Cosmological argument

=== Existence of infinite causal chains ===
[[David Hume]] and later [[Paul Edwards (philosopher)|Paul Edwards]] have invoked a similar principle in their criticisms of the cosmological argument.<ref name=Pruss>Alexander R. Pruss, [https://archive.today/20130202224654/http://www.springerlink.com/content/q134n458307w0125 The Hume-Edwards Principle and the Cosmological Argument], ''International Journal for Philosophy of Religion''</ref> [[William L. Rowe]] has called this the Hume-Edwards principle:

{{Blockquote|If the existence of every member of a set is explained, the existence of that set is thereby explained.<ref name=Pruss/>}}

Nevertheless, David White argues that the notion of an [[infinite regress|infinite causal regress]] providing a proper explanation is fallacious.<ref>{{cite journal|last=White|first=David E.|title=An argument for God's existence|journal=International Journal for Philosophy of Religion|volume=10|issue=1–3|pages=101–115|doi=10.1007/BF00143159|year=1979|s2cid=171007306}}</ref> Furthermore, in Hume's ''[[Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion]]'', the character Demea states that even if the succession of causes is infinite, the whole chain still requires a cause.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hume |first=David|year=1779 |title=  Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion |publisher=Penguin Books |place=London }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Calvert|first=Brian|title=Another problem about Part IX of Hume's Dialogues|journal=International Journal for Philosophy of Religion|volume=14|issue=2|pages=65–70|doi=10.1007/BF00131845|year=1983|s2cid=189828318}}</ref> To explain this, suppose there exists a causal chain of infinite contingent beings. If one asks the question, "Why are there any contingent beings at all?", it does not help to be told that "There are contingent beings because other contingent beings caused them." That answer would just presuppose additional contingent beings. An adequate explanation of why some contingent beings exist would invoke a different sort of being, a necessary being that is ''not'' contingent.<ref>{{cite web | url = http://personal.stthomas.edu/mwrota/InfiniteRegress4%20Final.doc | format = DOC | title = Infinite Causal Chains and Explanation | first = Michael | last = Rota | work = Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association | access-date = 2010-06-01 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160328172453/http://personal.stthomas.edu/mwrota/InfiniteRegress4%20Final.doc | archive-date = 2016-03-28 }}</ref> A response might suppose each individual is contingent but the infinite chain as a whole is not, or the whole infinite causal chain is its own cause.

Severinsen argues that there is an "infinite" and complex causal structure.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Severinsen|first=Morten|title=Principles Behind Definitions of Diseases – a Criticism of the Principle of Disease Mechanism and the Development of a Pragmatic Alternative|journal=Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics|volume=22|issue=4|pages=319–336|quote=This implies that there is an "infinite" and complex causal structure behind each disease, and that the disease mechanism would have to encompass the whole structure.|doi=10.1023/A:1011830602137|pmid=11680525|year=2001|s2cid=25953826}}</ref> White tried to introduce an argument "without appeal to the principle of sufficient reason and without denying the possibility of an infinite causal regress".<ref>{{cite journal|last=White|first=David E.|title=An argument for God's existence|journal=International Journal for Philosophy of Religion|volume=10|issue=1–3|pages=101–115|quote=My intention is to show that a cosmological argument for God's existence (not that of a first cause simpliciter) can be constructed without appeal to the principle of sufficient reason and without denying the possibility of an infinite causal regress.|doi=10.1007/BF00143159|year=1979|s2cid=171007306}}</ref> A number of other arguments have been offered to demonstrate that an actual infinite regress cannot exist, viz. the argument for the impossibility of concrete actual infinities, the argument for the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite, the argument from the lack of capacity to begin to exist, and various arguments from paradoxes.<ref>Andrew Loke, ''God and Ultimate Origins'' (Cham: Springer Nature, 2017), chapters 2 and 3; Waters, Ben. 2013. "Methuselah's Diary and the Finitude of the Past". ''Philosophia Christi'' 15: 463–469; Koons, Robert. 2014. ''A New Kalam Argument: Revenge of the Grim Reaper.'' Noûs 48: 256–267.</ref>

Other defenders of cosmological arguments such as Ed Feser argue that the type of series in which causes are hierarchically dependent (essentially ordered or ''per se'' series) one on the other, cannot regress to infinity, even if it may be possible for causal series which are extended backward through time (accidentally ordered or ''per accidens'' series) to regress infinitely.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Feser |first1=Edward |author1-link=Edward Feser |title=Five Proofs of the Existence of God |date=2017 |publisher=Ignatius Press |isbn=978-1621641339}}</ref> The rationale for this is that in a hierarchical ''per se'' causal series, each member cannot so much as act without the concurrent actualization or causation of more fundamental members of the series; thus an infinite hierarchical series would mean that the entire series is composed of members none of which can act of itself, which is impossible. An example of such a series would be the composition of water, which depends on the simultaneous composition of hydrogen and oxygen atoms, which in turn depend on the simultaneous composition of protons, neutrons, and electrons, etc. into deeper levels of the hierarchy of physical reality. This is contrasted with an accidentally ordered or linear series - parents causing their children to begin to exist, who in turn cause their children to begin to exist - in which one member in the series may continue to act even if whatever caused it has ceased to exist, and so there is seemingly no issue if this type of series regresses infinitely; the impossibility of the infinite regress in an essentially ordered causal series would suffice for at least some varieties of cosmological arguments. Further discussion on this point can be found under [[Five_Ways_(Aquinas)#Essential_and_accidental_causal_chains|essential and accidental causal chains]].