Nigerian Civil War

===France===
France provided weapons, mercenary fighters, and other assistance to Biafra and promoted its cause internationally, describing the situation as a [[genocide]]. President [[Charles de Gaulle]] referred to "Biafra's just and noble cause".<ref name="Olawoyin1971pages137to139">Olawoyin, "Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict" (1971), pp. 137–139.</ref> However, France did not recognise Biafra diplomatically.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), pp. 114–115. "France, however, categorically refused to officially recognise Biafra, a possibility President Charles de Gaulle ruled out as early as 14 December 1967. At the same time it was well known that France was supporting Biafran leader General Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu with covert military aid throughout the war, including mercenaries and weapons."</ref> Through [[Pierre Laureys]], France had apparently provided two [[Douglas A-26 Invader|B-26]]s, [[Aérospatiale Alouette II|Alouette]] helicopters, and pilots.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 119. Foccart says de Gaulle's decision to send military assistance to Biafra was made on 27 September 1967, when the General met personally with Houphouët-Boigny, who was Biafra's most important African ally throughout the war. On 26 September, the Biafran capital, Enugu, was shelled for the first time by Federal Nigerian forces. The problem with this date is that it appears that France had already supplied Biafra with two B-26 aircraft, Alouette helicopters and pilots in summer 1967 via the French arms dealer [[Pierre Laureys]]. In 1971, however, Ralph Uwechue, Biafra's envoy to France, wrote that "the helicopters had been purchases made by the Eastern Nigerian Regional Government from France for civilian purposes well before the war."</ref> France supplied Biafra with captured German and Italian weapons from [[World War II]], sans serial numbers, delivered as part of regular shipments to [[Ivory Coast]].<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 122. "De Gaulle made the decision to begin regular French arms shipments to Biafra on 17 or 18 October 1967. De Gaulle was very reluctant to send weapons from French stocks, and only agreed when Foccart suggested sending captured German and Italian weapons from World War II with the serial number scratched off. The weapons would not be sent directly to Ojukwu, but would go through Houphouët-Boigny, so that it looked like France was replenishing the Ivory Coast's stocks as stipulated in the normal bilateral military assistance agreements."</ref> France also sold [[Panhard]] armoured vehicles to the Nigerian federal government.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 179. "France, too, pursued contradictory policies, selling Nigeria Panhard light armoured cars and halting all arms transfers to Lagos only later that year, by which time it was supplying the Biafrans via the Ivory Coast and Gabon. Clapham notes that France's military aid to Biafra prolonged the war for about eighteen months."</ref>

French involvement in the war can be viewed in the context of its geopolitical strategy (''[[Françafrique]]'') and competition with the British in [[West Africa]]. Nigeria represented a base of British influence in the predominantly French-aligned area. France and Portugal used nearby countries in their sphere of influence, especially Ivory Coast under President [[Félix Houphouët-Boigny]], as waystations for shipments to Biafra.<ref name="Olawoyin1971pages137to139"/><ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015)</ref> To some extent, also, France repeated its earlier policy from the [[Congo Crisis]], when it supported the secession of the southern mining province [[State of Katanga|Katanga]].<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), pp. 116–117. "The Katanga secession (1960–1963) was in many ways a precursor to the Biafran War for France. French mercenaries went to Katanga to support the Belgian intervention. The Belgians were helping Tshombé fight Congolese forces loyal to Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who was supported by the Soviet Union.{{nbsp}}... The Katangan secession was ultimately unsuccessful, and thus it is a surprise that de Gaulle's government would support another secession in Biafra four years later. A number of other countries also drew a link between the two conflicts, and Ojukwu released a statement on 11 January 1969 called 'Biafra: the antithesis of Katanga', to reassure foreign powers.{{nbsp}}... Katanga gave France experience in using mercenaries to fight a war in which the consequences of failure were minimal."</ref>

