Immanuel Kant Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ==Philosophy== [[File:Immanuel Kant by Emanuel Bardou, view 2, Berlin, 1798, marble - Bode-Museum - DSC02884.JPG|thumb|200px|Bust of Immanuel Kant by [[Emanuel Bardou]], 1798]] Like many of his contemporaries, Kant was greatly impressed with the scientific advances made by [[Isaac Newton|Newton]] and others. This new evidence of the power of human reason, however, called into question for many the traditional authority of politics and religion. In particular, the modern mechanistic view of the world called into question the very possibility of morality; for, if there is no agency, there cannot be any responsibility.<ref>Kant ''CPuR'' Bxxviii–Bxxx</ref>{{sfn|di Giovanni|2005}} The aim of Kant's critical project is to secure human autonomy, the basis of religion and morality, from this threat of mechanism—and to do so in a way that preserves the advances of modern science.{{sfn|Rohlf|2020|loc = §2.1}} In the ''Critique of Pure Reason'', Kant summarizes his philosophical concerns in the following three questions: # What can I know? # What should I do? # What may I hope?<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' A804–05/B833</ref> ''[[The Critique of Pure Reason]]'' focuses upon the first question and opens a conceptual space for an answer to the second question. It argues that even though we cannot, strictly ''know'' that we are free, we can—and for practical purposes, must—''think'' of ourselves as free. In Kant's own words, "I had to deny '''knowledge''' in order to make room for '''faith'''."<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' Bxxx</ref> Our rational faith in morality is further developed in ''[[The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals]]'' and ''[[The Critique of Practical Reason]]''.{{sfn|Guyer|2014|pp=7–8}}{{sfn|Jankowiak|2023}} ''[[The Critique of Judgment|The Critique of the Power of Judgment]]'' argues we may ''rationally'' hope for the harmonious unity of the theoretical and practical domains treated in the first two ''Critiques'' on the basis, not only of its conceptual possibility, but also on the basis of our affective experience of natural beauty and, more generally, the organization of the natural world.{{sfn|Guyer|2014|pp=6–8}} In ''[[Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason|Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason]]'', Kant endeavors to complete his answer to this third question.<ref>di Giovanni, George. (1996) "Translator's Introduction", In ''Religion and Rational Theology''. Cambridge University Press. p.49, citing Kant in correspondence with Stäudlin.</ref> These works all place the active, rational human [[subject (philosophy)|subject]] at the center of the cognitive and moral worlds. In brief, Kant argues that the [[mind]] itself necessarily makes a constitutive contribution to [[knowledge]], that this contribution is transcendental rather than psychological, and that to act autonomously is to act according to rational moral principles.{{sfn|Rohlf|2020}} ===Kant's critical project=== {{See also|Critique of Pure Reason}} [[File:Kant017.jpg|thumb|Immanuel Kant by [[Carle Vernet]] (1758–1836)]] Kant's 1781 (revised 1787) book the ''Critique of Pure Reason'' has often been cited as the most significant volume of metaphysics and [[epistemology]] in modern philosophy.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/ |title=Immanuel Kant (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) |access-date=29 May 2019 |archive-date=14 November 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191114014720/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant/ |url-status=live }}</ref> In the first ''Critique'', and later on in other works as well, Kant frames the "general" and "real problem of pure reason" in terms of the following question: "'''How are synthetic judgments ''a priori'' possible'''?"<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' B135</ref>{{sfn|Guyer|2014|p=51}} To parse this claim, it is necessary to define some terms. First, Kant makes a distinction in terms of the source of the ''content'' of knowledge: # '''Cognitions ''a priori''''': "cognition independent of all experience and even of all the impressions of the senses". # '''Cognitions ''a posteriori''''': cognitions that have their sources in experience{{mdash}}that is, which are '''empirical'''.<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' B1–3</ref> Second, he makes a distinction in terms of the ''form'' of knowledge: # '''Analytic proposition''': a proposition whose predicate concept is contained in its subject concept; e.g., "All bachelors are unmarried", or "All bodies take up space". These can also be called "'''judgments of clarification'''". # '''Synthetic proposition''': a proposition whose predicate concept is not contained in its subject concept; e.g., "All bachelors are alone", "All swans are white," or "All bodies have weight". These can also be called "'''judgments of amplification'''".<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' A6–8/B10–12</ref> An analytic proposition is true by nature of strictly conceptual relations. All analytic propositions are ''a priori'' (it is analytically true that no analytic proposition could be ''a posteriori''). By contrast, a synthetic proposition is one the content of which includes something new. The truth or falsehood of a synthetic statement depends upon something more than what is contained in its concepts. The most obvious form of synthetic proposition is a simple empirical observation.{{sfn|Guyer|2014|pp=52–54}} Philosophers such as [[David Hume]] believed that these were the only possible kinds of human reason and investigation, which he called "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact".<ref>Hume, David. ''An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding''. Section 4; Part 1.</ref> Establishing the synthetic ''a priori'' as a third mode of knowledge would allow Kant to push back against Hume's skepticism about such matters as causation and metaphysical knowledge more generally. This is because, unlike ''a posteriori'' cognition, ''a priori'' cognition has "true or strict...'''universality'''" and includes a claim of "'''necessity'''".<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' B3–4</ref>{{sfn|Guyer|2014|pp=52–54}} Kant himself regards it as uncontroversial that we do have synthetic ''a priori'' knowledge{{mdash}}most obviously, that of mathematics. That 7 + 5 = 12, he claims, is a result not contained in the concepts of seven, five, and the addition operation.<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' B14–17</ref> Yet, although he considers the possibility of such knowledge to be obvious, Kant nevertheless assumes the burden of providing a philosophical proof that we have ''a priori'' knowledge in mathematics, the natural sciences, and metaphysics. It is the twofold aim of the ''Critique'' both ''to prove'' and ''to explain'' the possibility of this knowledge.{{sfn|Guyer|2014|p=55}} "There are", Kant says, "two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely '''sensibility''' and '''understanding''', through the first of which objects are ''given'' to us, but through the second of which they are ''thought''."<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' A15/B29, emphases added</ref> Kant's term for the object of sensibility is '''intuition''', and his term for the object of the understanding is '''concept'''. In general terms, the former is a non-discursive representation of a ''particular'' object, and the latter is a discursive (or mediate) representation of a ''general type'' of object.{{sfn|Guyer|2014|pp=32, 61}} The conditions of possible experience require both intuitions and concepts, that is, the affection of the receptive sensibility and the actively synthesizing power of the understanding.{{sfn|Rohlf|2020|loc = §2.12}}{{efn|More technically, Kant puts his general point that all genuine knowledge requires both sensory input and intellectual organization by saying that all knowledge requires both "intuitions" and "concepts" (e.g., A 50 / B 74). Intuitions and concepts are two different species of the genus "representation" (''Vorstellung''), Kant's most general term for any cognitive state (see A 320 / B 376–7). At the outset of the "Transcendental Aesthetic", Kant states that an "intuition" is our most direct or "immediate" kind of representation of objects, in contrast to a "concept" which always represents an object "through a detour (''indirecte'')"{{mdash}}that is, merely by some "mark" or property that the object has (A 19 / B 33). In his logic textbook, Kant defines an intuition as a "''singular'' representation"{{mdash}}that is, one that represents a particular object{{mdash}}while a concept is always a "''universal'' (''repraesentation per notas communes'')", which represents properties common to many objects (''Logic'', §1, 9:91).