said he was suspicious of Kissinger,{{sfn|Black|pp=780–782}} though the National Security Advisor referred to their meeting as his "encounter with history".{{sfn|PBS, The Nixon Visit}} A formal banquet welcoming the presidential party was given that evening in the [[Great Hall of the People]]. The following day, Nixon met with Zhou; the [[Shanghai Communiqué|joint communique]] following this meeting recognized Taiwan as a part of China and looked forward to a peaceful solution to the problem of reunification.{{sfn|Ambrose|1989|p=516}} When not in meetings, Nixon toured architectural wonders, including the [[Forbidden City]], the [[Ming tombs]], and the [[Great Wall of China|Great Wall]].{{sfn|PBS, The Nixon Visit}} Americans took their first glance into everyday Chinese life through the cameras that accompanied Pat Nixon, who toured the city of Beijing and visited communes, schools, factories, and hospitals.{{sfn|PBS, The Nixon Visit}}

The visit ushered in a new era of [[China–United States relations|US–China relations]].{{sfn|Nixon Library, President}} Fearing the possibility of a US–China alliance, the Soviet Union yielded to pressure for [[détente]] with the United States.{{sfn|Dallek|p=300}} This was one component of [[triangular diplomacy]].<ref>{{cite web|title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume I Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972|url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/i/21100.htm|website=2001-2009.state.gov}}</ref>

==== Vietnam War ====
{{Main|Vietnam War|Vietnamization|Role of the United States in the Vietnam War}}
[[File:NixononCambodia.jpg|thumb|left|Nixon delivers an address to the nation about the incursion in Cambodia.]]

When Nixon took office, about 300 American soldiers were dying each week in Vietnam,<ref>{{cite web | url = http://www.americanwarlibrary.com/vietnam/vwc24.htm | title = Vietnam War Deaths and Casualties By Month | access-date = June 22, 2012 | publisher = The American War Library | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131204020044/http://www.americanwarlibrary.com/vietnam/vwc24.htm | archive-date = December 4, 2013 | url-status = live }}</ref> and the war was widely unpopular in the United States, the subject of ongoing violent protests. The Johnson administration had offered to suspend bombing unconditionally in exchange for negotiations, but to no avail. According to Walter Isaacson, Nixon concluded soon after taking office that the Vietnam War could not be won, and he was determined to end it quickly.{{sfn|Drew|p=65}} He sought an arrangement that would permit American forces to withdraw while leaving South Vietnam secure against attack.{{sfn|Black|p=569}}

Nixon approved a secret [[Boeing B-52 Stratofortress|B-52]] carpet bombing campaign of North Vietnamese and [[Khmer Rouge]] positions in Cambodia beginning in March 1969 and code-named [[Operation Menu]], without the consent of Cambodian leader [[Norodom Sihanouk]].{{sfn|Black|p=591}}<ref name="Kiernan"/><ref>{{cite book|last=Clymer|first=Kenton|title=The United States and Cambodia, 1969–2000: A Troubled Relationship|publisher=[[Routledge]]|year=2013|isbn=978-1-134-34156-6|pages=14–16}}</ref> In mid-1969, Nixon began efforts to negotiate peace with the North Vietnamese, sending a personal letter to their leaders, and peace talks began in Paris. Initial talks did not result in an agreement,{{sfn|Ambrose|1989|pp=281–283}} and in May 1969 he publicly proposed to withdraw all American troops from South Vietnam provided North Vietnam did so, and suggesting South Vietnam hold internationally supervised elections with [[Viet Cong]] participation.<ref>[http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2047&st=&st1= Address to the Nation on Vietnam] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304043247/http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2047&st=&st1= |date=March 4, 2016 }} May 14, 1969</ref>

[[File:President Richard Nixon greets a U.S. Army 1st Infantry Division Soldier.jpg|thumb|upright|Nixon visits American troops in South Vietnam, July 30, 1969.]]

