Nigerian Civil War Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ==Background== ===Ethnic division=== This [[civil war]] can be connected to the [[Colonial Nigeria#Amalgamation|colonial amalgamation]] in 1914 of the [[Northern Nigeria Protectorate|Northern Protectorate]], [[Lagos Colony]], and [[Southern Nigeria Protectorate]], which was intended for better administration due to the proximity of these [[protectorate]]s {{Citation needed|date=September 2022}}. However, the change did not take into consideration the differences in the culture and religions of the people in each area. Competition for political and economic power exacerbated tensions.<ref name="Britannica"/> [[Nigeria]] gained independence from the [[United Kingdom]] on 1 October 1960, with a population of 45.2 million made up of more than 300 differing ethnic and cultural groups {{Citation needed|date=September 2022}}. When the colony of Nigeria was created, its three largest ethnic groups were the [[Igbo people|Igbo]], who formed about 60–70% of the population in the southeast;<ref>{{Cite web |title=Igbo {{!}} people |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/Igbo |website=Encyclopedia Britannica |language=en |access-date=2020-05-11}}</ref> the [[Hausa-Fulani]] of the [[Sokoto Caliphate]], who formed about 67% of the population in the northern part of the territory;<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Orji I. |first=Ema |title=Issues on ethnicity and governance in Nigeria: A universal human Right perspectives. |url=https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1819&context=ilj |journal=Fordham International Law Journal |volume=25 |issue=2 2001 Article 4}}</ref> and the [[Yoruba people|Yoruba]], who formed about 75% of the population in the southwest.<ref name=":0"/> Although these groups have their homelands, by the 1960s, the people were dispersed across Nigeria, with all three ethnic groups represented substantially in major cities. When the war broke out in 1967, there were still 5,000 Igbos in [[Lagos]].<ref>Olawoyin, ''Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict'' (1971), pp. 32–33. "The Ibo like the Hausa and Yoruba, are found in hundreds in all towns and cities throughout the Federation. Even at the period of the Civil War, they numbered more than 5,000 in Lagos alone."</ref> The semi-[[feudal]] and [[Muslim]] Hausa-Fulani in the north were traditionally ruled by a conservative Islamic hierarchy consisting of [[emir]]s who in turn owed their ultimate allegiance to the [[Sultan of Sokoto]], whom they regarded as the source of all political power and religious authority.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|title=Sokoto Caliphate|url=https://irepos.unijos.edu.ng/jspui/bitstream/123456789/2541/1/20181218113229.pdf}}</ref> Apart from the Hausa-Fulani, the [[Kanuri people|Kanuri]] were another dominant majority Muslim ethnic group that had key figures in the war. They made up about 5% of Nigeria's population and were the dominant ethnic group in the [[North-Eastern State|North-Eastern state]]. They historically successfully resisted the Sokoto Caliphate during the 19th-century through their millennium-long [[Kanem–Bornu Empire|Kanem-Bornu empire]]. The southernmost part of the region known as the [[Middle Belt]] had large populations of Christian and Animist populations. Through missionary activities and the 'Northernisation' policy of the [[Northern Region, Nigeria|Regional Government]], the subregion had a significant western-educated population. Several key figures on the Nigerian side of the war came from this subregion, such as Yakubu Gowon and Theophilus Danjuma, both of whom are Christians.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kirk-Greene |first=A. H. M. |date=1967 |title=The Peoples of Nigeria: The Cultural Background to the Crisis |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/720702 |journal=African Affairs |volume=66 |issue=262 |pages=3–11 |doi=10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a095561 |jstor=720702 |issn=0001-9909}}</ref> The [[Yoruba people|Yoruba]] [[political system]] in the southwest, like that of the Hausa-Fulani, also consisted of a series of [[monarch]]s, the [[Oba (ruler)|Oba]]. The Yoruba monarchs, however, were less [[autocratic]] than those in the north.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Nwafor-Ejelinma |first=Ndubisi |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AXff8YkxVG0C&pg=PA21 |title=Ndi-Igbo of Nigeria: Identity Showcase |date=August 2012 |publisher=Trafford Publishing |isbn=978-1-4669-3892-2 |language=en}}</ref> The political and social system of the Yoruba accordingly allowed for greater [[upward mobility]], based on acquired rather than inherited wealth and title.<ref>{{Cite web|title=The particularity of the problem with Nigeria @ 59|url=https://www.thecable.ng/the-particularity-of-the-problem-with-nigeria-59|date=2019-10-01|website=TheCable|language=en-US|access-date=2020-05-24}}</ref> In contrast to the two other groups, Igbos and the ethnic groups of the [[Niger Delta]] in the southeast lived mostly in autonomous, democratically organised communities, although there were E''ze'' or monarchs in many of the ancient cities, such as the [[Kingdom of Nri]]. At its zenith, the Kingdom controlled most of Igboland, including influence on the [[Anioma people]], [[Arochukwu]] (which controlled [[slavery]] in Igbo), and [[Onitsha]] territory. Unlike the other two regions, decisions within the Igbo communities were made by a general assembly in which men and women participated.