Teleological argument

== Classical philosophy ==

===Socrates and the pre-Socratics===
[[File:Sanzio 01 Plato Aristotle.jpg|thumb|upright|Plato and [[Aristotle]], depicted here in ''[[The School of Athens]]'', both developed philosophical arguments addressing the universe's apparent order (''[[logos]]'')]]

The argument from intelligent design appears to have begun with [[Socrates]], although the concept of a cosmic intelligence is older and [[David Sedley]] has argued that Socrates was developing an older idea, citing [[Anaxagoras of Clazomenae]], born about 500 BC, as a possible earlier proponent.<ref name=mcpherr/><ref name=ahbel/><ref name=sed/> The proposal that the order of nature showed evidence of having its own human-like "intelligence" goes back to the origins of Greek natural philosophy and science, and its attention to the orderliness of nature, often with special reference to the revolving of the heavens. Anaxagoras is the first person who is definitely known to have explained such a concept using the word "''[[nous]]''" (which is the original Greek term that leads to modern English "intelligence" via its Latin and French translations). Aristotle reports an earlier philosopher from [[Clazomenae]] named [[Hermotimus of Clazomenae|Hermotimus]] who had taken a similar position.<ref>''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'' I.4.[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Aristot.+Met.+1.984b 984b].</ref> Amongst [[Pre-Socratic philosophers]] before Anaxagoras, other philosophers had proposed a similar intelligent ordering principle causing life and the rotation of the heavens. For example [[Empedocles]], like [[Hesiod]] much earlier, described cosmic order and living things as caused by a cosmic version of [[love]],<ref>Kirk, Raven, and Schofield. 1983. ''The Presocratic Philosophers'' (2nd ed.). Cambridge: [[Cambridge University Press]]. ch. 10.</ref> and [[Pythagoras]] and [[Heraclitus]] attributed the cosmos with "[[reason]]" (''[[logos]]'').<ref>Kirk, Raven, and Schofield. 1983. ''The Presocratic Philosophers'' (2nd ed.). Cambridge: [[Cambridge University Press]]. pp. 204, 235.</ref> In his ''[[Philebus]]'' 28c [[Plato]] has Socrates speak of this as a tradition, saying that "all philosophers agree—whereby they really exalt themselves—that mind (''[[nous]]'') is king of heaven and earth. Perhaps they are right." and later states that the ensuing discussion "confirms the utterances of those who declared of old that mind (''nous'') always rules the universe".<ref>[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0174%3Atext%3DPhileb.%3Apage%3D28 28c] and [https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0174%3Atext%3DPhileb.%3Apage%3D30 30d]. Translation by Fowler.</ref>

Xenophon's report in his ''[[Memorabilia (Xenophon)|Memorabilia]]'' might be the earliest clear account of an argument that there is evidence in nature of intelligent design.<ref name="ahbel">Ahbel-Rappe, Sara. 2009. ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=GKewlVwJ9rgC Socrates: A Guide for the Perplexed]''. {{ISBN|9780826433251}}. [https://books.google.com/books?id=GKewlVwJ9rgC&pg=PA27 p. 27].</ref> The word traditionally translated and discussed as "design" is ''[[wikt:γνώμη|gnōmē]]'' and Socrates is reported by Xenophon to have pressed doubting young men to look at things in the market, and consider whether they could tell which things showed evidence of ''gnōmē'', and which seemed more to be by blind chance, and then to compare this to nature and consider whether it could be by blind chance.<ref name="mcpherr">{{Citation |last=McPherran |first=Mark |title=The Religion of Socrates |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nWfQx1CjZl0C&q=socrates+religion+%22intelligent+design%22&pg=PA274 |year=1996 |publisher=The Pennsylvania State University Press |isbn=978-0271040325}}, pp. 273–75.</ref><ref name="sed">{{Citation |last=Sedley |first=David |title=Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SgRuJEfzUG8C |year=2007 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=9780520934368}}.</ref> In Plato's ''[[Phaedo]]'', Socrates is made to say just before dying that his discovery of Anaxagoras' concept of a cosmic ''nous'' as the cause of the order of things, was an important turning point for him. But he also expressed disagreement with Anaxagoras' understanding of the implications of his own doctrine, because of Anaxagoras' [[materialism|materialist]] understanding of [[Causality|causation]]. Socrates complained that Anaxagoras restricted the work of the cosmic ''nous'' to the beginning, as if it were uninterested and all events since then just happened because of causes like air and water.<ref>[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DPhaedo%3Apage%3D97 97]-[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DPhaedo%3Apage%3D98 98]. Also see Ahbel Rappe.</ref> Socrates, on the other hand, apparently insisted that the demiurge must be "loving", particularly concerning humanity. (In this desire to go beyond Anaxagoras and make the cosmic ''nous'' a more active manager, Socrates was apparently preceded by [[Diogenes of Apollonia]].)<ref name=ahbel />; {{harvcoltxt|McPherran|1996|p=290}}; and <ref>Kirk, Raven, and Schofield. 1983. ''The Presocratic Philosophers'' (2nd ed.). Cambridge: [[Cambridge University Press]]. ch. XVI</ref>

