United States Army Air Forces Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ==Creation== ===Unity of command problems in the Air Corps=== The roots of the Army Air Forces arose in the formulation of theories of [[strategic bombing]] at the [[Air Corps Tactical School]] that gave new impetus to arguments for an independent air force, beginning with those espoused by Brig. Gen. [[Billy Mitchell]] that led to his later [[court-martial]]. Despite a perception of resistance and even obstruction then by the bureaucracy in the War Department [[Staff (military)|General Staff]] (WDGS), much of which was attributable to lack of funds, the Air Corps later made great strides in the 1930s, both organizationally and in doctrine. A strategy stressing precision bombing of industrial targets by heavily armed, long-range bombers emerged, formulated by the men who would become its leaders.<ref>Nalty (1997), pp. 112–113.</ref> A major step toward a separate air force came in March 1935, when the command of all combat air units within the Continental United States (CONUS) was centralized under a single organization called the ''"General Headquarters Air Force"''. Since 1920, control of aviation units had resided with commanders of the [[corps area]]s (a peacetime ground forces administrative echelon), following the model established by commanding General [[John J. Pershing]] during World War I. In 1924, the General Staff planned for a wartime activation of an Army general headquarters (GHQ), similar to the [[American Expeditionary Forces]] model of [[World War I]], with a GHQ Air Force as a subordinate component. Both were created in 1933 when a small conflict with Cuba seemed possible following a ''coup d'état'' but was not activated. The activation of GHQ Air Force represented a compromise between strategic airpower advocates and ground force commanders who demanded that the Air Corps mission remain tied to that of the land forces. Airpower advocates achieved a centralized control of air units under an air commander, while the WDGS divided authority within the air arm and assured a continuing policy of support of ground operations as its primary role.<ref>Nalty (1997), p. 130.</ref> GHQ Air Force organized combat groups administratively into a strike force of three wings deployed to the [[Atlantic Ocean|Atlantic]], Pacific, and [[Gulf of Mexico|Gulf coasts]] but was small in comparison to European air forces. Lines of authority were difficult, at best, since GHQ Air Force controlled only operations of its combat units while the Air Corps was still responsible for doctrine, acquisition of aircraft, and training. Corps area commanders continued to exercise control over airfields and administration of personnel, and in the overseas departments, operational control of units as well.<ref group=n>Three examples of the negative effects of this long-ingrained policy, even after creation of the AAF, occurred in Hawaii in the six months preceding the Japanese [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], where neither the Air Corps nor the AFCC had any command jurisdiction. First, Maj. Gen. [[Walter C. Short]], commanding general of the [[United States Army|U.S. Army's]] [[Hawaiian Department]], held the opinion that the [[Seventh Air Force|Hawaiian Air Force]] was grossly overstaffed and mandated in July 1941 that its non-flying AAF personnel complete infantry training, a program that took them from their primary jobs for a period of six to eight weeks. Second, efforts in October and November to complete gunnery training for B-17 gunners were stifled when aircrew were used by the Hawaiian Department to guard warehouses in [[Honolulu]]. Finally, after the War Department issued a war warning to Pacific commands on 27 November, Short insisted despite objections from his air commanders that aircraft be parked close together on open ramps as a security measure against [[sabotage]] rather than being dispersed in revetments for protection against air attack. (Arakaki and Kuborn, pp. 5–6, 38)</ref> Between March 1935 and September 1938, the commanders of GHQ Air Force and the Air Corps, Major Generals [[Frank Maxwell Andrews|Frank M. Andrews]] and [[Oscar Westover]] respectively, clashed philosophically over the direction in which the air arm was moving, exacerbating the difficulties.<ref>Nalty (1997), pp. 131–133.