<ref>{{Google books |id=Zm7sWUbDWakC |page=25 |title=Ijeaku, Nnamdi }}</ref> Considering this participation by women in this civil war, the study ''Female fighters and the fates of rebellions: How mobilizing women influences conflict duration'' by Reed M. Wood oberved that there was a longer duration of wars between rebel groups and the number of women that participated within the conflict at hand. In discussing the correlation between conflicts of longer duration and a high rate of participation of women, the study suggests that gender norms and the general ways in which "an armed group recruits as well as who it recruits may subsequently influence its behaviors during the conflict and the manner in which the conflict unfolds."<ref>{{Cite web |title=Female fighters and the fates of rebellions: How mobilizing women influences conflict duration |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/353791811}}</ref> The differing [[political system]]s and structures reflected and produced divergent customs and values. The Hausa-Fulani commoners, having contact with the political system only through a village head designated by the emir or one of his subordinates, did not view political leaders as amenable to influence. Political decisions were to be submitted to. As with many other [[Authoritarianism|authoritarian]] religious and political systems, leadership positions were given to persons willing to be subservient and loyal to superiors. A chief function of this political system in this context was to maintain conservative values, which caused many Hausa-Fulani to view economic and social innovation as subversive or sacrilegious.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Abutu|first=Dan|title=THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR|url=https://www.academia.edu/26022821|language=en}}</ref> In contrast to the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbos and other Biafrans often participated directly in the decisions which affected their lives. They had a lively awareness of the political system and regarded it as an instrument for achieving their personal goals. Status was acquired through the ability to [[Arbitration|arbitrate]] disputes that might arise in the village, and through acquiring rather than inheriting wealth.<ref>Olawoyin, ''Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict'' (1971), pp. 34–35. "In principle, authority in the local community was formerly exercised by a body of elders which met in council presided over by the head of the senior lineage and included heads of other lineage and sub-lineage. Councils were concerned mainly with offenses, religion, and public issues likely to break up the solidarity of the group, village or town. Men of influence, particularly men of wealth, who held titles, and were members of local Ozo and Eze lodges, frequently dominated the lineage heads, but there was no formal concentration of authority in a single individual. Among the Ibo, even where there was no title taking, a man of wealth could attain considerable political power, apart from any authority derived from his place in a kinship system.{{nbsp}}... New laws which affected the community required the consent of the community concerned as expressed at a public meeting."</ref> The Igbo had been substantially victimised in the [[Atlantic slave trade]]; in the year 1790, it was reported that of 20,000 people sold each year from [[Kingdom of Bonny|Bonny]], 16,000 were Igbo.<ref>Olawoyin, ''Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict'' (1971), p. 30. "Bonny, which became one of the principal slave markets on the coast, was largely peopled by Ibo. In 1790, according to Adams, 16,000 out of the 20,000 slaves sold there annually were Ibos. The last British slaver sailed from Bonny in 1808, though the trade continued until 1841."</ref> With their emphasis upon social achievement and political participation, the Igbo adapted to and challenged colonial rule in innovative ways.<ref name="Britannica"/> These tradition-derived differences were perpetuated and perhaps enhanced by the [[Colonial Nigeria|colonial government in Nigeria]]. In the north, the colonial government found it convenient to [[indirect rule|rule indirectly]] through the emirs, thus perpetuating rather than changing the [[Indigenous peoples|indigenous]] authoritarian political system. Christian [[missionaries]] were excluded from the north, and the area thus remained virtually closed to European cultural influence.