Cosmological argument

== History ==
<!--- this section is linked to from the article Celestial spheres.  Please do not change its title without either adding an appropriate anchor or appropriately amending all other articles which link to it --->
[[Image:Sanzio 01 Plato Aristotle.jpg|thumb|left|200px|[[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]], depicted here in [[Raphael]]'s ''[[The School of Athens]]'', both developed first cause arguments.]]

[[Plato]] (c. 427–347 BC) and [[Aristotle]] (c. 384–322 BC) both posited first cause arguments, though each had certain notable caveats.<ref>Craig, WL., [https://books.google.com/books?id=qbFKAwAAQBAJ&q=%22chapter+1%22+natural ''The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz''], Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2001, pp. 1–5, 13.</ref> In ''[[The Laws]]'' (Book X), Plato posited that all movement in the world and the [[Cosmos]] was "imparted motion". This required a "self-originated motion" to set it in motion and to maintain it. In ''[[Timaeus (dialogue)|Timaeus]]'', Plato posited a "demiurge" of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the Cosmos.

Aristotle argued ''against'' the idea of a first cause, often confused with the idea of a "[[Primum movens|prime mover]]" or "[[unmoved mover]]" ({{lang|grc|πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον}} or ''primus motor'') in his ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'' and ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]''.<ref>Aristotle, ''Physics'' VIII, 4–6; ''Metaphysics'' XII, 1–6.</ref> Aristotle argued in ''favor'' of the idea of several unmoved movers, one powering each [[celestial sphere]], which he believed lived beyond the sphere of the fixed stars, and explained why motion in the universe (which he believed was eternal) had continued for an infinite period of time. Aristotle argued the [[atomism|atomist's]] assertion of a non-eternal universe would require a [[first uncaused cause]] – in his terminology, an [[four causes|efficient]] first cause – an idea he considered a nonsensical flaw in the reasoning of the atomists.

Like Plato, Aristotle believed in an eternal [[cosmos]] with no beginning and no end (which in turn follows [[Parmenides]]' famous statement that "[[nothing comes from nothing]]"). In what he called "first philosophy" or metaphysics, Aristotle ''did'' intend a theological correspondence between the prime mover and a deity; functionally, however, he provided an explanation for the apparent motion of the "[[fixed stars]]" (now understood as the daily rotation of the Earth). According to his theses, immaterial unmoved movers are eternal unchangeable beings that constantly think about thinking, but being immaterial, they are incapable of interacting with the cosmos and have no knowledge of what transpires therein. From an "aspiration or desire",<ref>"Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God", in ''Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (1967), Vol. 2, p. 233 ''ff''.</ref> the [[celestial spheres]], ''imitate'' that purely intellectual activity as best they can, by [[uniform circular motion]]. The unmoved movers ''inspiring'' the [[classical planets|planetary]] spheres are no different in kind from the prime mover, they merely suffer a dependency of relation to the prime mover. Correspondingly, the motions of the planets are subordinate to the motion inspired by the prime mover in the sphere of fixed stars. Aristotle's natural theology admitted no creation or capriciousness from the immortal [[pantheon (gods)|pantheon]], but maintained a defense against dangerous charges of impiety.<ref>{{Cite journal |title=Review of: Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals |url=https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2001/2001.02.29/ |journal=Bryn Mawr Classical Review |issn=1055-7660}}</ref>

[[Plotinus]], a third-century Platonist, taught that the One transcendent absolute caused the universe to exist simply as a consequence of its existence (''creatio ex deo''). His disciple Proclus stated "The One is God".<ref>{{Cite web |title=Author and Citation Information for "Cosmological Argument" |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=cosmological-argument |access-date=2023-05-19 |website=plato.stanford.edu}}</ref>

Centuries later, the [[Islamic]] [[philosopher]] [[Avicenna]] (c. 980–1037) inquired into the question of [[being]], in which he distinguished between [[essence]] (''māhiyya'') and [[existence]] (''wuǧūd'').<ref>{{cite encyclopedia| title=Ibn Sina's Metaphysics| encyclopedia= Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | year= 2021 |url= https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-sina-metaphysics/#MetBetOntThe}}</ref> He argued that the fact of existence could not be inferred from or accounted for by the essence of existing things, and that form and matter by themselves could not originate and interact with the movement of the Universe or the progressive actualization of existing things. Thus, he reasoned that existence must be due to an [[Causality|agent cause]] that necessitates, imparts, gives, or adds existence to an essence. To do so, the cause must coexist with its effect and be an existing thing.<ref name="Islam in Britannica">{{cite encyclopedia| title=Islam |year=2007| encyclopedia=Encyclopædia Britannica Online | access-date=2007-11-27|url=https://www.britannica.com/eb/article-69190/Islam}}</ref>

Steven Duncan writes that it "was first formulated by a Greek-speaking Syriac Christian neo-Platonist, [[John Philoponus]], who claims to find a contradiction between the Greek pagan insistence on the eternity of the world and the Aristotelian rejection of the existence of any actual infinite". Referring to the argument as the "'[[Kalam]]' cosmological argument", Duncan asserts that it "received its fullest articulation at the hands of [medieval] Muslim and Jewish exponents of ''Kalam'' ("the use of reason by believers to justify the basic metaphysical presuppositions of the faith").<ref>Duncan, S., ''Analytic philosophy of religion: its history since 1955'', Humanities-Ebooks, p.165.</ref>

[[Thomas Aquinas]] (c. 1225–1274) adapted and enhanced the argument he found in his reading of Aristotle, Avicenna (the [[Proof of the Truthful]]), and Maimonides to form one of the most influential versions of the cosmological argument.<ref>Summa Theologica, St. Thomas Aquinas</ref><ref>Scott David Foutz, [http://www.quodlibet.net/aqu5ways.shtml An Examination of Thomas Aquinas' Cosmological Arguments as found in the Five Ways] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080509173359/http://www.quodlibet.net/aqu5ways.shtml |date=2008-05-09 }}, ''Quodlibet Online Journal of Christian Theology and Philosophy''</ref> His conception of first cause was the idea that the Universe must be caused by something that is itself uncaused, which he claimed is that which we call God:

{{blockquote|The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm#article3|title=Summa Theologica I Q2.3|website=www.newadvent.org}}</ref>}}

Importantly, Aquinas' Five Ways, given the second question of his ''[[Summa Theologica]]'', are not the entirety of Aquinas' demonstration that the Christian God exists. The Five Ways form only the beginning of Aquinas' Treatise on the Divine Nature.