</ref> The expected activation of Army General Headquarters prompted [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|Army Chief of Staff]] [[George C. Marshall]] to request a reorganization study from Chief of the Air Corps Maj. Gen. [[Henry H. Arnold]] resulting on 5 October 1940 in a proposal for creation of an air staff, unification of the air arm under one commander, and equality with the ground and supply forces. Arnold's proposal was immediately opposed by the General Staff in all respects, rehashing its traditional doctrinal argument that, in the event of war, the Air Corps would have no mission independent of support of the ground forces. Marshall implemented a compromise that the Air Corps found entirely inadequate, naming Arnold as acting "Deputy Chief of Staff for Air" but rejecting all organizational points of his proposal. GHQ Air Force instead was assigned to the control of Army General Headquarters, although the latter was a training and not an operational component, when it was activated in November 1940. A division of the GHQ Air Force into four geographical air defense districts on 19 October 1940 was concurrent with the creation of air forces to defend [[Hawaii]] and the [[Panama Canal]]. The air districts were converted in March 1941 into numbered air forces with a subordinate organization of 54 groups.<ref name="goss3">Craven and Cate, Vol. 6, pp. 17–18.</ref> ===Army Air Forces created=== [[File:021002-O-9999G-013.jpg|right|thumb|General of the Army [[Henry H. Arnold|Henry H. ("Hap") Arnold]]]] {{see also|Air warfare of World War II}} The likelihood of U.S. participation in [[World War II]] prompted the most radical reorganization of the [[aviation]] branch in its history, developing a structure that both unified command of all air elements and gave it total autonomy and equality with the ground forces by March 1942. In the spring of 1941, the success in Europe of air operations conducted under centralized control (as exemplified by the British [[Royal Air Force]] and the German [[Wehrmacht]]'s military air arm, the [[Luftwaffe]]) made clear that the splintering of authority in the American air forces, characterized as "[[Lernaean Hydra|hydra]]-headed" by one congressman,<ref group=n>Rep. [[James G. Scrugham]] (D-Nev). (Craven and Cate Vol. 6, p. 24)</ref> had caused a disturbing lack of clear channels of command. Less than five months after the rejection of Arnold's reorganization proposal, a joint U.S.-British strategic planning agreement ([[U.S.–British Staff Conference (ABC–1)|ABC-1]]) refuted the General Staff's argument that the Air Corps had no wartime mission except to support ground forces.<ref>Craven and Cate, Vol. 6, p. 20</ref> A struggle with the General Staff over control of air defense of the United States had been won by airmen and vested in four command units called "numbered air forces", but the bureaucratic conflict threatened to renew the dormant struggle for an independent United States Air Force. Marshall had come to the view that the air forces needed a "simpler system" and a unified command. Working with Arnold and [[Robert A. Lovett]], recently appointed to the long-vacant position of Assistant Secretary of War for Air, he reached a consensus that quasi-autonomy for the air forces was preferable to immediate separation.<ref name="goss"/> On 20 June 1941, to grant additional autonomy to the air forces and to avoid binding legislation from Congress, the War Department revised the army regulation governing the organization of Army aviation, AR 95–5.<ref name="goss">Craven and Cate, Vol. 6, p. 293</ref> Arnold assumed the title of ''Chief of the Army Air Forces'', creating an echelon of command over all military aviation components for the first time and ending the dual status of the Air Corps and GHQ Air Force, which was renamed ''Air Force Combat Command'' (AFCC) in the new organization. The AAF gained the formal "Air Staff" long opposed by the General Staff,<ref group=n>These staff positions were designated A-1 through A-5 and corresponded to the WDGS positions of G-1 through G-5. The AAF began the war with this air staff but replaced it in the March 1942 reorganization.</ref> and a single air commander,<ref name="goss"/> but still did not have equal status with the Army ground forces, and air units continued to report through two chains of command.<ref name="Nalty, p.181">Nalty (1997), p. 181.</ref> The commanding general of AFCC gained control of his stations and court martial authority over his personnel,<ref name="csm7"/> but under the new field manual FM-5 the Army General Headquarters had the power to detach units from AFCC at will by creating task forces, the WDGS still controlled the AAF budget and finances, and the AAF had no jurisdiction over units of the [[Army Service Forces]] providing "housekeeping services" as support<ref group=n>This issue was not completely resolved until November 1943 when the units of those services (Quartermaster, Signal, Ordnance, etc.), amounting to 600,000 personnel, were transferred from the ASF into the AAF. (Mooney 1946, p. 54)</ref> nor of air units, bases, and personnel located outside the continental United States.<ref>Mooney (1946), p. 43</ref><ref>Greer (1985), p. 114</ref> Arnold and Marshall agreed that the AAF would enjoy a general autonomy within the War Department (similar to that of the [[United States Marine Corps|Marine Corps]] within the [[United States Department of the Navy|Department of the Navy]])<ref name="csm7">Mooney (1956), p. 7</ref> until the end of the war, while its commanders would cease lobbying for independence.