Nigerian Civil War

==International involvement==

=== United Kingdom ===
The United Kingdom had planned to maintain and expand its supply of cheap high-quality oil from Nigeria. Therefore, it placed a high priority on maintenance of [[Extraction of petroleum|oil extraction]] and refining operations. The war broke out just a week before the [[Six-Day War]] in the Middle East, forcing oil tankers from the Middle East to use the long route around the Cape of Good Hope, thereby increasing the cost of Middle Eastern oil. In turn, this increased the importance of Nigerian oil to the United Kingdom, because Nigerian oil was cheaper than Persian Gulf oil.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=65}} Initially, when it was unclear which side would prevail, the United Kingdom took a "wait and see" approach before opting decisively for Nigeria.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|pp=65–66}} Nigeria had a navy of only six vessels, the largest of which was a frigate; an air force of 76 planes, none of which were fighters or bombers; and an army of 7,000 men with no tanks and a shortage of officers with command experience. Though Biafra was likewise similarly weak, the two sides appeared evenly matched at the beginning of the war, and Nigerian victory was by no means considered preordained.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|pp=72–73}}

The United Kingdom backed the Federal Government but, when the war broke out, cautioned them not to damage British oil installations in the East. These oilworks, under the control of the Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company (jointly owned by [[Royal Dutch Shell|Shell]] and [[British Petroleum]]), controlled 84 per cent of Nigeria's 580,000 barrels per day. Two-thirds of this oil came from the Eastern region, and another third from the newly created Mid-West region. Two-fifths of all Nigerian oil ended up in the United Kingdom.<ref name="Uche2008pages120to124">Uche, ''Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War'' (2008), pp. 120–124.</ref> In 1967, 30 per cent of the oil being imported into the United Kingdom came from Nigeria.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=66}}

Shell-BP therefore considered carefully a request by the Federal Government that it refuse to pay the royalties demanded by Biafra. Its lawyers advised that payment to Biafra would be appropriate if this government did in fact maintain law and order in the region in question. The British government advised that paying Biafra could undermine the goodwill of the Federal Government. Shell-BP made the payment, and the government established a blockade on oil exports.<ref name="Uche2008pages120to124"/> Forced to choose a side, Shell-BP and the British government threw in their lot with the Federal Government in Lagos, apparently calculating that this side would be more likely to win the war.<ref name="Uche2008pages125to127">Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), pp. 125–127. "The Nigerian government subsequently made it explicit to Shell-BP that it expected the company to pay the outstanding oil royalty immediately. Once the oil flow stopped, sitting on a fence ceased to be an option for the British government. The United Kingdom subsequently decided to back Nigeria, partly because it was advised that, in the event of war, the odds were 'slightly in favour of the Federal Military Government'. Perhaps more importantly, the British government calculated that supporting Nigeria was its safest option if it were to preserve its oil interests in the country, largely because the Cold War and the rivalry among some Western European states made it likely that other foreign powers would wade into the conflict."</ref> As the British High Commissioner in Lagos wrote to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs on 27 July 1967:

<blockquote>Ojukwu, even victorious, will not be in a strong position. He will require all the international help and recognition he can get. The Federal Government would be much better placed both internationally and internally. They would have a cast iron case for the severest treatment of a company which has [[Subsidy|subsidised]] a rebel, and I feel fairly convinced they would press their case to the lengths of cancelling the Company's concessions and nationalising their installations. I conclude, therefore, if the company does change its mind and asks the British Government for advice, the best that could be given is for it to clamber hastily back on the Lagos side of the fence with cheque book at the ready."<ref name="Uche2008pages125to127"/></blockquote>

Shell-BP took this advice.<ref name="Uche2008pages125to127"/> It continued to quietly support Nigeria through the rest of the war, in one case advancing a royalty of £5.5&nbsp;million to fund the purchase of more British weapons.<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), p. 132. "Given Shell-BP's interest in Nigeria taking over the major oilfields still in Biafran hands, it was not surprising that they overtly supported the Nigerian military cause.99 A case in point was in December 1967 when the Nigerian government, frustrated by the slow pace of progress in the war, requested that Shell-BP pay its royalty of £5.5 million in advance, in order to enable it to purchase arms from the United Kingdom. Shell-BP promptly complied."</ref>

It was not until Federal forces captured the ocean oil terminal at Bonny on 25 July 1967 that the British Prime Minister [[Harold Wilson]] decided to back Nigeria with military aid. After the Federal victory at Bonny, Wilson summoned [[David Hunt (diplomat)|David Hunt]], the British high commissioner to Nigeria, for a meeting at 10 Downing Street in early August 1967 for his assessment of the situation.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=76}} Hunt's view that the Federal forces were the better organised and would win because they could draw upon a greater population led Wilson to side with Nigeria.

