Vietnam War

==Gulf of Tonkin and Johnson's escalation, 1963–1969==
{{Main|Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963–1969}}
{{Further|United States in the Vietnam War#Americanization}}
{{See also|January 1964 South Vietnamese coup|September 1964 South Vietnamese coup attempt|December 1964 South Vietnamese coup|1965 South Vietnamese coup}}

President Kennedy [[Assassination of John F. Kennedy|was assassinated]] on 22 November 1963. Vice President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] had not been heavily involved with policy toward Vietnam;<ref name="Karnow 1997 336_339">{{Harvnb|Karnow|1997|pp=336–339}}. Johnson viewed many members that he inherited from Kennedy's cabinet with distrust because he had never penetrated their circle during Kennedy's presidency; to Johnson's mind, those like [[W. Averell Harriman]] and [[Dean Acheson]] spoke a different language.</ref>{{Refn|group="A"|Shortly after the assassination of Kennedy, when [[McGeorge Bundy]] called Johnson on the phone, Johnson responded: "Goddammit, Bundy. I've told you that when I want you I'll call you."<ref>{{Cite book |last=VanDeMark |first=Brian |title=Into the Quagmire |date=1995 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York |page=13}}</ref>}} however, upon becoming president, Johnson immediately focused on the war. On 24 November 1963, he said, "the battle against communism{{Nbsp}}… must be joined{{Nbsp}}… with strength and determination."<ref>{{Harvnb|Karnow|1997|p=339}}. Before a small group, including Henry Cabot Lodge, the new president also said, "We should stop playing cops and robbers [a reference to Diệm's failed leadership] and get back to{{Nbsp}}... winning the war{{Nbsp}}... tell the generals in Saigon that Lyndon Johnson intends to stand by our word{{Nbsp}}... [to] win the contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy."</ref> Johnson knew he had inherited a rapidly deteriorating situation in South Vietnam,<ref name="Karnow 1997 339">{{Harvnb|Karnow|1997|p=339}}: "At a place called Hoa Phu, for example, the strategic hamlet built during the previous summer now looked like it had been hit by a hurricane.{{Nbsp}}... Speaking through an interpreter, a local guard explained to me that a handful of Viet Cong agents had entered the hamlet one night and told the peasants to tear it down and return to their native villages. The peasants complied without question."</ref> but he adhered to the widely accepted domino theory argument for defending the South: Should they retreat or appease, either action would imperil other nations beyond the conflict.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hunt |first=Michael |title=The World Transformed – 1945 to the Present |date=2016 |publisher=Oxford |isbn=978-0-19-937102-0 |location=New York |pages=169–171}}</ref> Findings from RAND's [[Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Project]] bolstered his confidence that an air war would weaken the Viet Cong. Some have argued that the policy of North Vietnam was not to topple other non-communist governments in South East Asia.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|48}}

The military revolutionary council, meeting in lieu of a strong South Vietnamese leader, was made up of 12 members. This council was headed by General [[Dương Văn Minh]], whom [[Stanley Karnow]], a journalist on the ground, later recalled as "a model of lethargy".<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|340}} Lodge, frustrated by the end of the year, cabled home about Minh: "Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?" Minh's regime was overthrown in January 1964 by General [[Nguyễn Khánh]].<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|341}} There was also persistent instability in the military, however, as several coups—not all successful—occurred in a short period of time.

===Gulf of Tonkin incident===
{{Main|Gulf of Tonkin incident}}
{{Further|Credibility gap}}

[[File:Bombing in Vietnam.jpg|thumb|upright|A U.S. [[Douglas B-66 Destroyer|B-66 Destroyer]] and four [[Republic F-105 Thunderchief|F-105 Thunderchiefs]] dropping bombs on [[North Vietnam]] during [[Operation Rolling Thunder]]]]

On 2 August 1964, {{USS|Maddox|DD-731|6}}, on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam's coast, allegedly fired upon and damaged several torpedo boats that had been stalking it in the Gulf of Tonkin.<ref name=Kolko/>{{Rp|124}} A second attack was reported two days later on {{USS|Turner Joy|DD-951|6}} and ''Maddox'' in the same area. The circumstances of the attacks were murky.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|218–219}} Lyndon Johnson commented to Undersecretary of State George Ball that "those sailors out there may have been shooting at flying fish."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Kutler |first=Stanley I. |title=Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War |date=1996 |publisher=Charles Scribner's Sons |isbn=978-0-13-276932-7 |page=249}}</ref> An undated [[National Security Agency|NSA]] publication declassified in 2005 revealed that there was no attack on 4 August.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Shane |first=Scott |date=31 October 2005 |title=Vietnam Study, Casting Doubts, Remains Secret |work=The New York Times] |url=https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/2005/10/31/politics/31war.html |url-status=live |access-date=4 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081211090222/http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/31/politics/31war.html?fta=y&pagewanted=all |archive-date=11 December 2008}}</ref>

