Six-Day War

== Background ==
{{main|Origins of the Six-Day War}}

{{See also|Waiting period (Six-Day War)}}
[[File:Nasser and Egyptian pilots pre-1967.gif|thumb|On 22 May 1967, President Nasser addressed his pilots at [[Bir Gifgafa Airfield]] in Sinai: "The Jews are threatening war—we say to them [[wikt:أهلا وسهلا|ahlan wa-sahlan]] (welcome)!"<ref name="Gluska2007p152" />]]
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After the 1956 [[Suez Crisis]], Egypt agreed to the stationing of a [[United Nations Emergency Force]] (UNEF) in the Sinai to ensure all parties would comply with the [[1949 Armistice Agreements]].{{Sfnp|Rauschning|Wiesbrock|Lailach|1997|p=30}}{{Sfnp|Sachar|2007|pp=504, 507–508}}<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html |title=First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) – Background (Full text) |access-date=29 June 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160808112941/http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html |archive-date=8 August 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> In the following years there were numerous minor border clashes between Israel and its Arab neighbours, particularly Syria. In early November 1966, Syria signed a [[Collective security|mutual defence agreement]] with Egypt.<ref>{{harvp|Gawrych|2000|p=5}}. "Some sources date the agreement to 4 November, others to 7 November. Most sources simply say November."</ref> Soon after this, in response to [[Palestine Liberation Organisation]] (PLO) guerilla activity,<ref>Schiff, Zeev (1974) ''History of the Israeli Army'', Straight Arrow Books. p.&nbsp;145</ref>{{Sfnp|Churchill|Churchill|1967|p=21}} including a mine attack that left three dead,{{Sfnp|Pollack|2004|p=290}} the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) [[Samu Incident|attacked the village]] of [[as-Samu]] in the Jordanian-ruled West Bank.{{Sfnp|Segev|2007|pp=149–152}} Jordanian units that engaged the Israelis were quickly beaten back.{{Sfnp|Hart|1989|p=226}} King [[Hussein of Jordan]] criticized Egyptian President [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] for failing to come to Jordan's aid, and "hiding behind UNEF skirts".{{Sfnp|Oren|2002|p=312}}{{Sfnp|Burrowes|Muzzio|1972|pp=224–225}}<ref name=shemesh2007p118 /><ref>{{harvp|Tessler|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=3kbU4BIAcrQC&pg=PA378 378]}}: "Towards the War of June 1967: Growing tensions in the region were clearly visible long before Israel's November attack on Samu and two other West Bank towns. An escalating spiral of raid and retaliation had already been set in motion..."</ref>

In May 1967, Nasser received false reports from the [[Soviet Union]] that Israel was massing on the Syrian border.{{Sfnp|Herzog|1982|p=148}} Nasser began massing his troops in two defensive lines{{Sfnp|Quigley|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=0zEi3qGWLFIC&pg=PA32 32]}} in the Sinai Peninsula on Israel's border (16 May), expelled the UNEF force from Gaza and Sinai (19 May) and took over UNEF positions at [[Sharm el-Sheikh]], overlooking the [[Straits of Tiran]].{{Sfnp|Shlaim|2007|p=238}}<ref>{{harvp|Mutawi|2002|p=93|ps=: "Although Eshkol denounced the Egyptians, his response to this development was a model of moderation. His speech on 21 May demanded that Nasser withdraw his forces from Sinai but made no mention of the removal of UNEF from the Straits nor of what Israel would do if they were closed to Israeli shipping. The next day Nasser announced to an astonished world that henceforth the Straits were, indeed, closed to all Israeli ships"}}</ref> Israel repeated declarations it had made in 1957 that any closure of the Straits would be considered an act of war, or justification for war,{{Sfnp|Cohen|1988|p=12}}<ref name="MeirStraitsSpeech" /> but Nasser closed the Straits to Israeli shipping on 22–23 May.{{Sfnp|Morris|1999|p=306}}{{Sfnp|Gat|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ntLdA8QIgXIC&pg=PA202 202]}}<ref name=Colonomos2013p25 /> After the war, U.S. President [[Lyndon Johnson]] commented:<ref>"[https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1310&dat=19670619&id=valVAAAAIBAJ&sjid=JeEDAAAAIBAJ&pg=5448,4112160 LBJ Pledges U.S. to Peace Effort] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170517095210/https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1310&dat=19670619&id=valVAAAAIBAJ&sjid=JeEDAAAAIBAJ&pg=5448,4112160 |date=17 May 2017}}", ''Eugene Register-Guard'' (19 June 1967). See also Johnson, Lyndon. [http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28308 "Address at the State Department's Foreign Policy Conference for Educators"] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161227195747/http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28308 |date=27 December 2016}} (19 June 1967).</ref>