<ref group=n>AAF senior leadership actually decided in the fall of 1941 to oppose for the duration any bill to create an independent air force. (Mooney 1946, p. 42)</ref> Marshall, a strong proponent of airpower, left understood that the Air Force would likely achieve its independence following the war. Soon after the Japanese [[attack on Pearl Harbor]] on 7 December 1941, in recognition of importance of the role of the Army Air Forces, Arnold was given a seat on the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], the planning staff that served as the focal point of American strategic planning during the war, in order that the United States would have an air representative in staff talks with their British counterparts on the [[Combined Chiefs of Staff|Combined Chiefs]]. In effect the head of the AAF gained equality with Marshall. While this step was never officially recognized by the [[United States Navy]], and was bitterly disputed behind the scenes at every opportunity, it nevertheless succeeded as a pragmatic foundation for the future separation of the Air Force.<ref>Nalty (1997), pp. 179–181.</ref> ===Reorganizations of the AAF=== ====Circular No. 59 reorganization==== [[File:USAAF.jpg|thumb|right|USAAF [[Military recruitment|recruitment poster]] ]] Under the revision of AR 95–5, the Army Air Forces consisted of three major components: Headquarters AAF, Air Force Combat Command, and the Air Corps. Yet the reforms were incomplete, subject to reversal with a change of mood at the War Department, and of dubious legality.<ref group=n>Two changes were possibly in conflict with the [[National Defense Act of 1920|National Defense Act]]: the creation of an air staff as an "unnecessary duplication...in the work of" the WDGS, and the "superimposition of a level of authority above" that of the Chief of the Air Corps. (Mooney 1946, p. 43)</ref> By November 1941, on the eve of U.S. entry into the war, the division of authority within the Army as a whole, caused by the activation of Army GHQ a year before, had led to a "battle of memos" between it and the WDGS over administering the AAF, prompting Marshall to state that he had "the poorest command post in the Army" when defense commands showed a "disturbing failure to follow through on orders".<ref name="csm7"/> To streamline the AAF in preparation for war, with a goal of centralized planning and decentralized execution of operations, in October 1941 Arnold submitted to the WDGS essentially the same reorganization plan it had rejected a year before, this time crafted by Chief of Air Staff Brig. Gen. [[Carl Spaatz|Carl A. Spaatz]].<ref name="goss"/><ref name="Nalty, p.181"/><ref>Wolk (1996), p. 4</ref> When this plan was not given any consideration, Arnold reworded the proposal the following month which, in the face of Marshall's dissatisfaction with Army GHQ, the War Plans Division accepted. Just before Pearl Harbor, Marshall recalled an Air Corps officer, Brig. Gen. [[Joseph T. McNarney]], from an observer group in England and appointed him to chair a "War Department Reorganization Committee" within the War Plans Division, using Arnold's and Spaatz's plan as a blueprint.<ref name="hw6"/><ref>Mooney and Williamson (1956), p. 8</ref> After war began, Congress enacted the [[War Powers Act of 1941|First War Powers Act]] on 18 December 1941 endowing President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] with virtual ''carte blanche'' to reorganize the [[Executive (government)|executive branch]] as he found necessary.<ref>Mooney (1946), p. 47</ref> Under it, on 28 February 1942, Roosevelt issued [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16227 Executive Order 9082], based on Marshall's recommendation and the work of McNarney's committee. The EO changed Arnold's title to ''Commanding General, Army Air Forces'' effective 9 March 1942, making him co-equal with the commanding generals of the new [[Army Ground Forces]] and [[United States Army Services of Supply|Services of Supply]], the other two components of the [[United States Army|Army of the United States]]. The War Department issued Circular No. 59 on 2 March that carried out the executive order,<ref name="mc3241">McClendon (1996), pp. 132–141. The three documents referenced, AR 95-5, EO 9082, and WD Circular 59, are reproduced in their entirety.</ref> intended (as with the creation of the [[United States Army Air Service|Air Service]] in World War I) as a wartime expedient to expire six months after the end of the war.<ref name="hw6">Wolk (1996), p. 6</ref><ref>Correll, "GHQ Air Force", p. 68.</ref> The three components replaced a multiplicity of branches and organizations, reduced the WDGS greatly in size, and proportionally increased the representation of the air forces members on it to 50%.