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Do not fill this in! ==Central concepts== ===Knowledge=== [[File:Bertrand Russell 1949.jpg|thumb|[[Bertrand Russell]] famously brought attention to the distinction between propositional knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance]] {{Main|Knowledge}} The entry "Knowledge How" of the ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''<ref name="SEP Knowledge How"/> mentions that introductory classes to epistemology often start their analysis of knowledge by pointing out three different senses of "knowing" something: "[[Propositional knowledge|knowing that]]" (knowing the truth of propositions), "[[Procedural knowledge|knowing how]]" (understanding how to perform certain actions), and "[[Knowledge by acquaintance|knowing by acquaintance]]" (directly perceiving an object, being familiar with it, or otherwise coming into contact with it). This modern teaching of epistemology is primarily concerned with the first of these forms of knowledge, propositional knowledge. All three senses of "knowing" can be seen in the ordinary use of the word. In mathematics, it can be known {{em|that}} 2 + 2 = 4, but there is also knowing {{em|how}} to add two numbers, and knowing a {{em|person}} (e.g., knowing other persons,<ref name="Talbert2015"/><ref name="Benton2017"/> or knowing oneself), {{em|place}} (e.g., one's hometown), {{em|thing}} (e.g., cars), or {{em|activity}} (e.g., addition). While these distinctions are not explicit in English, they are explicitly made in other languages, including French, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Romanian, German, and Dutch (although some languages closely related to English have been said to retain these verbs, such as [[Scots language|Scots]]).{{Refn|group=note|name=Scots_witVsken}}. In French, Portuguese, Spanish, Romanian, German, and Dutch 'to know (a person)' is translated using {{lang|fr|connaître}}, {{lang|pt|conhecer}}, {{lang|es|conocer}}, {{lang|ro|a cunoaște}}, and {{lang|de|kennen}} (both German and Dutch) respectively, whereas 'to know (how to do something)' is translated using {{lang|fr|savoir}}, {{lang|es|saber}} (both Portuguese and Spanish), {{lang|ro|a şti}}, {{lang|de|wissen}}, and {{lang|nl|weten}}. Modern Greek has the verbs {{lang|el|γνωρίζω}} ({{lang|el-Latn|gnorízo}}) and {{lang|el|ξέρω}} ({{lang|el-Latn|kséro}}). Italian has the verbs {{lang|it|conoscere}} and {{lang|it|sapere}} and the nouns for ''knowledge'' are {{lang|it|conoscenza}} and {{lang|it|sapienza}}. German has the verbs {{lang|de|wissen}} and {{lang|de|kennen}}; the former implies knowing a fact, the latter knowing in the sense of being acquainted with and having a working knowledge of. There is also a noun derived from {{lang|de|kennen}}, namely {{lang|de|Erkennen}}, which has been said to imply knowledge in the form of recognition or acknowledgment.<ref name="Benton2017" />{{Rp|at=esp. Section 1.}} The verb itself implies a process of going from one state to another, from a state of "not-{{lang|de|erkennen}}" to a state of true {{lang|de|erkennen}}. This verb seems the most appropriate in terms of describing the "episteme" in one of the modern European languages, hence the German name "{{lang|de|{{ill|Erkenntnistheorie|de|vertical-align=sup}}}}". The theoretical interpretation and significance of these linguistic issues remains controversial. The distinction is most pronounced in Polish, where {{lang|pl|wiedzieć}} means "to know", {{lang|pl|umieć}} means "to know how" and {{lang|pl|znać}} means "to be familiar with" (to "know" a person). In his paper ''On Denoting'' and his later book ''Problems of Philosophy'', [[Bertrand Russell]] brought a great deal of attention to the distinction between "[[Descriptive knowledge|knowledge by description]]" and "[[knowledge by acquaintance#Bertrand Russell|knowledge by acquaintance]]". [[Gilbert Ryle]] is similarly credited with bringing more attention to the distinction between knowing how and knowing that in ''[[The Concept of Mind]]''. In ''Personal Knowledge'', [[Michael Polanyi]] argues for the epistemological relevance of knowledge how and knowledge that; using the example of the act of balance involved in riding a bicycle, he suggests that the theoretical knowledge of the physics involved in maintaining a state of balance cannot substitute for the practical knowledge of how to ride, and that it is important to understand how both are established and grounded. This position is essentially Ryle's, who argued that a failure to acknowledge the distinction between "knowledge that" and "knowledge how" leads to [[infinite regress]]. ====''A priori'' and ''a posteriori'' knowledge==== {{Main|A priori and a posteriori}} One of the most important distinctions in epistemology is between what can be known ''a priori'' (independently of experience) and what can be known ''a posteriori'' (through experience). The terms originate from the analytic methods of Aristotle's ''[[Organon]]'', and may be roughly defined as follows:<ref name="SEP apriori"/> * ''[[A priori and a posteriori|A priori]]'' knowledge is knowledge that is independent of experience. This means that it