Teleological argument

==Modernity==

=== Newton and Leibniz ===
[[Isaac Newton]] affirmed his belief in the truth of the argument when, in 1713, he wrote these words in an appendix to the second edition of his [[Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica|''Principia'']]:
{{blockquote|text=This most elegant system of the sun, planets, and comets could not have arisen without the design and dominion of an intelligent and powerful being.<ref>Newton, I., quoted in Huyssteen, JWV. (ed.), ''Encyclopedia of Science and Religion'', Macmillan, 2003, p. 621.</ref>}}

This view, that "God is known from his works", was supported and popularized by Newton's friends [[Richard Bentley]], [[Samuel Clarke]] and [[William Whiston]] in the [[Boyle lectures]], which Newton supervised.<ref>Leshem, A., ''Newton on Mathematics and Spiritual Purity'', Springer, 2003, p. 19.</ref> Newton wrote to Bentley, just before Bentley delivered the first lecture, that:

{{blockquote|text=when I wrote my treatise about our Systeme I had an eye upon such Principles as might work with considering men for the beliefe {{sic}} of a Deity, and nothing can rejoice me more than to find it useful for that purpose.<ref>Leshem, A., ''Newton on Mathematics and Spiritual Purity'', Springer, 2003, p. 20.</ref>}}

The German philosopher [[Gottfried Leibniz]] disagreed with Newton's view of design in the teleological argument. In the [[Leibniz–Clarke correspondence]], Samuel Clarke argued Newton's case that God constantly intervenes in the world to keep His design adjusted, while Leibniz thought that the universe was created in such a way that God would not need to intervene at all. As quoted by Ayval Leshem, Leibniz wrote:{{blockquote|text=According to [Newton's] doctrine, God Almighty wants [i.e. needs] to wind up his watch from time to time; otherwise it would cease to move. He had not it seems, sufficient foresight to make it a perpetual motion<ref>Leshem, A., ''Newton on Mathematics and Spiritual Purity'', Springer, 2003, pp. 21–22.[https://books.google.com/books?id=fD-qvJp0Q5kC&dq=argument+from+design+%22Samuel+Clarke%22&pg=PA19]</ref>}}

Leibniz considered the argument from design to have "only moral certainty" unless it was supported by his own idea of [[pre-established harmony]] expounded in his [[Monadology]].<ref>Pomerlaeau, ''Western Philosophies Religion'', Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998, p. 180.</ref> [[Bertrand Russell]] wrote that "The proof from the pre-established harmony is a particular form of the so-called physico-theological proof, otherwise known as the argument from design." According to Leibniz, the universe is completely made from individual substances known as [[monad (philosophy)|monads]], programmed to act in a predetermined way.<ref>''Encyclopædia Britannica'': "monads are basic substances that make up the universe but lack spatial extension and hence are immaterial. Each monad is a unique, indestructible, dynamic, soullike entity whose properties are a function of its perceptions and appetites."</ref> Russell wrote:
{{blockquote|text=In Leibniz's form, the argument states that the harmony of all the monads can only have arisen from a common cause. That they should all exactly synchronize, can only be explained by a Creator who pre-determined their synchronism.<ref>Russell, B., ''A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz,'', Routledge, 2005, First published 1900, p. 218.</ref>}}

=== British empiricists ===

The 17th-century [[Dutch people|Dutch]] writers [[Lessius]] and [[Grotius]] argued that the intricate structure of the world, like that of a house, was unlikely to have arisen by chance.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Franklin |first=James |title=The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal |publisher=Johns Hopkins University Press |year=2001 |isbn=978-0-8018-6569-5 |location=Baltimore |pages=244–5}}</ref> The empiricist [[John Locke]], writing in the late 17th century, developed the Aristotelian idea that, excluding geometry, all science must attain its knowledge ''a posteriori'' - through sensual experience.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Claiborne Chappell, Vere |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=f28fFbiohXMC&q=locke+a+priori&pg=PA163 |title=The Cambridge companion to Locke |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=1994 |isbn=978-0-521-38772-9 |pages=161–164}}</ref> In response to Locke, Anglican Irish Bishop [[George Berkeley]] advanced a form of [[idealism]] in which things only continue to exist when they are perceived.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Dicker, Georges |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=XBqQXI3JGeEC&q=teleological+argument+berkeley&pg=PA260 |title=Berkeley's Idealism: A Critical Examination |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2011 |isbn=978-0-19-538146-7 |page=260}}</ref> When humans do not perceive objects, they continue to exist because God is perceiving them. Therefore, in order for objects to remain in existence, God must exist omnipresently.<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |title=George Berkeley |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/berkeley/ |access-date=November 17, 2011 |author=Downing, Lisa}}</ref>