{{sfn|Guyer|2014|pp=60–61}}}} Thus the statement: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' A51/B75</ref> Kant's basic strategy in the first half of his book will be to argue that some intuitions and concepts are '''pure'''{{mdash}}that is, are contributed entirely by the mind, independent of anything empirical. Knowledge generated on this basis, under certain conditions, can be synthetic ''a priori''. This insight is known as Kant's "Copernican revolution", because, just as Copernicus advanced astronomy by way of a radical shift in perspective, so Kant here claims do the same for metaphysics.<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' Bxvi–xviii</ref>{{sfn|Rohlf|2020|loc= §2.2}} The second half of the ''Critique'' is the explicitly ''critical'' part. In this "transcendental dialectic", Kant argues that many of the claims of traditional rationalist metaphysics violate the criteria he claims to establish in the first, "constructive" part of his book.{{sfn|Jankowiak|2023|loc = 2(g)}}{{sfn|Guyer|2014|loc = ch. 4}} As Kant observes, "human reason, without being moved by the mere vanity of knowing it all, inexorably pushes on, driven by its own need to such questions that cannot be answered by any experiential use of reason".<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' B21</ref> It is the project of "the critique of pure reason" to establish the limits as to just how far reason may legitimately so proceed.<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' Axi–xii</ref> === The doctrine of transcendental idealism === {{See also | Transcendental idealism}} The section of the ''Critique'' entitled "The transcendental aesthetic" introduces Kant's famous metaphysics of [[transcendental idealism]]. Something is "transcendental" if it is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience, and "idealism" denotes some form of mind-dependence that must be further specified. (The correct interpretation of Kant's own specification remains controversial.){{sfn|Jankowiak|2023|loc= §2(d)}} The metaphysical thesis, then, states that human beings only experience and know phenomenal appearances, not independent things-in-themselves, because space and time are nothing but the subjective forms of intuition that we ourselves contribute to experience.{{sfn|Rohlf|2020|loc = §3}}<ref>Kant ''CPuR'' A43/B59–60, A369</ref> Nevertheless, although Kant says that space and time are "transcendentally ideal"—the ''pure forms'' of human sensibility, rather than part of nature or reality as it exists in-itself—he also claims that they are "empirically real", by which he means "that 'everything that can come before us externally as an object' is in both space and time, and that our internal intuitions of ourselves are in time".<ref>Kant ''CPuR'' A28/B44, A34–35/B51–51</ref>{{sfn|Rohlf|2020|loc = §3}} However we may interpret Kant's doctrine, he clearly wishes to distinguish his position from the [[subjective idealism]] of [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]].{{sfn|Stang|2022|loc = §2.3}} [[Paul Guyer]], although critical of many of Kant's arguments in this section, nevertheless writes of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" that it "not only lays the first stone in Kant's constructive theory of knowledge; it also lays the foundation for both his critique and his reconstruction of traditional metaphysics. It argues that all genuine knowledge requires a sensory component, and thus that metaphysical claims that transcend the possibility of sensory confirmation can never amount to knowledge."{{sfn|Guyer|2014|p=60}} ====Interpretive disagreements==== One interpretation, known as the "two-world" interpretation, regards Kant's position as a statement of epistemological limitation, that we are not able to transcend the bounds of our own mind, meaning that we cannot access the "[[thing-in-itself]]". On this particular view, the thing-in-itself is not numerically identical the phenomenal empirical object. However, Kant also speaks of the thing in itself or ''transcendent object'' as a product of the (human) understanding as it attempts to conceive of objects in abstraction from the conditions of sensibility. Following this line of thought, some interpreters have argued that the thing in itself does not represent a separate ontological domain, but simply a way of considering objects by means of the understanding alone; this is known as the "two-aspect" view.{{sfn|Rohlf|2020|loc = §§3.1–3.2}}{{sfn|Stang|2022|loc = §§4–5}} On this alternative view, the same objects which we attribute empirical properties like color, size, and shape are also, as considered as they are in themselves, the things-in-themselves otherwise inaccessible to human knowledge.{{citation_needed|date=January 2024}} ===Kant's theory of judgment=== {{See also|Category (Kant)}} [[File:Immanuelkant.JPG|thumb|Kant statue in the School of Philosophy and Human Sciences (FAFICH) in the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), [[Belo Horizonte]], Brazil]] Following the "Transcendental Analytic" is the "Transcendental Logic". Whereas the former was concerned with the contributions of the sensibility, the latter is concerned, first, with the contributions of the understanding ("Transcendental Analytic") and, second, with the faculty of ''reason'' as the source of both metaphysical errors and genuine regulatory principles ("Transcendental Dialectic"). The "Transcendental Analytic" is further divided into two sections. The first, "Analytic of Concepts", is concerned with establishing the universality and necessity of the ''pure'' concepts of the understanding (i.e., the categories). This section contains Kant's famous "transcendental deduction". The second, "Analytic of Principles", is concerned with the application of those pure concepts in ''empirical'' judgments. This second section is longer than the first and is further divided into many sub-sections.{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|pp=4–13}} ====Transcendental deduction of the categories of the understanding==== The "Analytic of Concepts" argues for the universal and necessary validity of the pure concepts of the understanding, or the categories, for instance, the concepts of substance and causation. These twelve basic categories define what it is to be a ''thing in general''{{mdash}}that is, they articulate the necessary conditions according to which something is a possible object of experience. These, in conjunction with the ''a priori'' forms of intuition, are the basis of all synthetic ''a priori'' cognition. According to [[Paul Guyer|Guyer]] and [[Allen W. Wood|Wood]], "Kant's idea is that just as there are certain essential features of all judgments, so there must be certain corresponding ways in which we form the concepts of objects so that judgments may be about objects."{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|p=8}} Kant provides two central lines of argumentation in support of his claims about the categories. The first, known as the "metaphysical deduction", proceeds analytically from a table of the Aristotelian logical functions of judgment. As Kant was aware, however, this assumes precisely what the skeptic rejects, namely, the existence of synthetic ''a priori'' cognition. For this reason, Kant also supplies a synthetic argument that does not depend upon the assumption in dispute.{{sfn|Guyer|2014|pp=89–90}} This argument, provided under the heading "Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding", is widely considered to be both the most important and the most difficult of Kant's arguments in the ''Critique''. Kant himself said that it is the one that cost him the most labor.<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' Axi</ref> Frustrated by its confused reception in the first edition of his book, he rewrote it entirely for the second edition.