During the war, the United Kingdom covertly supplied Nigeria with weapons and military intelligence and may have also helped it to hire mercenaries.<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), p. 130. "In reality, however, the British government supplied many more arms than it was publicly prepared to admit. Apart from direct arms supplies, it provided military intelligence to the Nigerian government and may have helped it to access sophisticated arms and mercenaries through third parties."</ref> After the decision was made to back Nigeria, the BBC oriented its reporting to favour this side.<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), p. 131. "Furthermore, once the war broke out and the British government decided to back the Nigerian side, the BBC swiftly shifted its reporting on the conflict, in Nigeria's favour. This was noticed and thankfully acknowledged by the Nigerian government."</ref> Supplies provided to the Federal Military Government included two vessels and 60 vehicles.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 274.</ref>

In the United Kingdom, the humanitarian campaign around Biafra began on 12 June 1968, with media coverage on ITV and in ''The Sun''. The charities [[Oxfam]] and [[Save the Children Fund]] were soon deployed, with large sums of money at their disposal.<ref name="OSullivan2014page302">O'Sullivan, "Humanitarian Encounters" (2014), p. 302. "It took time, however, for popular attention to focus on the crisis. In the United Kingdom that occurred only after 12 June 1968, when a film broadcast on ITV and a press campaign led by the ''Sun'' newspaper sparked the humanitarian response into life."</ref>

===France===
France provided weapons, mercenary fighters, and other assistance to Biafra and promoted its cause internationally, describing the situation as a [[genocide]]. President [[Charles de Gaulle]] referred to "Biafra's just and noble cause".<ref name="Olawoyin1971pages137to139">Olawoyin, "Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict" (1971), pp. 137–139.</ref> However, France did not recognise Biafra diplomatically.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), pp. 114–115. "France, however, categorically refused to officially recognise Biafra, a possibility President Charles de Gaulle ruled out as early as 14 December 1967. At the same time it was well known that France was supporting Biafran leader General Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu with covert military aid throughout the war, including mercenaries and weapons."</ref> Through [[Pierre Laureys]], France had apparently provided two [[Douglas A-26 Invader|B-26]]s, [[Aérospatiale Alouette II|Alouette]] helicopters, and pilots.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 119. Foccart says de Gaulle's decision to send military assistance to Biafra was made on 27 September 1967, when the General met personally with Houphouët-Boigny, who was Biafra's most important African ally throughout the war. On 26 September, the Biafran capital, Enugu, was shelled for the first time by Federal Nigerian forces. The problem with this date is that it appears that France had already supplied Biafra with two B-26 aircraft, Alouette helicopters and pilots in summer 1967 via the French arms dealer [[Pierre Laureys]]. In 1971, however, Ralph Uwechue, Biafra's envoy to France, wrote that "the helicopters had been purchases made by the Eastern Nigerian Regional Government from France for civilian purposes well before the war."</ref> France supplied Biafra with captured German and Italian weapons from [[World War II]], sans serial numbers, delivered as part of regular shipments to [[Ivory Coast]].<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 122. "De Gaulle made the decision to begin regular French arms shipments to Biafra on 17 or 18 October 1967. De Gaulle was very reluctant to send weapons from French stocks, and only agreed when Foccart suggested sending captured German and Italian weapons from World War II with the serial number scratched off. The weapons would not be sent directly to Ojukwu, but would go through Houphouët-Boigny, so that it looked like France was replenishing the Ivory Coast's stocks as stipulated in the normal bilateral military assistance agreements."</ref> France also sold [[Panhard]] armoured vehicles to the Nigerian federal government.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 179. "France, too, pursued contradictory policies, selling Nigeria Panhard light armoured cars and halting all arms transfers to Lagos only later that year, by which time it was supplying the Biafrans via the Ivory Coast and Gabon. Clapham notes that France's military aid to Biafra prolonged the war for about eighteen months."</ref>

French involvement in the war can be viewed in the context of its geopolitical strategy (''[[Françafrique]]'') and competition with the British in [[West Africa]]. Nigeria represented a base of British influence in the predominantly French-aligned area. France and Portugal used nearby countries in their sphere of influence, especially Ivory Coast under President [[Félix Houphouët-Boigny]], as waystations for shipments to Biafra.<ref name="Olawoyin1971pages137to139"/><ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015)</ref> To some extent, also, France repeated its earlier policy from the [[Congo Crisis]], when it supported the secession of the southern mining province [[State of Katanga|Katanga]].<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), pp. 116–117. "The Katanga secession (1960–1963) was in many ways a precursor to the Biafran War for France. French mercenaries went to Katanga to support the Belgian intervention. The Belgians were helping Tshombé fight Congolese forces loyal to Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who was supported by the Soviet Union.{{nbsp}}... The Katangan secession was ultimately unsuccessful, and thus it is a surprise that de Gaulle's government would support another secession in Biafra four years later. A number of other countries also drew a link between the two conflicts, and Ojukwu released a statement on 11 January 1969 called 'Biafra: the antithesis of Katanga', to reassure foreign powers.{{nbsp}}... Katanga gave France experience in using mercenaries to fight a war in which the consequences of failure were minimal."</ref>