The second "attack" led to [[Operation Pierce Arrow|retaliatory airstrikes]], and prompted Congress to approve the [[Gulf of Tonkin Resolution]] on 7 August 1964.<ref name="Moïse">{{Cite book |last=Moïse |first=Edwin E. |url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780807823002 |title=Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War |date=1996 |publisher=University of North Carolina Press |isbn=978-0-8078-2300-2 |url-access=registration}}</ref>{{Rp|78}} The resolution granted the president power "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression" and Johnson would rely on this as giving him authority to expand the war.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|221}} In the same month, Johnson pledged that he was not "committing American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land".<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|227}}

The [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]] recommended a three-stage escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. Following an [[Attack on Camp Holloway|attack on a U.S. Army base in Pleiku]] on 7 February 1965,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Simon |first=Dennis M. |date=August 2002 |title=The War in Vietnam, 1965–1968 |url=http://faculty.smu.edu/dsimon/Change-Viet2.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090426064833/http://faculty.smu.edu/dsimon/Change-Viet2.html |archive-date=26 April 2009 |access-date=7 May 2009}}</ref> a series of airstrikes was initiated, [[Operation Flaming Dart]], while Soviet Premier [[Alexei Kosygin]] was on a [[state visit]] to North Vietnam. [[Operation Rolling Thunder]] and [[Operation Arc Light]] expanded aerial bombardment and ground support operations.{{Sfn|Nalty|1998|pp=97, 261}} The bombing campaign, which ultimately lasted three years, was intended to force North Vietnam to cease its support for the Viet Cong by threatening to destroy North Vietnamese air defenses and industrial infrastructure. It was additionally aimed at bolstering the morale of the South Vietnamese.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Tilford |first=Earl L. |url=https://media.defense.gov/2017/Apr/07/2001728434/-1/-1/0/B_0040_TILFORD_SETUP.PDF |title=Setup: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why |date=1991 |publisher=Air University Press |page=89|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404230151/https://media.defense.gov/2017/Apr/07/2001728434/-1/-1/0/B_0040_TILFORD_SETUP.PDF|archive-date=April 4, 2023}}</ref> Between March 1965 and November 1968, ''Rolling Thunder'' deluged the north with a million tons of missiles, rockets and bombs.<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|468}}

===Bombing of Laos===
{{Main|Laotian Civil War}}
Bombing was not restricted to North Vietnam. Other aerial campaigns, such as [[Operation Barrel Roll]], targeted different parts of the Viet Cong and PAVN infrastructure. These included the Ho Chi Minh trail supply route, which ran through Laos and Cambodia. The ostensibly neutral Laos had become [[Laotian Civil War|the scene of a civil war]], pitting the [[Kingdom of Laos|Laotian government]] backed by the US against the Pathet Lao and its North Vietnamese allies.

Massive aerial bombardment against the Pathet Lao and PAVN forces were carried out by the US to prevent the collapse of the Royal central government, and to deny the use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Between 1964 and 1973, the U.S. dropped two million tons of bombs on Laos, nearly equal to the 2.1&nbsp;million tons of bombs the U.S. dropped on Europe and Asia during all of World War II, making Laos the most heavily bombed country in history relative to the size of its population.<ref name="KiernanTaylor">{{Cite journal |last1=Kiernan |first1=Ben |author-link=Ben Kiernan |last2=Owen |first2=Taylor |date=26 April 2015 |title=Making More Enemies than We Kill? Calculating U.S. Bomb Tonnages Dropped on Laos and Cambodia, and Weighing Their Implications |url=http://apjjf.org/2015/13/16/Ben-Kiernan/4313.html |journal=The Asia-Pacific Journal |volume=13 |issue=17 |id=4313 |access-date=18 September 2016|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230326111723/https://apjjf.org/Ben-Kiernan/4313.html|archive-date=March 26, 2023}}</ref>

The objective of stopping North Vietnam and the Viet Cong was never reached. The [[Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force]] [[Curtis LeMay]], however, had long advocated saturation bombing in Vietnam and wrote of the communists that "we're going to bomb them back into the Stone Age".<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|328}}