{{sfn|Jankowiak|2023|loc= §2(e)}}{{sfn|Rohlf|2020|loc = §4}} The "Transcendental Deduction" gives Kant's argument that these pure concepts apply universally and necessarily to the objects that are given in experience. According to Guyer and Wood, "He centers his argument on the premise that our experience can be ascribed to a single identical subject, via what he calls the 'transcendental unity of apperception,' only if the elements of experience given in intuition are synthetically combined so as to present us with objects that are thought through the categories."{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|p=9}} Kant's principle of apperception is that "The '''I think''' must '''be able''' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me."<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' B131-32</ref> The ''necessary'' possibility of the self-ascription of the representations of self-consciousness, identical to itself through time, is an ''a priori'' conceptual truth that cannot be based on experience.{{sfn|Rohlf|2020|loc = §4.1}} This, however, is only a bare sketch of one of the arguments that Kant presents. ====Principles of pure understanding==== Kant's deduction of the categories in the "Analytic of Concepts", if successful, demonstrates its claims about the categories only in an abstract way. The task of the "Analytic of Principles" is to show both ''that'' they must universally apply to objects given in actual experience (i.e., manifolds of intuition) and ''how'' it is they do so.{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|pp=9–10}} In the first book<!--????--> of this section<!--????--> on the "[[Schema (Kant)|schematism]]", Kant connects each of the purely logical categories of the understanding to the temporality of intuition to show that, although non-empirical, they do have purchase upon the objects of experience. The second book continues this line of argument in four chapters, each associated with one of the category groupings. In some cases, it adds a connection to the spatial dimension of intuition to the categories it analyzes.{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|pp=10–11}} The fourth chapter of this section, "The Analogies of Experience", marks a shift from "mathematical" to "dynamical" principles, that is, to those that deal with relations among objects. Some commentators consider this the most significant section of the ''Critique''.{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|p=11}} The analogies are three in number: # ''Principle of persistence of substance'': Kant is here concerned with the general conditions of determining time-relations among the objects of experience. He argues that the unity of time implies that "all change must consist in the alteration of states in an underlying substance, whose existence and quantity must be unchangeable or conserved."<ref>see Kant, ''CPuR'' A182–26/B224–36</ref> # ''Principle of temporal succession according to the law of causality'': Here Kant argues that "we can make determinate judgments about the objective succession of events, as contrasted to merely subjective successions of representations, only if every objective alteration follows a necessary rule of succession, or a causal law." This is Kant's most direct rejoinder to [[Humeanism#Causality_and_necessity|Hume's skepticism about causality]].<ref>see Kant, ''CPuR'' A186–211/B232–56</ref> # ''Principle of simultaneity according to the law of reciprocity or community'': The final analogy argues that "determinate judgments that objects (or states of substance) in different regions of space exists simultaneously are possible only if such objects stand in mutual causal relation of community or reciprocal interaction." (This is Kant's rejoinder to [[Leibniz]]'s thesis in the ''[[Monadology]]''.)<ref>see Kant, ''CPuR'' A211-15/B256-62</ref>{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|pp=11–12}} The fourth section of this chapter, which is not an analogy, deals with the empirical use of the modal categories. That was the end of the chapter in the A edition of the ''Critique''. The B edition, however, includes one more short section, "The Refutation of Idealism". In this section, by analysis of the concept of self-consciousness, Kant argues that his transcendental idealism is a "critical" or "formal" idealism that does not deny the existence of reality apart from our subjective representations.{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|p=12}} The final chapter of "The Analytic of Principles" distinguishes ''phenomena'', of which we have can have genuine knowledge, from ''noumena'', a term which refers to objects of pure thought that we cannot know, but to which we may still refer "in a negative sense".{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|pp=12–13}} An Appendix to the section further develops Kant's criticism of Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalism by arguing that its "dogmatic" metaphysics confuses the "mere features of concepts through which we think things...[with] features of the objects themselves". Against this, Kant reasserts his own insistence upon the necessity of a sensible component in all genuine knowledge.{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|p=13}} ===Critique of metaphysics=== The second of the two Divisions of "The Transcendental Logic", "The Transcendental Dialectic", contains the "negative" portion of Kant's ''Critique'', which builds upon the "positive" arguments of the preceding "Transcendental Analytic" to expose the limits of metaphysical speculation. In particular, it is concerned to demonstrate as spurious the efforts of reason to arrive at knowledge independent of sensibility. This endeavor, Kant argues, is doomed to failure, which he claims to demonstrate by showing that reason, unbounded by sense, is always capable of generating opposing or otherwise incompatible conclusions. Like "the light dove, in free flight cutting through the air, the resistance of which it feels", reason "could get the idea that it could do even better in airless space".<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' A5/B8</ref> Against this, Kant claims that, absent epistemic friction, there can be no knowledge. Nevertheless, Kant's critique is not entirely destructive. He presents the speculative excesses of traditional metaphysics as inherent in our very capacity of reason. Moreover, he argues that its products are not without some (carefully qualified) ''regulative'' value. ====On the concepts of pure reason==== Kant calls the basic concepts of metaphysics "ideas". They are different from the concepts of understanding in that they are not limited by the critical stricture limiting knowledge to the conditions of possible experience and its objects. "Transcendental illusion" is Kant's term for the tendency of reason to produce such ideas.{{sfn|Jankowiak|2023|loc= §2(g)}} Although reason has a "logical use" of simply drawing inferences from principles, in "The Transcendental Dialectic", Kant is concerned with its purportedly "real use" to arrive at conclusions by way of unchecked regressive syllogistic ratiocination.{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|p=15}} The three categories of ''relation'', pursued without regard to the limits of possible experience, yield the three central ideas of traditional metaphysics: # ''The soul'': the concept of substance as the ultimate subject; # ''The world in its entirety'': the concept of causation as a completed series; and # ''God'': the concept of community as the common ground of all possibilities.{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|p=15}} Although Kant denies that these ideas can be objects of genuine cognition, he argues that they are the result of reason's inherent drive to unify cognition into a systematic whole.{{sfn|Jankowiak|2023|loc= §2(g)}} Leibnizian-Wolffian metaphysics was divided into four parts: ontology, psychology, cosmology, and theology. Kant replaces the first with the positive results of the first part of the ''Critique''. He proposes to replace the following three with his later doctrines of anthropology, the metaphysical foundations of natural science, and the critical postulation of human freedom and morality.