Economically, France gained incentives through oil drilling contracts for the ''Société Anonyme Française de Recherches et d'Exploitation de Pétrolières'' (SAFRAP), apparently arranged with Eastern Nigeria in advance of its secession from the Nigerian Federation.<ref>Griffin, ''French Military Policy in the Nigerian Civil War'' (2015), p. 118. "Nigeria, however, was very important for France due to its size as well as the oil in the Niger River Delta. France had no diplomatic relations with Nigeria after 1960, as Nigeria expelled the French ambassador, Raymond Offroy, following the third French nuclear test in Algeria on 27 December. The severing of diplomatic relations did not halt commercial relations between the two countries, and in 1964, the French national oil company, SAFRAP, was given the rights to search for oil in parts of Eastern Nigeria that would later declare independence under the name of Biafra."</ref><ref name="Olawoyin1971pages135to136">Olawoyin, "Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict" (1971), pp. 135–136. "The French policy may be described as anti-British, anti-Nigerian and pr-Biafra. SAFRAP (a French oil company) is exploring for oil in Biafra as well as in Nigeria. Although France has leaned toward Biafra, SAFRAP has vast exploration rights in the Northern Region; this might have prevented France giving Biafra political recognition.{{nbsp}}... The highlight of increasing world sympathy for Ojukwu was also motivated by the declaration by the French government that it endorsed the principle of Biafra's right to self-determination. Before the start of the Civil War, France had strengthened her economic ties with Biafra. On August 8th, F.G. showed some documents (photostat copies) to the foreign press showing that Biafra had sold oil concessions to France."</ref> SAFRAP laid claim to 7% of the Nigerian petroleum supply.<ref name="Uche2008pages120to124"/> In the assessment of a CIA analyst in 1970, France's "support was actually given to a handful of Biafran bourgeoisie in return for the oil. "<ref>"[https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve05p1/d160 Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency to the White House Situation Room]," CIA, 20262, TDCS DB – 315/00173-70 (ADVANCE), 14 January 1970, in FRUS, Vol. E-5, 2005 (160); as cited in Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 120.</ref> Biafra, for its part, openly appreciated its relationship with France. Ojukwu suggested on 10 August 1967, that Biafra introduce compulsory French classes in secondary, technical and teacher training schools, in order to "benefit from the rich culture of the French-speaking world".<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 119.</ref>

France led the way, internationally, for political support of Biafra.<ref name="Olawoyin1971pages135to136"/> [[Portugal]] also sent weapons. These transactions were arranged through the "Biafran Historical Research Centre" in Paris.<ref name="griffin">Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 122. "The most important dimension of French military assistance was the shipment of weapons to Biafra, which had severe shortages of not only heavy weapons, but also small arms and ammunition. Portugal also provided weapons to Biafra, as did Czechoslovakia, until the Soviet invasion in 1968. The Biafrans set up an office in Paris called the 'Biafran Historical Research Centre', which was Ojukwu's contact point with Mauricheau-Beupré, Falques and Denard. The Centre allowed Ojukwu to purchase arms directly from European arms dealers. Denard would purchase arms from Czechoslovakia and ship them by sea to Biafra via Libreville. Starting in October 1967, there were also direct Czech arms flights, by a network of pilots led by Jack Malloch, a Rhodesian in contact with Houphouët-Boigny and Mauricheau-Beupré."</ref> French-aligned [[Gabon]] and Ivory Coast recognised Biafra in May 1968.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 123.</ref> On 8 May 1968, De Gaulle personally contributed 30,000 francs to medicine purchases for the [[French Red Cross]] mission. [[May 1968 events in France|Fairly widespread student-worker unrest]] diverted the government's attention only temporarily. The government declared an arms embargo but maintained arms shipments to Biafra under cover of humanitarian aid.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 124. "In May and early June 1968, protests and general strikes in France prevented de Gaulle, Foccart or any other French official from following the situation in Biafra. On 12 June, after the riots had subsided, a French ministerial council decided to impose an official arms embargo on both Nigeria and Biafra, and to start providing direct humanitarian aid to Ojukwu. Robert explains that the humanitarian aid provided a very effective cover for the secret French arms shipments, which began to increase."</ref> In July the government redoubled its efforts to involve the public in a humanitarian approach to the conflict. Images of starving children and accusations of genocide filled French newspapers and television programs. Amidst this press blitz, on 31 July 1968, De Gaulle made an official statement in support of Biafra.<ref name="Griffin2015page124">Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), pp. 124–125. "The 31 July 1938 statement in favour of Biafra was preceded by a concerted campaign in the French press during the month of July to inform the French public about events in Biafra.{{nbsp}}... The French government's next step after the 31 July statement was to launch a major campaign to gain public funding for humanitarian operations in Biafra. The campaign was coordinated at the highest levels of government, and the French Foreign Ministry files make it clear that the French television service and the French Red Cross were required to get governmental approval to ask for funds. The French public eventually contributed 12,600,000 francs. The French press continued a concerted campaign throughout August 1968 to alert the public to the humanitarian situation."</ref> Maurice Robert, head of ''[[Service de Documentation Extérieure et de Contre-Espionnage]]'' (SDECE, the French foreign intelligence service) African operations, wrote in 2004 that his agency supplied the press with details about the war and told them to use the word "genocide" in their reporting.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), p. 124. "Robert, in a surprising admission, stated that it was the SDECE that instructed the media to use the term 'genocide' in 1968. He says that the SDECE gave the French press precise information about Biafran casualties and civilian losses, and that ''Le Monde'' was the first to pick up the story. Rony Braumann wrote in 2006 that the SDECE paid the Biafran press service Markpress, located in Geneva, to introduce the theme of genocide to the general public."</ref>

