Empire Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ==Theoretical research== ===Empire versus nation state=== Empires have been the dominant international organization in [[Human history|world history]]: {{Blockquote| The fact that tribes, peoples, and nations have made empires points to a fundamental political dynamic, one that helps explain why empires cannot be confined to a particular place or era but emerged and reemerged over thousands of years and on all continents.{{Sfn|Burbank|Cooper|2010|page=8}}}} {{Blockquote| Empires ... can be traced as far back as the recorded history goes; indeed, most history is the history of empires ... It is the nation-state—an essentially 19th-century ideal—that is the historical novelty and that may yet prove to be the more ephemeral entity.<ref>[[Niall Ferguson]], "The Unconscious Colossus: Limits of (Alternatives to) American Empire", ''Daedalus'', 134/2, (2005): p 24.</ref>}} {{Blockquote| Our field's fixation on the Westphalian state has tended to obscure the fact that the main actors in global politics, for most of time immemorial, have been empires rather than states ... In fact, it is a very distorted view of even the Westphalian era not to recognize that it was always at least as much about empires as it was states. Almost all of the emerging European states no sooner began to consolidate than they were off on campaigns of conquest and commerce to the farthest reaches of the globe... Ironically, it was the European empires that carried the idea of the sovereign territorial state to the rest of the world ...<ref>[http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/9/0/5/pages99056/p99056-9.php Yale H. Ferguson & Richard W. Mansbach, "Superpower, Hegemony, Empire," San Diego: Annual Meeting paper, The International Studies Association, March 22–26, (2006: 9)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161124093803/http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/9/0/5/pages99056/p99056-9.php |date=2016-11-24 }}</ref>}} {{Blockquote| Empire has been the historically predominant form of order in world politics. Looking at a time frame of several millennia, there was no global anarchic system until the European explorations and subsequent imperial and colonial ventures connected disparate regional systems, doing so approximately 500 years ago. Prior to this emergence of a global-scope system, the pattern of world politics was characterized by regional systems. These regional systems were initially anarchic and marked by high levels of military competition. But almost universally, they tended to consolidate into regional empires ... Thus it was empires—not anarchic state systems—that typically dominated the regional systems in all parts of the world ... Within this global pattern of regional empires, European political order was distinctly anomalous because it persisted so long as an anarchy.<ref>[http://www.scholar.princeton.edu/sites/.../am-impact-dd-gji-final-1-august-2015.pdf Daniel Deudney & G. John Ikenberry, "America's Impact: The End of Empire and the Globalization of the Westphalian System", working paper, Princeton University, 2015, pp. 7–8] {{Dead link|date=August 2019 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>}} Similarly, [[Anthony Pagden]], [[Eliot A. Cohen]], [[Jane Burbank]] and [[Frederick Cooper (historian)|Frederick Cooper]] estimate that "empires have always been more frequent, more extensive political and social forms than tribal territories or nations have ever been."<ref>{{Cite journal |first=Anthony |last=Pagden |title=Imperialism, Liberalism & the Quest for Perpetual Peace |journal=Daedalus |volume=134 |issue=2 |date=2005 |page=47|doi=10.1162/0011526053887301 |s2cid=57564158 |doi-access=free }}</ref> Many empires endured for centuries, while the age of the ancient Egyptian, Chinese and Japanese Empires is counted in millennia. "Most people throughout history have lived under imperial rule."{{Sfn|Cohen|2004|page=50}} {{Blockquote| Empires have played a long and critical part in human history ... [Despite] efforts in words and wars to put national unity at the center of political imagination, imperial politics, imperial practices, and imperial cultures have shaped the world we live in ... Rome was evoked as a model of splendor and order into the Twentieth century and beyond... By comparison, the nation-state appears as a blip on the historical horizon, a state form that emerged recently from under imperial skies and whose hold on the world's political imagination may well prove partial or transitory... The endurance of empire challenges the notion that the nation-state is natural, necessary, and inevitable ...{{Sfn|Burbank|Cooper|2010|pages=2–3}}}} Political scientist [[Hedley Bull]] wrote that "in the broad sweep of human history ... the form of states system has been the exception rather than the rule".<ref>''The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics'', London: Macmillan, 1977, p. 21).