<ref name="mc3241"/><ref>Mooney (1946), p. 49</ref> In addition to dissolving both Army General Headquarters and the chiefs of the [[combat arms]], and assigning their training functions to the Army Ground Forces, War Department Circular 59 reorganized the Army Air Forces, disbanding both Air Force Combat Command and the Office of Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC), eliminating all its training and organizational functions, which removed an entire layer of authority.<ref>Cline (1990), p. 92.</ref><ref group=n>The Air Corps itself was a statutory entity and could not be legally discontinued except by act of Congress, but executive abolition of the OCAC under authority of the First War Powers Act gave the AAF legal standing. The chiefs of the other combat arms, including Infantry, were also abolished.</ref> Taking their former functions were eleven numbered air forces (later raised to sixteen) and six support commands (which became eight in January 1943). The circular also restated the mission of the AAF, in theory removing from it responsibility for strategic planning and making it only a Zone of Interior "training and supply agency", but from the start AAF officers viewed this as a "paper" restriction negated by Arnold's place on both the Joint and Combined Chiefs, which gave him strategic planning authority for the AAF,<ref>Mooney (1946), pp. 49–50</ref><ref>Mooney and Williamson (1956), p. 10</ref><ref>McClendon (1996), p. 98</ref> a viewpoint that was formally sanctioned by the War Department in mid-1943 and endorsed by the president.<ref>Mooney (1946), pp. 57–58</ref><ref>McClendon (1996), pp. 99–100</ref><ref group=n>FM 100-20 ''Command and Employment of Air Power'' (Field Service Regulations), issued by the War Department on 21 July 1943, was viewed by the senior leadership of the Army Ground Forces as the Army Air Forces' "Declaration of Independence." (Greenfield 1948, p. 47)</ref> The Circular No. 59 reorganization directed the AAF to operate under a complex division of administrative control performed by a policy staff, an operating staff, and the support commands (formerly "field activities" of the OCAC). The former field activities operated under a "bureau" structure, with both policy and operating functions vested in staff-type officers who often exercised command and policy authority without responsibility for results, a system held over from the Air Corps years. The concept of an "operating staff", or directorates, was modeled on the RAF system that had been much admired by the observer groups sent over in 1941, and resulted from a desire to place experts in various aspects of military aviation into key positions of implementation. However functions often overlapped, communication and coordination between the divisions failed or was ignored, policy prerogatives were usurped by the directorates, and they became overburdened with detail, all contributing to the diversion of the directorates from their original purpose. The system of directorates in particular handicapped the developing operational training program (see [[United States Army Air Forces#Combat units|''Combat units'']] below), preventing establishment of an OTU command and having a tendency to micromanage because of the lack of centralized control.<ref name="mel223">Layman (1946), pp. 22–23</ref> Four main directorates—Military Requirements, Technical Services, Personnel, and Management Control—were created, each with multiple sub-directorates, and eventually more than thirty offices were authorized to issue orders in the name of the commanding general.<ref name="afhra10"/> ====March 1943 reorganization==== [[File:USAAF Reorganization Chart, 29March1943.pdf|thumb|29 March 1943 reorganization of the United States Army Air Forces]] [[File:Winning Your Wings.ogv|thumb|thumbtime=16:03|The recruiting film ''[[Winning Your Wings]]'' (1942) helped enlist 150,000 pilots]] Among the headquarters directorates were Technical Services,{{sfn|Frye}} Air Defense, Base Services, Ground-Air Support, Management Control, Military Equipment,{{sfn|Futrell|1951}} [[Muir S. Fairchild|Military Requirements]], and Procurement & Distribution.<ref name=VolumeSix>{{Cite report |author=Craven and Cate |volume=Six: Men and Planes |title=The Army Air Forces in World War II |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wm2mz4weQNsC&q=%22Flight+Control+Command%22+USAAF&pg=PA70 |format=Google books |access-date=2013-10-16 }} (page 233, others).</ref> A "strong and growing dissatisfaction" with the organization led to an attempt by Lovett in September 1942 to make the system work by bringing the Directorate of Management Control<ref group=n>Management Control coordinated all the other directorates through the activities of organizational and legislative planning, statistical control, and the Adjutant General, who under the operating staff system was chief of administrative services rather than the issuer of orders and directives as he had been under the Chief of the Air Corps.