In July 1969, Nixon visited [[South Vietnam]], where he met with his U.S. military commanders and President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu. Amid protests at home demanding an immediate pullout, he implemented a strategy of replacing American troops with [[Army of the Republic of Vietnam|Vietnamese troops]], known as "[[Role of United States in the Vietnam War#Vietnamization, 1969–1975|Vietnamization]]".{{sfn|Nixon Library, President}} He soon instituted phased U.S. troop withdrawals,{{sfn|''Time''|1971-04-05}} but also authorized incursions into Laos, in part to interrupt the [[Ho Chi Minh trail]] passing through Laos and Cambodia and used to supply North Vietnamese forces. In March 1970, at the explicit request of the Khmer Rouge and negotiated by [[Pol Pot]]'s then-second-in-command, [[Nuon Chea]], North Vietnamese troops launched an offensive and overran much of Cambodia.<ref>{{cite book|first=Dmitry |last=Mosyakov |chapter=The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists: A History of Their Relations as Told in the Soviet Archives |editor-first=Susan E. |editor-last=Cook |title=Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda |series=Yale Genocide Studies Program Monograph Series |issue=1 |date=2004 |page=54ff |chapter-url=http://www.yale.edu/gsp/publications/Mosyakov.doc |quote=In April–May 1970, many North Vietnamese forces entered Cambodia in response to the call for help addressed to Vietnam not by Pol Pot, but by his deputy Nuon Chea. Nguyen Co Thach recalls: 'Nuon Chea has asked for help and we have liberated five provinces of Cambodia in ten days.' |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130309074636/http://www.yale.edu/gsp/publications/Mosyakov.doc |archive-date=March 9, 2013}}</ref> Nixon announced the [[Cambodian campaign|ground invasion of Cambodia]] on April 30, 1970, against North Vietnamese bases in the east of the country,{{sfn|AP/''St. Peterburg Independent''}} and further protests erupted against perceived expansion of the conflict, which resulted in Ohio National Guardsmen killing four unarmed students at [[Kent State shootings|Kent State University]].<ref>{{cite book|last=Gitlin|first=Todd|title=The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage|url=https://archive.org/details/sixtiesyearsofho00gitl|url-access=registration|publisher=Bantam Books|year=1987|isbn=978-0-553-37212-0|page=[https://archive.org/details/sixtiesyearsofho00gitl/page/410 410]}}</ref> Nixon's responses to protesters included [[Richard Nixon's visit to the Lincoln Memorial|an impromptu, early morning meeting with them]] at the [[Lincoln Memorial]] on May 9, 1970.{{r|Safire pp205–209}}{{sfn|UPI/''Beaver County Times''|1970-05-09}}{{sfn|Black|pp=675–676}} Nixon's campaign promise to curb the war, contrasted with the escalated bombing, led to claims that Nixon had a "[[credibility gap]]" on the issue.{{sfn|''Time''|1971-04-05}} It is estimated that between 50,000 and 150,000 people were killed during the [[Operation Freedom Deal|bombing of Cambodia]] between 1970 and 1973.<ref name="Kiernan">{{cite magazine|last1=Owen|first1=Taylor|last2=Kiernan|first2=Ben|title=Bombs Over Cambodia|magazine=The Walrus|date=October 2006|url=http://www.yale.edu/cgp/Walrus_CambodiaBombing_OCT06.pdf|pages=32–36|access-date=January 29, 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160420220434/http://www.yale.edu/cgp/Walrus_CambodiaBombing_OCT06.pdf|archive-date=April 20, 2016|url-status=live}} Kiernan and Owen later revised their estimate of 2.7 million tons of U.S. bombs dropped on Cambodia down to the previously accepted figure of roughly 500,000 tons: See {{cite web|authorlink1=Ben Kiernan|last1=Kiernan|first1=Ben|last2=Owen|first2=Taylor|url=http://apjjf.org/2015/13/16/Ben-Kiernan/4313.html|title=Making More Enemies than We Kill? Calculating U.S. Bomb Tonnages Dropped on Laos and Cambodia, and Weighing Their Implications|work=The Asia-Pacific Journal|date=April 26, 2015|access-date=November 15, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150912002843/http://www.yale.edu/cgp/Walrus_CambodiaBombing_OCT06.pdf|archive-date=September 12, 2015|url-status=live}}</ref>

In 1971, excerpts from the "[[Pentagon Papers]]", which had been leaked by [[Daniel Ellsberg]], were published by ''[[The New York Times]]'' and ''[[The Washington Post]]''. When news of the leak first appeared, Nixon was inclined to do nothing; the Papers, a history of United States' involvement in Vietnam, mostly concerned the lies of prior administrations and contained few real revelations. He was persuaded by Kissinger that the Papers were more harmful than they appeared, and the President tried to prevent publication, but the Supreme Court [[New York Times Co. v. United States|ruled in favor of]] the newspapers.{{sfn|Ambrose|1989|pp=446–448}}

