Thomas Aquinas

==Theology==
{{Catholic philosophy}}

Thomas Aquinas viewed theology, "the sacred [[doctrine]]", as a science,<ref name="SEP2" /> by which he meant a field of study in which humanity could learn more by its own efforts (as opposed to being totally dependent on having divine revelation planted into our minds). For Thomas, the raw material data of this field consists of written [[Sacred Tradition|scripture]] and the tradition of the Catholic Church. These sources of data were produced by the self-revelation of God to individuals and groups of people throughout history. Faith and reason, being distinct but related, are the two primary tools for processing the data of theology. Thomas believed both were necessary—or, rather, that the ''confluence'' of both was necessary—for one to obtain true knowledge of God.<ref name="SEP2" />

Thomas blended Greek philosophy and Christian doctrine by suggesting that rational thinking and the study of nature, like revelation, were valid ways to understand truths pertaining to God. According to Thomas, God reveals himself through nature, so to study nature is to study God. The ultimate goals of theology, in Thomas's mind, are to use reason to grasp the truth about God and to experience salvation through that truth. The central thought is "[[gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit]]" ('[[divine grace|grace]] does not destroy nature, but perfects it').<ref name="SEP2" />

===Revelation===
Thomas believed that truth is known through reason, rationality ([[natural revelation]]) and faith ([[supernatural revelation]]). ''Supernatural'' revelation has its origin in the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and is made available through the teaching of the prophets, summed up in Holy Scripture, and transmitted by the [[Magisterium]], the sum of which is called "Tradition". ''Natural'' revelation is the truth available to all people through their human nature and powers of reason. For example, he felt this applied to rational ways to know the existence of God.

Though one may deduce the existence of God and his Attributes (Unity, Truth, Goodness, Power, Knowledge) through reason, certain specifics may be known only through the special revelation of God through [[Jesus Christ]]. The major theological components of Christianity, such as the [[Trinity]], the [[Incarnation]], and charity are revealed in the teachings of the church and the [[scripture]]s and may not otherwise be deduced.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hankey |first=Wayne |title=The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion |publisher=Routledge |year=2013 |isbn=978-0-415-78295-1 |edition=Second |location=CSU East Bay |pages=134–135}}</ref> However, Thomas also makes a distinction between "demonstrations" of sacred doctrines and the "persuasiveness" of those doctrines.<ref name="autogenerated1">{{cite web |date= |title=Aquinas' Philosophical Theology &#124; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/thomas-aquinas-political-theology/#SH3c |accessdate=7 August 2022 |publisher=Iep.utm.edu}}</ref> The former is akin to something like "certainty", whereas the latter is more probabilistic in nature.<ref name="autogenerated1" />

In other words, Thomas thought Christian doctrines were "fitting" to reason (i.e. reasonable), even though they can't be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.<ref name="autogenerated1" /> In fact, the ''Summa Theologica'' is filled with examples of Thomas arguing that we would expect certain Christian doctrines to be true, even though these expectations aren't demonstrative (i.e. 'fitting' or reasonable).<ref name="Iep.utm.edu">{{cite web |date= |title=Aquinas' Philosophical Theology &#124; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=https://iep.utm.edu/thomas-aquinas-political-theology/#H4 |accessdate=7 August 2022 |publisher=Iep.utm.edu}}</ref> For example, Thomas argues that we would expect God to become incarnate, and we would expect a resurrected Christ to ''not'' stay on Earth.<ref name="Iep.utm.edu" /><ref>{{cite web |date= |title=Summa Theologiae: The ascension of Christ (Tertia Pars, Q. 57) |url=https://www.newadvent.org/summa/4057.htm#article1 |accessdate=7 August 2022 |publisher=Newadvent.org}}</ref>

====Reconciling faith and reason====
According to Thomas, faith and reason complement rather than [[Fideism|contradict each other]], each giving different views of the same truth. A discrepancy between faith and reason arises from a shortcoming of either natural science or scriptural interpretation. Faith can reveal a divine mystery that eludes scientific observation. On the other hand, science can suggest where fallible humans misinterpret a scriptural metaphor as a literal statement of fact.<ref>{{cite news |last=Beattie |first=Tina |date=13 February 2012 |title=Thomas Aquinas, part 3: scripture, reason and the being of God |newspaper=The Guardian |publisher=www.theguardian.com |url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2012/feb/13/scripture-reason-god-thomas-aquinas |accessdate=25 March 2023}}</ref>