===Plato and Aristotle===
Plato's ''[[Timaeus (dialogue)|Timaeus]]'' is presented as a description of someone who is explaining a "likely story" in the form of a myth, and so throughout history commentators have disagreed about which elements of the myth can be seen as the position of Plato.<ref name="sed" />{{Rp|132}} Sedley (2007) nevertheless calls it "the creationist manifesto" and points out that although some of Plato's followers denied that he intended it, in classical times writers such as Aristotle, [[Epicurus]], the [[Stoicism|Stoics]], and [[Galen]] all understood Plato as proposing the world originated in an "intelligent creative act".<ref name="sed" />{{Rp|133}} Plato has a character explain the concept of a "[[demiurge]]" with supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the cosmos in his work.

Plato's teleological perspective is also built upon the analysis of ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' order and structure in the world that he had already presented in ''[[Republic (dialogue)|The Republic]]''. The story does not propose creation ''[[ex nihilo]]''; rather, the demiurge made order from the chaos of the cosmos, imitating the eternal Forms.<ref>Brickhouse, Thomas, and Nicholas D. Smith. 21 April 2005. "[http://www.iep.utm.edu/plato/ Plato]". ''[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''. Retrieved November 12, 2011.</ref>

{{blockquote|text=Plato's world of eternal and unchanging [[Theory of Forms|Forms]], imperfectly represented in matter by a divine Artisan, contrasts sharply with the various mechanistic [[Weltanschauungen]], of which [[atomism]] was, by the 4th century at least, the most prominent {{omission}} This debate was to persist throughout the ancient world. Atomistic mechanism got a shot in the arm from [[Epicurus]] {{omission}} while the [[Stoics]] adopted a divine teleology {{omission}} The choice seems simple: either show how a structured, regular world could arise out of undirected processes, or inject intelligence into the system.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hankinson |first=R. J. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iwfy-n5IWL8C |title=Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1997 |isbn=978-0-19-924656-4 |page=125}}</ref>|author=R. J. Hankinson|title=Cause and Explanation in Ancient Greek Thought}}

Plato's student and friend Aristotle (c. 384 – 322 BC), continued the Socratic tradition of criticising natural scientists such as [[Democritus]] who sought (as in modern science) to explain everything in terms of matter and chance motion. He was very influential in the future development of classical creationism, but was not a straightforward "creationist" because he required no creation interventions in nature, meaning he "insulated god from any requirement to intervene in nature, either as creator or as administrator".<ref name="sed" />{{Rp|204}} Instead of direct intervention by a creator it is "scarcely an exaggeration to say that for Aristotle the entire functioning of the natural world, as also the heavens, is ultimately to be understood as a shared striving towards godlike [[actuality]]".<ref name="sed" />{{Rp|171}} And whereas the myth in the ''Timaeus'' suggests that all living things are based on one single paradigm, not one for each species, and even tells a story of "devolution" whereby other living things devolved from humans, it was Aristotle who presented the influential idea that each type of normal living thing must be based on a fixed paradigm or form for that species.<ref name=sed/>