</ref> and several traditional offices that had been moved to the operating staff, including the Air Judge Advocate and Budget Officer, back under the policy staff umbrella. When this adjustment failed to resolve the problems, the system was scrapped and all functions combined into a single restructured air staff.<ref>Craven and Cate, Vol. 6, p. 42</ref> The hierarchical "command" principle, in which a single commander has direct final accountability but delegates authority to staff, was adopted AAF-wide in a major reorganization and consolidation on 29 March 1943. The four main directorates and seventeen subordinate directorates (the "operating staff")<ref>Mooney and Williamson (1956), chart p. 30</ref> were abolished as an unnecessary level of authority, and execution of policies was removed from the staffs to be assigned solely to field organizations along functional lines. The policy functions of the directorates were reorganized and consolidated into offices regrouped along conventional military lines under six assistant chiefs of air staff (AC/AS): Personnel; Intelligence; Operations, Commitments, and Requirements (OC&R); Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution (MM&D);<ref group=n>MM&D became "Materiel and Services" (M&S) on 17 July 1944 in conjunction with the planned consolidation of the Air Materiel and Air Service Commands.</ref> Plans; and Training. Command of Headquarters AAF resided in a Chief of Air Staff and three deputies.<ref name="afhra10">Mooney and Williamson (1956), pp. 29, 33, 40, 41, 43, and 68.</ref> This wartime structure remained essentially unchanged for the remainder of hostilities. In October 1944 Arnold, to begin a process of reorganization for reducing the structure, proposed to eliminate the AC/AS, Training and move his office into OC&R, changing it to Operations, Training and Requirements (OT&R)<ref group=n>"Commitments" would be consolidated as part of AC/AS, Plans.</ref> but the mergers were never effected. On 23 August 1945, after the capitulation of Japan, realignment took place with the complete elimination of OC&R. The now five assistant chiefs of air staff were designated AC/AS-1 through -5 corresponding to Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Training, Materiel and Supply, and Plans.<ref>Mooney and Williamson (1956), pp. 61–62.</ref> Most personnel of the Army Air Forces were drawn from the Air Corps. In May 1945, 88 per cent of officers serving in the Army Air Forces were commissioned in the Air Corps, while 82 per cent of enlisted members assigned to AAF units and bases had the Air Corps as their combat arm branch.<ref>Correll, "But What About the Air Corps?", pp. 64–65.</ref> While officially the air arm was the ''Army Air Forces'', the term ''Air Corps'' persisted colloquially among the public as well as veteran airmen; in addition, the singular ''Air Force'' often crept into popular and even official use, reflected by the designation ''Air Force Combat Command'' in 1941–42.<ref group=n>The term "air force" had appeared officially as early as 1923, when Training Regulation TR 440-15 and Army Regulation 95-10 used "air force aviation" to denote combat air units in contrast to "air service aviation" (auxiliary units to support ground forces). (Futrell, Historical Study 139, p. 40) In a letter of farewell to all members of the Air Corps on 27 February 1933, outgoing Assistant Secretary of War (Air) [[F. Trubee Davison]] wrote: "Ours may not be the biggest air force in the world, but, my gracious, it is one of the best!" (''Air Corps News Letter'' 24 February 1933, Vol. XVII No. 2)</ref> This misnomer was also used on official recruiting posters (see image above) and was important in promoting the idea of an "Air Force" as an independent service. [[James Stewart|Jimmy Stewart]], a [[Hollywood (film industry)|Hollywood]] movie star serving as an AAF pilot, used the terms "Air Corps" and "Air Forces" interchangeably in the narration of the 1942 recruiting short ''"[[Winning Your Wings]]"''. The term "Air Force" also appeared prominently in [[Frank Capra]]'s 1945 War Department indoctrination film ''"[[War Comes to America]]"'', of the famous iconic ''"[[Why We Fight]]"'' series, as an animated map graphic of equal prominence to that of the Army and Navy.<ref group=n>By 1945 the term had also found its way into feature cinema, such as ''"[[They Were Expendable]]"'', in which a naval officer ([[John Wayne]]) and an AAF pilot ([[Louis Jean Heydt]]) chide each other about lack of reinforcement from their respective services. Wayne's character asks, "And where is the Air Force?"</ref> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). 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