<ref>{{Cite web |title=6: Christian Missionary Activities in West Africa – History Textbook |url=https://wasscehistorytextbook.com/6-christian-missionary-activities-in-west-africa/ |access-date=2022-07-07 |language=en-GB}}</ref> By contrast, the richest of the Igbo often sent their sons to British universities, with the intention of preparing them to work with the British. During the ensuing years, the northern emirs maintained their traditional political and religious institutions, while reinforcing their [[social structure]]. At the time of independence in 1960, the north was by far the most underdeveloped area in Nigeria. It had an English literacy rate of 2%, as compared to 19.2% in the east (literacy in [[Ajami script|Ajami]], local languages in Arabic script, learned in connection with religious education, was much higher). The west also enjoyed a much higher literacy level, as it was the first part of the country to have contact with western education and established a free primary education program under the pre-independence Western Regional Government.<ref name="ReferenceA">'' Biafra Story'', Frederick Forsyth, Leo Cooper, 2001 {{ISBN|0-85052-854-2}}</ref><ref>Pierri, ''A New Entry into the World Oil Market'' (2013), p. 108. "The North had developed very differently from the rest of the country, for it lagged far behind the South in terms of European-educated population. Hence, Northerners feared that incorporation into an independent and unitary Nigerian State molded according to European standards would cause their cultural and political submission to the South."</ref> In the west, the missionaries rapidly introduced Western forms of education. Consequently, the Yoruba were the first group in Nigeria to adopt Western bureaucratic social norms. They made up the first classes of African civil servants, doctors, lawyers, and other technicians and professionals.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Causes, and Consequences of Rapid Erosion of Cultural Values in a Traditional African Society |last1=Wahab |first1=E. O. |last2=Odunsi |first2=S. O. |date=2012 |journal=Journal of Anthropology |language=en |last3=Ajiboye |first3=O. E. |volume=2012 |pages=1–7 |doi=10.1155/2012/327061 |doi-access=free}}</ref> [[Missionary|Missionaries]] were introduced at a later date in eastern areas because the British experienced [[Anglo-Aro War|difficulty establishing firm control]] over the highly autonomous communities there.<ref>Audrey Chapman, "Civil War in Nigeria," ''Midstream'', Feb 1968</ref> However, the Igbo and other Biafran people actively embraced Western education, and they overwhelmingly came to adopt Christianity. Population pressure in the Igbo homeland, combined with aspirations for monetary wages, drove thousands of Igbos to other parts of Nigeria in search of work. By the 1960s, Igbo political culture was more unified and the region relatively prosperous, with tradesmen and literate elites active not just in the traditionally Igbo east, but throughout Nigeria.<ref>Oliver, Roland and Atmore, Anthony. ''Africa Since 1800''. 1994, p. 270</ref> By 1966, the traditional ethnic and religious differences between northerners and the Igbo were exacerbated by new differences in education and economic class.<ref name="Jeyifo2013"/><ref name=":1" /> ===Politics and economics of federalism=== The colonial administration divided Nigeria into three regions—North, West and East—something which exacerbated the already well-developed economic, political, and social differences among Nigeria's different [[ethnic group]]s. The country was divided in such a way that the North had a slightly higher population than the other two regions combined. There were also widespread reports of [[fraud]] during Nigeria's first [[census]],<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ipobinusa.org/nigeria-britains-creation|title=NIGERIA: BRITAIN'S CREATION HANDED OVER TO THE FULANI|website=Indigenous People of Biafra USA|language=en-US|access-date=2019-04-13}}</ref> and even today population remains a highly political issue in Nigeria. On this basis, the Northern Region was allocated a majority of the seats in the Federal Legislature established by the colonial authorities. Within each of the three regions the dominant ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo, respectively formed political parties that were largely regional and based on ethnic [[allegiance]]s: the [[Northern People's Congress]] (NPC) in the North; the [[Action Group (Nigeria)|Action Group]] in the West (AG); and the [[National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons]] (NCNC) in the East. Although these parties were not exclusively [[Homogeneous charge compression ignition|homogeneous]] in terms of their ethnic or regional make-up, the disintegration of Nigeria resulted largely from the fact that these parties were primarily based in one region and one tribe.<ref name="Britannica"/><ref>{{Cite book|last=Azikiwe|first=Nnamdi|title=The development of political parties in Nigeria: office of the commissioner in U.K for eastern regions of Nigeria, London; (1961) Zik: A selection of the speeches of Dr. Nnamdi A. : A peace proposals for ending the Nigeria Civil War|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1970}}</ref> The basis of modern Nigeria formed in 1914 when the United Kingdom amalgamated the [[Northern Nigeria Protectorate|Northern]] and [[Southern Nigeria Protectorate|Southern]] protectorates. Beginning with the Northern Protectorate, the [[British Empire|British]] implemented a system of [[indirect rule]] of which they exerted influence through alliances with local forces. This system worked so well, Colonial Governor [[Frederick Lugard]] successfully lobbied to extend it to the Southern [[Protectorate]] through amalgamation. In this way, a foreign and hierarchical system of governance was imposed on the Igbos.