As U.S. troop withdrawals continued, [[Conscription in the United States|conscription]] was phased out by 1973, and the armed forces became all-volunteer.{{sfn|Evans}} After years of fighting, the [[Paris Peace Accords]] were signed at the beginning of 1973. The agreement implemented a cease fire and allowed for the withdrawal of remaining American troops without requiring withdrawal of the 160,000 [[North Vietnam Army]] regulars located in the South.{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|pp=53–55}} Once American combat support ended, there was a brief truce, before fighting resumed, and North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam in 1975.{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|p=473}}

==== Latin American policy ====
{{See also|U.S. intervention in Chile#1973 coup|Operation Condor}}
[[File:Gustavo Diaz Ordaz Richard Nixon San Diego.jpg|thumb|Nixon with Mexican president [[Gustavo Díaz Ordaz]] (to his right); motorcade in San Diego, California, September 1970]]

Nixon had been a firm supporter of Kennedy during the 1961 [[Bay of Pigs Invasion]] and 1962 [[Cuban Missile Crisis]]. On taking office in 1969, he stepped up covert operations against Cuba and its president, [[Fidel Castro]]. He maintained close relations with the Cuban-American exile community through his friend, [[Charles Rebozo|Bebe Rebozo]], who often suggested ways of irritating Castro. The Soviets and Cubans became concerned, fearing Nixon might attack Cuba and break the understanding between Kennedy and Khrushchev that ended the missile crisis. In August 1970, the Soviets asked Nixon to reaffirm the understanding, which he did, despite his hard line against Castro. The process was not completed before the Soviets began expanding their base at the Cuban port of [[Cienfuegos]] in October 1970. A minor confrontation ensued, the Soviets stipulated they would not use Cienfuegos for submarines bearing ballistic missiles, and the final round of diplomatic notes were exchanged in November.{{sfn|Ambrose|1989|pp=379–383}}

The election of Marxist candidate [[Salvador Allende]] as [[President of Chile]] in September 1970 spurred a vigorous campaign of covert opposition to him by Nixon and Kissinger.<ref name="The Pinochet File">{{cite book|last=Kornbluh|first=Peter|title=The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability|year=2003|publisher=The New Press|location=New York|isbn=978-1-56584-936-5}}</ref>{{rp|25}} This began by trying to convince the Chilean congress to confirm [[Jorge Alessandri]] as the winner of the election, and then messages to military officers in support of a coup.<ref name="The Pinochet File"/> Other support included strikes organized against Allende and funding for Allende opponents. It was even alleged that "Nixon personally authorized" $700,000 in covert funds to print anti-Allende messages in a prominent Chilean newspaper.<ref name="The Pinochet File"/>{{rp|93}} Following an extended period of social, political, and economic unrest, General [[Augusto Pinochet]] assumed power in a violent [[1973 Chilean coup d'état|coup d'état]] on September 11, 1973; among the [[Death of Salvador Allende|dead was Allende]].{{sfn|Black|p=921}}

==== Soviet Union ====
[[File:Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon talks in 1973.png|thumb|Nixon with Brezhnev during the Soviet leader's trip to the U.S., 1973]]

Nixon used the improving international environment to address the topic of nuclear peace. Following the announcement of his visit to China, the Nixon administration concluded negotiations for him to visit the Soviet Union. The President and First Lady arrived in Moscow on May 22, 1972, and met with [[Leonid Brezhnev]], the [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary of the Communist Party]]; [[Alexei Kosygin]], the [[Premier of the Soviet Union|Chairman of the Council of Ministers]]; and [[Nikolai Podgorny]], the [[List of heads of state of the Soviet Union|Chairman]] of the [[Presidium of the Supreme Soviet]], among other leading Soviet officials.{{sfn|BBC|1972-05-22}}

Nixon engaged in intense negotiations with Brezhnev.{{sfn|BBC|1972-05-22}} Out of the summit came agreements for increased trade and two landmark arms control treaties: [[SALT I]], the first comprehensive limitation pact signed by the two superpowers,{{sfn|Nixon Library, President}} and the [[Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty]], which banned the development of systems designed to intercept incoming missiles. Nixon and Brezhnev proclaimed a new era of "peaceful coexistence". A banquet was held that evening at the [[Kremlin]].{{sfn|BBC|1972-05-22}}

