Epistemology Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ==Defining knowledge== {{main|Definitions of knowledge}} A central issue in epistemology is the question of what the nature of knowledge is or how to define it. Sometimes the expressions "theory of knowledge" and "analysis of knowledge" are used specifically for this form of inquiry.<ref name="Hannon2021"/><ref name="Lehrer2015"/><ref name="IchikawaSteup2018"/> The term "knowledge" has various meanings in [[natural language]]. It can refer to an [[awareness]] of [[fact]]s, as in knowing that [[Mars]] is a planet, to a possession of [[skill]]s, as in knowing how to swim, or to an [[Experience|experiential]] acquaintance, as in knowing [[Daniel Craig]] personally.<ref name="StanleyWilllamson2001"/><ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Zagzebski1999"/> Factual knowledge, also referred to as ''propositional knowledge'' or ''[[descriptive knowledge]]'', plays a special role in epistemology. On the linguistic level, it is distinguished from the other forms of knowledge since it can be expressed through a that-clause, for instance, using a formulation like "They know that..." followed by the known [[proposition]].<ref name="Klein1998"/><ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Britannica Epistemology" /> Some features of factual knowledge are widely accepted: it is a form of cognitive success that establishes epistemic contact with [[reality]].<ref name="SEP Epistemology"/><ref name="Zagzebski1999"/> However, even though it has been studied intensely, there are still various disagreements about its exact nature. Different factors are responsible for these disagreements. Some theorists try to furnish a practically useful definition by describing its most noteworthy and easily identifiable features.<ref name="Zagzebski1999"/> Others engage in an [[analysis of knowledge]], which aims to provide a theoretically precise definition that identifies the set of [[Essence|essential]] features characteristic for all instances of knowledge and only for them.<ref name="Zagzebski1999"/><ref name="IchikawaSteup2018"/><ref name="SEP definitions #ReaNomDef"/> Differences in the [[Philosophical methodology|methodology]] may also cause disagreements. In this regard, some epistemologists use abstract and general intuitions in order to arrive at their definitions. A different approach is to start from concrete individual cases of knowledge to determine what all of them have in common.<ref name="Pritchard2013"/><ref name="IEP problem-of-the-criterion"/><ref name="Fumerton2008"/> Yet another method is to focus on linguistic evidence by studying how the term "knowledge" is commonly used.<ref name="Britannica Epistemology" /><ref name="Lehrer2015"/> Different standards of knowledge are further sources of disagreement. A few theorists set these standards very high by demanding that absolute certainty or infallibility is necessary. On such a view, knowledge is a very rare thing. Theorists more in tune with [[Ordinary language philosophy|ordinary language]] usually demand lower standards and see knowledge as something commonly found in everyday life.<ref name="Black2002"/><ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Sidelle2001"/> === As justified true belief === The historically most influential definition, discussed since [[ancient Greek philosophy]], characterizes knowledge in relation to three essential features: as (1) a [[belief]] that is (2) [[Truth|true]] and (3) [[Justification (epistemology)|justified]].<ref name="IchikawaSteup2018"/><ref name="Zagzebski1999"/><ref name="Parikh2017"/> There is still wide acceptance that the first two features are correct, that is, that knowledge is a [[mental state]] that affirms a true proposition.<ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Britannica Epistemology" /><ref name="Zagzebski1999"/> However, there is a lot of dispute about the third feature: justification.<ref name="Klein1998"/><ref name="Zagzebski1999"/><ref name="IchikawaSteup2018"/> This feature is usually included to distinguish knowledge from true beliefs that rest on [[superstition]], [[luck]]y guesses, or [[Fallacy|faulty reasoning]]. This expresses the idea that knowledge is not the same as being right about something.<ref name="Klein1998"/><ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Lehrer2015"/> Traditionally, justification is understood as the possession of evidence: a belief is justified if the believer has good evidence supporting it. Such evidence could be a [[Experience#Perception|perceptual experience]], a [[memory]], or a second belief.<ref name="IchikawaSteup2018"/><ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Lehrer2015"/> === Gettier problem and alternative definitions === [[File:Justified_True_Belief_model_of_knowledge.svg|thumb|300px|An [[Euler diagram]] representing a version of the traditional definition of knowledge that is adapted to the Gettier problem. This problem gives us reason to think that not all justified true beliefs constitute knowledge.]] The justified-true-belief account of knowledge came under severe criticism in the second half of the 20th century, when [[Edmund Gettier]] proposed various counterexamples.<ref name="IEP Gettier"/> In a famous example of what came to be known as a Gettier case, a person is driving on a country road lined with multiple [[Potemkin village|barn façades]], only one of which is real barn, but it is not possible to tell the difference between them from the road. The person then stops by a fortuitous coincidence in front of the only real barn and forms the belief that it is a barn. The idea behind this thought experiment is that this is not knowledge even though the belief is both justified and true. The reason is that it is just a lucky accident since the person cannot tell the difference: They would have formed exactly the same justified belief if they had stopped at another site, in which case the belief would have been false.<ref name="Rodriguez2018"/><ref name="Goldman1976"/><ref name="IEP defeaters-in-epistemology #sh2b"/> Various additional examples were proposed along similar lines. Most of them involve a justified true belief that apparently fails to amount to knowledge because the belief's justification is in some sense not relevant to its truth.<ref name="Klein1998"/><ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Zagzebski1999"/> These counterexamples have provoked very diverse responses. Some theorists think that one only needs to modify one's conception of justification to avoid them. But the more common approach is to search for an additional criterion.<ref name="IchikawaSteup2018"/><ref name="DuránFormanek2018"/> On this view, all cases of knowledge involve a justified true belief but some justified true beliefs do not amount to knowledge since they lack this additional feature. There are diverse suggestions for this fourth criterion. Some epistemologists require that no false belief is involved in the justification or that no [[defeater]] of the belief is present.<ref name="IEP defeaters-in-epistemology #sh2b"/><ref name="Lehrer2015"/> A different approach is to require that the belief tracks truth, that is, that the person would not have the belief if it was false.<ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Zagzebski1999"/> Some even require that the justification has to be infallible, that is, that it necessitates the belief's truth.<ref name="IEP Knowledge"/><ref name="Kraft2012"/> A quite different approach is to affirm that the justified-true-belief account of knowledge is deeply flawed and to seek a complete reconceptualization of knowledge. These reconceptualizations often do not require justification at all.<ref name="IchikawaSteup2018"/> One such approach is to require that the true belief was produced by a reliable process. Naturalized epistemologists often hold that the believed fact has to cause the belief.<ref name="Swain1998"/><ref name="IEP int-ext"/><ref name="Klein1998"/> [[Virtue epistemology|Virtue theorists]] are also interested in how the belief is produced. For them, the belief must be a manifestation of a cognitive virtue.<ref name="IEP Virtue Epistemology" /><ref name="TurriAlfanoGreco2021"/><ref name="SEP Epistemology"/> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page