France declared "Biafra Week" on 11–17 March 1969, centred on a 2-franc raffle held by the French Red Cross. Soon after, de Gaulle terminated arms shipments, then resigned on 27 April 1969. Interim president [[Alain Poher]] fired General [[Jacques Foccart]], the lead coordinator of France's Africa policy. [[Georges Pompidou]] re-hired Foccart and resumed support for Biafra, including cooperation with the South African secret service to import more weapons.<ref>Griffin, "French military policy in the Nigerian Civil War" (2015), pp. 127–128.</ref>

===Soviet Union===
The [[Soviet Union]] strongly backed the Nigerian government, emphasising the similarity with the Congo situation. Nigeria's need for more aircraft, which the United Kingdom and the United States refused to sell, led Gowon to accept a Soviet offer in the summer of 1967 to sell a squadron of 17 [[MiG-17]] fighters.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=79}} The British-trained Nigerian military tended to be distrustful of the Soviet Union, but the Soviet ambassador in Lagos, Alexander Romanov, a gregarious and friendly man as well as a shrewd diplomat, established an excellent rapport with Gowon and persuaded him that accepting Soviet weapons would not mean subjection to the Soviet Union.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|pp=79–80}} The first MiG-17s arrived in Nigeria in August 1967 together with some about 200 Soviet technicians to train the Nigerians in their use. Though the MiG-17s turned out to be too sophisticated for the Nigerians to use properly, requiring Egyptian Air Force pilots to fly them, the Soviet-Nigerian arms deal turned out to be one of the turning points of the war. Besides establishing an arms pipeline from the Soviet Union to Nigeria, the possibility that the Soviet Union would gain greater influence in Nigeria led the United Kingdom to increase its supply of arms to maintain its influence in Lagos while ruling out the possibility of either the United States or Britain recognising Biafra.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=80}}

The Soviet Union consistently supplied Nigeria with weapons, with the diplomatic disclaimer that these were "strictly for cash on a commercial basis". In 1968, the USSR agreed to finance the [[Kainji Dam]] on the Niger (somewhat upriver from the Delta). Soviet media outlets initially accused the British of cynically supporting the Biafran secession, then had to adjust these claims later when it turned out that the United Kingdom was, in fact, supporting the Federal Government.<ref name="Stent1973">[[Angela Stent]], "The Soviet Union and the Nigerian Civil War: A Triumph of Realism", ''Issue: A Journal of Opinion'' 3.2, Summer 1973.</ref>

One explanation for Soviet sympathy with the Federal Military Government was a shared opposition to internal secessionist movements. Before the war, the Soviets had seemed sympathetic to the Igbos. But Soviet Prime Minister [[Alexei Kosygin]] stated to their chagrin in October 1967 that "the Soviet people fully understand" Nigeria's motives and its need "to prevent the country from being dismembered."<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 273. "From 1967 to 1970, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland sold Nigeria twelve L-29 Delfin training aircraft, forty-seven MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter jets, and five Ilyushin-28 bombers, two of which Egypt transferred to Lagos. This constituted a virtual about-face in Soviet policy, because, until the secession, Moscow had evinced both admiration of the Igbos and sympathy for their plight. The Soviet Union chose pragmatism, in the form of alignment with federal Nigeria, over the ideological (if not idealist) alternative of support for Biafra."</ref>