</ref> His colleague [[Robert Gilpin]] confirmed this conclusion for the pre-modern period: {{Blockquote| The history of interstate relations was largely that of successive great empires. The pattern of international political change during the millennia of the pre-modern era has been described as an imperial cycle ... World politics was characterized by the rise and decline of powerful empires, each of which in turn unified and ordered its respective international system. The recurrent pattern in every civilization of which we have knowledge was for one state to unify the system under its imperial domination. The propensity toward universal empire was the principal feature of pre-modern politics.<ref>Gilpin ''War and Change in World Politics'', (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, pp. 110–116).</ref>}} Historian Michael Doyle who undertook an extensive research on empires extended the observation into the modern era: {{Blockquote| Empires have been the key actors in world politics for millennia. They helped create the interdependent civilizations of all the continents ... Imperial control stretches through history, many say, to the present day. Empires are as old as history itself ... They have held the leading role ever since.<ref>''Empires'', (London: Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 12, 51, 137).</ref>}} The author of ''[[The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background]]'', [[Hans Kohn]], acknowledged that it was the opposite idea—of imperialism—that was, perhaps, the most influential single idea for two millennia, the ordering of human society through unified dominion and common civilization.<ref>[https://archive.org/details/worldorderinhist0000kohn/page/n5/mode/2up?view=theater Kohn, Hans, (1942). ''World Order in Historical Perspective'', (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), p 113]</ref> ===Universal empire=== {{See also|Universal monarchy}} Expert on warfare [[Quincy Wright]] generalized on what he called "universal empire"—empire unifying all the contemporary system: {{Blockquote| Balance of power systems have in the past tended, through the process of conquest of lesser states by greater states, towards reduction in the number of states involved, and towards less frequent but more devastating wars, until eventually a universal empire has been established through the conquest by one of all those remaining.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wright |first=Quincy |date=August 1, 1948 |title=On the Application of Intelligence to World Affairs |journal=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] |volume=4 |issue=8 |page=250 |bibcode=1948BuAtS...4h.249W |doi=10.1080/00963402.1948.11460234}}</ref>}} German Sociologist Friedrich Tenbruck finds that the macro-historic process of imperial expansion gave rise to [[World history (field)|global history]] in which the formations of universal empires were most significant stages.<ref>{{Cite journal |first=Friedrich |last=Tenbruck |title=Internal History of Society or Universal History? |translator=J. Bleicher |journal=Theory, Culture, Society |issue=11 |date=1994 |page=87}}</ref> A later group of political scientists, working on the phenomenon of the current [[unipolarity]], in 2007 edited research on several pre-modern civilizations by experts in respective fields. The overall conclusion was that the [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] was inherently unstable order and usually soon broke in favor of imperial order.<ref>[[William Wohlforth]], & Stuart J. Kaufman, & Richard Little, ''Balance of Power in World History'', (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).</ref> Yet before the advent of the unipolarity, world historian [[Arnold J. Toynbee|Arnold Toynbee]] and political scientist [[Martin Wight]] had drawn the same conclusion with an unambiguous implication for the modern world: {{Blockquote| When this [imperial] pattern of political history is found in the New World as well as in the Old World, it looks as if the pattern must be intrinsic to the political history of societies of the species we call civilizations, in whatever part of the world the specimens of this species occur. If this conclusion is warranted, it illuminates our understanding of civilization itself.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Garcilaso de la Vega |title=Royal Commentaries of the Incas and General History of Peru |date=1966 |isbn=978-0-292-73358-9 |pages=X–XI |chapter=Foreword |publisher=University of Texas Press |author-link=Inca Garcilaso de la Vega}}</ref>}} {{Blockquote| Most states systems have ended in universal empire, which has swallowed all the states of the system. The examples are so abundant that we must ask two questions: Is there any states system which has not led fairly directly to the establishment of a world empire? Does the evidence rather suggest that we should expect any states system to culminate in this way? ... It might be argued that every state system can only maintain its existence on the [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]], that the latter is inherently unstable, and that sooner or later its tensions and conflicts will be resolved into a monopoly of power.<ref>''System of States'', (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977, pp. 43–44).