{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|p=14}} ====The dialectical inferences of pure reason==== In the second of the two Books of "The Transcendental Dialectic", Kant undertakes to demonstrate the contradictory nature of unbounded reason. He does this by developing contradictions in each of the three metaphysical disciplines that he contends are, in fact, pseudo-sciences. This section of the ''Critique'' is long and Kant's arguments are extremely detailed. In this context, it not possible to do much more than enumerate the topics of discussion. The first chapter addresses what Kant terms the ''paralogisms''{{mdash}}i.e., false inferences{{mdash}}that pure reason makes in the metaphysical discipline of rational psychology. He argues that one cannot take the mere thought of "I" in the proposition "I think" as the proper cognition of "I" as an object. In this way, he claims to debunk various metaphysical theses about the substantiality, unity, and self-identity of the soul.{{sfn|Jankowiak|2023|loc= §2(g.i)}} The second chapter, which is the longest, takes up the topic Kant calls the ''[[Antinomy|antinomies]]'' of pure reason{{mdash}}that is, the contradictions of reason with itself{{mdash}}in the metaphysical discipline of rational cosmology. (Originally, Kant had thought that all transcendental illusion could be analyzed in antinomic terms.{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|p=16}}) He presents four cases in which he claims reason is able to prove opposing theses with equal plausibility: # That "reason seems to be able to prove that the universe is both finite and infinite in space and time"; # that "reason seems to be able to prove that matter both is and is not infinitely divisible into ever smaller parts"; # that "reason seems to be able to prove that free will cannot be a causally efficacious part of the world (because all of nature is deterministic) and yet that it must be such a cause"; and, # that "reason seems to be able to prove that there is and there is not a necessary being (which some would identify with God)".{{sfn|Jankowiak|2023|loc= §2(g.ii)}}{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|pp=16–17}} Kant further argues in each case that his doctrine of transcendental idealism is able to resolve the antinomy.{{sfn|Jankowiak|2023|loc= §2(g.ii)}} The third chapter examines fallacious arguments about God in rational theology under the heading of the "Ideal of Pure Reason". (Whereas an ''idea'' is a pure concept generated by reason, an ''ideal'' is the concept of an idea as an ''individual thing''.{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|p=17}}) Here Kant addresses and claims to refute three traditional arguments for the existence of God: the [[ontological argument]], the [[cosmological argument]], and the [[argument from design|physio-theological argument]] (i.e., the argument from design).{{sfn|Jankowiak|2023|loc= §2(g.iii)}} The results of the transcendental dialectic so far appear to be entirely negative. In an Appendix to this section, however, Kant rejects such a conclusion. The ideas of pure reason, he argues, have an important ''regulatory'' function in directing and organizing our theoretical and practical inquiry. Kant's later works elaborate upon this function at length and in detail.{{sfn|Guyer|Wood|1998|p=18}} ===Moral thought=== {{Main|Kantian ethics}} Kant developed his ethics, or moral philosophy, in three works: ''[[Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals]]'' (1785), ''[[Critique of Practical Reason]]'' (1788), and ''[[Metaphysics of Morals]]'' (1797). With regard to [[morality]], Kant argued that the source of the [[Goodness and value theory|good]] lies not in anything outside the [[human]] subject, either in [[nature]] or given by [[God]], but rather is only the good will itself. A good will is one that acts from duty in accordance with the universal moral law that the autonomous human being freely gives itself. This law obliges one to treat humanity{{mdash}}understood as rational agency, and represented through oneself as well as others{{mdash}}as an [[end in itself]] rather than (merely) as [[means (philosophy)|means]] to other ends the individual might hold. Kant is known for his theory that all [[moral obligation]] is grounded in what he calls the "[[categorical imperative]]", which is derived from the concept of [[duty]]. He argues that the moral law is a principle of [[reason]] itself, not based on contingent facts about the world, such as what would make us happy; to act on the moral law has no other motive than "worthiness to be happy".<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' A806/B834</ref> ====The idea of freedom==== In the ''Critique of Pure Reason'', Kant distinguishes between the transcendental idea of freedom, which as a psychological concept is "mainly empirical" and refers to "whether a faculty of beginning a series of successive things or states from itself is to be assumed",<ref name="Kant, CPuR A448/B467">Kant, ''CPuR'' A448/B467</ref> and the practical concept of freedom as the independence of our will from the "coercion" or "necessitation through sensuous impulses". Kant finds it a source of difficulty that the practical idea of freedom is founded on the transcendental idea of freedom,<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' A533–34/B561–62</ref> but for the sake of practical interests uses the practical meaning, taking "no account of ... its transcendental meaning", which he feels was properly "disposed of" in the Third Antinomy, and as an element in the question of the freedom of the will is for philosophy "a real stumbling block" that has embarrassed speculative reason.<ref name="Kant, CPuR A448/B467"/> Kant calls ''practical'' "everything that is possible through freedom"; he calls the pure practical laws that are never given through sensuous conditions, but are held analogously with the universal law of causality, moral laws. Reason can give us only the "pragmatic laws of free action through the senses", but pure practical laws given by reason ''a priori''<ref name="Kant, CPuR A448/B467"/> dictate "what is to be done".<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' A800–02/B 828–30</ref> Kant's categories of freedom function primarily as conditions for the possibility for actions (i) to be free, (ii) to be understood as free, and (iii) to be morally evaluated. For Kant, although actions as theoretical objects are constituted by means of the theoretical categories, actions as practical objects (objects of practical use of reason, and which can be good or bad) are constituted by means of the categories of freedom. Only in this way can actions, as phenomena, be a consequence of freedom, and be understood and evaluated as such.<ref>[[Susanne Bobzien]], 'Die Kategorien der Freiheit bei Kant', in ''Kant: Analysen, Probleme, Kritik'' Vol. 1, 1988, 193–220.</ref> ====The categorical imperative==== Kant makes a distinction between categorical and [[hypothetical imperative]]s. A ''hypothetical'' imperative is one that we must obey to satisfy contingent desires. A ''categorical'' imperative binds us regardless of our desires: for example, everyone has a duty to respect others as individual ends in themselves, regardless of circumstances, even though it is sometimes in our narrowly selfish interest to not do so. These imperatives are morally binding because of the categorical form of their maxims, rather than contingent facts about an agent.<ref>Driver 2007, p. 83.</ref> Unlike hypothetical imperatives, which bind us insofar as we are part of a group or society which we owe duties to, we cannot opt out of the categorical imperative, because we cannot opt out of being [[rational agent]]s. We owe a duty to rationality by virtue of being rational agents; therefore, rational moral principles apply to all rational agents at all times.{{sfn|Johnson|2008}} Stated in other terms, with all forms of instrumental rationality excluded from morality, "the moral law itself, Kant holds, can only be the form of lawfulness itself, because nothing else is left once all content has been rejected".{{sfn|Schneewind|2010|p=261}} Kant provides three formulations for the categorical imperative. He claims that these are necessarily equivalent, as all being expressions of the pure universality of the moral law as such.<ref>Kant, ''G''. 4:420–421, 436.</ref> Many scholars, however, are not convinced.<ref>Wood, Allen. (2017) ''Formulas of the Moral Law''. Cambridge University Press, pp. 74–78</ref> The formulas are as follows: * ''Formula of Universal Law'': **"Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you at the same time can will that it become a universal law";<ref name="Kant, G 4:421">Kant, ''G'' 4:421</ref> alternatively, ***''Formula of the Law of Nature'': "So act, as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature."<ref name="Kant, G 4:421"/> * ''Formula of Humanity as End in Itself'': **"So act that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means".<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:429</ref> * ''Formula of Autonomy'': **"the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law",<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:431; cf. 4:432</ref> or "Not to choose otherwise than so that the maxims of one's choice are at the same time comprehended with it in the same volition as universal law";<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:440; cf. 4:432, 434, 438</ref> alternatively, ***''Formula of the Realm of Ends'': "Act in accordance with maxims of a universally legislative member for a merely possible realm of ends."<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:439; cf. 4:433, 437–439</ref><ref>Wood, Allen. (2017) ''Formulas of the Moral Law''. Cambridge University Press, p.6</ref> Kant defines ''maxim'' as a "subjective principle of volition", which is distinguished from an "objective principle or 'practical law.{{'"}} While "the latter is valid for every rational being and is a 'principle according to which they ought to act[,]' a maxim 'contains the practical rule which reason determines in accordance with the conditions of the subject (often their ignorance or inclinations) and is thus the principle according to which the subject does act.{{'"}}<ref>Caygill, Howard. (1995) ''A Kant Dictionary''. Blackwell Publishing, p. 289, citing ''GMM''.</ref> Maxims fail to qualify as practical laws if they produce a contradiction in conception or a contradiction in the will when universalized. A contradiction in conception happens when, if a maxim were to be universalized, it ceases to make sense, because the "maxim would necessarily destroy itself as soon as it was made a universal law".<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:403.</ref> For example, if the maxim 'It is permissible to break promises' was universalized, no one would trust any promises made, so the idea of a promise would become meaningless; the maxim would be [[Self-refuting idea|self-contradictory]] because, when it is universalized, promises cease to be meaningful. The maxim is not moral because it is logically impossible to universalize{{mdash}}that is, we could not conceive of a world where this maxim was universalized.<ref>Driver 2007, p. 88.</ref> A maxim can also be immoral if it creates a contradiction in the will when universalized. This does not mean a logical contradiction, but that universalizing the maxim leads to a state of affairs that no ''rational'' being would desire. ===="The Doctrine of Virtue"==== As Kant explains in the 1785 ''[[Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals]]'' (and as its title directly indicates) that text is "nothing more than the search for and establishment of the ''supreme principle of morality''".<ref>Kant, ''GMM'' 4:392.</ref> His promised ''Metaphysics of Morals'', however, was much delayed and did not appear until its two parts, "The Doctrine of Right" and "The Doctrine of Virtue", were published separately in 1797 and 1798.<ref>Gregor, Mary J. (1996) "Translator's note on the text of The metaphysics of morals". In ''Practical Philosophy''. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, p. 355.</ref> The first deals with political philosophy, the second with ethics. "The Doctrine of Virtue" provides "a very different account of ordinary moral reasoning" than the one suggested by the ''Groundwork''.{{sfn|Wood|2006|p=68}} It is concerned with ''duties of virtue'' or "ends that are at the same time duties".<ref>Kant, ''MM''. 6:382–391.</ref> It is here, in the domain of ethics, that the greatest innovation by ''The Metaphysics of Morals'' is to be found. According to Kant's account, "ordinary moral reasoning is fundamentally teleological{{mdash}}it is reasoning about what ends we are constrained by morality to pursue, and the priorities among these ends we are required to observe".{{sfn|Wood|2006|p=69}} More specifically, <blockquote>There are two sorts of ends that it is our duty to have: our own perfection and the happiness of others (''MS'' 6:385). "Perfection" includes both our natural perfection (the development of our talents, skills, and capacities of understanding) and moral perfection (our virtuous disposition) (''MS'' 6:387). A person's "happiness" is the greatest rational whole of the ends the person set for the sake of her<!--Kant, Wood????--> own satisfaction (''MS'' 6:387–388).{{sfn|Wood|2006|p=70}}</blockquote> Kant's elaboration of this teleological doctrine offers up a moral theory very different from the one typically attributed to him on the basis of his foundational works alone. ===Political philosophy=== {{Main|Political philosophy of Immanuel Kant}} {{Liberalism sidebar}} In ''Towards Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Project'', Kant listed several conditions that he thought necessary for ending wars and creating a lasting peace. They included a world of constitutional republics.<ref>Kant, ''PP'' 8:349–353</ref> His [[classical republicanism|classical republican]] theory was extended in the ''Doctrine of Right'', the first part of the ''[[Metaphysics of Morals]]'' (1797).<ref>Manfred Riedel, ''Between Tradition and Revolution: The Hegelian Transformation of Political Philosophy'', Cambridge 1984</ref> Kant believed that [[Universal history (genre)|universal history]] leads to the ultimate world of republican states at peace, but his theory was not pragmatic. The process was described in ''Perpetual Peace'' as natural rather than rational: {{blockquote|What affords this ''guarantee'' (surety) is nothing less than the great artist ''nature'' (''natura daedala rerum'') from whose mechanical course purposiveness shines forth visibly, letting concord arise by means of the discord between human beings even against their will; and for this reason nature, regarded as necessitation by a cause the laws of whose operation are unknown to us, is called ''fate'', but if we consider its purposiveness in the course of the world as the profound wisdom of a higher cause directed to the objective final end of the human race and predetermining this course of the world, it is called ''providence''.<ref>Kant, ''PP'' 8:360–362</ref>}} Kant's political thought can be summarized as republican government and international organization: "In more characteristically Kantian terms, it is doctrine of the state based upon the law (''[[Rechtsstaat]]'') and of eternal peace. Indeed, in each of these formulations, both terms express the same idea: that of legal constitution or of 'peace through law.{{'"}}<ref>Hassner, Pierre. "Immanuel Kant", in ''History of Political Philosophy'', edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, The University of Chicago Press, 1987, pp. 581–582</ref> "Kant's political philosophy, being essentially a legal doctrine, rejects by definition the opposition between moral education and the play of passions as alternate foundations for social life. The state is defined as the union of men under law. The state rightly so called is constituted by laws which are necessary a priori because they flow from the very concept of law. A regime can be judged by no other criteria nor be assigned any other functions, than those proper to the lawful order as such."<ref>Hassner, Pierre. "Immanuel Kant", in ''History of Political Philosophy'', edited by Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 603</ref> He opposed "democracy", which at his time meant [[direct democracy]], believing that majority rule posed a threat to individual liberty. He stated, "''democracy'' in the strict sense of the word is necessarily a ''despotism'' because it establishes an executive power in which all decide for and, if need be, against one (who thus does not agree), so that all, who are nevertheless not all, decide; and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom."<ref>Kant, ''PP'' 8:352</ref> As with most writers at the time, he distinguished three forms of government{{mdash}}namely, democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy{{mdash}}with [[mixed government]] as the most ideal form of it. He believed in [[republic]]an ideals and forms of governance, and [[rule of law]] brought on by them. Although Kant published this as a "popular piece", [[Mary J. Gregor]] points out that two years later, in ''The Metaphysics of Morals'', Kant claims to demonstrate ''systematically'' that "establishing universal and lasting peace constitutes not merely a part of the doctrine of right, but rather the entire final end of the doctrine of right within the limits of mere reason".