=== God ===
[[Augustine of Hippo]]'s reflection on divine essentiality or [[essentialist]] theology would influence [[Richard of St. Victor]], [[Alexander of Hales]], and [[Bonaventure]]. By this method, the [[essence]] of God is defined by what God is, and also by describing what God is not ([[negative theology]]). Thomas took the text of [[Book of Exodus|Exodus]] beyond the explanation of essential theology. He bridged the gap of understanding between the being of essence and the being of existence. In [[Summa Theologica]], the way is prepared with the proofs for the existence of God. All that remained was to recognize the God of [[Book of Exodus|Exodus]] as having the nature of "Him Who is the supreme act of being". God is simple, there is no composition in God. In this regard, Thomas relied on [[Boethius]] who in turn followed the path of [[Platonism]], something Thomas usually avoided.<ref name="Gilson, Etienne 1994, pp. 84">Gilson, Etienne, ''The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas'', University of Notre Dame Press, 1994, pp.&nbsp;84–95</ref>

The conclusion was that the meaning of "I Am Who I Am" is not an enigma to be answered, but a statement of the essence of God. This is the discovery of Thomas: the essence of God is not described by negative analogy, but the "essence of God is to exist". This is the basis of "[[existential theology]]" and leads to what Gilson calls the first and only [[existential philosophy]]. In Latin, this is called "Haec Sublimis Veritas", "the sublime truth". The revealed essence of God is to exist, or in the words of Thomas, “I am the pure Act of Being”. This has been described as the key to understanding [[Thomism]]. Thomism has been described (as a philosophical movement), as either the emptiest or the fullest of philosophies.<ref name="Gilson, Etienne 1994, pp. 84" />

===Creation===
[[File:Tommaso - Super libros de generatione et corruptione - 4733257 00007.tif|thumb|''Super libros de generatione et corruptione'']]
{{further|abiogenesis|spontaneous generation}}

As a Catholic, Thomas believed that God was the "maker of heaven and earth, of all that is visible and invisible." But he thought that this fact can be proved by natural reason; indeed, in showing that it is necessary that any existent being has been created by God, he uses only philosophical arguments, based on his metaphysics of participation.<ref>See Thomas Aquinas, {{lang|la|Summa Theologiae}} I, q. 44, a. 1, co ([https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth1044.html#30287 Latin] and [https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/summa/FP/FP044.html#FPQ44A1THEP1 English])</ref> He also maintains that God creates {{lang|la|ex nihilo}}, from nothing, that is he does not make use of any preexisting matter.<ref>See {{lang|la|Summa Theologiae}} I, q. 44, a. 2 ([https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth1044.html#30291 Latin] and [https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/summa/FP/FP044.html#FPQ44A2THEP1 English]), and q. 45, a. 1 ([https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth1044.html#30320 Latin] and [https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/summa/FP/FP045.html#FPQ45A1THEP1 English])</ref> On the other hand, Thomas thought that the fact that the world started to exist by God's creation and is not eternal is only known to us by faith; it cannot be proved by natural reason.<ref>See {{lang|la|Summa Theologiae}} I, q. 46, aa. 1–2 ([https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth1044.html#30388 Latin] and [https://isidore.co/aquinas/english/summa/FP/FP046.html#FPQ46A1THEP1 English])</ref>

Like Aristotle, Thomas posited that life could form from non-living material or plant life:

{{blockquote|Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it was not incompatible with the first formation of things, that from the corruption of the less perfect the more perfect should be generated. Hence animals generated from the corruption of inanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated then.<ref>{{cite book| author= Thomas Aquinas| title= Summa Theologica | chapter-url= https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201/st1-ques72.pdf |chapter= On the Work of the Sixth Day, Reply to Objection 5| translator=| via= NDPR}}</ref>}}
[[File:Tommaso d'Aquino – Super Physicam Aristotelis, 1595 – BEIC 4733624.jpg|thumb|''Super Physicam Aristotelis'', 1595]]
Additionally, Thomas considered [[Empedocles]]'s theory that various mutated [[species]] emerged at the dawn of Creation. Thomas reasoned that these species were generated through [[mutation]]s in animal [[sperm]], and argued that they were not unintended by [[nature]]; rather, such species were simply not intended for perpetual existence. That discussion is found in his commentary on Aristotle's ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'':

{{blockquote|The same thing is true of those substances Empedocles said were produced at the beginning of the world, such as the 'ox-progeny', i.e., half ox and half-man. For if such things were not able to arrive at some end and final state of nature so that they would be preserved in existence, this was not because nature did not intend this [a final state], but because they were not capable of being preserved. For they were not generated according to nature, but by the corruption of some natural principle, as it now also happens that some monstrous offspring are generated because of the corruption of seed.<ref>Saint Thomas Aquinas, [http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Physics2.htm#14 Physica] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141228130315/http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Physics2.htm#14 |date=28 December 2014 }}, ''Book 2, Lecture 14'', Fathers of the English Dominican Province</ref>}}

===Nature of God===
Thomas believed that the [[existence of God]] is self-evident in itself, but not to us. "Therefore, I say that this proposition, "God exists", of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject{{nbsp}}... Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature—namely, by effects."<ref>{{Cite book |author=Thomas Aquinas |title=Summa Theologica |chapter=The Existence of God (Prima Pars, Q. 2) |chapter-url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm#article1 |via=newadvent.org}}</ref>

Thomas believed that the existence of God can be demonstrated. Briefly in the ''Summa Theologiae'' and more extensively in the ''[[Summa contra Gentiles]]'', he considered in great detail five arguments for the existence of God, widely known as the ''[[quinque viae]]'' (Five Ways).

# Motion: Some things undoubtedly move, though cannot cause their own motion. Since, as Thomas believed, there can be no infinite chain of causes of motion, there must be a [[Unmoved mover|First Mover]] not moved by anything else, and this is what everyone understands by God.
# Causation: As in the case of motion, nothing can cause itself, and an infinite chain of causation is impossible, so there must be a [[Prima causa|First Cause]], called God.
# Existence of necessary and the unnecessary: Our experience includes things certainly existing but apparently unnecessary. Not everything can be unnecessary, for then once there was nothing and there would still be nothing. Therefore, we are compelled to suppose something that exists necessarily, having this necessity only from itself; in fact itself the cause for other things to exist.
# Gradation: If we can notice a gradation in things in the sense that some things are more hot, good, etc., there must be a superlative that is the truest and noblest thing, and so most fully existing. This then, we call God.{{efn|name=qualities}}
# Ordered tendencies of nature: A direction of actions to an end is noticed in all bodies following natural laws. Anything without awareness tends to a goal under the guidance of one who is aware. This we call God.{{efn|name=objects}}<ref>Summa of Theology I, q.2, The Five Ways Philosophers Have Proven God's Existence</ref>

Thomas was receptive to and influenced by [[Avicenna]]'s [[Proof of the Truthful]].<ref>Adamson, Peter (2013). "From the necessary existent to God". In Adamson, Peter (ed.). ''Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays''. Cambridge University Press. {{ISBN|978-0521190732}}.</ref> Concerning the nature of God, Thomas, like Avicenna felt the best approach, commonly called the ''[[negative theology|via negativa]]'', was to consider what God is not. This led him to propose five statements about the divine qualities:
# [[divine simplicity|God is simple]], without composition of parts, such as body and soul, or matter and form.{{sfn|Kreeft|1990|pp=74–77}}
# God is perfect, lacking nothing. That is, God is distinguished from other beings on account of God's complete actuality.{{sfn|Kreeft|1990|pp=86–87}} Thomas defined God as the Ipse [[Actus Essendi]] subsistens, subsisting act of being.<ref>''Actus Essendi'' and the Habit of the First Principle in Thomas Aquinas (New York: Einsiedler Press, 2019)</ref>
# God is infinite. That is, God is not finite in the ways that created beings are physically, intellectually, and emotionally limited. This infinity is to be distinguished from infinity of size and infinity of number.{{sfn|Kreeft|1990|pp=97–99}}
# God is immutable, incapable of change on the levels of God's essence and character.{{sfn|Kreeft|1990|p=105}}
# God is one, without diversification within God's self. The unity of God is such that God's essence is the same as God's existence. In Thomas's words, "in itself the proposition 'God exists' is [[logical truth|necessarily true]], for in it subject and predicate are the same."{{sfn|Kreeft|1990|pp=111–112}}