</ref>}} The earliest thinker to approach the phenomenon of universal empire from a theoretical point of view was [[Polybius]] (2:3): {{Blockquote| In previous times events in the world occurred without impinging on one another ... [Then] history became a whole, as if a single body; events in Italy and Libya came to be enmeshed with those in Asia and Greece, and everything gets directed towards one single goal.}} [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte]], having witnessed the battle at Jena in 1806 when Napoleon overwhelmed Prussia, described what he perceived as a deep historical trend: {{Blockquote| There is necessary tendency in every cultivated State to extend itself generally ... Such is the case in Ancient History ... As the States become stronger in themselves and cast off that [Papal] foreign power, the tendency towards a Universal Monarchy over the whole Christian World necessarily comes to light ... This tendency ... has shown itself successively in several States which could make pretensions to such a dominion, and since the fall of the Papacy, it has become the sole animating principle of our History ... Whether clearly or not—it may be obscurely—yet has this tendency lain at the root of the undertakings of many States in Modern Times ... Although no individual Epoch may have contemplated this purpose, yet is this the spirit which runs through all these individual Epochs, and invisibly urges them onward.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Fichte |first=Johann Gottlieb |chapter=Characteristics of the Present Age |date=1975 |title=Theory and Practice of the Balance of Power, 1486–1914: Selected European Writings |isbn=978-0-460-10196-7 |editor-last=Wright |editor-first=Moorhead |pages=87–89 |author-link=Johann Gottlieb Fichte |orig-date=1806}}</ref>}} Fichte's later compatriot, Geographer [[Alexander von Humboldt]], in the mid-Nineteenth century observed a macro-historic trend of imperial growth in both Hemispheres: "Men of great and strong minds, as well as whole nations, acted under influence of one idea, the purity of which was utterly unknown to them."<ref>{{Cite book |title=Cosmos: a sketch of a physical description of the universe by Alexander von Humboldt; translated from German by E. C. Otté |year=1866 |url=https://www.biodiversitylibrary.org/bibliography/32462 |page=359 |volume=I}}</ref> The imperial expansion filled the world {{Circa|1900}}.<ref name="youtube.com">{{cite web| url = https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dp0tqdu7fH4| title = "50 Centuries in 10 Minutes", (2014)| website = [[YouTube]]}}</ref><ref name="World 2015">{{cite web| url = https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ymI5Uv5cGU4| title = "History of the World: Every Year", (2015)| website = [[YouTube]]}}</ref> Two famous contemporary observers—[[Frederick Jackson Turner|Frederick Turner]] and [[Halford Mackinder]] described the event and drew implications, the former predicting American overseas expansion<ref>{{Cite book |last=Turner |first=Frederick Jackson |url=https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/22994 |title=The Frontier in American History |date=1920 |author-link=Frederick Jackson Turner}}</ref> and the latter stressing that the world empire is now in sight.<ref>[[Halford J. Mackinder]], ''The [[Geographical Pivot of History]]'', J. Murray, London, 1904.</ref> In 1870, Argentine diplomat, jurist and political theorist [[Juan Bautista Alberdi]] described imperial consolidation. As von Humboldt, he found this trend unplanned and irrational but evident beyond doubt in the "unwritten history of events." He linked this trend to the recent [[Evolution theory]]: Nations gravitate towards the formation of a single universal society. The laws that lead the nations in that direction are the same natural laws that has formed societies and are part of evolution. These evolutionary laws exist disregarding whether men recognize them.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.hacer.org/pdf/Guerra.pdf|title=In Spanish. Alberdi, Juan Bautista, (1870). Chapter VIII, "Analogia biologica," ''El crimen de la guerra''}}</ref> Similarly, [[Friedrich Ratzel]] observed that the "drive toward the building of continually larger states continues throughout the entirety of history" and is active in the present.<ref>Fridriech Ratzel, "The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States", ''The Structure of Political Geography'', (eds. Kasperson, Roger E., & Minghi, Julian V., Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), p 28.</ref> He drew "Seven Laws of Expansionism". His seventh law stated: "The general trend toward amalgamation transmits the tendency of territorial growth from state to state and increases the tendency in the process of transmission." He commented on this law to make its meaning clear: "There is on this small planet sufficient space for only one great state."<ref>Cited in [[Robert Strausz-Hupé]], ''Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power'', (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), p 30-31.