===The 1964 offensive===
[[File:DongXoaiHuey-65a.JPG|thumb|ARVN Forces and a US Advisor inspect a downed helicopter, [[Battle of Dong Xoai]], June 1965]]

Following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Hanoi anticipated the arrival of US troops and began expanding the Viet Cong, as well as sending increasing numbers of North Vietnamese personnel southwards. At this phase they were outfitting the Viet Cong forces and standardizing their equipment with [[AK-47]] rifles and other supplies, as well as forming the [[9th Division (Vietnam)|9th Division]].<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|223}}<ref>{{Cite book |title=Vietnam War After Action Reports |publisher=BACM Research |page=[{{GBurl|id=Dch3m7u2K5YC|p=84}} 84] |language=en}}</ref> "From a strength of approximately 5,000 at the start of 1959 the Viet Cong's ranks grew to about 100,000 at the end of 1964{{Nbsp}}... Between 1961 and 1964 the Army's strength rose from about 850,000 to nearly a million men."{{Sfn|Demma|1989}} The numbers for U.S. troops deployed to Vietnam during the same period were much lower: 2,000 in 1961, rising rapidly to 16,500 in 1964.<ref name="Kahin">{{Cite book |last1=Kahin |first1=George |title=The United States in Vietnam: An analysis in depth of the history of America's involvement in Vietnam |last2=Lewis |first2=John W. |date=1967 |publisher=Delta Books}}</ref> During this phase, the use of captured equipment decreased, while greater numbers of ammunition and supplies were required to maintain regular units. Group 559 was tasked with expanding the Ho Chi Minh trail, in light of the near constant bombardment by US warplanes. The war had begun to shift into the final, conventional warfare phase of Hanoi's [[Viet Cong and PAVN strategy, organization and structure#The Protracted War conflict model|three-stage protracted warfare model]]. The Viet Cong was now tasked with destroying the ARVN and capturing and holding areas; however, the Viet Cong was not yet strong enough to assault major towns and cities.

In December 1964, ARVN forces had suffered heavy losses at the [[Battle of Bình Giã]],<ref>{{Cite book |last=Moyar |first=Mark |title=Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 |date=2006 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-86911-9 |page=[{{GBurl|id=phJrZ87RwuAC|p=339}} 339]}}</ref> in a battle that both sides viewed as a watershed. Previously, the VC had utilized hit-and-run guerrilla tactics. At Binh Gia, however, they had defeated a strong ARVN force in a conventional battle and remained in the field for four days.<ref name="McNeill">{{Cite book |last=McNeill |first=Ian |title=To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966 |date=1993 |publisher=Allen & Unwin |isbn=978-1-86373-282-6}}</ref>{{Rp|58}} Tellingly, South Vietnamese forces were again defeated in June 1965 at the [[Battle of Đồng Xoài]].<ref name=McNeill/>{{Rp|94}}

===American ground war===
{{See also|Buddhist Uprising}}
[[File:Vietcongsuspect.jpg|thumb|A Marine from [[1st Battalion, 3rd Marines]], moves a suspected Viet Cong during a search and clear operation held by the battalion {{Convert|15|mi|km|0}} west of [[Da Nang Air Base]], 1965.]]

On 8 March 1965, 3,500 [[United States Marine Corps|U.S. Marines]] were landed near [[Da Nang]], South Vietnam.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|246–247}} This marked the beginning of the American ground war. U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment.<ref>{{Cite web |date=17 October 2002 |title=Generations Divide Over Military Action in Iraq |url=http://www.people-press.org/2002/10/17/generations-divide-over-military-action-in-iraq |publisher=Pew Research Center|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20221121005317/https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2002/10/17/generations-divide-over-military-action-in-iraq/|archive-date=21 November 2022}}</ref> The Marines' initial assignment was the defense of [[Da Nang Air Base]]. The first deployment of 3,500 in March 1965 was increased to nearly 200,000 by December.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|349–351}} The U.S. military had long been schooled in offensive warfare. Regardless of political policies, U.S. commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited to a defensive mission.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|349–351}}

General [[William Westmoreland]] informed Admiral [[U. S. Grant Sharp Jr.]], commander of U.S. Pacific forces, that the situation was critical.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|349–351}} He said, "I am convinced that U.S. troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the NLF (Viet Cong)".<ref>United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, vol. 4, p. 7.</ref> With this recommendation, Westmoreland was advocating an aggressive departure from America's defensive posture and the sidelining of the South Vietnamese. By ignoring ARVN units, the U.S. commitment became open-ended.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|353}} Westmoreland outlined a three-point plan to win the war:
* Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. (and other allies) forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.
* Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would end when the enemy had been worn down, thrown on the defensive, and driven back from major populated areas.
* Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of twelve to eighteen months following Phase 2 would be required for the final destruction of enemy forces remaining in remote base areas.<ref>United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, vol. 5, pp. 8–9.</ref>

