Immortality Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ==Philosophical arguments for the immortality of the soul== ===Alcmaeon of Croton=== [[Alcmaeon of Croton]] argued that the soul is continuously and ceaselessly in motion. The exact form of his argument is unclear, but it appears to have influenced Plato, Aristotle, and other later writers.<ref name="alcmaeon">{{Cite book|chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/alcmaeon/#immort|title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|chapter=Alcmaeon|year=2021|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref> ===Plato=== [[Plato]]'s ''[[Phaedo]]'' advances four arguments for the soul's immortality:<ref>{{Cite book|chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato/|title = The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|chapter = Plato|year = 2017|publisher = Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref> * The [[Phaedo#The Cyclical Argument|Cyclical Argument]], or Opposites Argument explains that [[Theory of forms|Forms]] are eternal and unchanging, and as the soul always brings life, then it must not die, and is necessarily "imperishable". As the body is mortal and is subject to physical death, the soul must be its indestructible opposite. Plato then suggests the analogy of fire and cold. If the form of cold is imperishable, and fire, its opposite, was within close proximity, it would have to withdraw intact as does the soul during death. This could be likened to the idea of the opposite charges of magnets. * The [[Anamnesis (philosophy)|Theory of Recollection]] explains that we possess some non-empirical knowledge (e.g. The Form of Equality) at birth, implying the soul existed before birth to carry that knowledge. Another account of the theory is found in Plato's ''[[Meno]]'', although in that case Socrates implies anamnesis (previous knowledge of everything) whereas he is not so bold in ''Phaedo''. * The [[Phaedo#The Affinity Argument|Affinity Argument]], explains that invisible, immortal, and incorporeal things are different from visible, mortal, and corporeal things. Our soul is of the former, while our body is of the latter, so when our bodies die and decay, our soul will continue to live. * The [[Phaedo#The Argument from Form of Life|Argument from Form of Life]] or The Final Argument explains that the Forms, incorporeal and static entities, are the cause of all things in the world, and all things participate in Forms. For example, beautiful things participate in the Form of Beauty; the number four participates in the Form of the Even, etc. The soul, by its very nature, participates in the Form of Life, which means the soul can never die. ===Plotinus=== [[Plotinus]] offers a version of the argument that Kant calls "The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology". Plotinus first argues that the soul is [[Simple (philosophy)|simple]], then notes that a simple being cannot decompose. Many subsequent philosophers have argued both that the soul is simple and that it must be immortal. The tradition arguably culminates with [[Moses Mendelssohn]]'s [[Phaedon]].<ref>Henry, D. (2008) "The Neoplatonic Achilles" in "The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology". Springer. Volume 7 of the series Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind pp. 59–74.</ref> ===Metochites=== [[Theodore Metochites]] argues that part of the soul's nature is to move itself, but that a given movement will cease only if what causes the movement is separated from the thing moved – an impossibility if they are one and the same.<ref name="metochites">{{cite encyclopedia |title=Byzantine Philosophy |year=2018 |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |department=Metaphysics Research Lab |publisher=Stanford University |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/byzantine-philosophy/#ImmSou}}</ref> ===Avicenna=== [[Avicenna]] argued for the distinctness of the soul and the body, and the incorruptibility of the former.{{efn|For [[Avicenna]]'s views, see: Moussa, Dunya, & Zayed (1960);<ref name=Moussa-Dunya-Zayed-1960-Metaphys/> Arberry (1964);<ref name=Arberry-1964-IslCiv/> Michot (1986);<ref name=Michot-1986-destinée/> Janssen (1987);<ref name=Janssen-1987-ibnSînâ/> Marmura (2005)(complete translation).<ref name=Marmura-2005-Avicenna/> }} ===Aquinas=== The full argument for the immortality of the soul and [[Thomas Aquinas]]' elaboration of Aristotelian theory is found in Question 75 of the First Part of the ''[[Summa Theologica]]''.<ref>{{Cite book|chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/|title = The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|chapter = Saint Thomas Aquinas|year = 2018|publisher = Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref> ===Descartes=== [[René Descartes]] endorses the claim that the soul is simple, and also that this entails that it cannot decompose. Descartes does not address the possibility that the soul might suddenly disappear.<ref>Rozemond, M. (2010). "Descartes and the Immortality of the Soul". in Mind, Method and Morality: Essays in Honor of Anthony Kenny. Oxford University Press.</ref> ===Leibniz=== In early work, [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz]] endorses a version of the argument from the simplicity of the soul to its immortality, but like his predecessors, he does not address the possibility that the soul might suddenly disappear. In his [[monadology]] he advances a sophisticated novel argument for the immortality of monads.<ref>{{Cite book|chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz/|title = The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|chapter = Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|year = 2020|publisher = Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref> ===Moses Mendelssohn=== [[Moses Mendelssohn]]'s ''[[Phaedon]]'' is a defense of the simplicity and immortality of the soul. It is a series of three dialogues, revisiting the Platonic dialogue ''[[Phaedo]]'', in which [[Socrates]] argues for the immortality of the soul, in preparation for his own death. Many philosophers, including Plotinus, Descartes, and Leibniz, argue that the soul is simple, and that because simples cannot decompose they must be immortal. In the Phaedon, Mendelssohn addresses gaps in earlier versions of this argument (an argument that Kant calls the Achilles of Rationalist Psychology). The Phaedon contains an original argument for the simplicity of the soul, and also an original argument that simples cannot suddenly disappear. It contains further original arguments that the soul must retain its rational capacities as long as it exists.<ref>Sassen, B. (2008). "Kant and Mendelssohn on the Implications of the 'I Think' ".in "The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology". Springer. Volume 7 of the series Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind pp. 59–74.</ref> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page