Nigerian Civil War

===Nigerian offensive===
The command was divided into two brigades with three battalions each. The 1st Brigade advanced on the axis of the Ogugu–Ogunga–Nsukka road while the 2nd Brigade advanced on the axis of the Gakem–Obudu–Ogoja road. By 10 July 1967, the 1st Brigade had conquered all its assigned territories. By 12 July the 2nd brigade had captured Gakem, Ogudu, and Ogoja. To assist Nigeria, Egypt sent six [[Ilyushin Il-28]] bombers flown by Egyptian air crews.<ref>Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) p. 12</ref><ref name="litencyc.com">{{Cite web|url=http://www.litencyc.com/theliterarymagazine/biafra.php|title=The Literary Magazine – the Biafra War and the Age of Pestilence by Herbert Ekwe Ekwe|access-date=16 June 2010|archive-date=20 August 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180820081648/https://www.litencyc.com/theliterarymagazine/biafra.php|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>''Shadows: Airlift and Airwar in Biafra and Nigeria 1967–1970'', by Michael I. Draper ({{ISBN|1-902109-63-5}})</ref> The habit of the Egyptians to bomb Red Cross hospitals together with schools, hospitals, and marketplaces did much to earn Biafra international sympathy.<ref>{{cite book |last=Venter |first=A.J. |title=Biafra's War 1967–1970: A Tribal Conflict in Nigeria That Left a Million Dead |year=2016 |page=139}}</ref>

[[File:Lynn Garrison in cockpit 1966.jpg|thumb|[[Lynn Garrison]] in cockpit of his F4U-7 Corsair 1966]]

Enugu became the hub of secession and rebellion, and the Nigerian government believed that once Enugu was captured, the drive for secession would end. The plans to conquer Enugu began on 12 September 1967.{{citation needed|date=April 2023}} On 4 October, the Nigerian 1st Division [[Fall of Enugu|captured Enugu]].{{sfn|Jowett|2016|p=6}} Ojukwu was asleep in the Biafran State House when the federal troops attacked and narrowly escaped by disguising himself as a servant.{{sfn|Baxter|2015|p=23}} Many Nigerians hoped that Enugu's capture would convince the Igbos' traditional elite to end their support for secession, even if Ojukwu did not follow them. This did not occur. Ojukwu relocated his government without difficulty to [[Umuahia]], a city positioned deep within traditional Igbo territory.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|pp=97–98}} The fall of Enugu contributed to a brief destabilisation of Biafran propaganda efforts, as the forced relocation of personnel left the Ministry of Information disorganised and the federal force's success undermined previous Biafran assertions that the Nigerian state could not withstand a protracted war.{{sfn|Stremlau|2015|p=111}} On 23 October the Biafran official radio declared in a broadcast that Ojukwu promised to continue resisting the federal government, and that he attributed the loss of Enugu to subversive actions.<ref name= NYT1>{{cite news |title=Nigerian Civil War Makes Enugu a Ghost Town |newspaper=The New York Times |page=A20 |date=24 October 1967}}</ref>

Nigerian soldiers under Murtala Mohammed carried out [[Asaba massacre|a mass killing]] of 700 civilians when they captured [[Asaba, Nigeria|Asaba]] on the [[River Niger]]. The Nigerians were repulsed three times as they attempted to cross the River Niger during October, resulting in the loss of thousands of troops, dozens of tanks and equipment. The first attempt by the 2nd Infantry Division on 12 October to cross the Niger from the town of Asaba to the Biafran city of Onitsha cost the Nigerian Federal Army over 5,000 soldiers killed, wounded, captured or missing. [[Operation Tiger Claw]] (17–20 October 1967) was a military conflict between Nigerian and Biafran military forces. On 17 October 1967 Nigerians invaded [[Calabar]] led by the "Black Scorpion", Benjamin Adekunle, while the Biafrans were led by Col. Ogbu Ogi, who was responsible for controlling the area between Calabar and Opobo, and Lynn Garrison, a foreign mercenary. The Biafrans came under immediate fire from the water and the air. For the next two days Biafran stations and military supplies were bombarded by the Nigerian air force. That same day Lynn Garrison reached Calabar but came under immediate fire by federal troops. By 20 October, Garrison's forces withdrew from the battle while Col. Ogi officially surrendered to Gen. Adekunle. On 19 May 1968 Port Harcourt was captured. With the capture of Enugu, Bonny, Calabar and Port Harcourt, the outside world was left in no doubt of the Federal supremacy in the war.<ref>Al J. Vetner. “Biafra’s War 1967-1970: A Tribal Conflict That Left a Million Dead.” Warwick, UK, Helion & Company, 2015. {{ISBN|978-1-910294-69-7}}. pp. 197–210.</ref> Biafran propaganda always blamed military defeats on "saboteurs" within the ranks of the Biafran officer, and both officers and the other ranks were encouraged to denounce suspected "saboteurs".<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 17"/> Throughout the war, Biafran officers were far more likely to be executed by their own side than by the Federal Army as Ojukwu conducted purges and had officers who were merely accused of being "saboteurs" taken out and shot.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 17-18">Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) pp. 17–18</ref> Ojukwu did not trust the majority of the former Federal Igbo officers who had rallied to Biafra and saw them as potential rivals, thus leading to murderous purges that led to most of them being executed.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 17-18"/> Furthermore, Ojukwu needed scapegoats for Biafra's defeats and death was the usual punishment for Biafran officers who lost a battle.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 18">Barua, Pradeep ''The Military Effectiveness of Post-Colonial States'' (2013) p. 18</ref> Out of a fear of a coup, Ojukwu created several units such as the S Brigade commanded by himself and the 4th Commando Brigade commanded by the German mercenary [[Rolf Steiner]] that existed outside of the regular chain of command.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 18"/> Barua wrote that Ojukwu's leadership, especially his frequent executions of his own officers had a "disastrous impact" on the morale of the Biafran officer corps.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 18"/> The executions of officers also made it difficult for the Biafran officers to acquire the necessary experience to conduct military operations successfully as Barua noted the Biafran Army lacked both the "continuity and cohesion" to learn from the war.<ref name="Barua, Pradeep 2013 p. 18"/>