Nixon and Kissinger planned to link arms control to détente and to the resolution of other urgent problems through what Nixon called "[[Linkage (policy)|linkage.]]" David Tal argues:
{{blockquote|The linkage between strategic arms limitations and outstanding issues such as the Middle East, Berlin and, foremost, Vietnam thus became central to Nixon's and Kissinger's policy of détente. Through the employment of linkage, they hoped to change the nature and course of U.S. foreign policy, including U.S. nuclear disarmament and arms control policy, and to separate them from those practiced by Nixon's predecessors. They also intended, through linkage, to make U.S. arms control policy part of détente{{nbsp}}... His policy of linkage had in fact failed. It failed mainly because it was based on flawed assumptions and false premises, the foremost of which was that the Soviet Union wanted strategic arms limitation agreement much more than the United States did.<ref>David Tal, " 'Absolutes' and 'Stages' in the Making and Application of Nixon's SALT Policy." ''Diplomatic History'' 37.5 (2013): 1090–1116, quoting pp 1091, 1092. Nixon himself later wrote, "[W]e decided to link progress in such areas of Soviet concern as strategic arms limitation and increased trade with progress in areas that were important to us—Vietnam, the Mideast, and Berlin. This concept became known as linkage." {{cite book|author=Richard Nixon|title=RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UyfcLYY9F0gC&pg=RA1-PT388|year=1978|page=346|publisher=Simon and Schuster|isbn=978-1-4767-3183-4}}{{Dead link|date=March 2024 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>}}

Seeking to foster better relations with the United States, China and the Soviet Union both cut back on their diplomatic support for North Vietnam and advised Hanoi to come to terms militarily.{{sfn|Gaddis|pp=294, 299}} Nixon later described his strategy:
{{blockquote|I had long believed that an indispensable element of any successful peace initiative in Vietnam was to enlist, if possible, the help of the Soviets and the Chinese. Though rapprochement with China and détente with the Soviet Union were ends in themselves, I also considered them possible means to hasten the end of the war. At worst, Hanoi was bound to feel less confident if Washington was dealing with Moscow and Beijing. At best, if the two major Communist powers decided that they had bigger fish to fry, Hanoi would be pressured into negotiating a settlement we could accept.{{sfn|Nixon|1985|pp=105–106}}
}}
In 1973, Nixon encouraged the [[Export–Import Bank of the United States|Export-Import Bank]] to finance in part a trade deal with the Soviet Union in which [[Armand Hammer]]'s [[Occidental Petroleum]] would export [[phosphate]] from Florida to the Soviet Union, and import Soviet [[ammonia]]. The deal, valued at $20 billion over 20 years, involved the construction of two major Soviet port facilities at [[Odessa]] and [[Ventspils]],<ref>{{cite news|last=Smith|first=Hedrick|date=June 29, 1974|title=OCCIDENTAL SIGNS DEAL WITH SOVIET|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1974/06/29/archives/occidental-signs-deal-with-soviet-4-contracts-are-activated-in-a.html|access-date=December 6, 2021|issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{cite news|date=November 29, 1981|title=THE RIDDLE OF ARMAND HAMMER|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/29/magazine/the-riddle-of-armand-hammer.html|access-date=December 6, 2021|issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref name="Rich">{{cite news|last=Rich|first=Spencer|date=October 4, 1979|title=Soviets Dumping Ammonia, ITC Says|language=en-US|newspaper=Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1979/10/04/soviets-dumping-ammonia-itc-says/4d53c7fa-6c89-470b-b8f0-5aced1b92513/|access-date=December 7, 2021|issn=0190-8286}}</ref> and a pipeline connecting four ammonia plants in the greater [[Volga]] region to the port at Odessa.<ref name="Rich"/> In 1973, Nixon announced his administration was committed to seeking [[most favored nation]] trade status with the USSR,<ref>{{cite news|date=October 5, 1973|title=NIXON IN APPEAL ON SOVIET TRADE|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1973/10/05/archives/nixon-in-appeal-on-soviet-trade-urges-congress-to-include.html|access-date=December 7, 2021|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> which was challenged by Congress in the [[Jackson–Vanik amendment|Jackson-Vanik Amendment]].<ref>{{cite book|last=Herring|first=George C.|url=https://archive.org/details/fromcolonytosupe00herr|title=From Colony to Superpower; U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776|date=2008|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-507822-0|pages=804}}</ref>