can be known or justified prior to or independently of any specific empirical evidence or sensory observations. Such knowledge is obtained through reasoning, logical analysis, or introspection. Examples of ''a priori'' knowledge include mathematical truths, logical tautologies (e.g., "All bachelors are unmarried"), and certain fundamental principles of reason and logic. One of the key proponents of'' a priori '' knowledge was the philosopher [[Immanuel Kant]]. He argued that certain fundamental truths about the nature of reality, such as the concepts of space, time, causality, and the categories of understanding, are not derived from experience, but are inherent in the structure of the mind itself. According to Kant, these ''a priori'' categories enable the organization and interpretation of sensory experiences, giving rise to an understanding of the world. * ''[[A priori and a posteriori|A posteriori]]'' knowledge is knowledge that is derived from experience. It is based on empirical evidence, sensory perception, and observations of the external world. ''A posteriori'' knowledge is contingent upon the information gained through the senses and relies on the collection and interpretation of data. Scientific observations and experimental results are typical examples of ''a posteriori'' knowledge. Views that emphasize the importance of ''a priori'' knowledge are generally classified as [[rationalist]]. Views that emphasize the importance of ''a posteriori'' knowledge are generally classified as [[empiricist]].<ref name="SEP rationalism-empiricism"/><ref name=Sangeetha2021/> ===Belief=== {{Main|Belief}} One of the core concepts in epistemology is ''belief''. A belief is an attitude that a person holds regarding anything that they take to be true.<ref name="SEP Belief"/> For instance, to believe that snow is white is comparable to accepting the truth of the [[proposition]] "snow is white". Beliefs can be ''occurrent'' (e.g., a person actively thinking "snow is white"), or they can be ''dispositional'' (e.g., a person who if asked about the color of snow would assert "snow is white"). While there is not universal agreement about the nature of belief, most contemporary philosophers hold the view that a disposition to express belief ''B'' qualifies as holding the belief ''B''.<ref name="SEP Belief"/> There are various different ways that contemporary philosophers have tried to describe beliefs, including as representations of ways that the world could be ([[Jerry Fodor]]), as dispositions to act as if certain things are true ([[Roderick Chisholm]]), as interpretive schemes for making sense of someone's actions ([[Daniel Dennett]] and [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]]), or as mental states that fill a particular function ([[Hilary Putnam]]).<ref name="SEP Belief"/> Some have also attempted to offer significant revisions to the notion of belief, including [[Eliminativism|eliminativists]] about belief who argue that there is no phenomenon in the natural world which corresponds to our [[folk psychology|folk psychological]] concept of belief ([[Paul Churchland]]) and [[Formal epistemology|formal epistemologists]], who aim to replace our bivalent notion of belief ("either I have a belief or I don't have a belief") with the more permissive, probabilistic notion of credence ("there is an entire spectrum of degrees of belief, not a simple dichotomy between belief and non-belief").<ref name="SEP Belief"/><ref name="SEP Formal Belief"/> While belief plays a significant role in epistemological debates surrounding knowledge and justification, it has also generated many other philosophical debates in its own right. Notable debates include: "What is the rational way to revise one's beliefs when presented with various sorts of evidence?"; "Is the content of our beliefs entirely determined by our mental states, or do the relevant facts have any bearing on our beliefs (e.g., if I believe that I'm holding a glass of water, is the non-mental fact that water is H<sub>2</sub>O part of the content of that belief)?"; "How fine-grained or coarse-grained are our beliefs?"; and "Must it be possible for a belief to be expressible in language, or are there non-linguistic beliefs?"<ref name="SEP Belief"/> ===Truth=== {{Main|Truth}} [[Truth]] is the property or state of being in accordance with facts or reality.<ref name="SEP truth"/> On most views, truth is the correspondence of language or thought to a mind-independent world. This is called the [[correspondence theory of truth]]. Among philosophers who think that it is possible to analyze the conditions necessary for knowledge, virtually all of them accept that truth is such a condition. There is much less agreement about the extent to which a knower must know ''why'' something is true in order to know. On such views, something being known implies that it is true. However, this should not be confused for the more contentious view that one must know that one knows in order to know (the [[KK thesis|KK principle]]).