Reportedly, the war substantially improved Soviet-Nigerian diplomatic and trade relations, and [[Moskvitch]] cars began to make appearances around Lagos. The USSR became a competitive importer of Nigerian [[Cocoa bean|cacao]].<ref name="Stent1973"/>

===China===
Because the Soviet Union was one of Nigeria's leading supporters, supplying arms on a generous scale, China, having recently become rivals with the Soviets in the [[Sino-Soviet split]], declared its support for Biafra.<ref name="whokilledbiafra">{{Cite journal|last=Diamond|first=Stanley|date=2007|title=Who Killed Biafra?|journal=[[Dialectical Anthropology]]|volume=31|issue=1/3|pages=339–362|jstor=29790795|doi=10.1007/s10624-007-9014-9|s2cid=144828601}}</ref> In its first major statement on the war in September 1968, the [[Xinhua News Agency|Xinhua Press Agency]] stated the People's Republic of China fully supported the justified struggle for liberation of the people of Biafra against the Nigerian government supported by "Anglo-American imperialism and Soviet revisionism". China supported arms to Biafra via [[Tanzania]], supplying arms worth some $2&nbsp;million in 1968–1969.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=237}}

===Israel===
From early on, Israel perceived that Nigeria would be an important player in West African politics and saw good relations with Lagos as an important foreign policy objective. Nigeria and Israel established a linkage in 1957. In 1960, the United Kingdom allowed the creation of an Israeli diplomatic mission in Lagos, and Israel made a $10&nbsp;million loan to the Nigerian government.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265341363|title=Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra Civil War, 1967–1970}}</ref> Israel also developed a cultural relation with the Igbos based on possible shared traditions. These moves represented a significant diplomatic success given the Muslim orientation of the northern-dominated government. Some northern leaders disapproved of contact with Israel and banned Israelis from [[Maiduguri]] and [[Sokoto]].<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), pp. 264–265. "Israel was certain that Nigeria, the most populous country on the continent (fifty- five million in 1960) and rich in oil, would have a great influence on African politics. The Israeli foreign ministry was determined to establish full diplomatic relations upon that colony's receipt of independence (1 October 1960). Ehud Avriel, ambassador to Ghana and a close confidant of both Prime Minister David Ben Gurion and Foreign Minister Golda Meir, cautioned that were Israel to fail to establish ties with Nigeria, 'all of our work in West Africa will have come to naught'."</ref>

Israel did not begin arms sales to Nigeria until after Aguyi-Ironsi came to power on 17 January 1966. This was considered an opportune time to develop this relationship with the federal government. Ram Nirgad became Israeli ambassador to Nigeria in January. Thirty tons of mortar rounds were delivered in April.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 266.</ref>

The Eastern Region began seeking assistance from Israel in September 1966. Israel apparently turned down their requests repeatedly, although they may have put the Biafran representatives in contact with another arms dealer.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 267. "By September 1966, an open arms race had developed between the East and the Federal Government. In mid August, Ojukwu sent two representatives from the Eastern Region on a clandestine visit to Israel in a bid to purchase military hardware. Biafran attention to Israel was a highly astute move, primarily because the secessionists knew well what associations the massacres evoked for the Israelis."</ref> In 1968, Israel began supplying the Federal Military Government with arms—about $500,000 worth, according to the US State Department.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), p. 280.</ref> Meanwhile, as elsewhere, the situation in Biafra became publicised as a genocide. The [[Knesset]] publicly debated this issue on 17 and 22 July 1968, winning applause from the press for its sensitivity. Right-wing and left-wing political groups, and student activists, spoke for Biafra.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), pp. 270–271. "Uri Avneri of ''HaOlam HaZeh—Koach Hadash'' ('This World—New Force', a far left-wing faction) called for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Biafra, while Aryeh Ben-Eliezer, of the right-wing herut party, lambasted Egyptian and Soviet support of Nigeria. The Israeli press praised the Knesset's attention to Biafra, pointing out that Israel's parliament was the first in the world both to devote a session to the issue and to declare its intention to help the victims."</ref> In August 1968, the [[Israeli Air Force]] overtly sent twelve tons of food aid to a nearby site outside of Nigerian (Biafran) airspace. Covertly, Mossad provided Biafra with $100,000 (through Zurich) and attempted an arms shipment. Soon after, Israel arranged to make clandestine weapons shipments to Biafra using Ivory Coast transport planes.<ref>Levey, "Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war" (2014), pp. 271–272.</ref><ref>[https://unitedwithisrael.org/biafran-airlift-israels-secret-mission-to-save-lives/ "Biafran Airlift: Israel's Secret Mission to Save Lives"]. Eitan Press. ''United With Israel. www.unitedwithisrael.org''. 13 October 2013. Accessed 13 January 2017.</ref> The nations of sub-Saharan Africa tended to support the Arabs in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute by voting for resolutions sponsored by Arab states at the United Nations. A [[Alliance of the periphery|major goal]] of Israeli diplomacy was to wean the African states away from the Arab states and given the way that the majority of African nations supported Nigeria, Israel was loath to antagonise them by supporting Biafra too overtly.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=236}}

