Logic Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ===Informal=== {{main|Informal logic}} [[Informal logic]] is usually carried out in a less systematic way. It often focuses on more specific issues, like investigating a particular type of fallacy or studying a certain aspect of argumentation. Nonetheless, some frameworks of informal logic have also been presented that try to provide a systematic characterization of the correctness of arguments.{{sfnm|1a1=Hansen|1y=2020|2a1=Korb|2y=2004|2pp=41β42, 48|3a1=Ritola|3y=2008|3p=335|4a=Goarke|4y=2021|4loc=lead section; 2. Systems of Informal Logic; 4.2 Fallacy Theory}} The ''pragmatic'' or ''dialogical approach'' to informal logic sees arguments as [[speech act]]s and not merely as a set of premises together with a conclusion.{{sfnm|1a1=Hansen|1y=2020|2a1=Korb|2y=2004|2pp=43β44|3a1=Ritola|3y=2008|3p=335}} As speech acts, they occur in a certain context, like a [[dialogue]], which affects the standards of right and wrong arguments.{{sfnm|1a1=Walton|1y=1987|1loc=1. A new model of argument|1pp=2β3|2a1=Ritola|2y=2008|2p=335}} A prominent version by [[Douglas N. Walton]] understands a dialogue as a game between two players. The initial position of each player is characterized by the propositions to which they are committed and the conclusion they intend to prove. Dialogues are games of persuasion: each player has the goal of convincing the opponent of their own conclusion.{{sfn |Walton |1987 |loc=1. A new model of argument |pp=3β4, 18β22 }} This is achieved by making arguments: arguments are the moves of the game.{{sfnm|1a1=Walton|1y=1987|1loc=1. A new model of argument|1pp=3β4, 11, 18|2a1=Ritola|2y=2008|2p=335}} They affect to which propositions the players are committed. A winning move is a successful argument that takes the opponent's commitments as premises and shows how one's own conclusion follows from them. This is usually not possible straight away. For this reason, it is normally necessary to formulate a sequence of arguments as intermediary steps, each of which brings the opponent a little closer to one's intended conclusion. Besides these positive arguments leading one closer to victory, there are also negative arguments preventing the opponent's victory by denying their conclusion.{{sfn |Walton |1987 |loc=1. A new model of argument |pp=3β4, 18β22 }} Whether an argument is correct depends on whether it promotes the progress of the dialogue. Fallacies, on the other hand, are violations of the standards of proper argumentative rules.{{sfnm|1a1=Hansen|1y=2020|2a1=Walton|2y=1987|2loc=3. Logic of propositions|2pp=3β4, 18β22}} These standards also depend on the type of dialogue. For example, the standards governing the scientific discourse differ from the standards in business negotiations.{{sfn |Ritola |2008 |p=335}} The ''epistemic approach'' to informal logic, on the other hand, focuses on the epistemic role of arguments.{{sfnm|1a1=Hansen|1y=2020|2a1=Korb|2y=2004|2pp=43, 54β55}} It is based on the idea that arguments aim to increase our knowledge. They achieve this by linking justified beliefs to beliefs that are not yet justified.{{sfn |Siegel |Biro |1997 |pp=277β292}} Correct arguments succeed at expanding knowledge while fallacies are epistemic failures: they do not justify the belief in their conclusion.{{sfnm|1a1=Hansen|1y=2020|2a1=Korb|2y=2004|2pp=41β70}} For example, the [[fallacy of begging the question]] is a ''fallacy'' because it fails to provide independent justification for its conclusion, even though it is deductively valid.{{sfnm|1a1=Mackie|1y=1967|2a1=Siegel|2a2=Biro|2y=1997|2pp=277β292}} In this sense, logical normativity consists in epistemic success or rationality.{{sfn |Siegel |Biro |1997 |pp=277β292}} The [[Bayesian epistemology|Bayesian approach]] is one example of an epistemic approach.{{sfnm |1a1=Hansen |1y=2020 |2a1=Moore |2a2=Cromby |2y=2016 |2p=60}} Central to Bayesianism is not just whether the agent believes something but the degree to which they believe it, the so-called ''credence''. Degrees of belief are seen as [[subjective probability|subjective probabilities]] in the believed proposition, i.e. how certain the agent is that the proposition is true.{{sfnm|1a1=Olsson|1y=2018|1pp=431β442|1loc=Bayesian Epistemology|2a1=HΓ‘jek|2a2=Lin|2y=2017|2pp=207β232|3a1=Hartmann|3a2=Sprenger|3y=2010|3pp=609β620|3loc=Bayesian Epistemology}} On this view, reasoning can be interpreted as a process of changing one's credences, often in reaction to new incoming information.{{sfn|Shermer|2022|p=136}} Correct reasoning and the arguments it is based on follow the laws of probability, for example, the [[Bayesian epistemology#Principle of conditionalization|principle of conditionalization]]. Bad or irrational reasoning, on the other hand, violates these laws.{{sfnm|1a1=Korb|1y=2004|1pp=41β42, 44β46|2a1=HΓ‘jek|2a2=Lin|2y=2017|2pp=207β232|3a1=Talbott|3y=2016}} Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. 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