<ref name="Ejiogu2013">{{cite journal |first=E. C. |last=Ejiogu |title=Chinua Achebe on Biafra: An Elaborate Deconstruction |journal=[[Journal of Asian and African Studies]] |volume=48 |issue=6 |pages=653–670 |year=2013 |doi=10.1177/0021909613506457 |s2cid=145129982 }}</ref> [[Intellectual]]s began to agitate for greater rights and independence.<ref>Olawoyin, "Historical Analysis of Nigeria–Biafra Conflict" (1971), pp. 53–73. "...{{nbsp}}there was a tendency for British officials to build social barriers between themselves and Westernised Nigerians which, on the one hand, gave strength to nationalistic paroxysms. The Westernised Nigerian was an isolated individual, possibly because he was seen as a potential rival. He thus became a creature left to seek his own salvation. All that was left for him then was to seek expression in nationalistic organisations."</ref> The size of this intellectual class increased significantly in the 1950s, with the massive expansion of the national education program.<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), pp. 17–18.</ref> During the 1940s and 1950s, the Igbo and Yoruba parties were in the forefront of the campaign for independence from British rule. Northern leaders, fearful that independence would mean political and [[Economy|economic]] domination by the more Westernized elites in the South, preferred the continuation of British rule. As a condition for accepting independence, they demanded that the country continue to be divided into three regions with the North having a clear majority. Igbo and Yoruba leaders, anxious to obtain an independent country at all costs, accepted the Northern demands.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Nwadike |first=Jerome Agu |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MhhD6NOcBUgC&pg=PA10 |title=A Biafran Soldier'S Survival from the Jaws of Death: Nigerian – Biafran Civil War |date=2010-09-25 |publisher=Xlibris Corporation |isbn=978-1-4535-1381-1 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Patrick A. |first=Anwunah |title=The Nigeria -Biafra War (1967 -1970): my memoirs |publisher=Spectrum Books Limited |year=2007}}</ref> However, the two Southern regions had significant cultural and ideological differences, leading to discord between the two Southern political parties. Firstly, the AG favoured a loose confederacy of regions in the emergent Nigerian nation whereby each region would be in total control of its own distinct territory. The status of Lagos was a sore point for the AG, which did not want Lagos, a Yoruba town situated in Western Nigeria (which was at that time the federal capital and seat of national government) to be designated as the capital of Nigeria, if it meant loss of Yoruba [[sovereignty]]. The AG insisted that Lagos must be completely recognised as a Yoruba town without any loss of identity, control or autonomy by the Yoruba. Contrary to this position, the NCNC was anxious to declare Lagos, by virtue of it being the "Federal Capital Territory" as "no man's land"—a declaration which as could be expected angered the AG, which offered to help fund the development of another territory in Nigeria as [[Federal Capital Territory (Nigeria)|"Federal Capital Territory"]] and then threatened secession from Nigeria if it didn't get its way. The threat of secession by the AG was tabled, documented and recorded in numerous constitutional conferences, including the constitutional conference held in London in 1954 with the demand that a right of secession be enshrined in the constitution of the emerging Nigerian nation to allow any part of the emergent nation to opt out of Nigeria, should the need arise.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Separatist Agitations in Nigeria since 1914 |first=Tekena N. |last=Tamuno |journal=The Journal of Modern African Studies |volume=8 |issue=4 |pages=563–584 |doi=10.1017/s0022278x00023909 |jstor=159090 |year=1970|s2cid=153672623 }}</ref> This proposal for inclusion of right of secession by the regions in independent Nigeria by the AG was rejected and resisted by NCNC which vehemently argued for a tightly bound united/unitary structured nation because it viewed the provision of a secession clause as detrimental to the formation of a unitary Nigerian state. In the face of sustained opposition by the [[National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons|NCNC]] delegates, later joined by the NPC and backed by threats to view maintenance of the inclusion of secession by the AG as treasonable by the British, the AG was forced to renounce its position of inclusion of the right of secession a part of the Nigerian constitution. Had such a provision been made in the Nigerian constitution, later events which led to the Nigerian/Biafran civil war may have been avoided. The pre-independence alliance between the NCNC and the NPC against the aspirations of the AG would later set the tone for political governance of independent Nigeria by the NCNC/NPC and lead to disaster in later years in Nigeria.