The plan was approved by Johnson and marked a profound departure from the previous administration's insistence that the government of South Vietnam was responsible for defeating the guerrillas. Westmoreland predicted victory by the end of 1967.<ref>United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, vol. 4, pp. 117–19. and vol. 5, pp. 8–12.</ref> Johnson did not, however, communicate this change in strategy to the media. Instead he emphasized continuity.<ref>''Public Papers of the Presidents, 1965.'' Washington, DC Government Printing Office, 1966, vol. 2, pp. 794–99.</ref> The change in U.S. policy depended on matching the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong in a contest of [[attrition warfare|attrition]] and [[morale]]. The opponents were locked in a cycle of [[Conflict escalation|escalation]].<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|353–354}} The idea that the government of South Vietnam could manage its own affairs was shelved.<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|353–354}} Westmoreland and McNamara furthermore touted the [[Body count#Vietnam War|body count]] system for gauging victory, a metric that would later prove to be flawed.<ref name=Mohr>{{Cite news |last=Mohr |first=Charles |date=16 May 1984 |title=McNamara on Record, Reluctantly, on Vietnam |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/16/us/mcnamara-on-record-reluctantly-on-vietnam.html|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404185613/https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/16/us/mcnamara-on-record-reluctantly-on-vietnam.html|archive-date=April 4, 2023}}</ref>

[[File:Vietnamese villagers suspected of being communists by the US Army - 1966.jpg|thumb|left|upright|Peasants suspected of being Viet Cong under detention of U.S. Army, 1966]]

The American buildup transformed the South Vietnamese economy and had a profound effect on society. South Vietnam was inundated with manufactured goods. Stanley Karnow noted that "the main PX [Post Exchange], located in the Saigon suburb of [[Cholon, Ho Chi Minh City|Cholon]], was only slightly smaller than the New York [[Bloomingdale's]]{{Nbsp}}..."<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|453}}

Washington encouraged its [[Southeast Asia Treaty Organization|SEATO]] allies to contribute troops. Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|556}} all agreed to send troops. South Korea would later ask to join the [[Many Flags]] program in return for economic compensation. Major allies, however, notably the [[NATO]] countries of Canada and the United Kingdom, declined Washington's troop requests.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Church |first=Peter |title=A Short History of South-East Asia |date=2006 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-470-82481-8 |page=193}}</ref>

The U.S. and its allies mounted complex [[search and destroy]] operations, designed to find enemy forces, destroy them, and then withdraw, typically using war [[helicopters]]. In November 1965, the U.S. engaged in its first major battle with the PAVN, the [[Battle of Ia Drang]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Galloway |first=Joseph |date=18 October 2010 |title=Ia Drang – The Battle That Convinced Ho Chi Minh He Could Win |url=http://www.historynet.com/ia-drang-where-battlefield-losses-convinced-ho-giap-and-mcnamara-the-u-s-could-never-win.htm |access-date=2 May 2016 |publisher=Historynet|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230322083652/https://www.historynet.com/ia-drang-where-battlefield-losses-convinced-ho-giap-and-mcnamara-the-u-s-could-never-win/?f|archive-date=March 22, 2023}}</ref> The operation was the first large scale helicopter air assault by the U.S., and first to employ [[Boeing B-52 Stratofortress]] strategic bombers in a tactical support role.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|284–285}} These tactics continued in 1966–1967 with operations such as [[Operation Masher|Masher]], [[Operation Thayer|Thayer]], [[Operation Attleboro|Attleboro]], [[Operation Cedar Falls|Cedar Falls]], and [[Operation Junction City|Junction City]]. However, the PAVN/VC insurgents remained elusive and demonstrated great tactical flexibility. By 1967, the war had generated large-scale internal refugees, numbering nearly 2.1&nbsp;million in South Vietnam, with 125,000 people evacuated and rendered homeless during Operation Masher alone,<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Ward |first1=Geoffrey C. |title=The Vietnam War: An Intimate History |last2=Burns |first2=Ken |date=5 September 2017 |publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group |isbn=978-1-5247-3310-0 |page=[{{GBurl|id=i4KyDQAAQBAJ|q=125}} 125] |language=en |quote=By the end of the year, more than 125,000 civilians in the province had lost their homes{{Nbsp}}...}}</ref> which was the largest search and destroy operation in the war up to that point.{{Citation needed|date=June 2022}} Operation Masher would have negligible impact, however, as the PAVN/VC returned to the province just four months after the operation ended.<ref name="Ward">{{Cite book |last1=Ward |first1=Geoffrey C. |title=The Vietnam War: An Intimate History |last2=Burns |first2=Ken |date=2017 |publisher=Alfred A. Knopf |isbn=978-0-307-70025-4}}</ref>{{Rp|153–156}} Despite the continual conductance of major operations, which the Viet Cong and PAVN would typically evade, the war was characterized by smaller-unit contacts or engagements.<ref name="GS">{{Cite book |title=The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition), Volume 4 |at=Section 4, pp. 277–604 |chapter=Chapter 2, US Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965–1968 |access-date=12 June 2018 |chapter-url=https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon4/pent9.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190626210700/https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon4/pent9.htm |archive-date=26 June 2019 |url-status=dead |via=International Relations Department, Mount Holyoke College}}</ref> Up to the war's end, the Viet Cong and PAVN would initiate 90% of large firefights, of which 80% were clear and well-planned operations, and thus the PAVN/Viet Cong would retain strategic initiative despite overwhelming US force and fire-power deployment.<ref name=GS/> The PAVN and Viet Cong had furthermore developed strategies capable of countering U.S. military doctrines and tactics (see [[NLF and PAVN battle tactics]]).