David Hume, in the mid-18th century, referred to the teleological argument in his ''[[A Treatise of Human Nature]]''. Here, he appears to give his support to the argument from design. John Wright notes that "Indeed, he claims that the whole thrust of his analysis of causality in the Treatise supports the Design argument", and that, according to Hume, "we are obliged 'to infer an infinitely perfect Architect.{{'"}}<ref>Wright, JP., in Traiger, S., ''The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise'', John Wiley & Sons, 2008, p.&nbsp;12.</ref>

However, later he was more critical of the argument in his ''[[An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding]]''. This was presented as a dialogue between Hume and "a friend who loves sceptical paradoxes", where the friend gives a version of the argument by saying of its proponents, they "paint in the most magnificent colours the order, beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe; and then ask if such a glorious display of intelligence could come from a random coming together of atoms, or if chance could produce something that the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire".<ref>Pomerleau, WP., ''Twelve Great Philosophers: A Historical Introduction to Human Nature'', Rowman & Littlefield, 1997, p. 215.</ref>

Hume also presented arguments both for and against the teleological argument in his ''[[Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion]]''. The character Cleanthes, summarizing the teleological argument, likens the universe to a man-made machine, and concludes by the principle of similar effects and similar causes that it must have a designing intelligence:
{{blockquote|text=Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great-machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy, which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man; though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument ''a posteriori,'' and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.<ref name="Hume1779" />}}

On the other hand, Hume's sceptic, Philo, is not satisfied with the argument from design. He attempts a number of refutations, including one that arguably foreshadows Darwin's theory, and makes the point that if God resembles a human designer, then assuming divine characteristics such as omnipotence and omniscience is not justified. He goes on to joke that far from being the perfect creation of a perfect designer, this universe may be "only the first rude essay of some infant deity... the object of derision to his superiors".<ref name="Hume1779">{{Cite book |last=Hume |first=David |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=E7dbAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA111 |title=Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion |publisher=[[Sine nomine|s.n.]] |year=1779 |isbn=9781843271659 |edition=The Second |location=London |page=111}}</ref>

=== Derham's natural theology ===
Starting in 1696 with his ''Artificial Clockmaker'', [[William Derham]] published a stream of teleological books. The best known of these are ''Physico-Theology'' (1713); ''[[Astro-Theology]]'' (1714); and ''Christo-Theology'' (1730). ''Physico-Theology'', for example, was explicitly subtitled "A demonstration of the being and attributes of God from his works of creation". A [[Natural theology|natural theologian]], Derham listed scientific observations of the many variations in nature, and proposed that these proved "the unreasonableness of infidelity". At the end of the section on Gravity for instance, he writes: "What else can be concluded, but that all was made with manifest Design, and that all the whole Structure is the Work of some intelligent Being; some Artist, of Power and Skill equivalent to such a Work?"<ref>Derham, W., ''Physico-Theology'', 1713, p. 36.</ref> Also, of the "sense of sound" he writes:<ref>Derham, W., ''Physico-Theology'', 1713, pp. 131–132.</ref>
{{blockquote|text=For who but an intelligent Being, what less than an omnipotent and infinitely wise God could contrive, and make such a fine Body, such a Medium, so susceptible of every Impression, that the Sense of Hearing hath occasion for, to empower all Animals to express their Sense and Meaning to others.}}