===Nature of sin===
Following [[Augustine of Hippo]], Thomas defines [[sin]] as "a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the [[Divine law|eternal law]]."<ref>{{Cite book |author=Thomas Aquinas |title=Summa Theologica |volume=II-I |chapter=Question 71, Article 6 |access-date=17 January 2010 |chapter-url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2071.htm#article6 |via=newadvent.org}}</ref> It is important to note the analogous nature of law in Thomas's legal philosophy. Natural law is an instance or instantiation of eternal law. Because natural law is what human beings determine according to their own nature (as rational beings), disobeying reason is disobeying natural law and eternal law. Thus eternal law is logically prior to reception of either "natural law" (that determined by reason) or "divine law" (that found in the Old and New Testaments). In other words, God's will extends to both reason and revelation. Sin is abrogating either one's own reason, on the one hand, or revelation on the other, and is synonymous with "evil" ([[privation]] of good, or ''[[privatio boni]]''<ref>{{cite book |author=Thomas Aquinas |title=Summa Theologica |volume=II-I |chapter=Question 75, Article 1 |quote=For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to a thing. |chapter-url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2075.htm#article1}}</ref>). Thomas, like all Scholastics, generally argued that the findings of reason and data of revelation cannot conflict, so both are a guide to God's will for human beings.

===Nature of the Trinity===
Thomas argued that God, while perfectly united, also is perfectly described by [[Trinity|Three Interrelated Persons]]. These three persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit) are constituted by their relations within the essence of God. Thomas wrote that the term "Trinity" "does not mean the relations themselves of the Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other; and hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to another."<ref>{{Cite book |author=Thomas Aquinas |title=Summa Theologica |chapter=The unity or plurality in God (Prima Pars, Q. 31) |chapter-url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1031.htm#article3 |via=newadvent.org}}</ref> The Father generates the Son (or the Word) by the relation of self-awareness. This eternal generation then produces an eternal Spirit "who enjoys the divine nature as the Love of God, the Love of the Father for the Word."

This Trinity exists independently from the world. It transcends the created world, but the Trinity also decided to give grace to human beings. This takes place through the [[Incarnation (Christianity)|Incarnation]] of the Word in the person of [[Jesus Christ]] and through the indwelling of the [[Holy Spirit in Christianity|Holy Spirit]] within those who have experienced [[salvation]] by God; according to Aidan Nichols.{{sfn|Nichols|2002|pp=173–174}}

===''Prima causa'' (first cause)===
Thomas's five proofs for the existence of God take some of Aristotle's assertions concerning the principles of being. For God as ''[[prima causa]]'' ("first cause") comes from Aristotle's concept of the [[unmoved mover]] and asserts that God is the ultimate cause of all things.{{sfn|Nichols|2002|pp=80–82}}

===Nature of Jesus Christ===
[[File:Bartolomé Esteban Murillo Santo Tomás de Aquino.jpg|thumb|left|''Thomas Aquinas'' by [[Bartolomé Esteban Murillo]], 1650]]

In the ''Summa Theologica,'' Thomas begins his discussion of Jesus Christ by recounting the biblical story of [[Adam and Eve]] and by describing the negative effects of [[original sin]]. The purpose of Christ's Incarnation was to restore human nature by removing ''the contamination of sin'', which humans cannot do by themselves. "Divine Wisdom judged it fitting that God should become man, so that thus one and the same person would be able both to restore man and to offer satisfaction."<ref>Thomas Aquinas, pp. 228–229.</ref> Thomas argued in favour of the [[atonement (satisfaction view)|satisfaction view of atonement]]; that is, that [[Christian views of Jesus|Jesus Christ]] [[death of Jesus|died]] "to satisfy for the whole human race, which was sentenced to die on account of sin."<ref>{{Cite book |author=Thomas Aquinas |title=Summa Theologica |volume=III |chapter=Question 50, Article 1 |access-date=17 January 2010 |chapter-url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4050.htm#article1 |via=newadvent.org}}</ref>