Aristotle felt that biology was a particularly important example of a field where materialist natural science ignored information which was needed in order to understand living things well. For example birds use wings for the purpose of flight.<ref name="HistAnimI2">{{Cite book |last=Aristotle |url=http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/history_anim.1.i.html#223 |title=History of Animals |at=I 2}}</ref> Therefore the most complete explanation in regard to the natural, as well as the artificial, is for the most part teleological.<ref name="Nussbaum1985">{{Cite book |last=Nussbaum |first=M.C. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ISD05P7TcOAC&pg=PA60 |title=Aristotle's de Motu Animalium |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=1985 |isbn=978-0-691-02035-8 |series=Princeton paperbacks |page=60,66,69–70,73–81,94–98,101 |lccn=77072132}}</ref> In fact, proposals that species had changed by chance survival of the fittest, similar to what is now called "[[natural selection]]", were already known to Aristotle, and he rejected these with the same logic.<ref name="Nussbaum1985" /><ref name="PhysI2">{{Cite book |last=Aristotle |url=http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.1.i.html#130 |title=Physics |at=I 2 (¶15)}}</ref><ref name="PartsAnimI1">{{Cite book |last=Aristotle |url=http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/parts_animals.1.i.html#100 |title=Parts of Animals |at=I 1}}</ref><ref name="Ross2004">{{Cite book |last1=Ross |first1=D. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=651Bg2-8xsEC&pg=PA80 |title=Aristotle |last2=Ackrill |first2=J.L. |publisher=Routledge |year=2004 |isbn=978-0-415-32857-9 |page=80}}</ref><ref name="HullRuse2007">{{Cite book |last1=Hull |first1=D.L. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aZOgg-x4UyIC&pg=PA174 |title=The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology |last2=Ruse |first2=M. |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-521-61671-3 |series=Cambridge Companions to Philosophy |page=174 |lccn=2006025898}}</ref> He conceded that monstrosities (new forms of life) could come about by chance,<ref name="PhysII8a">{{Cite book |last=Aristotle |url=http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html#530 |title=Physics |at=II 8 &nbsp;(¶2)}}</ref><ref name="PhysII8b">{{Cite book |last=Aristotle |url=http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html#585 |title=Physics |at=II 8 &nbsp;(¶5)}}</ref> but he disagreed with those who ascribed all nature purely to chance<ref name="PhysII8c">{{Cite book |last=Aristotle |url=http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html#604 |title=Physics |at=II 8 &nbsp;(¶8)}}</ref> because he believed science can only provide a general account of that which is normal, "always, or for the most part".<ref name="PhysII8">{{Cite book |last=Aristotle |url=http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html#522 |title=Physics |at=II 8}}</ref> The distinction between what is normal, or by nature, and what is "accidental", or not by nature, is important in Aristotle's understanding of nature. As pointed out by Sedley, "Aristotle is happy to say (''Physics'' II 8, 199a33-b4) without the slightest fear of blasphemy, crafts make occasional mistakes; therefore, by analogy, so can nature."<ref name="sed" />{{Rp|186}} According to Aristotle the changes which happen by nature are caused by their "[[formal cause]]s", and for example in the case of a bird's wings there is also a [[final cause]] which is the purpose of flying. He explicitly compared this to human technology:
{{blockquote|text=If then what comes from art is for the sake of something, it is clear that what come from nature is too {{omission}} This is clear most of all in the other animals, which do nothing by art, inquiry, or deliberation; for which reason some people are completely at a loss whether it is by intelligence or in some other way that spiders, ants, and such things work. {{omission}} It is absurd to think that a thing does not happen for the sake of something if we do not see what sets it in motion deliberating. {{omission}} This is most clear when someone practices medicine himself on himself; for nature is like that.|author=Aristotle|source=Physics, II 8.<ref>Sachs translation (1998), ''Aristotle's physics; a guided study'', 2nd ed., pages 67–68.</ref>}}