Derham concludes: "For it is a Sign a Man is a wilful, perverse Atheist, that will impute so glorious a Work, as the Creation is, to any Thing, yea, a mere Nothing (as Chance is) rather than to God.<ref>[[William Derham|Derham, William]]. 1713. [https://books.google.com/books/about/Physico_theology_Or_A_Demonstration_of_t.html?id=6Tm2CZLTl0wC ''Physico-Theology'']. p. 328.</ref> Weber (2000) writes that Derham's ''Physico-Theology'' "directly influenced" William Paley's later work.<ref>Weber, A. S. 2000. ''Nineteenth-Century Science: An Anthology''. [[Broadview Press]]. p. 18.</ref>

The power, and yet the limitations, of this kind of reasoning is illustrated in microcosm by the history of [[La Fontaine's Fables|La Fontaine's]] fable of [[The Acorn and the Pumpkin]], which first appeared in France in 1679. The light-hearted anecdote of how a doubting peasant is finally convinced of the wisdom behind creation arguably undermines this approach.<ref>Peter France, "The poet as a teacher" in ''Poetry in France: metamorphoses of a muse'', Edinburgh U 1992, p.&nbsp;138</ref> However, beginning with [[Anne Finch, Countess of Winchilsea|Anne Finch]]'s conversion of the story into a polemic against atheism, it has been taken up by a succession of moral writers as presenting a valid argument for the proposition that "The wisdom of God is displayed in creation."<ref>Spirago, Francis, and James Joseph Baxter. 1904. ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=--ELAwAAQBAJ Anecdotes and Examples: Illustrating the Catholic Catechism]''. New York: [[Benziger Bros]]. pp. [https://books.google.com/books?id=--ELAwAAQBAJ&dq=%22the+acorn+and+the+pumpkin%22&pg=PA39 39]–40.</ref>

=== Watchmaker analogy ===
[[File:WilliamPaley.jpg|thumb|[[William Paley]] popularized the "watchmaker analogy" used by earlier [[natural theology|natural theologians]], making it a famous teleological argument.]]
{{main|Watchmaker analogy}}

The [[watchmaker analogy]], framing the teleological argument with reference to a timepiece, dates at least back to the Stoics, who were reported by Cicero in his ''[[De Natura Deorum]]'' (II.88), using such an argument against [[Epicureans]], whom, they taunt, would "think more highly of the achievement of [[Archimedes]] in making a model of the revolutions of the firmament than of that of nature in creating them, although the perfection of the original shows a craftsmanship many times as great as does the counterfeit".<ref>{{Citation |title=De natura deorum |url=https://archive.org/details/denaturadeorumac00ciceuoft |year=1933 |publisher=London W. Heinemann}}, translated by H. Rackham. This is discussed at Sedley p.&nbsp;207.</ref> It was also used by [[Robert Hooke]]<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hooke |first=Rober |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0DYXk_9XX38C |title=Micrographia |publisher=Courier Dover Publications |year=2003 |isbn=978-0-486-49564-4 |page=2}}</ref> and [[Voltaire]], the latter of whom remarked:<ref>[[Étienne Gilson|Gilson, Étienne]], trans. 2009. ''Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again: A Journey in Final Causality, Species, and Evolution''. [[Ignatius Press]]. p. 126.</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Voltaire |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Ai8HAAAAQAAJ&q=point+d%27horloger&pg=PA9 |title=Les cabales,: oeuvre pacifique |publisher=Oxford University, s. n., 1772 |year=1772 |isbn=978-1-165-51896-8 |page=9 |author-link=Voltaire}}</ref>

{{Verse translation|L'univers m'embarrasse, et je ne puis songer
Que cette horloge existe, et n'ait point d'horloger|The Universe troubles me, and much less can I think
That this clock exists and should have no clockmaker.}}

[[William Paley]] presented his version of the watchmaker analogy at the start of his ''[[Natural Theology or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity|Natural Theology]]'' (1802).<ref>{{harvnb|Paley|1809|p=[http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?itemID=A142&viewtype=text&pageseq=7 1].}}</ref>
{{blockquote|text=[S]uppose I found a watch upon the ground, and it should be inquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think...that, for anything I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch as well as for [a] stone [that happened to be lying on the ground]?... For this reason, and for no other; namely, that, if the different parts had been differently shaped from what they are, if a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any order than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use that is now served by it.}}