Thomas argued against several specific contemporary and historical theologians who held differing views about Christ. In response to [[Photinus]], Thomas stated that Jesus was truly divine and not simply a human being. Against [[Nestorius]], who suggested that the Son of God was merely conjoined to the man Christ, Thomas argued that the fullness of God was an integral part of Christ's existence. However, countering [[Apollinaris of Laodicea|Apollinaris]]' views, Thomas held that Christ had a truly human (rational) [[soul]], as well. This produced a duality of nature in Christ. Thomas argued against [[Eutyches]] that this duality persisted after the Incarnation. Thomas stated that these two natures existed simultaneously yet distinguishably in one real human body, unlike the teachings of [[Manichaeus]] and [[Valentinus (Gnostic)|Valentinus]].<ref>Thomas Aquinas, pp. 231–239.</ref>

With respect to [[Paul the Apostle|Paul]]'s assertion that Christ, "though he was in the form of God{{nbsp}}... emptied himself" ([[Philippians]] 2:6–7) in becoming human, Thomas offered an articulation of divine [[kenosis]] that has informed much subsequent Catholic [[Christology]]. Following the [[First Council of Nicaea|Council of Nicaea]], [[Augustine of Hippo]], as well as the assertions of Scripture, Thomas held the doctrine of [[Immutability (theology)|divine immutability]].<ref>{{cite web |date=20 May 325 |title=First Council of Nicaea – 325 AD |url=https://www.papalencyclicals.net/councils/ecum01.htm |via=papalencyclicals.net}}</ref><ref>Augustine, Sermo VII, 7.</ref><ref>For instance, Malachi 3:6 and James 1:17</ref> Hence, in becoming human, there could be no change in the divine person of Christ. For Thomas, "the mystery of Incarnation was not completed through God being changed in any way from the state in which He had been from eternity, but through His having united Himself to the creature in a new way, or rather through having united it to Himself."<ref>ST III.1.1.</ref>

Similarly, Thomas explained that Christ "emptied Himself, not by putting off His divine nature, but by assuming a human nature."<ref name="dhspriory.org">{{cite web |title=Commentary on Saint Paul's Letter to the Philippians, available at §2–2. |url=http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/SSPhilippians.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171020002518/http://dhspriory.org/thomas/english/SSPhilippians.htm |archive-date=20 October 2017 |access-date=19 June 2015}}</ref> For Thomas, "the divine nature is sufficiently full, because every perfection of goodness is there. But human nature and the soul are not full, but capable of fulness, because it was made as a slate not written upon. Therefore, human nature is empty."<ref name="dhspriory.org" /> Thus, when Paul indicates that Christ "emptied himself" this is to be understood in light of his assumption of a human nature.

In short, "Christ had a ''real body'' of the same nature of ours, a ''true rational soul'', and, together with these, ''perfect Deity''". Thus, there is both unity (in his one ''[[hypostasis (philosophy)|hypostasis]]'') and composition (in his two natures, human and Divine) in Christ.<ref>Thomas Aquinas, pp. 241, 245–249. Emphasis is the author's.</ref>

{{blockquote|I answer that, The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insomuch as one being subsists in two.<ref>{{Cite book |chapter-url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/4002.htm#article4 | author= Thomas Aquinas| title= Summa Theologica | chapter= The mode of union of the Word incarnate (Tertia Pars, Q. 2) | via= New Advent}}</ref>}}

Echoing [[Athanasius of Alexandria]], he said that "The only begotten Son of God{{nbsp}}... assumed our nature, so that he, made man, might make men gods."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Weigel |first=George |url=https://archive.org/details/truthofcatholici00weig/page/9 |title=The Truth of Catholicism |publisher=[[HarperCollins]] |year=2001 |isbn=0-06-621330-4 |location=New York |page=[https://archive.org/details/truthofcatholici00weig/page/9 9] |author-link=George Weigel}}</ref>

===Goal of human life===
[[File:Thomas von Aquin 17th century sculpture.jpeg|thumb|A 17th-century sculpture of Thomas Aquinas]]
Thomas Aquinas identified the goal of human existence as union and eternal fellowship with God. This goal is achieved through the [[beatific vision]], in which a person experiences perfect, unending happiness by seeing the essence of God. The vision occurs after death as a gift from God to those who in life experienced salvation and redemption through Christ.