During the previous two years, Nixon had made considerable progress in U.S.–Soviet relations, and he embarked on a second trip to the Soviet Union in 1974.{{sfn|Black|p=963}} He arrived in Moscow on June 27 to a welcome ceremony, cheering crowds, and a state dinner at the [[Grand Kremlin Palace]] that evening.{{sfn|Black|p=963}} Nixon and Brezhnev met in [[Yalta]], where they discussed a proposed mutual defense pact, détente, and [[MIRV]]s. Nixon considered proposing a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but he felt he would not have time to complete it during his presidency.{{sfn|Black|p=963}} There were no significant breakthroughs in these negotiations.{{sfn|Black|p=963}}

==== Middle Eastern policy ==== 
{{anchor|Middle East policy}}
[[File:Dan Hadani collection (990045274210205171).jpg|thumb|alt=Nixon with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, June 1974. |Nixon with Israeli Prime Minister [[Golda Meir]], June 1974]]
[[File:Nixon Sadat.jpg|thumb|Nixon with President [[Anwar Sadat]] of Egypt, June 1974]]

As part of the [[Nixon Doctrine]], the U.S. avoided giving direct combat assistance to its allies and instead gave them assistance to defend themselves. During the Nixon administration, the U.S. greatly increased arms sales to the Middle East, particularly Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia.{{r|Hanhimäki-Small}} The Nixon administration strongly supported Israel, an American ally in the Middle East, but the support was not unconditional. Nixon believed Israel should make peace with its Arab neighbors and that the U.S. should encourage it. The president believed that—except during the [[Suez Crisis]]—the U.S. had failed to intervene with Israel, and should use the leverage of the large U.S. military aid to Israel to urge the parties to the negotiating table. The Arab-Israeli conflict was not a major focus of Nixon's attention during his first term—for one thing, he felt that no matter what he did, American Jews would oppose his reelection.{{efn|name=Jewish vote}}

On October 6, 1973, an Arab coalition led by Egypt and Syria, supported with arms and materiel by the Soviet Union, attacked Israel in the [[Yom Kippur War]]. Israel suffered heavy losses and Nixon ordered an airlift to resupply Israeli losses, cutting through inter-departmental squabbles and bureaucracy and taking personal responsibility for any response by Arab nations. More than a week later, by the time the U.S. and Soviet Union began [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 338|negotiating a truce]], Israel had penetrated deep into enemy territory. The truce negotiations rapidly escalated into a superpower crisis; when Israel gained the upper hand, Egyptian President Sadat requested a joint U.S.–USSR peacekeeping mission, which the U.S. refused. When Soviet Premier Brezhnev threatened to unilaterally enforce any peacekeeping mission militarily, Nixon ordered the U.S. military to [[DEFCON]]3,<ref name="fas-defcon">{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/defcon.htm|title=DEFCON DEFense CONdition|work=fas.org|access-date=June 17, 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150617123557/https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/c3i/defcon.htm|archive-date=June 17, 2015|url-status=live}}</ref> placing all U.S. military personnel and bases on alert for nuclear war. This was the closest the world had come to nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Brezhnev backed down as a result of Nixon's actions.{{sfn|Nixon|1978|pp=938–940}}

Because Israel's victory was largely due to U.S. support, the Arab OPEC nations retaliated by refusing to sell crude oil to the U.S., resulting in the [[1973 oil crisis]].{{sfn|Black|pp=923–928}} The embargo caused gasoline shortages and rationing in the United States in late 1973, and was eventually ended by the oil-producing nations as peace in the Middle East took hold.{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|p=311}}

After the war, and under Nixon's presidency, the U.S. reestablished relations with Egypt for the first time since 1967. Nixon used the Middle East crisis to restart [[List of Middle East peace proposals|the stalled Middle East Peace Negotiations]]; he wrote in a confidential memo to Kissinger on October 20:
<blockquote>I believe that, beyond a doubt, we are now facing the best opportunity we have had in 15 years to build a lasting peace in the Middle East. I am convinced history will hold us responsible if we let this opportunity slip by&nbsp;... I now consider a permanent Middle East settlement to be the most important final goal to which we must devote ourselves.<ref>Tyler, Patrick (2010), p. 161</ref></blockquote>

Nixon made one of his final international visits as president to the Middle East in June 1974, and became the first President to visit Israel.{{sfn|Black|pp=951–952, 959}}
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