<ref name="SEP Epistemology 2014"/> Epistemologists disagree about whether belief is the only [[truth-bearer]]. Other common suggestions for things that can bear the property of being true include [[propositions]], [[sentence (mathematical logic)|sentence]]s, [[thought]]s, [[utterance]]s, and [[judgment]]s. Plato, in his [[Gorgias (dialogue)|Gorgias]], argues that belief is the most commonly invoked truth-bearer.<ref name="Plato2008"/>{{clarify|date=June 2020}} Many of the debates regarding truth are at the crossroads of epistemology and [[logic]].<ref name="SEP truth"/> Some contemporary debates regarding truth include: How do we define truth? Is it even possible to give an informative definition of truth? What things are truth-bearers and therefore capable of being true or false? Are truth and falsity [[Principle of bivalence|bivalent]], or are there other truth values? What are the [[criteria of truth]] that allow us to identify it and to distinguish it from falsity? What role does truth play in constituting [[knowledge]]? And is truth [[Absolute (philosophy)|absolute]], or is it merely [[knowledge relativity|relative]] to one's perspective?<ref name="SEP truth"/> ===Justification=== {{Main|Justification (epistemology)}} As the term ''justification'' is used in epistemology, a belief is justified if one has good reason for holding it. Loosely speaking, justification is the ''reason'' that someone holds a rationally admissible belief, on the assumption that it is a ''good reason'' for holding it. Sources of justification might include [[perception|perceptual experience]] (the evidence of the senses), [[reason]], and authoritative [[testimony]]. However, a belief being justified does ''not'' guarantee that the belief is true, since a person could be justified in forming beliefs based on very convincing evidence that was nonetheless deceiving. ====Internalism and externalism==== {{Main|Internalism and externalism}} A central debate about the nature of justification is a debate between epistemological externalists on the one hand and epistemological internalists on the other. While epistemic externalism first arose in attempts to overcome the [[Gettier problem]], it has flourished in the time since as an alternative way of conceiving of epistemic justification. The initial development of epistemic externalism is often attributed to [[Alvin Goldman]], although numerous other philosophers have worked on the topic in the time since.<ref name="SEP knowledge-analysis" /> Externalists hold that factors deemed "external", meaning outside of the psychological states of those who gain knowledge, can be conditions of justification. For example, an externalist response to the Gettier problem is to say that for a justified true belief to count as knowledge, there must be a link or dependency between the belief and the state of the external world. Usually, this is understood to be a causal link. Such causation, to the extent that it is "outside" the mind, would count as an external, knowledge-yielding condition. Internalists, on the other hand, assert that all knowledge-yielding conditions are within the psychological states of those who gain knowledge. Though unfamiliar with the internalist-externalist debate himself, many point to [[René Descartes]] as an early example of the internalist path to justification. He wrote that because the only method by which we perceive the external world is through our senses, and that, because the senses are not infallible, we should not consider our concept of knowledge infallible. The only way to find anything that could be described as "indubitably true", he advocates, would be to see things "clearly and distinctly".<ref name=Descartes1985/> He argued that if there is an omnipotent, good being who made the world, then it is reasonable to believe that people are made with the ability to know. However, this does not mean that the human ability to know is perfect. God gave humankind the ability to know, but not the capacity for omniscience. Descartes said that we must use our capacities for knowledge correctly and carefully through methodological doubt.<ref name="Descartes1985b"/> The dictum "''Cogito ergo sum''" (I think, therefore I am) is also commonly associated with Descartes's theory. In his own methodological doubt—doubting everything he previously knew so that he could start from a blank slate—the first thing that he could not logically bring himself to doubt was his own existence: "I do not exist" would be a contradiction in terms. The act of saying that one does not exist assumes that someone must be making the statement in the first place. Descartes could doubt his senses, his body, and the world around him—but he could not deny his own existence, because he was able to doubt and must exist to manifest that doubt. Even if some "evil genius" were deceiving him, he would have to exist to be deceived. This one sure point provided him with what he called his Archimedean point, in order to further develop his foundation for knowledge. Simply put, Descartes's epistemological justification depended on his indubitable belief in his own existence and his clear and distinct knowledge of God.<ref name="Descartes1985b"/> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. 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