Epistemology Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ==Acquiring knowledge== ===Sources of knowledge=== {{Main|Knowledge#Sources of knowledge}} There are many proposed sources of knowledge and justified belief which we take to be actual sources of knowledge in our everyday lives. Some of the most commonly discussed include [[perception]], [[reason]], [[memory]], and [[Testimony#Philosophy|testimony]].<ref name="IEP Epistemology"/><ref name="SEP Epistemology"/> ===Important distinctions=== ====''A priori''–''a posteriori'' distinction==== {{Main|A priori and a posteriori}} As mentioned above, epistemologists draw a distinction between what can be known ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' (independently of experience) and what can only be known ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a posteriori]]'' (through experience). Much of what we call ''a priori'' knowledge is thought to be attained through reason alone, as featured prominently in [[rationalism]]. This might also include a non-rational faculty of [[intuition]], as defended by proponents of [[innatism]]. In contrast, ''a posteriori'' knowledge is derived entirely through experience or as a result of experience, as emphasized in [[empiricism]]. This also includes cases where knowledge can be traced back to an earlier experience, as in memory or testimony.<ref name="SEP apriori"/> A way to look at the difference between the two is through an example. Bruce Russell gives two propositions in which the reader decides which one he believes more.{{clarify|date=July 2020}} Option A: All crows are birds. Option B: All crows are black. If you believe option A, then you are ''a priori'' justified in believing it because you do not have to see a crow to know it is a bird. If you believe in option B, then you are ''a posteriori'' justified to believe it because you have seen many crows therefore knowing they are black. He goes on to say that it does not matter if the statement is true or not, only that if you believe in one or the other that matters.<ref name="SEP apriori"/> The idea of ''a priori'' knowledge is that it is based on intuition or rational insights. Laurence BonJour says in his article "The Structure of Empirical Knowledge",<ref>BonJour, Laurence, 1985, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.</ref> that a "rational insight is an immediate, non-inferential grasp, apprehension or 'seeing' that some proposition is necessarily true" (p. 3). Going back to the crow example, by Laurence BonJour's definition the reason you would believe in option A is because you have an immediate knowledge that a crow is a bird, without ever experiencing one. [[Evolutionary psychology]] takes a novel approach to the problem. It says that there is an innate predisposition for certain types of learning. "Only small parts of the brain resemble a [[tabula rasa]]; this is true even for human beings. The remainder is more like an exposed negative waiting to be dipped into a developer fluid".<ref>Wilson, E.O., [[Sociobiology: The New Synthesis]]. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1975</ref> ====Analytic–synthetic distinction==== [[File:Immanuel Kant portrait c1790.jpg|thumb|The analytic–synthetic distinction was first proposed by [[Immanuel Kant]].]] {{Main|Analytic–synthetic distinction}} [[Immanuel Kant]], in his ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'', drew a distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic" propositions. He contended that some propositions are such that we can know they are true just by understanding their meaning. For example, consider, "My father's brother is my uncle." We can know it is true solely by virtue of our understanding in what its terms mean. Philosophers call such propositions "analytic". Synthetic propositions, on the other hand, have distinct subjects and predicates. An example would be, "My father's brother has black hair." Kant stated that all mathematical and scientific statements are synthetic a priori propositions because they are [[logical truth|necessarily true]], but our knowledge about the attributes of the mathematical or physical subjects we can only get by logical inference. While this distinction is first and foremost about [[Meaning (philosophy of language)|meaning]] and is therefore most relevant to the [[philosophy of language]], the distinction has significant epistemological consequences, seen most prominently in the works of the [[logical positivism|logical positivists]].<ref name="SEP Analytic Synthetic"/> In particular, if the set of propositions which can only be known ''a posteriori'' is coextensive with the set of propositions which are synthetically true, and if the set of propositions which can be known ''a priori'' is coextensive with the set of propositions which are analytically true (or in other words, which are true by definition), then there can only be two kinds of successful inquiry: Logico-mathematical inquiry, which investigates what is true by definition, and empirical inquiry, which investigates what is true in the world. Most notably, this would exclude the possibility that branches of philosophy like [[metaphysics]] could ever provide informative accounts of what actually exists.<ref name="SEP apriori"/><ref name="SEP Analytic Synthetic"/> The American philosopher [[Willard Van Orman Quine|W. V. O. Quine]], in his paper "[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]", famously challenged the analytic-synthetic distinction, arguing that the boundary between the two is too blurry to provide a clear division between propositions that are true by definition and propositions that are not. While some contemporary philosophers take themselves to have offered more sustainable accounts of the distinction that are not vulnerable to Quine's objections, there is no consensus about whether or not these succeed.<ref>Russell, G.: Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2008</ref> === Science as knowledge acquisition === {{Main|Philosophy of science}} Science is often considered to be a refined, formalized, systematic, institutionalized form of the pursuit and acquisition of [[empirical knowledge]]. As such, the [[philosophy of science]] may be viewed as an application of the principles of epistemology and as a foundation for epistemological inquiry.<ref name="Piaget1967"/> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page