The goal of union with God has implications for the individual's life on earth. Thomas stated that an individual's [[Free Will|will]] must be ordered toward the right things, such as charity, peace, and [[Sacred|holiness]]. He saw this orientation as also the way to happiness. Indeed, Thomas ordered his treatment of the moral life around the idea of happiness. The relationship between will and goal is antecedent in nature "because rectitude of the will consists in being duly ordered to the last end [that is, the beatific vision]." Those who truly seek to understand and see God will necessarily love what God loves. Such love requires morality and bears fruit in everyday human choices.{{sfn|Kreeft|1990|p=383}}

===Treatment of heretics===
Thomas Aquinas belonged to the Dominican Order (formally ''[[Ordo Praedicatorum]]'', the Order of Preachers) which began as an order dedicated to the conversion of the [[Albigensians]] and other heterodox factions, at first by peaceful means; later the Albigensians were dealt with by means of the [[Albigensian Crusade]]. In the ''Summa Theologiae'', he wrote:
<blockquote>With regard to heretics two points must be observed: one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On their own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith that quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death.

On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy, which looks to the conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but "after the first and second admonition", as [[Paul of Tarsus|the Apostle]] directs: after that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him to the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death.<ref>{{cite book |author=Thomas Aquinas |title=Summa Theologica |volume=II–II |chapter=Question 11, Article 3 |chapter-url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3011.htm#article3}}</ref></blockquote>

Heresy was a capital offence against the secular law of most European countries of the 13th century. Kings and emperors, even those at war with the papacy, listed heresy first among the crimes against the state. Kings claimed power from God according to the Christian faith. Often enough, especially in that age of papal claims to universal worldly power, the rulers' power was tangibly and visibly legitimated directly through coronation by the pope.

Simple theft, forgery, fraud, and other such crimes were also capital offences; Thomas's point seems to be that the gravity of this offence, which touches not only the material goods but also the spiritual goods of others, is at least the same as forgery. Thomas's suggestion specifically demands that heretics be handed to a "secular tribunal" rather than [[magisterium|magisterial]] authority. That Thomas specifically says that heretics "deserve{{nbsp}}... death" is related to his theology, according to which all sinners have no intrinsic right to life ("For the wages of sin is death; but the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord"<ref>{{bibleverse|Romans|6:23|ASV}}</ref>). Although the life of a heretic who repents should be spared, the former heretic should be executed if he relapses into heresy. Thomas elaborates on his opinion regarding heresy in the next article, when he says:<blockquote>In God's tribunal, those who return are always received, because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who return in sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for she presumes that those who relapse after being once received, are not sincere in their return; hence she does not debar them from the way of salvation, but neither does she protect them from the sentence of death.

For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance those who return from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards their lives, and sometimes by dispensation, restores them to the ecclesiastical dignities which they may have had before, should their conversion appear to be sincere: we read of this as having frequently been done for the good of peace. But when they fall again, after having been received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant in faith, wherefore when they return again, they are admitted to Penance, but are not delivered from the pain of death.<ref>{{cite book |author=Thomas Aquinas |title=Summa Theologica |volume=II–II |chapter=Question 11, Article 4 |chapter-url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3011.htm#article4}}</ref></blockquote>

For Jews, Thomas argues for toleration of both their persons and their religious rites.<ref>Novak, Michael (December 1995), [http://www.firstthings.com/article/1995/12/003-aquinas-and-the-heretics "Aquinas and the Heretics"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160409052324/http://www.firstthings.com/article/1995/12/003-aquinas-and-the-heretics|date=9 April 2016}}, ''First Things''.</ref>
==== Forced baptism of children of Jews and heretics ====
The position taken by Thomas was that if children were being reared in error, the Church had no authority to intervene. From ''[[Summa Theologica]]'' II-II Q. 10 Art. 12:

: Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore, these should not be baptized against their parent's will. The custom of the Church has been given very great authority and ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine of Catholic Doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than that of an [[Augustine of Hippo|Augustine]] or a [[Jerome]] or any doctor whatever. Now it was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of Jews against the will of their parents. There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger to faith. For children baptized before coming into the use of reason, might easily be persuaded by their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith. The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is by nature part of its father: at first, it is not distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within the mother's womb and later on after birth, and before it has the use of [[free will]], it is enfolded in the care of its parents, like a spiritual womb. So long as a man does not have the use of reason, he is no different from an irrational animal. Hence, it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parent's custody, or anything done against its parent's wish.

The question was again addressed by Thomas in ''[[Summa Theologica]]'' III Q. 68 Art. 10:

: It is written in the Decretals (Dist. xiv), quoting the [[Council of Toledo]]: In regard to the Jews the holy synod commands that henceforth none of them be forced to believe; for such are not to be saved against their will, but willingly, that their righteousness may be without flaw. Children of non-believers either have the use of reason or they have not. If they have, then they already begin to control their own actions, in things that are of Divine or natural law. And therefore, of their own accord, and against the will of their parents, they can receive Baptism, just as they can contract in marriage. Consequently, such can be lawfully advised and persuaded to be baptized. If, however, they have not yet the use of free-will, according to the natural law they are under the care of their parents as long as they cannot look after themselves. For which reason we say that even the children of the ancients were saved through the faith of their parents.

The issue was discussed in a papal bull by [[Pope Benedict XIV]] (1747) where both schools were addressed. The pope noted that the position of Aquinas had been more widely held among theologians and [[canon lawyers]], than that of John Duns Scotus.<ref>Denzinger, Henry, [[Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum|''The Sources of Catholic Dogma'']], B. Herder Book Co., St. Louis, 1955, p.&nbsp;364</ref>

===Magic and its practitioners===
Regarding magic, Thomas wrote that:
* only God can perform miracles, create and transform.<ref>''[[Summa contra gentiles]]'' 102</ref>
* angels and demons ("spiritual substances") may do wonderful things, but they are not miracles and merely use natural things as instruments.<ref>''Summa contra gentiles'' 103</ref>
* any efficacy of magicians does not come from the power of particular words, or celestial bodies, or special figures, or sympathetic magic, but by bidding (ibid., 105)
* "demons" are intellective substances which were created good and have chosen to be bad, it is these who are bid.<ref>''Summa contra gentiles'' 106–108</ref>
* if there is some transformation that could not occur in nature it is either the demon working on human imagination or arranging a fake.<ref>{{cite book |author=Thomas Aquinas |title=Summa Theologica |volume=I |chapter=Question 114, Article 4}}</ref>

A mention of witchcraft appears in the ''Summa Theologicae''<ref>{{cite book |title=Summa theologica Supplement |chapter=Question 38, Article 2 |quote=Whether a spell can be in impediment to marriage.}} Note this Supplement was written or compiled by others after Thomas's death.</ref> and concludes that the church does not treat temporary or permanent impotence attributed to a spell any differently to that of natural causes, as far as an impediment to marriage.

Under the ''[[canon Episcopi]]'', church doctrine held that witchcraft was not possible and any practitioners of sorcery were deluded and their acts an illusion. Thomas Aquinas was instrumental in developing a new doctrine that included the belief in the real power of witches.{{Disputed inline|date=August 2018}} This was a departure from the teachings of his master [[Albertus Magnus]] whose doctrine was based in the ''Episcopi''.<ref name="Burr17374">{{cite book |last=Burr |first=G. L. |title=Selected Writings |year=1943 |editor=L. O. Gibbons |place=New York |pages=173–174}} Original essay (1890) available here [https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=6ZUlAQAAMAAJ] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210225085817/https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=6ZUlAQAAMAAJ|date=25 February 2021}}.</ref> The famous 15th-century witch-hunter's manual, the ''[[Malleus Maleficarum]]'', also written by a member of the Dominican Order, begins by quoting Thomas Aquinas ("Commentary on Pronouncements" Sent.4.34.I.Co.) refuting{{Disputed inline|date=August 2018}} the ''Episcopi'' and goes on to cite Thomas Aquinas over a hundred times.<ref>{{cite book |last=Kramer |first=Heinrich |title=Malleus Maleficarum |year=2009 |place=Cambridge |pages=91–92 |translator=Christopher Mackay}}</ref> Promoters of the witch hunts that followed often quoted Thomas more than any other source.<ref name="Burr17374" />