</ref> Two other contemporaries—[[Kang Youwei]] and George [[Vacher de Lapouge]]—stressed that imperial expansion cannot indefinitely proceed on the definite surface of the globe and therefore world empire is imminent. Kang Youwei in 1885 believed that the imperial trend will culminate in the contest between Washington and Berlin<ref>[[K'ang Yu-wei]], ''The One World Philosophy'', (tr. Thompson, Lawrence G., London, 1958), pp. 79–80, 85.</ref> and Vacher de Lapouge in 1899 estimated that the final contest will be between Russia and America in which America is likely to triumph.<ref>George [[Vacher de Lapouge]], ''L'Aryen: Son Rôle Social'', (Nantes: 1899), chapter "L'Avenir des Aryens".</ref> The above envisaged contests indeed took place, known to us as World War I and II. Writing during the First, [[Oswald Spengler]] in ''[[The Decline of the West]]'' compared two emergences of universal empires and implied for the modern world: The Chinese League of States failed as well as the Taoist idea of intellectual self-disarmament. The Chinese states defended their last independence with bitterness but in vain. Also in vain Rome attempted to avoid conquest of the Hellenistic east. Imperialism is so necessary a product of any civilization that when a strongest people refuse to assume the role of master, it is pushed into it. It is the same with us. The [[Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907|Hague Conference of 1907]] was the prelude of World War, the [[Washington Naval Conference|Washington Conference]] of 1921 will have been that of other wars. Napoleon introduced the idea of military world empire different from the preceding European maritime empires. The contest "for the heritage of the whole world" will culminate "within two generations" (from 1922). The destinies of small states are "without importance to the great march of things." The strongest race will win and seize the management of the world.<ref>Spengler, Oswald (1922). ''The Decline of the West: Perspectives on World-History'', (tr. Atkinson, Charles Francis, (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD), vol II, p 422, 428-432, https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.264078/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> Writing during the next World War, political scientists Derwent Whittlesey, [[Robert Strausz-Hupé]] and [[John H. Herz]] concluded: "Now that the earth is at last parceled out, consolidation has commenced."<ref>Derwent Whittlesey, ''German Strategy of World Conquest'', (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1942), p 74.</ref> In "this world of fighting superstates there could be no end to war until one state had subjected all others, until world empire had been achieved by the strongest. This undoubtedly is the logical final stage in the geopolitical theory of evolution."<ref>Robert Strausz-Hupé, ''Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power'', (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), p XI.</ref> {{Blockquote| The world is no longer large enough to harbor several self-contained powers ... The trend toward world domination or hegemony of a single power is but the ultimate consummation of a power-system engrafted upon an otherwise integrated world.<ref>John H. Herz, "Power Politics and World Organization,"' ''The American Political Science Review'', 36/6, (1942): p 1041.</ref>}} Writing in the last year of the War, American Theologian Parley Paul Wormer, German Historian [[Ludwig Dehio]],and Hungarian-born writer [[Emery Reves]] drew similar conclusions. Fluctuating but persistent movement occurred through the centuries toward ever greater unity. The forward movement toward ever larger unities continues and there is no reason to conclude that it has come to an end. More likely, the greatest convergence of all time is at hand. "Possibly this is the deeper meaning of the savage world conflicts" of the 20th century.<ref>Wormer, Parley Paul, (1945). ''Citizenship and the New Day'', (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press), p 206.</ref> {{Blockquote| [T]he old European tendency toward division is now being thrust aside by the new global trend toward unification. And the onrush of this trend may not come to rest until it has asserted itself throughout our planet ... The global order still seems to be going through its birth pangs ... With the last tempest barely over, a new one is gathering.<ref>Ludwig Dehio, ''The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle, 1945'', (tr. Fullman, Charles, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 266–267.