Boko Haram

==Response of Nigerian authorities==
Until the 1990s, the Nigerian military was seen as a force for stability across the region.<ref name="reuters1"/> But by 2014, it was short of basic equipment, including radios and [[Armoured fighting vehicle|armoured vehicles]]. Morale was said to be low. Senior officers were allegedly skimming military procurement and budget funds which were intended to pay for the standard issue equipment which is supposed to be provided to soldiers. The country's defense budget accounted for more than a third of the country's security budget of $5.8 billion, but only 10 per cent of this money was allocated to cover capital spending.<ref name="reuters1">{{cite news |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-military-insight-idUSBREA4809220140509 |title=Boko Haram exploits Nigeria's slow military decline |work=[[Reuters]]|author=Tim Cocks |date=9 May 2014 |access-date=27 October 2014 |archive-date=12 December 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141212224800/http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/09/us-nigeria-military-insight-idUSBREA4809220140509 |url-status=live }}</ref> A 2016 [[United States Department of Defense]] assessment stated that the Nigerian administration's response to the Boko Haram crisis was marred by "high-level corruption" but that the morale in the military had improved after several former senior government officials were arrested on corruption charges.<ref name="Congressional"/>{{rp|9}}

In the summer of 2013, the Nigerian military shut down mobile phone coverage in three north-eastern Nigerian states in order to disrupt Boko Haram's communication and ability to detonate IEDs. Accounts by military insiders and data of Boko Haram incidences{{verify spelling|date=September 2022|reason=''incidence'' is normally used only in the singular form, perhaps ''incidence'', ''incidents'',  or ''instances'' was intended}} before, during, and after the mobile phone blackout all suggest that the shut down was 'successful' from a military- tactical point of view. However, it angered citizens who lived in the region (owing to the negative social and economic consequences of the mobile shutdown) and engendered negative opinions of the state and its new emergency policies. While citizens and organizations developed various coping and circumventing strategies, Boko Haram evolved from an open network model of insurgency to a closed centralized system, shifting the center of its operations to the Sambisa Forest. As a consequence, Boko Haram's changing strategies fundamentally changed the dynamics of the conflict.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Jacob | first1 = J.U.U. | last2 = Akpan | first2 = I | year = 2015 | title = Silencing Boko Haram: Mobile Phone Blackout and Counterinsurgency in Nigeria's Northeast region. Stability: International | journal = Journal of Security and Development | volume = 4 | issue = 1| page = 8 | doi = 10.5334/sta.ey | doi-access = free }}</ref>

In July 2014, Nigeria was estimated to have suffered the highest number of terrorist killings in the world over the past year, 3477, killed in 146 attacks.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35643:nigeria-tops-world-terror-attack-fatality-list&catid=49:National%20Security&Itemid=115 |title=Nigeria tops world terror attack fatality list |publisher=defenseWeb |author=Oscar Nkala |date=29 July 2014 |access-date=30 July 2014}}</ref> The governor of Borno, [[Kashim Shettima]], of the opposition [[All Nigeria Peoples Party|ANPP]], said in February 2014:<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence-idUSBREA1G1AO20140217 |title=Nigeria Islamists better armed, motivated than army: governor |work=[[Reuters]]|author=Felix Onuoh |date=17 February 2014 |access-date=26 July 2014 |archive-date=28 July 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140728121240/http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/17/us-nigeria-violence-idUSBREA1G1AO20140217 |url-status=live }}</ref> {{blockquote|Boko Haram are better armed and are better motivated than our own troops. Given the present state of affairs, it is absolutely impossible for us to defeat Boko Haram.}}

In April 2018, the President of Nigeria, [[Muhammadu Buhari]], approved a release of $1bn for the procurement of security equipment to fight insurgency and revolt in the country. This announcement came days after an attack by Boko Haram that left 18 dead in northern Nigeria.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Adetayo|first1=Olalekan|title=Boko Haram: Buhari approves release of $1bn for security equipment|url=http://punchng.com/breaking-boko-haram-buhari-approves-release-of-1bn-for-security-equipment/|website=Punch|date=4 April 2018}}</ref>

In September 2021, Brigadier General Bernard Onyeuko of the [[Nigerian Armed Forces]] announced the surrender of close to 6,000 Boko Haram insurgents.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/almost-6000-boko-haram-fighters-have-surrendered-nigerian-army-says-2021-09-02/|title=Almost 6,000 Boko Haram fighters have surrendered, Nigerian army says|date=2 September 2021|work=[[Reuters]]}}</ref>

On 15th February, 2024, the Borno Government says it has cleared 500 suspects of involvement in terrorism and had them released from the Nigerian Army detention facility at Giwa Barracks, Maiduguri. <ref>{{Cite web |last=Report |first=Agency |date=2024-02-15 |title=Boko Haram: 500 detained suspects released in Borno |url=https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/668519-boko-haram-500-detained-suspects-released-in-borno.html |access-date=2024-02-16 |website=Premium Times Nigeria |language=en-GB}}</ref>