Morality

==Neuroscience==
{{anchor|Neuroscience of morality}}
{{see also|Science of morality|Neuromorality}}
The brain areas that are consistently involved when humans reason about moral issues have been investigated by multiple quantitative large-scale meta-analyses of the brain activity changes reported in the moral neuroscience literature.<ref name = Bzdok>{{cite journal|title=Bzdok, D. et al. Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition: ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy. Brain Struct Funct, 2011 |date=2012-01-24 |doi=10.1007/s00429-012-0380-y |pmid=22270812 |volume=217 |issue=4 |journal=Brain Structure and Function |pages=783–96|last1=Bzdok |first1=Danilo |last2=Schilbach |first2=Leonhard |last3=Vogeley |first3=Kai |last4=Schneider |first4=Karla |last5=Laird |first5=Angela R |last6=Langner |first6=Robert |last7=Eickhoff |first7=Simon B |pmc=3445793}}</ref><ref name="ReferenceA"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Boccia |first1=M. |last2=Dacquino |first2=C. |last3=Piccardi |first3=L. |last4=Cordellieri |first4=P. |last5=Guariglia |first5=C. |last6=Ferlazzo |first6=F. |last7=Ferracuti |first7=S. |last8=Giannini |first8=A. M. |title=Neural foundation of human moral reasoning: an ALE meta-analysis about the role of personal perspective |journal=Brain Imaging and Behavior |date=25 January 2016 |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=278–92 |doi=10.1007/s11682-016-9505-x |pmid=26809288 |s2cid=3984661 |url=http://www.springer.com/cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/Instructions+for+Authors.pdf?SGWID=0-0-45-1658265-p173667707 |access-date=23 September 2019 |archive-date=23 September 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190923130437/https://www.springer.com/cda/content/document/cda_downloaddocument/Instructions+for+Authors.pdf%3FSGWID=0-0-45-1658265-p173667707 |url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Eres |first1=Robert |last2=Louis |first2=Winnifred R. |last3=Molenberghs |first3=Pascal |title=Common and distinct neural networks involved in fMRI studies investigating morality: an ALE meta-analysis |journal=Social Neuroscience |date=27 July 2017 |volume=13 |issue=4 |pages=384–98 |doi=10.1080/17470919.2017.1357657|pmid=28724332 |s2cid=31749926 }}</ref> The neural network underlying moral decisions overlaps with the network pertaining to representing others' intentions (i.e., theory of mind) and the network pertaining to representing others' (vicariously experienced) emotional states (i.e., empathy). This supports the notion that moral reasoning is related to both seeing things from other persons' points of view and to grasping others' feelings. These results provide evidence that the neural network underlying moral decisions is probably domain-global (i.e., there might be no such things as a "moral module" in the human brain) and might be dissociable into cognitive and affective sub-systems.<ref name = Bzdok />

Cognitive neuroscientist [[Jean Decety]] thinks that the ability to recognize and vicariously experience what another individual is undergoing was a key step forward in the evolution of social behavior, and ultimately, morality.<ref>{{Cite news| url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/27/AR2007052701056_pf.html | newspaper=The Washington Post | title=If It Feels Good to Be Good, It Might Be Only Natural | first=Shankar | last=Vedantam | access-date=2010-05-13}}</ref> The inability to feel empathy is one of the defining characteristics of [[psychopath]]y, and this would appear to lend support to Decety's view.<ref>{{Cite journal|vauthors=de Wied M, Goudena PP, Matthys W |title=Empathy in boys with disruptive behavior disorders |journal=Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, and Allied Disciplines |volume=46 |issue=8 |pages=867–80 |year=2005 |pmid=16033635 |doi=10.1111/j.1469-7610.2004.00389.x|hdl=1874/11212 |s2cid=45683502 |hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|vauthors=Fernandez YM, Marshall WL |title=Victim empathy, social self-esteem, and psychopathy in rapists |journal=Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment |volume=15 |issue=1 |pages=11–26 |year=2003 |pmid=12616926 |doi=10.1023/A:1020611606754|s2cid=195293070 |doi-access=free }}</ref> Recently, drawing on empirical research in [[evolutionary theory]], [[developmental psychology]], [[social neuroscience]], and psychopathy, Jean Decety argued that empathy and morality are neither systematically opposed to one another, nor inevitably complementary.<ref>{{cite book|last=Decety|first=Jean|series=Research and Perspectives in Neurosciences |title=New Frontiers in Social Neuroscience |date=November 1, 2014|chapter=The Neuroevolution of Empathy and Caring for Others: Why It Matters for Morality|chapter-url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287290900|volume=21|pages=127–151|doi=10.1007/978-3-319-02904-7_8|isbn=978-3-319-02903-0}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Decety|first1=J.|last2=Cowell|first2=J. M.|year=2014|title=The complex relation between morality and empathy|url=http://spihub.org/site/resource_files/publications/spi_wp_135_decety.pdf|journal=Trends in Cognitive Sciences|volume=18|issue=7|pages=337–339|doi=10.1016/j.tics.2014.04.008|pmid=24972506|s2cid=355141 }}</ref>