===Egypt===
President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] dispatched pilots of the [[Egyptian Air Force]] to fight for Nigeria in August 1967, flying the recently arrived MiG-17s. The tendency of Egyptian pilots to indiscriminately bomb Biafran civilians proved counterproductive in the propaganda war as the Biafrans did their best to publicise cases of civilians killed by the Egyptians.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=333}} In the spring of 1969, the Nigerians replaced the Egyptian pilots with European pilots who proved to be considerably more competent.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|pp=333–334}}

===United States===
The civil war began while the United States was under the presidency of [[Lyndon B. Johnson]], who was officially neutral in regard to the civil war,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e5/c15646.htm|title=Nigerian Civil War|first=Bureau of Public Affairs|last=[[United States Department of State]]: The Office of Electronic Information|date=25 October 2005|website=2001-2009.state.gov}}</ref> with U.S. Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] stating that "America is not in a position to take action as Nigeria is an area under British influence".<ref name="shellbpinflu"/> Strategically, U.S. interests aligned with the Federal Military Government, although there was considerable popular public sentiment in support of Biafra. The U.S. also saw value in its alliance with Lagos, and sought to protect $800&nbsp;million (in the assessment of the State Department) worth of private investment.<ref>Pierri, "A New Entry into the World Oil Market" (2013), pp. 105–106.</ref>

The neutrality was not universally popular, and a pro-Biafra lobby emerged within the United States to pressure the U.S. government to take a more active role in assisting Biafra.<ref name="lefever"/> The American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive was an organization founded by American activists to inform the American public of the war and sway popular opinion towards Biafra.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=McNeil |first1=Brian |title='And starvation is the grim reaper': the American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive and the genocide question during the Nigerian civil war, 1968–70 |journal=Journal of Genocide Research |date=3 July 2014 |volume=16 |issue=2–3 |pages=317–336 |doi=10.1080/14623528.2014.936723 |s2cid=70911056 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14623528.2014.936723 |issn=1462-3528}}</ref> Biafra became a topic in the [[1968 United States presidential election]] and on 9 September 1968, future Republican president [[Richard Nixon]] called for Lyndon B. Johnson to take action in helping Biafra, stating:
<blockquote>Until now, efforts to relieve the Biafran people have been thwarted by the desire of central government of Nigeria to pursue total and unconditional victory and by the fear of the Ibo people that surrender means wholesale atrocities and genocide. But genocide is what is taking place right now—and starvation is the grim reaper.<ref name="Olawoyin1971pages137to139"/><ref>{{cite web |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e5/54841.htm |title=Technical Difficulties }}</ref></blockquote>

Both Biafran officials and the U.S. pro-Biafra lobby hoped the election of Richard Nixon would change U.S. foreign policy regarding the war. However, when Nixon became president in 1969, he found there was little he could do to change the established stance aside from calling for another round of peace talks. According to American political theorist [[Ernest W. Lefever]], the U.S. providing official support to Biafra would have resulted in hostility from not only Nigeria, but also other African nations who supported Nigeria in the war, who had successfully argued to the [[United Nations]] that the war was an internal affair that the U.N. should not be involved with.<ref name="lefever">{{cite journal |last1=Lefever |first1=Ernest W. |title=The "Biafra Lobby" and U.S. Foreign Policy |journal=Worldview |date=February 1969 |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=6–7 |doi=10.1017/S0084255900013395 |url=https://doi.org/10.1017/S0084255900013395 |language=en |issn=0084-2559}}</ref> The [[Vietnam War]] served as another obstacle to a possible U.S. intervention in Biafra. Despite this, Nixon continued to personally support Biafra.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://notevenpast.org/foreign-policy-from-candidate-to-president-richard-nixon-and-the-lesson-of-biafra/|title=Foreign Policy from Candidate to President: Richard Nixon and the Lesson of Biafra – Not Even Past|date=5 December 2016|website=notevenpast.org}}</ref>

Himself a Jew who escaped persecution from [[Nazi Germany]], U.S. Secretary of State [[Henry Kissinger]] compared the Igbo people to Jews in a memoriam written to U.S. President [[Richard Nixon]], stating:
{{blockquote|The Ibos are the wandering Jews of West Africa – gifted, aggressive, Westernized; at best envied and resented, but mostly despised by the mass of their neighbors in the Federation.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chiluwa |first1=Innocent |last2=Chiluwa |first2=Isioma M. |title=Separatists or terrorists? Jews or Nigerians?: Media and cyber discourses on the complex identity of the "Biafrans" |journal=Journal of Language and Politics |date=8 June 2020 |volume=19 |issue=4 |pages=583–603 |doi=10.1075/jlp.19041.chi |s2cid=214072392 |url=https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/jlp.19041.chi |language=en |issn=1569-2159}}</ref>}}