The question of how to understand Aristotle's conception of nature having a purpose and direction something like human activity is controversial in the details. [[Martha Nussbaum]] for example has argued that in his biology this approach was practical and meant to show nature only being analogous to human art, explanations of an organ being greatly informed by knowledge of its essential function.<ref name="Nussbaum1985" /> Nevertheless, Nussbaum's position is not universally accepted. In any case, Aristotle was not understood this way by his followers in the Middle Ages, who saw him as consistent with monotheistic religion and a teleological understanding of all nature. Consistent with the medieval interpretation, in his ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]'' and other works Aristotle clearly argued a case for there being one highest god or "[[prime mover theory|prime mover]]" which was the ultimate cause, though specifically not the material cause, of the eternal forms or natures which cause the natural order, including all living things.{{citation needed|date=October 2021}} He clearly refers to this entity having an [[active intellect|intellect]] that humans somehow share in, which helps humans see the true natures or forms of things without relying purely on sense perception of physical things, including living species. This understanding of nature, and Aristotle's arguments against materialist understandings of nature, were very influential in the Middle Ages in Europe. The idea of fixed species remained dominant in biology until Darwin, and a focus upon biology is still common today in teleological criticisms of modern science.

===Roman era===
It was the [[Stoicism|Stoics]] who "developed the battery of creationist arguments broadly known under the label 'The Argument from Design'".<ref name="sed" />{{Rp|xviii}} Cicero (c. 106 – c. 43 BC) reported the teleological argument of the Stoics in ''[[De Natura Deorum]]'' (''On the Nature of the Gods'') Book II, which includes an early version of the watchmaker analogy, which was later developed by William Paley. He has one of the characters in the dialogue say:
{{Blockquote|text=When you see a sundial or a water-clock, you see that it tells the time by design and not by chance. How then can you imagine that the universe as a whole is devoid of purpose and intelligence, when it embraces everything, including these artifacts themselves and their artificers?|author=Cicero|source=''De Natura Deorum'', II.34}}

Another very important classical supporter of the teleological argument was [[Galen]], whose compendious works were one of the major sources of medical knowledge until modern times, both in Europe and the medieval Islamic world. He was not a Stoic, but like them he looked back to the Socratics and was constantly engaged in arguing against atomists such as the Epicureans. Unlike Aristotle (who was however a major influence upon him), and unlike the Neoplatonists, he believed there was really evidence for something literally like the "demiurge" found in Plato's ''Timaeus'', which worked physical upon nature. In works such as his ''On the Usefulness of Parts'' he explained evidence for it in the complexity of animal construction. His work shows "early signs of contact and contrast between the pagan and the Judaeo-Christian tradition of creation", criticizing the account found in the Bible. "Moses, he suggests, would have contented himself with saying that God ordered the eyelashes not to grow and that they obeyed. In contrast to this, the Platonic tradition's Demiurge is above all else a technician." Surprisingly, neither Aristotle nor Plato, but Xenophon are considered by Galen, as the best writer on this subject. Galen shared with Xenophon a scepticism of the value of books about most speculative philosophy, except for inquiries such as whether there is "something in the world superior in power and wisdom to man". This he saw as having an everyday importance, a usefulness for living well. He also asserted that Xenophon was the author who reported the real position of Socrates, including his aloofness from many types of speculative science and philosophy.<ref>Sedley (2007) ''Epilogue''.</ref>

Galen's connection of the teleological argument to discussions about the complexity of living things, and his insistence that this is possible for a practical scientist, foreshadows some aspects of modern uses of the teleological argument.