<ref>Kant, ''MM'' 6:355</ref><ref>Gregor, Mary J. "Introduction", in ''Practical Philosophy''. Cambridge University Press, p. 313</ref> ''The Doctrine of Right'', published in 1797, contains Kant's most mature and systematic contribution to political philosophy. It addresses duties according to law, which are "concerned only with protecting the external freedom of individuals" and indifferent to incentives. (Although we do have a moral duty "to limit ourselves to actions that are right, that duty is not part of [right] itself".){{sfn|Wood|2006|p=68}} Its basic political idea is that "each person's entitlement to be his or her own master is only consistent with the entitlements of others if public legal institutions are in place".<ref>Ripstein, Arthur. (2009) ''Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy''. Harvard University Press, p. 9.</ref> ===Religious writings=== {{Main|Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason}} Starting in the twentieth century, commentators have tended to see Kant as having a strained relationship with religion, although in the nineteenth century this had not been the prevalent view. [[Karl Leonhard Reinhold]], whose letters helped make Kant famous, wrote: "I believe that I may infer without reservation that the interest of religion, and of Christianity in particular, accords completely with the result of the Critique of Reason."<ref>Karl Leonhard Reinhold, ''Letters on the Kantian Philosophy'' (1786), 3rd Letter</ref> According to [[Johann Schultz]], who wrote one of the first commentaries on Kant: "And does not this system itself cohere most splendidly with the Christian religion? Do not the divinity and beneficence of the latter become all the more evident?"<ref>Johann Schultz, ''Exposition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason'' (1784), 141.</ref> The reason for these views was Kant's moral theology and the widespread belief that his philosophy was the great antithesis to [[Spinozism]], which was widely seen as a form of sophisticated pantheism or even atheism. As Kant's philosophy disregarded the possibility of arguing for God through pure reason alone, for the same reasons it also disregarded the possibility of arguing against God through pure reason alone. Kant articulates his strongest criticisms of the organization and practices of religious organizations to those that encourage what he sees as a religion of counterfeit service to God.<ref>Kant, ''RBMR'' Part IV, First part, First section [6:157–163]</ref> Among the major targets of his criticism are external ritual, superstition, and a hierarchical church order. He sees these as efforts to make oneself pleasing to God in ways other than conscientious adherence to the principle of moral rightness in choosing and acting upon one's maxims. Kant's criticisms on these matters, along with his rejection of certain theoretical proofs for the existence of God that were grounded in pure reason (particularly the [[ontological argument]]) and his philosophical commentary on some Christian doctrines, have resulted in interpretations that see Kant as hostile to religion in general and to Christianity in particular.<ref>E.g., Walsh, W. H., 1967, "Kant, Immanuel: Philosophy of Religion", ''The Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', Volume Four, Paul Edwards (ed.), New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc. & The Free Press, 322.</ref> Other interpreters, nevertheless, consider that Kant was trying to mark off defensible from indefensible Christian belief.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|last1=Pasternack|first1=Lawrence|last2=Rossi|first2=Philip|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/|title=Kant's Philosophy of Religion|encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|edition=Fall 2014|access-date=18 October 2019|archive-date=9 July 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100709212423/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-religion/|url-status=live}}</ref> Regarding Kant's conception of religion, some critics have argued that he was sympathetic to deism.<ref>For example Peter Byrne, who wrote about Kant's relationship with deism. Byrne, Peter (2007), ''Kant on God'', London: Ashgate, p. 159.</ref> Other critics have argued that Kant's moral conception moves from deism to theism (as moral theism), for example, Allen W. Wood<ref>Wood, Allen W. (1970), ''Kant's moral religion'', London and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 16.</ref> and Merold Westphal.<ref>Westphal, Merold (2010), ''The Emerge of Modern Philosophy of Religion'', in Taliaferro, Charles, Draper, Paul and Quinn, Philip (editors), ''A Companion to Philosophy of Religion'', Oxford: Blackwell, p. 135.</ref> As for Kant's book ''[[Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason|Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason]]'', it was emphasized that Kant reduced religiosity to rationality, religion to morality, and Christianity to ethics.<ref>Iţu, Mircia (2004), ''Dumnezeu şi religia în concepţia lui Immanuel Kant din Religia în limitele raţiunii'', in Boboc, Alexandru and Mariş, N.I. (editors), ''Studii de istoria filosofiei universale'', volume 12, Bucharest: Romanian Academy.</ref> However, many interpreters, including Allen W. Wood<ref>Wood, Allen W. (2020), ''Kant and Religion'', Cambridge University Press, p.2.</ref> and Lawrence Pasternack,<ref>See e.g., Lawrence Pasternack, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant on Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (New York, Routledge, 2014), pp. 239–240.</ref> now agree with [[Stephen Palmquist]]'s claim that a better way of reading Kant's ''Religion'' is to see him as raising morality to the status of religion.<ref>Palmquist, Stephen (1992), "Does Kant Reduce Religion to Morality?", ''Kant-Studien'' 83.2, pp. 129–148.</ref> === Aesthetics === {{See also | Kant's teleology}} {{more citations needed section|date=April 2023}} [[File:Immanuel Kant.jpg|thumb|Immanuel Kant]] Kant discusses the subjective nature of aesthetic qualities and experiences in ''[[Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime]]'' (1764). Kant's contribution to [[aesthetics|aesthetic theory]] is developed in the ''[[Critique of Judgment|Critique of the Power of Judgment]]'' (1790), where he investigates the possibility and logical status of "judgments of taste". In the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment", the first major division of the ''Critique of the Power of Judgment'', Kant used the term "aesthetic" in a manner that differs from its modern sense.<ref>Critique of Judgment in "Kant, Immanuel" ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Vol 4. Macmillan, 1973.</ref> In the ''Critique of Pure Reason'', to note essential differences between judgments of taste, moral judgments, and scientific judgments, Kant abandoned the term "aesthetic" as "designating the critique of taste", noting that judgments of taste could never be "directed" by "laws ''a priori''".<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' A22/B36</ref> After [[Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten|A. G. Baumgarten]], who wrote ''Aesthetica'' (1750–58),{{efn|Beardsley, Monroe. "History of Aesthetics". ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Vol. 1, section on "Toward a unified aesthetics", p. 25, Macmillan 1973. Baumgarten coined the term "aesthetics" and expanded, clarified, and unified Wolffian aesthetic theory, but had left the ''Aesthetica'' unfinished (See also: Tonelli, Giorgio. "Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten". ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Vol. 1, Macmillan 1973). In Bernard's translation of the ''Critique of Judgment'' he indicates in the notes that Kant's reference in § 15 in regard to the identification of perfection and beauty is probably a reference to Baumgarten.}} Kant was one of the first philosophers to develop and integrate aesthetic theory into a unified and comprehensive philosophical system, utilizing ideas that played an integral role throughout his philosophy.<ref>German Idealism in "History of Aesthetics" ''Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. Vol 1. Macmillan, 1973.