Meanwhile, the political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilize with the coming to power of prime minister Air Marshal [[Nguyễn Cao Kỳ]] and figurehead chief of state, General [[Nguyễn Văn Thiệu]], in mid-1965 at the head of a military junta. This ended a series of coups that had happened more than once a year. In 1967, Thieu became president with Ky as his deputy, after rigged elections. Although they were nominally a civilian government, Ky was supposed to maintain real power through a behind-the-scenes military body. However, Thieu outmanoeuvred and sidelined Ky by filling the ranks with generals from his faction. Thieu was also accused of murdering Ky loyalists through contrived military accidents. Thieu, mistrustful and indecisive, remained president until 1975, having won a [[1971 South Vietnamese presidential election|one-candidate election in 1971]].<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|706}}

[[File:NARA 111-CCV-529-CC38112 Ronald A. Payne checking tunnel entrance Operation Cedar Falls 1967.jpg|thumb|A US "[[tunnel rat]]" soldier prepares to enter a Viet Cong tunnel.]]

The Johnson administration employed a "policy of minimum candor"<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|18}} in its dealings with the media. Military information officers sought to manage media coverage by emphasizing stories that portrayed progress in the war. Over time, this policy damaged the public trust in official pronouncements. As the media's coverage of the war and that of the Pentagon diverged, a so-called [[credibility gap]] developed.<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|18}} Despite Johnson and Westmoreland publicly proclaiming victory and Westmoreland stating that the "end is coming into view",<ref>{{Cite news |title=TWE Remembers: General Westmoreland Says the "End Begins to Come Into View" in Vietnam |language=en |work=Council on Foreign Relations |url=https://www.cfr.org/blog/twe-remembers-general-westmoreland-says-end-begins-come-view-vietnam |access-date=12 June 2018|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230605025020/https://www.cfr.org/blog/twe-remembers-general-westmoreland-says-end-begins-come-view-vietnam|archive-date=June 5, 2023}}</ref> internal reports in the ''[[Pentagon Papers]]'' indicate that Viet Cong forces retained strategic initiative and controlled their losses. Viet Cong attacks against static US positions accounted for 30% of all engagements, Viet Cong/PAVN ambushes and encirclements for 23%, American ambushes against Viet Cong/PAVN forces for 9%, and American forces attacking Viet Cong emplacements for only 5% of all engagements.<ref name=GS/>

{| class="wikitable"
|+Types of Engagements, From Department of Defence Study 1967<ref name=GS/>
!TYPE OF ENGAGEMENTS IN COMBAT NARRATIVES
!Percentage of
Total Engagements
!Notes
|-
|Hot Landing Zone. VC/PAVN Attacks U.S. Troops As They Deploy
|12.5%
| rowspan="3" |Planned VC/PAVN Attacks
Are 66.2% Of All Engagements
|-
|Planned VC/PAVN Attack Against US Defensive Perimeter
|30.4%
|-
|VC/PAVN Ambushes or Encircles A Moving US Unit
|23.3%
|-
|Unplanned US Attacks On A VC/PAVN Defensive Perimeter,
Engagement A Virtual Surprise To US Commanders
|12.5%
|Defensive Posts Being Well Concealed
or VC/PAVN Alerted or Anticipated
|-
|Planned US Attack Against Known
VC/PAVN Defensive Perimeter
|5.4%
| rowspan="2" |Planned US Attacks Against
VC/PAVN Represent 14.3%

