Ontology Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! === Properties and relations === {{main|Property (philosophy)|Relations (philosophy)}} The category of ''properties'' consists of entities that can be exemplified by other entities, e.g., by substances.<ref name="Orilia">{{cite web |last1=Orilia |first1=Francesco |last2=Paolini Paoletti |first2=Michele |title=Properties |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2020}}</ref> Properties characterize their bearers, they express what their bearer is like.<ref name="Borchert2"/> For example, the red color and the round shape of an apple are properties of this apple. Various ways have been suggested concerning how to conceive properties themselves and their relation to substances.<ref name="Sandkühler2"/> The traditionally dominant view is that properties are universals that inhere in their bearers.<ref name="Borchert2"/> As universals, they can be shared by different substances. Nominalists, on the other hand, deny that universals exist.<ref name="MacLeod"/> Some nominalists try to account for properties in terms of resemblance relations or class membership.<ref name="Sandkühler2"/> Another alternative for nominalists is to conceptualize properties as simple particulars, so-called [[Trope (philosophy)#In metaphysics|tropes]].<ref name="Borchert2"/> This position entails that both the apple and its redness are particulars. Different apples may still exactly resemble each other concerning their color, but they do not share the same particular property on this view: the two color-tropes are ''numerically distinct''.<ref name="MacLeod"/> Another important question for any theory of properties is how to conceive the relation between a bearer and its properties.<ref name="Sandkühler2"/> Substratum theorists hold that there is some kind of substance, ''substratum'', or ''[[Substance theory#Bare particular|bare particular]]'' that acts as bearer.<ref name="Benovsky">{{cite journal |last=Benovsky |first=Jiri |title=The Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory: Deadly Enemies or Twin Brothers? |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=2008 |volume=141 |issue=2 |pages=175–190 |doi=10.1007/s11098-007-9158-0 |s2cid=18712931 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BENTBT-2}}</ref> [[Bundle theory]] is an alternative view that does away with a substratum altogether: objects are taken to be just a bundle of properties.<ref name="Robinson"/><ref>{{cite journal |last=Rodriguez-Pereyra |first=Gonzalo |title=The Bundle Theory is Compatible with Distinct but Indiscernible Particulars |journal=Analysis |date=2004 |volume=64 |issue=1 |pages=72–81 |doi=10.1093/analys/64.1.72 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ERETBT}}</ref> They are held together not by a substratum but by the so-called ''compresence-relation'' responsible for the bundling. Both substratum theory and bundle theory can be combined with conceptualizing properties as universals or as particulars.<ref name="Benovsky"/> An important distinction among properties is between ''categorical'' and ''dispositional'' properties.<ref name="Borchert2"/><ref name="Kriegel"/> Categorical properties concern what something is like, e.g., what qualities it has. Dispositional properties, on the other hand, involve what powers something has, what it is able to do, even if it is not actually doing it.<ref name="Borchert2"/> For example, the shape of a sugar cube is a categorical property, while its tendency to dissolve in water is a dispositional property. For many properties there is a lack of consensus as to how they should be classified, for example, whether colors are categorical or dispositional properties.<ref name="Choi">{{cite web |last1=Choi |first1=Sungho |last2=Fara |first2=Michael |title=Dispositions |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dispositions/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Rubenstein |first=Eric M. |title=Color |url=https://iep.utm.edu/color/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=7 January 2021}}</ref> [[Property (philosophy)#Categoricalism vs. dispositionalism|Categoricalism]] is the thesis that on a fundamental level there are only categorical properties, that dispositional properties are either non-existent or dependent on categorical properties. [[Property (philosophy)#Categoricalism vs. dispositionalism|Dispositionalism]] is the opposite theory, giving ontological primacy to dispositional properties.<ref name="Kriegel">{{cite journal |last=Kriegel |first=Uriah |title=Introverted Metaphysics: How We Get Our Grip on the Ultimate Nature of Objects, Properties, and Causation |journal=Metaphilosophy |date=2019 |volume=50 |issue=5 |pages=688–707 |doi=10.1111/meta.12391 |s2cid=211938090 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/KRIIMH}}</ref><ref name="Choi"/> Between these two extremes, there are dualists who allow both categorical and dispositional properties in their ontology.<ref name="Orilia"/> ''Relations'' are ways in which things, the relata, stand to each other.<ref name="Borchert2"/><ref>{{cite book |last=Honderich |first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=relations}}</ref> Relations are in many ways similar to properties in that both characterize the things they apply to. Properties are sometimes treated as a special case of relations involving only one relatum.<ref name="Orilia"/> Central for ontology is the distinction between ''internal'' and ''external'' relations.<ref name="MacBride">{{cite web |last=MacBride |first=Fraser |title=Relations |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relations/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=9 January 2021 |date=2020}}</ref> A relation is ''internal'' if it is fully determined by the features of its relata.<ref>{{cite book |last=Honderich |first=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=relations, the nature of}}</ref> For example, an apple and a tomato stand in the ''internal relation'' of [[Similarity (philosophy)|similarity]] to each other because they are both red.<ref>{{cite web |last=Allen |first=Sophie |title=Properties |url=https://iep.utm.edu/properties/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=19 January 2021}}</ref> Some philosophers have inferred from this that internal relations do not have a proper ontological status since they can be reduced to intrinsic properties.<ref name="MacBride"/><ref>{{cite book |last=Borchert |first=Donald |title=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Edition |date=2006 |publisher=Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BORMEO |chapter=Relations, Internal and External}}</ref> ''External'' relations, on the other hand, are not fixed by the features of their relata. For example, a book stands in an ''external'' relation to a table by lying on top of it. But this is not determined by the book's or the table's features like their color, their shape, and so forth.<ref name="MacBride"/> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page