</ref> In the chapter "Analytic of the Beautiful" in the ''Critique of the Power of Judgment'', Kant states that beauty is not a property of an artwork or natural phenomenon, but is instead consciousness of the pleasure that attends the 'free play' of the imagination and the understanding. Even though it appears that we are using reason to decide what is beautiful, the judgment is not a cognitive judgment,{{efn|Kant's general discussions of the distinction between "cognition" and "conscious of" are also given in the ''Critique of Pure Reason'' (notably A320/B376), and section V and the conclusion of section VIII of his Introduction in ''Logic''.}} "and is consequently not logical, but aesthetical".<ref>Kant, ''CPJ'' §1</ref> A pure judgement of taste is subjective since it refers to the emotional response of the subject and is based upon nothing but esteem for an object itself: it is a disinterested pleasure, and we feel that pure judgements of taste (i.e., judgements of beauty), lay claim to universal validity.<ref>Kant, ''CPJ'' §§ 20–22</ref> This universal validity is not derived from a determinate concept of beauty but from ''common sense''.<ref>Kant, ''CPJ'' §40</ref> Kant also believed that a judgement of taste shares characteristics engaged in a moral judgement: both are disinterested, and we hold them to be universal. In the chapter "Analytic of the Sublime" Kant identifies the [[Sublime (philosophy)|sublime]] as an aesthetic quality that, like beauty, is subjective, but unlike beauty refers to an indeterminate relationship between the faculties of the imagination and of reason, and shares the character of moral judgments in the use of reason. The feeling of the sublime, divided into two distinct modes (the mathematical and the dynamical sublime), describes two subjective moments that concern the relationship of the faculty of the imagination to reason. Some commentators<ref>{{cite web |last=Clewis |first=Robert |year=2009 |title=The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom |location=Cambridge |publisher=Cambridge University Press |url=http://www.cambridge.org/us/knowledge/isbn/item2326741/?site_locale=en_US |access-date=8 December 2011 |archive-date=20 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121020224616/http://www.cambridge.org/us/knowledge/isbn/item2326741/?site_locale=en_US |url-status=live }}</ref> argue that Kant's critical philosophy contains a third kind of the sublime, the moral sublime, which is the aesthetic response to the moral law or a representation, and a development of the "noble" sublime in Kant's theory of 1764. The mathematical sublime results from the failure of the imagination to comprehend natural objects that appear boundless and formless, or appear "absolutely great".<ref>Kant, ''CPJ'' §§23–25</ref> This imaginative failure is then recuperated through the pleasure taken in reason's assertion of the concept of infinity. In this move the faculty of reason proves itself superior to our fallible sensible self.<ref>Kant, ''CPJ'' §§25–26</ref> In the dynamical sublime, there is the sense of annihilation of the sensible self as the imagination tries to comprehend a vast might. This power of nature threatens us but through the resistance of reason to such sensible annihilation, the subject feels a pleasure and a sense of the human moral vocation. This appreciation of moral feeling through exposure to the [[sublime (philosophy)|sublime]] helps to develop moral character. Kant developed a theory of [[Humour|humor]]<ref>Kant, ''CPJ'' §54</ref> that has been interpreted as an "incongruity" theory. He illustrated his theory of humor by telling three narrative jokes in the ''Critique of Judgment''. He thought that the physiological impact of humor is akin to that of music.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Jakobidze-Gitman|first=Alexander|title=Kant's Situated Approach to Musicking and Joking|journal=Journal of Interdisciplinary Music Studies|year=2020|volume=10|pages=17–33|doi=10.25364/24.10:2020.2}}</ref> Kant developed a distinction between an object of art as a material value subject to the conventions of society and the transcendental condition of the judgment of taste as a "refined" value in his ''Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim'' (1784). In the Fourth and Fifth Theses of that work he identified all art as the "fruits of unsociableness" due to men's "antagonism in society"<ref>Kant, ''UH'' 8:20–22</ref> and, in the Seventh Thesis, asserted that while such material property is indicative of a civilized state, only the ideal of morality and the universalization of refined value through the improvement of the mind "belongs to culture".<ref>Kant, ''UH'' 8:24–26.</ref> ===Anthropology=== [[File:German 5 DM 1974 D Silver Coin Immanuel Kant.jpg|right|thumb|5 DM 1974 D silver coin commemorating the 250th birthday of Immanuel Kant in [[Königsberg]]]] Kant lectured on [[History of anthropology|anthropology]], the study of human nature, for twenty-three years.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Wilson |first1=Holly |title=Kant's Pragmatic Anthropology |url=https://archive.org/details/kantspragmatican00wils |url-access=limited |date=2006 |publisher=State University of New York Press |location=Albany |isbn=978-0-7914-6849-4 |page=[https://archive.org/details/kantspragmatican00wils/page/n21 7]}}</ref> His ''[[Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View]]'' was published in 1798. Transcripts of Kant's lectures on anthropology were published for the first time in 1997 in German.<ref>Thomas Sturm, ''Kant und die Wissenschaften vom Menschen'' (Paderborn: Mentis Verlag, 2009).</ref> Kant was among the first people of his time to introduce anthropology as an intellectual area of study, long before the field gained popularity, and his texts are considered to have advanced the field. His point of view was to influence the works of later philosophers such as [[Martin Heidegger]] and [[Paul Ricoeur]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Piercey |first1=Robert |last2=Philosophy Documentation Center |date=2011 |title=Kant and the Problem of Hermeneutics: Heidegger and Ricoeur on the Transcendental Schematism |url=http://www.pdcnet.org/oom/service?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=&rft.imuse_id=idstudies_2011_0041_0003_0187_0202&svc_id=info:www.pdcnet.org/collection |journal=Idealistic Studies |volume=41 |issue=3 |pages=187–202 |doi=10.5840/idstudies201141315 |issn=0046-8541}}</ref> Kant was also the first to suggest using a dimensionality approach to human diversity. He analyzed the nature of the [[Hippocrates]]-[[Galen]] [[four temperaments]] and plotted in two dimensions "what belongs to a human being's faculty of desire": "his natural aptitude or natural predisposition" and "his temperament or sensibility".<ref>Kant ''APPV'' 7:285</ref> Cholerics were described as emotional and energetic, phlegmatics as balanced and weak, sanguines as balanced and energetic, and melancholics as emotional and weak. These two dimensions reappeared in all subsequent models of temperament and personality traits. Kant viewed anthropology in two broad categories: (1) the physiological approach, which he referred to as "what nature makes of the human being"; and (2) the pragmatic approach, which explores the things that a human "can and should make of himself".<ref>Kant ''APPV'' 7:119</ref> ====Racism==== [[File:Kant drawing.png|thumb|100px|''Kant Mixing Mustard'', drawn by {{interlanguage link|Carl Friedrich Hagemann|de}}, 1801]] Kant's theory of race and his prejudicial beliefs are among the most contentious areas of recent Kant scholarship.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book |title=Kant and the Concept of Race |publisher=State University of New York Press |year=2013 |isbn=978-1438443614 |editor-last=Mikkelsen |editor-first=Jon M. |location=Albany, New York |pages=12–30 |language=English}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{Cite journal |last=Zorn |first=Daniel-Pascal |title=Kant{{mdash}}a Racist? |url=https://public-history-weekly.degruyter.com/?p=17156 |journal=Public History Weekly |year=2020 |volume=2020 |issue=8 |doi=10.1515/phw-2020-17156 |s2cid=225247836 |issn=2197-6376}}</ref>{{sfn|Kleingeld|2007|pp=573–592}}<!-- <ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kleingeld |first=Pauline |date=October 2007 |title=Kant's Second Thoughts on Race |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/KLEKST |journal=Philosophical Quarterly |volume=57 |issue=229 |pages=573–592 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.498.x}}</ref>--> While few, if any, dispute the overt racism and chauvinism present in his work, a more contested question is the degree to which it degrades or invalidates his other contributions. His most severe critics assert that Kant intentionally manipulated science to support chattel slavery and discrimination.