{{Quote|If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than any other, it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the Straits of Tiran would be closed. The right of innocent, maritime passage must be preserved for all nations.}}

On 30 May, Jordan and Egypt signed a defence pact. The following day, at Jordan's invitation, the Iraqi army began deploying troops and armoured units in Jordan.{{Sfnp|Churchill|Churchill|1967|pp=52 & 77}} They were later reinforced by an Egyptian contingent. On 1 June, Israel formed a [[National Unity Government]] by widening its cabinet, and on 4 June the decision was made to go to war. The next morning, Israel launched [[Operation Focus]], a large-scale, surprise air strike that launched the Six-Day War.

=== Military preparation ===
Before the war, Israeli pilots and ground crews had trained extensively in rapid refitting of aircraft returning from [[sortie]]s, enabling a single aircraft to sortie up to four times a day, as opposed to the norm in Arab air forces of one or two sorties per day. This enabled the [[Israeli Air Force]] (IAF) to send several attack waves against Egyptian airfields on the first day of the war, overwhelming the Egyptian Air Force and allowed it to knock out other Arab air forces on the same day. This has contributed to the Arab belief that the IAF was helped by foreign air forces (see [[Controversies relating to the Six-Day War#Combat support|Controversies relating to the Six-Day War]]). Pilots were extensively schooled about their targets, were forced to memorise every single detail, and rehearsed the operation multiple times on dummy runways in total secrecy.

The Egyptians had constructed fortified defences in the Sinai. These designs were based on the assumption that an attack would come along the few roads leading through the desert, rather than through the difficult desert terrain. The Israelis chose not to risk attacking the Egyptian defences head-on, and instead surprised them from an unexpected direction.

James Reston, writing in ''[[The New York Times]]'' on 23 May 1967, noted, "In; discipline, training, morale, equipment and general competence his [Nasser's] army and the other Arab forces, without the direct assistance of the Soviet Union, are no match for the Israelis. ... Even with {{gaps|50|000}} troops and the best of his generals and air force in Yemen, he has not been able to work his way in that small and primitive country, and even his effort to help the Congo rebels was a flop."<ref>{{Cite news |author=Reston, James |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1967/05/24/archives/washington-nassers-reckless-maneuvers-cairo-and-moscow-the-us.html |title=Washington: Nasser's Reckless Maneuvers; Cairo and Moscow The U.S. Commitment The Staggering Economy Moscow's Role |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=24 May 1967 |page=46 |access-date=22 July 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180706021950/https://www.nytimes.com/1967/05/24/archives/washington-nassers-reckless-maneuvers-cairo-and-moscow-the-us.html |archive-date=6 July 2018 |url-status=live }}</ref>

On the eve of the war, Israel believed it could win a war in 3–4 days. The United States estimated Israel would need 7–10 days to win, with British estimates supporting the U.S. view.{{Sfnp|Quigley|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=0zEi3qGWLFIC&pg=PA60 60]}}<ref>{{Cite web |title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 – Office of the Historian |url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d130 |website=history.state.gov}}</ref>