Of All Engagements
|-
|U.S. Forces Ambushes Moving VC/PAVN Units
|8.9%
|-
|Chance Engagement, Neither Side Planned
|7.1%
|
|}

===Tet Offensive===
[[File:T4 Vietcong Tet Offensive.jpg|thumb|Viet Cong before departing to participate in the Tet Offensive around Saigon-Gia Dinh]]
[[File:ARVN in action HD-SN-99-02062.JPEG|thumb|ARVN forces assault a stronghold in the [[Mekong Delta]].]]
{{Main|Tet Offensive|United States news media and the Vietnam War}}

In late 1967, the PAVN lured American forces into the hinterlands at [[Battle of Dak To|Đắk Tô]] and at the Marine [[Battle of Khe Sanh|Khe Sanh combat base]] in [[Quảng Trị Province]], where the U.S. fought a series of battles known as [[The Hill Fights]]. These actions were part of a diversionary strategy meant to draw U.S. forces towards the Central Highlands.<ref>{{Cite web |date=12 June 2006 |title=Interview with NVA General Tran Van Tra {{!}} HistoryNet |url=http://www.historynet.com/interview-with-nva-general-tran-van-tra.htm |access-date=1 June 2018 |website=www.historynet.com |language=en-US|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230409152943/https://www.historynet.com/interview-with-nva-general-tran-van-tra/?f|archive-date=April 9, 2023}}</ref> Preparations were underway for the ''General Offensive, General Uprising'', known as Tet Mau Than, or the [[Tet Offensive]], with the intention of [[Văn Tiến Dũng]] for forces to launch "direct attacks on the American and puppet nerve centers—Saigon, [[Huế]], Danang, all the cities, towns and main bases{{Nbsp}}..."<ref name="Wilson">{{Cite news |date=20 October 2014 |title=The Urban Movement and the Planning and Execution of the Tet Offensive |language=en |work=Wilson Center |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-urban-movement-and-the-planning-and-execution-the-tet-offensive |access-date=1 June 2018|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230409152950/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-urban-movement-and-the-planning-and-execution-the-tet-offensive|archive-date=April 9, 2023}}</ref> Le Duan sought to placate critics of the ongoing stalemate by planning a decisive victory.<ref name="Nguyen">{{Cite book |last=Nguyen |first=Lien-Hang T. |title=Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam |date=2012 |publisher=Univ of North Carolina Press |isbn=978-1-4696-2835-6}}</ref>{{Rp|90–94}} He reasoned that this could be achieved through sparking a general uprising within the towns and cities,<ref name=Nguyen/>{{Rp|148}} along with mass defections among ARVN units, who were on holiday leave during the truce period.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Wiest |first=Andrew |date=1 March 2018 |title=Opinion {{!}} The Tet Offensive Was Not About Americans |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/opinion/tet-offensive-americans-vietnam.html |access-date=1 June 2018 |issn=0362-4331|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230416233243/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/01/opinion/tet-offensive-americans-vietnam.html|archive-date=April 16, 2023}}</ref>