[[Gulf Oil]] Nigeria, the third major player in Nigerian oil, was producing 9% of the oil coming out of Nigeria before the war began.<ref name="Uche2008pages120to124"/> Its operations were all located offshore of the federally controlled Mid-Western territory; therefore it continued to pay royalties to the federal government and its operations were mostly undisrupted.<ref name="Uche2008pages125to127"/>

===Canada===
At the request of the Nigerian government, Canada sent three observers to investigate allegations of genocide and war crimes against the Nigerian military. Major General W.A. Milroy was joined by two other Canadian officers in 1968, and the Canadian contingent remained until February 1970.<ref>Department of National Defense{{cite web |title=Details/Information for Canadian Forces (CF) Operation Observer Team Nigeria |url=http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=131&CdnOpId=155 |website=Operations Database Details/Information |date=9 November 2004 |access-date=6 March 2019 |archive-date=4 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200804120959/http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/od-bdo/di-ri-eng.asp?IntlOpId=131&CdnOpId=155 |url-status=dead }}</ref>

===Rest of Africa===
Biafra appealed unsuccessfully for support from the [[Organisation of African Unity]] (OAU), the precursor to the [[African Union]]. The OAU, bound by its charter to oppose any secession from a member state, denounced Biafra's attempt to secede from Nigeria. Equally bound by its charter to refrain from interference in the internal affairs of its member states, the OAU took no further action.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Kamanu |first1=Onyeonoro S. |title=Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: an O.A.U. Dilemma |journal=The Journal of Modern African Studies |date=September 1974 |volume=12 |issue=3 |page=373 |quote=The obligation to 'defend' the territorial status quo theoretically precludes the participation of the O.A.U. in any settlement of an internal conflict whose terms might favor the break-up of a member state. The dilemma this creates for the Organization was made startlingly and embarassingly apparent by the Nigerian-Biafran war. While one of the costliest wars in African history was raging out of control and hundreds of thousands of African lives were being lost, all the O.A.U. Assembly of Heads of State and Government could do was to reiterate its 'condemnation of secession in any Member State' and to 'send a consultative mission of 6 Heads of State...to the Head of the Federal Government of Nigeria to assure him of the Assembly's desire for the territorial integrity, unity and peace of Nigeria'. |doi=10.1017/S0022278X00009678 |s2cid=153949636 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/abs/secession-and-the-right-of-selfdetermination-an-oau-dilemma/F3F8BC828CE731E8FE48703ED5A8E9E5 |language=en |issn=1469-7777}}</ref> Countries such as Ethiopia<ref>{{cite book |last1=Sadleman |first1=Stephen |title=The Ties That Divide |date=2000 |page=86 |publisher=Columbia University Press |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_8UzCgAAQBAJ&q=ethiopia+support&pg=PA87 |access-date=8 June 2018|isbn=9780231122290 }}</ref> and Egypt vocally supported the Nigerian government's policies in order to prevent inspiring revolts within their own borders.<ref name="HeertenMoses2014page175">Heerten & Moses, "The Nigeria–Biafra War" (2014), pp. 174–175. "Realising their slim chances on the battlefield, the Biafran leadership moved the conflict into the propaganda domain. The situation did not look promising for Biafra's propagandists in the international sphere, either. Governments of the global south were particularly hesitant. As many of them faced separatist movements at home, they were adamantly opposed to what they understood as illegitimate secession rather than the legitimate exercise of the Biafran's right to self-determination."</ref> However, Biafra received the support of African countries such as Tanzania,<ref>Malcolm MacDonald: ''Bringing an End to Empire'', 1995, p. 416.</ref><ref>''Ethnic Politics in Kenya and Nigeria'', 2001, p. 54.{{full citation needed|date=October 2022}}</ref><ref>''Africa 1960–1970: Chronicle and Analysis'', 2009, p. 423.{{full citation needed|date=October 2022}}</ref> Zambia, Gabon and Ivory Coast.<ref name="africamasterweb.com"/> [[Rhodesia]]n pilots smuggled weapons and money into Biafra, which Rhodesian intelligence chief [[Ken Flower]] claimed was part of the operations of Rhodesia's [[Central Intelligence Organisation]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=White |first1=Luise |title=Unpopular sovereignty: Rhodesian independence and African decolonization |date=2015 |publisher=The University of Chicago Press |location=Chicago (Ill.) |isbn=9780226235226}}</ref>