According to [[Alister McGrath]], Paley argued that "The same complexity and utility evident in the design and functioning of a watch can also be discerned in the natural world. Each feature of a biological organism, like that of a watch, showed evidence of being designed in such a way as to adapt the organism to survival within its environment. Complexity and utility are observed; the conclusion that they were designed and constructed by God, Paley holds, is as natural as it is correct."<ref>{{Cite book |last=McGrath, AE. |url=https://archive.org/details/darwinismdivinee00mcgr |title=Darwinism and the Divine: Evolutionary Thought and Natural Theology |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |year=2011 |page=[https://archive.org/details/darwinismdivinee00mcgr/page/n109 94] |url-access=limited}}</ref>

Natural theology strongly influenced British science, with the expectation as expressed by [[Adam Sedgwick]] in 1831 that truths revealed by science could not conflict with the moral truths of religion.<ref>[[Janet Browne|Browne, E. Janet]]. 1995. ''Charles Darwin: vol. 1 Voyaging''. London: [[Jonathan Cape]]. {{ISBN|1-84413-314-1}}. p. 129.</ref> These natural philosophers saw God as the first cause, and sought secondary causes to explain design in nature: the leading figure Sir [[John Herschel]] wrote in 1836 that by analogy with other [[Physical law|intermediate causes]] "the origination of fresh species, could it ever come under our cognizance, would be found to be a natural in contradistinction to a miraculous process".<ref name="hersch">[[John van Wyhe|Wyhe, John van]]. 2007. "Mind the Gap: Did Darwin Avoid Publishing His Theory for Many Years?" ''[[Notes and Records of the Royal Society]]'' 61:177–205. {{doi|10.1098/rsnr.2006.0171}}. p. [http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?viewtype=text&itemID=A544&pageseq=21 197].</ref><ref>[[Charles Babbage|Babbage, Charles]]. [1838] 2002. ''[[Ninth Bridgewater Treatise|The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise]]'' (2nd ed.), edited by [[John van Wyhe|J. van Wyhe]]. London: [[John Murray (publishing house)|John Murray]]. pp. [http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?viewtype=text&itemID=A25&pageseq=232 225–27].</ref>

As a theology student, [[Charles Darwin]] found Paley's arguments compelling. However, he later developed his theory of [[evolution]] in his 1859 book ''[[On the Origin of Species]]'', which offers an alternate explanation of biological order. In his autobiography, Darwin wrote that "The old argument of design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection has been discovered".<ref>{{harvnb|Darwin|1958|pp=[http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?viewtype=text&itemID=F1497&pageseq=61 59], [http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?viewtype=text&itemID=F1497&pageseq=89 87].}}</ref> Darwin struggled with the [[problem of evil]] and of suffering in nature, but remained inclined to believe that nature depended upon "designed laws" and commended [[Asa Gray]]'s statement about "Darwin's great service to Natural Science in bringing back to it Teleology: so that, instead of Morphology versus Teleology, we shall have Morphology wedded to Teleology."<ref name="SMiles">Miles, Sara Joan, "[http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/2001/PSCF9-01Miles.html Charles Darwin and Asa Gray Discuss Teleology and Design]", ''PSCF'' (2001) 53: 196–201.</ref>

Darwin owned he was "bewildered" on the subject, but was "inclined to look at everything as resulting from designed laws, with the details, whether good or bad, left to the working out of what we may call chance:"<ref>Darwin, Charles. 1903. ''[[More Letters of Charles Darwin]]'', edited by [[Francis Darwin|F. Darwin]]. New York: [[D. Appleton & Company]]. p. 252, quoted in Miles, Sara Joan. 2001. "[http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/2001/PSCF9-01Miles.html Charles Darwin and Asa Gray Discuss Teleology and Design]". ''[[Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith]]'' 53:196–201.</ref>
{{blockquote|text=But I own that I cannot see, as plainly as others do, & as I shd wish to do, evidence of design & beneficence on all sides of us. There seems to me too much misery in the world. I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent & omnipotent God would have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with the express intention of their feeding within the living bodies of caterpillars, or that a cat should play with mice. Not believing this, I see no necessity in the belief that the eye was expressly designed.}}