===Thoughts on the afterlife and resurrection===
[[File:Santo Tomás de Aquino - Antonio del Castillo Saavedra.jpg|thumb|Portrait of St. Thomas by [[Antonio del Castillo y Saavedra]], {{Circa|1649|lk=no}}]]
A grasp of Thomas's psychology is essential for understanding his beliefs about the afterlife and resurrection. Thomas, following church doctrine, accepts that the soul continues to exist after the death of the body. Because he accepts that the soul is the form of the body, then he also must believe that the human being, like all material things, is form-matter composite. The substantial form (the human soul) configures prime matter (the physical body) and is the form by which a material composite belongs to that species it does; in the case of human beings, that species is a rational animal.{{sfn|Stump|2003|p=194}} So, a human being is a matter-form composite that is organized to be a rational animal. Matter cannot exist without being configured by form, but form can exist without matter—which allows for the separation of soul from body. Thomas says that the soul shares in the material and spiritual worlds, and so has some features of matter and other, immaterial, features (such as access to universals). The human soul is different from other material and spiritual things; it is created by God, but also comes into existence only in the material body.

Human beings are material, but the human person can survive the death of the body through the continued existence of the soul, which persists. The human soul straddles the spiritual and material worlds, and is both a configured subsistent form as well as a configurer of matter into that of a living, bodily human.{{sfn|Stump|2003|p=200}} Because it is spiritual, the human soul does not depend on matter and may exist separately. Because the human being is a soul-matter composite, the body has a part in what it is to be human. Perfected human nature consists in the human dual nature, embodied and intellecting.

Resurrection appears to require dualism, which Thomas rejects. Yet Thomas believes the soul persists after the death and corruption of the body, and is capable of existence, separated from the body between the time of death and the [[resurrection of the flesh]]. Thomas believes in a different sort of dualism, one guided by Christian scripture. Thomas knows that human beings are essentially physical, but physicality has a spirit capable of returning to God after life.{{sfn|Stump|2003|p=192}} For Thomas, the rewards and punishment of the afterlife are not ''only'' spiritual. Because of this, resurrection is an important part of his philosophy on the soul. The human is fulfilled and complete in the body, so the hereafter must take place with souls enmattered in resurrected bodies. In addition to spiritual reward, humans can expect to enjoy material and physical blessings. Because Thomas's soul requires a body for its actions, during the afterlife, the soul will also be punished or rewarded in corporeal existence.

Thomas states clearly his stance on resurrection, and uses it to back up his philosophy of justice; that is, the promise of resurrection compensates Christians who suffered in this world through a heavenly union with the divine. He says, "If there is no resurrection of the dead, it follows that there is no good for human beings other than in this life."{{sfn|Stump|2003|pp=461, 473}} Resurrection provides the impetus for people on earth to give up pleasures in this life. Thomas believes the human who prepared for the afterlife both morally and intellectually will be rewarded more greatly; however, all reward is through the grace of God. Thomas insists beatitude will be conferred according to merit, and will render the person better able to conceive the divine.

Thomas accordingly believes punishment is directly related to earthly, living preparation and activity as well. Thomas's account of the soul focuses on epistemology and metaphysics, and because of this, he believes it gives a clear account of the immaterial nature of the soul. Thomas conservatively guards Christian doctrine and thus maintains physical and spiritual reward and punishment after death. By accepting the essentiality of both body and soul, he allows for a [[Heaven]] and [[Hell]] described in scripture and church [[dogma]].
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