===Brain areas===

An essential, shared component of moral judgment involves the capacity to detect morally salient content within a given social context. Recent research implicated the [[salience network]] in this initial detection of moral content.<ref name="ReferenceB">{{cite journal |last1=Sevinc |first1=Gunes |last2=Gurvit |first2=Hakan |last3=Spreng |first3=R. Nathan |title=Salience network engagement with the detection of morally laden information |journal=Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience |date=July 2017 |volume=12 |issue=7 |pages=1118–27 |doi=10.1093/scan/nsx035|pmid=28338944 |pmc=5490682 }}</ref> The salience network responds to behaviorally salient events <ref>{{cite journal |last1=Seeley |first1=W. W. |last2=Menon |first2=V. |last3=Schatzberg |first3=A. F. |last4=Keller |first4=J. |author5-link=Gary H. Glover |last5=Glover |first5=G. H. |last6=Kenna |first6=H. |last7=Reiss |first7=A. L. |last8=Greicius |first8=M. D. |title=Dissociable Intrinsic Connectivity Networks for Salience Processing and Executive Control |journal=Journal of Neuroscience |date=28 February 2007 |volume=27 |issue=9 |pages=2349–56 |doi=10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5587-06.2007|pmid=17329432 |pmc=2680293 }}</ref> and may be critical to modulate downstream default and frontal control network interactions in the service of complex moral reasoning and decision-making processes.

The explicit making of moral right and wrong judgments coincides with activation in the [[ventromedial prefrontal cortex]] (VMPC), a region involved in valuation, while intuitive reactions to situations containing implicit moral issues activates the [[temporoparietal junction]] area, a region that plays a key role in understanding intentions and beliefs.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Harenski | first1 = CL | last2 = Antonenko | first2 = O | last3 = Shane | first3 = MS | last4 = Kiehl | first4 = KA.  | year = 2010 | title = A functional imaging investigation of moral deliberation and moral intuition | journal = NeuroImage | volume = 49 | issue = 3| pages = 2707–16 | doi = 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.10.062 | pmid = 19878727 | pmc = 4270295 }}</ref><ref name="ReferenceB"/>

Stimulation of the VMPC by [[transcranial magnetic stimulation]], or neurological lesion, has been shown to inhibit the ability of human subjects to take into account intent when forming a moral judgment. According to such investigations, TMS did not disrupt participants' ability to make any moral judgment. On the contrary, moral judgments of intentional harms and non-harms were unaffected by TMS to either the RTPJ or the control site; presumably, however, people typically make moral judgments of intentional harms by considering not only the action's harmful outcome but the agent's intentions and beliefs. So why were moral judgments of intentional harms not affected by TMS to the RTPJ? One possibility is that moral judgments typically reflect a weighted function of any morally relevant information that is available at the time. Based on this view, when information concerning the agent's belief is unavailable or degraded, the resulting moral judgment simply reflects a higher weighting of other morally relevant factors (e.g., outcome). Alternatively, following TMS to the RTPJ, moral judgments might be made via an abnormal processing route that does not take belief into account. On either account, when belief information is degraded or unavailable, moral judgments are shifted toward other morally relevant factors (e.g., outcome). For intentional harms and non-harms, however, the outcome suggests the same moral judgment as to the intention. Thus, the researchers suggest that TMS to the RTPJ disrupted the processing of negative beliefs for both intentional harms and attempted harms, but the current design allowed the investigators to detect this effect only in the case of attempted harms, in which the neutral outcomes did not afford harsh moral judgments on their own.<ref>{{cite journal |last1= Young |first1= Liane |last2= Camprodon |first2= Joan Albert |last3= Hauser |first3= Marc |last4= Pascual-Leone |first4= Alvaro |last5= Saxe |first5= Rebecca |year= 2010 |title= Disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation reduces the role of beliefs in moral judgments |journal= [[Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America|PNAS]] |volume= 107 |issue= 15 |pages= 6753–58 |doi= 10.1073/pnas.0914826107 |pmid=20351278 |pmc=2872442|bibcode= 2010PNAS..107.6753Y |doi-access= free }}</ref>

Similarly, individuals with a lesion of the VMPC judge an action purely on its outcome and are unable to take into account the intent of that action.<ref>{{cite journal |last1= Young |first1= Liane |last2= Bechara |first2= Antoine |last3= Tranel |first3= Daniel |last4= Damasio |first4= Hanna |last5= Hauser |first5= Marc |last6= Damasio |first6= Antonio |year= 2010 |title= Damage to ventromedial prefrontal cortex impairs judgment of harmful intent |journal= Neuron |volume= 65 |issue= 6 |pages= 845–51 |doi= 10.1016/j.neuron.2010.03.003 |pmid=20346759 |pmc=3085837}}</ref>