<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), p. 3. "On 31st March 1953, Anthony Enaharo of the Action Group (AG) tabled a motion in the House of Representatives in Lagos which called for independence in 1956. The National Congress of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), which had earlier committed itself to a 1956 independence date, during its annual party convention held in Kano in August 1951, supported the Enahoro motion, while the Northern People's Congress (NPC) rejected it out of hand. Instead, the NPC sought an amendment to the motion and advocated independence 'as soon as practicable.'"</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Madiebo|first=Alex|title=The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War|publisher=Fourth Dimension Publishers|year=1980}}</ref> Northern–Southern tension manifested firstly in the [[1945 Jos riots]]<ref name="auto3"/> and again on 1 May 1953, as [[1953 Kano riot|fighting in the Northern city of Kano]].<ref>Kirk-Greene, ''The Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War'' (1975), p. 9. "It slipped several more notches after the vulgarity of the Lagos mob – <u>con mutunci</u>, personal humiliation through public abuse, is to the Hausa a worse offense than physical assault – and the Kano riots. If 1953 was to become one of the Biafran points of no return because of the slaughter of Ibos in Kano, it had never been anything less in the NPC demonology of the South because of their treatment by politicians and proletariat alike in Lagos."</ref> The political parties tended to focus on building power in their own regions, resulting in an incoherent and disunified dynamic in the federal government.<ref>Kirk-Greene, ''The Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War'' (1975), p. 12. "Once (a) the principle of federalism (b) the quality of Nigerian federalism (loose and lopsided, the very negation of classic Whearism) had been agreed on by the Nigerian leaders, the direction from 1954 onwards was progressively towards the construction of impregnable bases of power within each Region. Nearly every move can be analysed in terms of increasing the rigidity of the Regional cores and inhibiting the effective extension of the central authority."</ref> In 1946, the British [[Federalism in Nigeria|divided]] the Southern Region into the Western Region and the [[Eastern Region, Nigeria|Eastern Region]]. Each government was entitled to collect [[Royalty payment|royalties]] from resources extracted within its area. This changed in 1956 when [[Shell Nigeria|Shell]]-[[BP]] found large petroleum deposits in the Eastern region. A Commission led by [[Jeremy Raisman|Sir Jeremy Raisman]] and [[Ronald Tress]] determined that resource royalties would now enter a "Distributable Pools Account" with the money split between different parts of government (50% to region of origin, 20% to federal government, 30% to other regions).<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), pp. 115–116.</ref> To ensure continuing influence, the British government promoted unity in the Northern bloc and secessionist sentiments among and within the two Southern regions. The Nigerian government, following independence, promoted discord in the West with the creation of a new [[Mid-Western Region, Nigeria|Mid-Western Region]] in an area with oil potential.<ref>Uche, "Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War" (2008), pp. 116–117. "In the struggle over the national wealth, control depended on who dominated the government at the centre. With Southern Nigeria virtually split into two, the North, which was now by far the largest region, had the upper hand. British Colonial Officers also encouraged it to promote the philosophy of one North in order to maintain its political control.{{nbsp}}... In an attempt to weaken the opposition the ruling coalition (NPC and NCNC) sponsored a crisis within the Western Region parliament culminating in the declaration of a State of Emergency in the Region in 1962. In 1963, the Western Region was further split into two. This effectively separated the core Yoruba group from the minorities. Interestingly, the new Mid-Western Region, dominated by minorities also had prospects for oil exploration."</ref> The new constitution of 1946 also proclaimed that "The entire property in and control of all [[mineral oil]]s, in, under, or upon any lands, in Nigeria, and of all rivers, streams, and watercourses throughout Nigeria, is and shall be vested in, the Crown."<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), p. 11.</ref> The United Kingdom profited significantly from a fivefold rise in Nigerian exports amidst the post-war economic boom.<ref>Ekwe-Ekwe, ''The Biafra War'' (1990), pp. 19–20. "But Nigeria was still a British colony, with a political economy that existed principally to serve British interests."</ref> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. 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