The Tet Offensive began on 30 January 1968, as over 100 cities were attacked by over 85,000 VC/PAVN troops, including assaults on key military installations, headquarters, and government buildings and offices, including the [[United States Embassy, Saigon|U.S. Embassy in Saigon]].<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|363–365}} U.S. and South Vietnamese forces were initially shocked by the scale, intensity and deliberative planning of the urban offensive, as infiltration of personnel and weapons into the cities was accomplished covertly;<ref name=Wilson/> the offensive constituted an [[intelligence failure]] on the scale of [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|Pearl Harbor]].<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|556}} Most cities were recaptured within weeks, except the former imperial capital of Huế in which PAVN/Viet Cong troops captured most of the city and citadel except the headquarters of the [[1st Division (South Vietnam)|1st Division]] and held on in the fighting for 26 days.<ref name="Bowden">{{Cite book |last=Bowden |first=Mark |title=Hue 1968 A turning point of the American war in Vietnam |date=2017 |publisher=Atlantic Monthly Press}}</ref>{{Rp|495}} During that time, they had [[Massacre at Huế|executed approximately 2,800 unarmed Huế]] civilians and foreigners they considered to be enemy's spies.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hosmer |first=Stephen T. |title=Viet Cong Repression and its Implications for the Future |date=1970 |publisher=Rand Corporation |pages=72–8}}</ref><ref name=Bowden/>{{Rp|495}} In the following [[Battle of Huế]] American forces employed massive firepower that left 80 percent of the city in ruins.<ref name=Kolko/>{{Rp|308–309}} Further north, at Quảng Trị City, the [[Republic of Vietnam Airborne Division|ARVN Airborne Division]], the 1st Division and a regiment of the US [[1st Cavalry Division (United States)|1st Cavalry Division]] had managed to hold out and overcome an assault intended to capture the city.<ref name="Villard">{{Cite book |last=Villard |first=Erik B. |url=https://history.army.mil/html/books/vietnam/tet_battles/tet.pdf |title=The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri City and Hue |date=2008 |publisher=U.S. Army Center of Military History |isbn=978-1-5142-8522-0|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230605173341/https://history.army.mil/html/books/vietnam/tet_battles/tet.pdf|archive-date=June 5, 2023}}</ref>{{Rp|}}<ref name="Ankony">{{Cite book |last=Ankony |first=Robert C. |title=Lurps: A Ranger's Diary of Tet, Khe Sanh, A Shau, and Quang Tri |date=2009 |publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group |isbn=978-0-7618-3281-2}}</ref>{{Rp|104}} In Saigon, Viet Cong/PAVN fighters had captured areas in and around the city, attacking key installations and the neighborhood of Cholon before US and ARVN forces dislodged them after three weeks.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|479}} During one battle, [[Peter Arnett]] reported an infantry commander saying of the [[Battle of Bến Tre]] (laid to rubble by U.S. attacks) that "it became necessary to destroy the village in order to save it."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Keyes |first=Ralph |url=https://archive.org/details/quoteverifierwho00keye |title=The Quote Verifier: Who Said What, Where, and When |date=2006 |publisher=St. Martin's Griffin |isbn=978-0-312-34004-9}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Weinraub |first=Bernard |date=8 February 1968 |title=Survivors Hunt Dead of Bentre, Turned to Rubble in Allied Raids |work=The New York Times |url=https://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0D1FFA3F541B7B93CAA91789D85F4C8685F9|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230409014500/https://www.nytimes.com/1968/02/08/archives/survivors-hunt-dead-of-bentre-turned-to-rubble-in-allied-raids.html|archive-date=April 9, 2023}}</ref>

[[File:Cholon after Tet Offensive operations 1968.jpg|thumb|The ruins of a section of Saigon, in the Cholon neighborhood, following fierce fighting between ARVN forces and Viet Cong Main Force battalions]]

During the first month of the offensive, 1,100 Americans and other allied troops, 2,100 ARVN and 14,000 civilians were killed.<ref name="Trieu">{{Cite journal |last=Triều |first=Họ Trung |date=5 June 2017 |title=Lực lượng chính trị và đấu tranh chính trị ở thị xã Nha Trang trong cuộc Tổng tiến công và nổi dậy Tết Mậu Thân 1968 |journal=Hue University Journal of Science: Social Sciences and Humanities |volume=126 |issue=6 |doi=10.26459/hujos-ssh.v126i6.3770 |doi-broken-date=31 January 2024 |issn=2588-1213}}</ref> By the end of the first offensive, after two months, nearly 5,000 ARVN and over 4,000 U.S. forces had been killed and 45,820 wounded.<ref name=Trieu/> The U.S. claimed 17,000 of the PAVN and Viet Cong had been killed and 15,000 wounded.<ref name=Ankony/>{{Rp|104}}<ref name=Villard/>{{Rp|82}} A month later a second offensive known as the [[May Offensive]] was launched; although less widespread, it demonstrated the Viet Cong were still capable of carrying out orchestrated nationwide offensives.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|488–489}} Two months later a third offensive was launched, the [[Phase III Offensive]]. The PAVN's own official records of their losses across all three offensives was 45,267 killed and 111,179 total casualties.<ref>{{Cite news |title=Tết Mậu Thân 1968 qua những số liệu |language=vi-VN |url=http://www.nhandan.com.vn/chinhtri/item/7976502-.html |access-date=1 June 2018|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230407184326/https://nhandan.vn/tet-mau-than-1968-qua-nhung-so-lieu-post484868.html|archive-date=April 7, 2023}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Eyraud |first=Henri |date=March 1987 |title=Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience. By Kolko Gabriel. [New York: Pantheon Books, 1985. 628 pp.] |journal=The China Quarterly |volume=109 |page=135 |doi=10.1017/s0305741000017653 |issn=0305-7410 |s2cid=154919829}}</ref> By then it had become the bloodiest year of the war up to that point. The failure to spark a general uprising and the lack of defections among the ARVN units meant both war goals of Hanoi had fallen flat at enormous costs.<ref name=Nguyen/>{{Rp|148–149}} By the end of 1968, the VC insurgents held almost no territory in South Vietnam, and their recruitment dropped by over 80%, signifying a drastic reduction in guerrilla operations, necessitating increased use of PAVN regular soldiers from the north.{{Sfn|Military History Institute of Vietnam|2002|pp=247–249}}