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Eze |first=Emmanuel |chapter=The Color of Reason: the Idea of 'Race' in Kant's Anthropology |date=1997 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/EZETCO |title=Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader |pages=103–140 |editor-last=Eze |editor-first=Emmanuel Chukwudi |publisher=Blackwell |access-date=2023-04-20}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Serequeberhan |first=T. |date=1996 |title=Eurocentrism in Philosophy: the Case of Immanuel Kant |journal=The Philosophical Forum |s2cid=170547963 |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> Others acknowledge that he lived in an era of immature science, with many erroneous beliefs, some racist, all appearing decades before evolution, molecular genetics, and other sciences that today are taken for granted.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Cite web |title=The Philosophy Junkie: Immanuel Kant's Racism and Sexism with Professors Lucy Allais and Helga Varden on Apple Podcasts |url=https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/immanuel-kants-racism-and-sexism-with-professors/id1512137924?i=1000496715962 |access-date=2023-04-20 |website=Apple Podcasts |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Geismann |first=Georg |date=2022-01-01 |title=Why Kant Was Not a 'Racist' |url=https://elibrary.duncker-humblot.com/article/69870/why-kant-was-not-a-racist |journal=Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik/Annual Review of Law and Ethics |volume=30 |issue=1 |pages=263–357 |doi=10.3790/jre.30.1.263 |s2cid=255676303 |issn=0944-4610}}</ref> Kant was one of the most notable Enlightenment thinkers to defend [[racism]]. Philosopher [[Charles W. Mills]] is unequivocal: "Kant is also seen as one of the central figures in the birth of modern 'scientific' racism. Whereas other contributors to early racial thought like Carolus Linnaeus and Johann Friedrich Blumenbach had offered only 'empirical' (scare-quotes necessary!) observation, Kant produced a full-blown ''theory'' of race."{{sfn|Mills|2017|pp=91–112|p=95}} Using the [[four temperaments]] of ancient Greece, Kant proposed a hierarchy of racial categories including white Europeans, black Africans, and red Native Americans.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Kant |first=Immanuel |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/34663347 |title=On the Different Races of Man |work=Race and the Enlightenment: a reader |publisher=Blackwell |year=1997 |isbn=0-631-20136-X |editor-last=Eze |editor-first=Emmanuel Chukwudi |location=Cambridge, Mass. |pages=38–49 |oclc=34663347 |orig-date=1775, 1777}}</ref> Although he was a proponent of [[scientific racism]] for much of his career, Kant's views on race changed significantly in the last decade of his life, and he ultimately rejected racial hierarchies and European [[colonialism]] in ''[[Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch]]'' (1795).{{sfn|Kleingeld|2007|pp=573–592}}{{sfn|Mills|2017|pp=91–112}}<ref name=":2" />{{efn|Kant wrote that "[Whites] contain all the impulses of nature in affects and passions, all talents, all dispositions to culture and civilization and can as readily obey as govern. They are the only ones who always advance to perfection." He describes South Asians as "educated to the highest degree but only in the arts and not in the sciences". He goes on that Hindustanis can never reach the level of abstract concepts and that a "great hindustani man" is one who has "gone far in the art of deception and has much money". He states that the Hindus always stay the way they are and can never advance. About black Africans, Kant wrote that "they can be educated but only as servants, that is they allow themselves to be trained". To Kant, "the Negro can be disciplined and cultivated, but is never genuinely civilized. He falls of his own accord into savagery." Native Americans, Kant opined, "cannot be educated". He calls them unmotivated, lacking affect, passion and love, and describes them as too weak for labor, unfit for any culture, and too [[Four temperaments|phlegmatic]] for diligence. He said that Native Americans are "far below the Negro, who undoubtedly holds the lowest of all remaining levels by which we designate the different races". Kant stated that "Americans and Blacks cannot govern themselves. They thus serve only for slaves."{{sfn|Mills|2017|pp=169–193}}{{sfn|Bowersox|2016}}}} Kant was an opponent of [[miscegenation]], believing that whites would be "degraded" and that "fusing of races" is undesirable, for "not every race adopts the morals and customs of the Europeans". He states that "instead of assimilation, which was intended by the melting together of the various races, nature has here made a law of just the opposite".<ref>Kant ''APPV'' 7:320</ref> Kant was also an anti-Semite, believing that Jews were incapable of transcending material forces, which a moral order required. In this way, Jews are presented as the opposite of autonomous, rational Christians, and therefore incapable of being incorporated into an ethical Christian society. In his "Anthropology", Kant called the Jews "a nation of cheaters" and portrayed them as "a group that has followed not the path of transcendental freedom but that of enslavement to the material world".{{sfn|Shrage|2019}} [[Charles W. Mills]] wrote that Kant has been "sanitized for public consumption", his racist works conveniently ignored.{{sfn|Mills|2017|pp=95–97}} [[Robert Bernasconi]] stated that Kant "supplied the first scientific definition of race". [[Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze]] is credited with bringing Kant's contributions to racism to light in the 1990s among Western philosophers, who he believed often glossed over this part of his life and works.{{sfn|Bouie|2018}} Pauline Kleingeld argues that, while Kant "did defend a racial hierarchy until at least the end of the 1780s", his views on race changed significantly in works published in the last decade of his life. In particular, she argues that Kant rejected past views related to racial hierarchies and the diminished rights or moral status of non-whites in ''[[Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch|Perpetual Peace]]'' (1795). This work also saw him providing extended arguments against European [[colonialism]], which he claimed was morally unjust and incompatible with the equal rights held by indigenous populations. Kleingeld argues that this shift in Kant's views later in life has often been forgotten or ignored in the literature on Kant's racist anthropology, and that the shift suggests a belated recognition of the fact that racial hierarchy was incompatible with a universalized moral framework.{{sfn|Kleingeld|2007|pp=573–592}} While Kant's racist rhetoric is indicative of the state of scholarship and science during the 18th century, German philosopher [[Daniel-Pascal Zorn]] explains the risk of taking period quotations out of context. Many of Kant's most outrageous quotations are from a series of articles from 1777–1788, a public exchange among Kant, Herder, natural scientist [[Georg Forster]], and other scholars prominent in that period.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/861693001 |title=Kant and the Concept of Race: late eighteenth-century writings |date=2013 |others=Jon M. Mikkelsen |isbn=978-1-4619-4312-9 |editor-last=Mikkelsen |editor-first=Jon M. |location=Albany |oclc=861693001 |publisher=State University of New York Press}}</ref>{{sfn|Kuehn|2001|pp=298–301, 343–345}}<ref>cf. Kant, ''DCHR'' 8:91-106</ref> Kant asserts that all races of humankind are of the same species, challenging the position of Forster and others that the races were distinct species. While his commentary is clearly biased at times, certain extreme statements were patterned specifically to paraphrase or counter Forster and other authors.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /> By considering the full arc of Kant's scholarship, Zorn notes the progression in both his philosophical and his anthropological works, "with which he argues, against the ''zeitgeist'', for the unity of humanity".<ref name=":1" /> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page