Nigerian Civil War

=== United Kingdom ===
The United Kingdom had planned to maintain and expand its supply of cheap high-quality oil from Nigeria. Therefore, it placed a high priority on maintenance of [[Extraction of petroleum|oil extraction]] and refining operations. The war broke out just a week before the [[Six-Day War]] in the Middle East, forcing oil tankers from the Middle East to use the long route around the Cape of Good Hope, thereby increasing the cost of Middle Eastern oil. In turn, this increased the importance of Nigerian oil to the United Kingdom, because Nigerian oil was cheaper than Persian Gulf oil.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=65}} Initially, when it was unclear which side would prevail, the United Kingdom took a "wait and see" approach before opting decisively for Nigeria.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|pp=65–66}} Nigeria had a navy of only six vessels, the largest of which was a frigate; an air force of 76 planes, none of which were fighters or bombers; and an army of 7,000 men with no tanks and a shortage of officers with command experience. Though Biafra was likewise similarly weak, the two sides appeared evenly matched at the beginning of the war, and Nigerian victory was by no means considered preordained.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|pp=72–73}}

The United Kingdom backed the Federal Government but, when the war broke out, cautioned them not to damage British oil installations in the East. These oilworks, under the control of the Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company (jointly owned by [[Royal Dutch Shell|Shell]] and [[British Petroleum]]), controlled 84 per cent of Nigeria's 580,000 barrels per day. Two-thirds of this oil came from the Eastern region, and another third from the newly created Mid-West region. Two-fifths of all Nigerian oil ended up in the United Kingdom.<ref name="Uche2008pages120to124">Uche, ''Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War'' (2008), pp. 120–124.</ref> In 1967, 30 per cent of the oil being imported into the United Kingdom came from Nigeria.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=66}}

Shell-BP therefore considered carefully a request by the Federal Government that it refuse to pay the royalties demanded by Biafra. Its lawyers advised that payment to Biafra would be appropriate if this government did in fact maintain law and order in the region in question. The British government advised that paying Biafra could undermine the goodwill of the Federal Government. Shell-BP made the payment, and the government established a blockade on oil exports.<ref name="Uche2008pages120to124"/> Forced to choose a side, Shell-BP and the British government threw in their lot with the Federal Government in Lagos, apparently calculating that this side would be more likely to win the war.<ref name="Uche2008pages125to127">Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), pp. 125–127. "The Nigerian government subsequently made it explicit to Shell-BP that it expected the company to pay the outstanding oil royalty immediately. Once the oil flow stopped, sitting on a fence ceased to be an option for the British government. The United Kingdom subsequently decided to back Nigeria, partly because it was advised that, in the event of war, the odds were 'slightly in favour of the Federal Military Government'. Perhaps more importantly, the British government calculated that supporting Nigeria was its safest option if it were to preserve its oil interests in the country, largely because the Cold War and the rivalry among some Western European states made it likely that other foreign powers would wade into the conflict."</ref> As the British High Commissioner in Lagos wrote to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs on 27 July 1967:

<blockquote>Ojukwu, even victorious, will not be in a strong position. He will require all the international help and recognition he can get. The Federal Government would be much better placed both internationally and internally. They would have a cast iron case for the severest treatment of a company which has [[Subsidy|subsidised]] a rebel, and I feel fairly convinced they would press their case to the lengths of cancelling the Company's concessions and nationalising their installations. I conclude, therefore, if the company does change its mind and asks the British Government for advice, the best that could be given is for it to clamber hastily back on the Lagos side of the fence with cheque book at the ready."<ref name="Uche2008pages125to127"/></blockquote>

Shell-BP took this advice.<ref name="Uche2008pages125to127"/> It continued to quietly support Nigeria through the rest of the war, in one case advancing a royalty of £5.5&nbsp;million to fund the purchase of more British weapons.<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), p. 132. "Given Shell-BP's interest in Nigeria taking over the major oilfields still in Biafran hands, it was not surprising that they overtly supported the Nigerian military cause.99 A case in point was in December 1967 when the Nigerian government, frustrated by the slow pace of progress in the war, requested that Shell-BP pay its royalty of £5.5 million in advance, in order to enable it to purchase arms from the United Kingdom. Shell-BP promptly complied."</ref>

It was not until Federal forces captured the ocean oil terminal at Bonny on 25 July 1967 that the British Prime Minister [[Harold Wilson]] decided to back Nigeria with military aid. After the Federal victory at Bonny, Wilson summoned [[David Hunt (diplomat)|David Hunt]], the British high commissioner to Nigeria, for a meeting at 10 Downing Street in early August 1967 for his assessment of the situation.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=76}} Hunt's view that the Federal forces were the better organised and would win because they could draw upon a greater population led Wilson to side with Nigeria.

During the war, the United Kingdom covertly supplied Nigeria with weapons and military intelligence and may have also helped it to hire mercenaries.<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), p. 130. "In reality, however, the British government supplied many more arms than it was publicly prepared to admit. Apart from direct arms supplies, it provided military intelligence to the Nigerian government and may have helped it to access sophisticated arms and mercenaries through third parties."</ref> After the decision was made to back Nigeria, the BBC oriented its reporting to favour this side.<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), p. 131. "Furthermore, once the war broke out and the British government decided to back the Nigerian side, the BBC swiftly shifted its reporting on the conflict, in Nigeria's favour. This was noticed and thankfully acknowledged by the Nigerian government."</ref> Supplies provided to the Federal Military Government included two vessels and 60 vehicles.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 274.</ref>

In the United Kingdom, the humanitarian campaign around Biafra began on 12 June 1968, with media coverage on ITV and in ''The Sun''. The charities [[Oxfam]] and [[Save the Children Fund]] were soon deployed, with large sums of money at their disposal.<ref name="OSullivan2014page302">O'Sullivan, "Humanitarian Encounters" (2014), p. 302. "It took time, however, for popular attention to focus on the crisis. In the United Kingdom that occurred only after 12 June 1968, when a film broadcast on ITV and a press campaign led by the ''Sun'' newspaper sparked the humanitarian response into life."</ref>