Prior to Tet, in November 1967, Westmoreland had spearheaded a public relations drive for the Johnson administration to bolster flagging public support.<ref name="Witz">{{Cite book |last=Witz |title=The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War |date=1994 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-0-8014-8209-0 |pages=1–2}}</ref> In a speech before the [[National Press Club (United States)|National Press Club]] he said a point in the war had been reached "where the end comes into view."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Berman |first=Larry |title=Lyndon Johnson's War |date=1991 |publisher=W.W. Norton |page=116}}</ref> Thus, the public was shocked and confused when Westmoreland's predictions were trumped by the Tet Offensive.<ref name=Witz/> Public approval of his overall performance dropped from 48 percent to 36 percent, and endorsement for the war effort fell from 40 percent to 26 percent."<ref name=Karnow/>{{Rp|546}} The American public and media began to turn against Johnson as the three offensives contradicted claims of progress made by the Johnson administration and the military.<ref name=Witz/>

At one point in 1968, Westmoreland considered the use of [[nuclear weapon]]s in Vietnam in a contingency plan codenamed [[Fracture Jaw]], which was abandoned when it became known to the White House.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Sanger |first=David E. |date=6 October 2018 |title=U.S. General Considered Nuclear Response in Vietnam War, Cables Show |language=en |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/world/asia/vietnam-war-nuclear-weapons.html |access-date=8 October 2018|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230314213812/https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/world/asia/vietnam-war-nuclear-weapons.html|archive-date=March 14, 2023}}</ref> Westmoreland requested 200,000 additional troops, which was leaked to the media, and the subsequent fallout combined with intelligence failures caused him to be removed from command in March 1968, succeeded by his deputy [[Creighton Abrams]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Sorley |first=Lewis |title=A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam |date=1999 |publisher=Harvest |isbn=0-15-601309-6 |pages=11–6}}</ref>

On 10 May 1968, [[Paris Peace Accords|peace talks]] began between the United States and North Vietnam in Paris. Negotiations stagnated for five months, until Johnson gave orders to halt the bombing of North Vietnam. At the same time, Hanoi realized it could not achieve a "total victory" and employed a strategy known as "talking while fighting, fighting while talking", in which military offensives would occur concurrently with negotiations.<ref>{{Cite news |date=16 April 2012 |title=North Vietnam's "Talk-Fight" Strategy and the 1968 Peace Negotiations with the United States |language=en |work=Wilson Center |url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/north-vietnams-talk-fight-strategy-and-the-1968-peace-negotiations-the-united-states |access-date=1 June 2018|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20230409174807/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/north-vietnams-talk-fight-strategy-and-the-1968-peace-negotiations-the-united-states|archive-date=April 9, 2023}}</ref>

Johnson declined to run for re-election as his approval rating slumped from 48 to 36 percent.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|486}} His escalation of the war in Vietnam divided Americans into warring camps, cost 30,000 American lives by that point and was regarded to have destroyed his presidency.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|486}} Refusal to send more U.S. troops to Vietnam was also seen as Johnson's admission that the war was lost.<ref name="Command Magazine Issue 18, page 15">''Command Magazine'' Issue 18, p. 15.</ref> As Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara noted, "the dangerous illusion of victory by the United States was therefore dead."<ref name=McNamara/>{{Rp|367}}

Vietnam was a major political issue during the [[1968 United States presidential election|United States presidential election in 1968]]. The election was won by Republican party candidate Richard Nixon who claimed to have a secret plan to end the war.<ref name=Hastings/>{{Rp|515}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Johns |first=Andrew |title=Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War |date=2010 |publisher=University Press of Kentucky |isbn=978-0-8131-7369-6 |pages=198 |language=en}}</ref>