Economically, France gained incentives through oil drilling contracts for the ''Société Anonyme Française de Recherches et d'Exploitation de Pétrolières'' (SAFRAP), apparently arranged with Eastern Nigeria in advance of its secession from the Nigerian Federation.<ref>Griffin, ''French Military Policy in the Nigerian Civil War'' (2015), p. 118. "Nigeria, however, was very important for France due to its size as well as the oil in the Niger River Delta. France had no diplomatic relations with Nigeria after 1960, as Nigeria expelled the French ambassador, Raymond Offroy, following the third French nuclear test in Algeria on 27 December. The severing of diplomatic relations did not halt commercial relations between the two countries, and in 1964, the French national oil company, SAFRAP, was given the rights to search for oil in parts of Eastern Nigeria that would later declare independence under the name of Biafra."</ref><ref name="Olawoyin1971pages135to136">Olawoyin, "Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict" (1971), pp. 135–136. "The French policy may be described as anti-British, anti-Nigerian and pr-Biafra. SAFRAP (a French oil company) is exploring for oil in Biafra as well as in Nigeria. Although France has leaned toward Biafra, SAFRAP has vast exploration rights in the Northern Region; this might have prevented France giving Biafra political recognition.{{nbsp}}... The highlight of increasing world sympathy for Ojukwu was also motivated by the declaration by the French government that it endorsed the principle of Biafra's right to self-determination. Before the start of the Civil War, France had strengthened her economic ties with Biafra. On August 8th, F.G. showed some documents (photostat copies) to the foreign press showing that Biafra had sold oil concessions to France."</ref> SAFRAP laid claim to 7% of the Nigerian petroleum supply.<ref name="Uche2008pages120to124"/> In the assessment of a CIA analyst in 1970, France's "support was actually given to a handful of Biafran bourgeoisie in return for the oil. "<ref>"[https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve05p1/d160 Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency to the White House Situation Room]," CIA, 20262, TDCS DB – 315/00173-70 (ADVANCE), 14 January 1970, in FRUS, Vol. E-5, 2005 (160); as cited in Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 120.</ref> Biafra, for its part, openly appreciated its relationship with France. Ojukwu suggested on 10 August 1967, that Biafra introduce compulsory French classes in secondary, technical and teacher training schools, in order to "benefit from the rich culture of the French-speaking world".<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 119.</ref>

France led the way, internationally, for political support of Biafra.<ref name="Olawoyin1971pages135to136"/> [[Portugal]] also sent weapons. These transactions were arranged through the "Biafran Historical Research Centre" in Paris.<ref name="griffin">Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 122. "The most important dimension of French military assistance was the shipment of weapons to Biafra, which had severe shortages of not only heavy weapons, but also small arms and ammunition. Portugal also provided weapons to Biafra, as did Czechoslovakia, until the Soviet invasion in 1968. The Biafrans set up an office in Paris called the 'Biafran Historical Research Centre', which was Ojukwu's contact point with Mauricheau-Beupré, Falques and Denard. The Centre allowed Ojukwu to purchase arms directly from European arms dealers. Denard would purchase arms from Czechoslovakia and ship them by sea to Biafra via Libreville. Starting in October 1967, there were also direct Czech arms flights, by a network of pilots led by Jack Malloch, a Rhodesian in contact with Houphouët-Boigny and Mauricheau-Beupré."</ref> French-aligned [[Gabon]] and Ivory Coast recognised Biafra in May 1968.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 123.</ref> On 8 May 1968, De Gaulle personally contributed 30,000 francs to medicine purchases for the [[French Red Cross]] mission. [[May 1968 events in France|Fairly widespread student-worker unrest]] diverted the government's attention only temporarily. The government declared an arms embargo but maintained arms shipments to Biafra under cover of humanitarian aid.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 124. "In May and early June 1968, protests and general strikes in France prevented de Gaulle, Foccart or any other French official from following the situation in Biafra. On 12 June, after the riots had subsided, a French ministerial council decided to impose an official arms embargo on both Nigeria and Biafra, and to start providing direct humanitarian aid to Ojukwu. Robert explains that the humanitarian aid provided a very effective cover for the secret French arms shipments, which began to increase."</ref> In July the government redoubled its efforts to involve the public in a humanitarian approach to the conflict. Images of starving children and accusations of genocide filled French newspapers and television programs. Amidst this press blitz, on 31 July 1968, De Gaulle made an official statement in support of Biafra.<ref name="Griffin2015page124">Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), pp. 124–125. "The 31 July 1938 statement in favour of Biafra was preceded by a concerted campaign in the French press during the month of July to inform the French public about events in Biafra.{{nbsp}}... The French government's next step after the 31 July statement was to launch a major campaign to gain public funding for humanitarian operations in Biafra. The campaign was coordinated at the highest levels of government, and the French Foreign Ministry files make it clear that the French television service and the French Red Cross were required to get governmental approval to ask for funds. The French public eventually contributed 12,600,000 francs. The French press continued a concerted campaign throughout August 1968 to alert the public to the humanitarian situation."</ref> Maurice Robert, head of ''[[Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage]]'' (SDECE, the French foreign intelligence service) African operations, wrote in 2004 that his agency supplied the press with details about the war and told them to use the word "genocide" in their reporting.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 124. "Robert, in a surprising admission, stated that it was the SDECE that instructed the media to use the term 'genocide' in 1968. He says that the SDECE gave the French press precise information about Biafran casualties and civilian losses, and that ''Le Monde'' was the first to pick up the story. Rony Braumann wrote in 2006 that the SDECE paid the Biafran press service Markpress, located in Geneva, to introduce the theme of genocide to the general public."</ref>

France declared "Biafra Week" on 11–17 March 1969, centred on a 2-franc raffle held by the French Red Cross. Soon after, de Gaulle terminated arms shipments, then resigned on 27 April 1969. Interim president [[Alain Poher]] fired General [[Jacques Foccart]], the lead coordinator of France's Africa policy. [[Georges Pompidou]] re-hired Foccart and resumed support for Biafra, including cooperation with the South African secret service to import more weapons.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), pp. 127–128.</ref>