===Foreign mercenaries===
Outmatched by Nigeria's superior firepower, Biafra hired foreign mercenaries for extra support.<ref>{{Cite magazine|url=http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,900387,00.html|title = Biafra: The Mercenaries|magazine = Time|date = 25 October 1968}}</ref> Mercenaries with prior experience fighting in the [[Congo Crisis]] were eagerly drawn to Biafra. German mercenary [[Rolf Steiner]] was placed in charge of the 4th Commando Brigade of the Biafran Armed Forces and commanded 3,000 men. Welsh mercenary [[Taffy Williams]], one of Steiner's subordinates, was in command of one hundred Biafran fighters. Steiner's other subordinates were a mixture of adventurers consisting of the Italian Giorgio Norbiato; the Rhodesian explosive expert Johnny Erasmus; the Scotsman Alexander "Alec" Gay; the Irishman Louis "Paddy" Malrooney; the Corsican Armand Iaranelli who had been able to enlist in the Foreign Legion by pretending to be Italian; and a Jamaican bartender turned mercenary who called himself "Johnny Korea".{{sfn|Jowett|2016|p=15}} Polish-Swiss pilot [[Jan Zumbach]] formed and commanded a ragtag air force for Biafra. Canadian pilot [[Lynn Garrison]], Swedish pilot [[Carl Gustaf von Rosen]], and Rhodesian pilot [[Jack Malloch]] served as leaders of Biafran air operations, attacking Nigerian forces and also supplying weapons and food aid. Portuguese pilots also served in the Biafran Air Force, transporting weapons from Portugal to Biafra. Steiner established a [[brown water navy]] by converting some [[Chris-Craft Boats]] into gun boats, which turned out to be successful in launching surprise raids for weapons and supplies.{{sfn|Venter|2016|p=95}}

It was hoped that employing mercenaries in Nigeria would have similar impact to the Congo, but the mercenaries proved largely ineffective since the Nigerian military received much more professional and adequate training compared to the Congolese militias.{{sfn|Baxter|2015|p=49}} Despite some initial early successes (such as [[Operation OAU]]), over half of the 4th Commando Brigade was wiped out by Nigerian forces during the disastrous [[Operation Hiroshima]] of 15–29 November 1968, resulting in Steiner experiencing depression and a nervous breakdown, leading to his eventual expulsion and replacement by Taffy Williams. Although Nigeria appeared to be a tougher opponent, commentators observing the war noted that the remaining mercenaries appeared to have developed a personal or ideological commitment to Biafra's cause, which is a rare trait for mercenaries.{{sfn|Baxter|2015|p=50}} Belgian mercenary [[Marc Goosens]], who was killed by defensive Nigerian forces in a [[suicide mission]] during Operation Hiroshima, was reportedly motivated to return to Africa after a dispute with his girlfriend.{{sfn|Baxter|2015|p=50}} Goosens was photographed in the moments before and after his death.{{sfn|Baxter|2015|p=50}}<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.jeremy-duns.com/blog/2014/5/30/the-real-dogs-of-war |title=The real dogs of war — JEREMY DUNS |website=www.jeremy-duns.com |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160323040031/http://www.jeremy-duns.com/blog/2014/5/30/the-real-dogs-of-war |archive-date=2016-03-23}}</ref> Steiner claimed to have fought for Biafra for idealistic reasons, saying the Igbo people were the victims of genocide, but the American journalist [[Edward P. Morgan|Ted Morgan]] mocked his claims, describing Steiner as a militarist who simply craved war because killing was the only thing he knew how to do well.<ref name="Morgan">{{cite news |last1=Morgan |first1=Ted |title=War Is Heaven |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1978/07/09/archives/war-is-heaven.html |access-date=11 April 2020 |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=9 July 1978}}</ref> Journalist [[Frederick Forsyth]] quotes Taffy Williams speaking of his Biafran subordinates, "I've seen a lot of Africans at war. But there's nobody to touch these people. Give me 10,000 Biafrans for six months, and we'll build an army that would be invincible on this continent. I've seen men die in this war who would have won the [[Victoria Cross]] in another context".{{sfn|Baxter|2015|p=50}}

After the war, [[Philip Effiong]], the chief of the Biafran general staff was asked by a journalist about the impact of the mercenaries on the war, his reply was: "They had not helped. It would had made no difference if not a single one of them came to work for the secessionist forces. Rolf Steiner stayed the longest. He was more of a bad influence than anything else. We were happy to get rid of him."<ref name="Oyewole">{{cite journal |last1=Oyewole |first1=Fola |title=Scientists and Mercenaries |journal=Transition |year=1975 |volume=48 | pages=64–65}}</ref>