</ref>}} The famous ''[[The Anatomy of Peace|Anatomy of Peace]]'' by Reves, written and published in 1945, supposed that without the industrial power of the United States, Hitler already might have established world empire. Proposing [[world federalism]], the book warned: Every dynamic force, every economic and technological reality, every "law of history" and logic "indicates that we are on the verge of a period of empire building," which is "the last phase of the struggle for the conquest of the world." As an elimination contest, one of the three remaining powers or a combination "will achieve by force that unified control made mandatory by the times we live in… Anyone of three, by defeating the other two, would conquer and rule the world." If we fail to institute a unified control over the world in democratic way, the "iron law of history" would compel us to wage wars until world empire is finally attained through conquest. Since the former way is improbable due human blindness, we should precipitate the unification by conquest as quickly as possible and start the restoration of human liberties within the world empire.<ref>Reves, Emery (1945). ''The Anatomy of Peace'', (1 ed. New York & London: Harper & Brothers Publishers), pp 265-266, 268-270.</ref> === Atomic bomb and empire === Reves added "Postscript" to the ''Anatomy'', opening: "A few weeks after the publication of this book, the first atomic bomb exploded over the city of Hiroshima…" This new physical fact however has changed nothing in the political situation. The world empire remains inevitable and nothing else in the book would have been said differently had it been written after August 6, 1945. Not much chance we have to establish [[world government]] before the next horrible war between the two superpowers and whoever is victorious would establish the world empire.<ref>Reves 1945: pp 277-278, 287.</ref> The book sold an exceptional 800,000 copies in thirty languages, was endorsed by [[Albert Einstein]] and numerous other prominent figures, and in 1950 Reves was nominated for the [[Nobel Peace Prize]]. The year after the War and in the first year of the nuclear age, Einstein and British Philosopher [[Bertrand Russell]], known as prominent pacifists, outlined for the near future a perspective of world empire (world government established by force). Einstein believed that, unless world government is established by agreement, an imperial world government would come by war or wars.<ref>{{cite book| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=6NoFIRmg3J4C| title = Atomic War or Peace", 1945, ''Albert Einstein Collection: Essays in Humanism'', (New York: Philosophical Library/Open Road), 2016| isbn = 978-1-4532-0459-7| last1 = Einstein| first1 = Albert| date = 27 September 2011| publisher = Open Road Media}}</ref> Russell expected a [[third World War]] to result in a world government under the empire of the United States.<ref>{{cite web| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=WwwAAAAAMBAJ| title = "Atomic Weapon and the Prevention of War", ''Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists'', 2/7-8, October 1: p. 20| date = October 1946}}</ref> Three years later, another prominent pacifist, Theologian [[Reinhold Niebuhr]], generalized on the ancient Empires of Egypt, Babylon, Persia and Greece to imply for the modern world: "The analogy in present global terms would be the final unification of the world through the preponderant power of either America or Russia, whichever proved herself victorious in the final struggle."<ref>{{cite web| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=mA0AAAAAMBAJ| title = "The Illusion of World Government", ''Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists'', 5/10: (October 1, 1949): p. 291| date = October 1949}}</ref> Russian colleague of Russell and Neighbour, [[Georgy Fedotov]], wrote in 1945: All empires are but stages on the way to the sole Empire which must swallow all others. The only question is who will build it and on which foundations. Universal unity is the only alternative to annihilation. Unity by conference is utopian but unity by conquest by the strongest Power is not and probably the uncompleted in this War will be completed in the next. "Pax Atlantica" is the best of possible outcomes.<ref>Георгий П. Федотов, (1945). "Новое Отечество," ''Новый Град'', Нью Йорк: Издательство Чехова, 1952, p 98, 102, 107.</ref> Originally drafted as a secret study for the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (the precursor of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]) in 1944<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://monthlyreview.org/2006/01/01/the-new-geopolitics-of-empire/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180929233206/https://monthlyreview.org/2006/01/01/the-new-geopolitics-of-empire|title=Monthly Review | The New Geopolitics of Empire|first=John Bellamy FosterTopics: Imperialism Political Economy|last=Stagnation|date=January 1, 2006|archive-date=September 29, 2018}}</ref> and published as a book three years later, ''The Struggle for the World...'' by [[James Burnham]] concludes: If either of the two Superpowers wins, the result would be a universal empire which in our case would also be a world empire. The historical stage for a world empire had already been set prior to and independently of the discovery of atomic weapons but these weapons make a world empire inevitable and imminent. "The atomic weapons ... will not permit the world to wait." Only a world empire can establish monopoly on atomic weapons and thus guarantee the survival of civilization. A world empire "is in fact the objective of the Third World War which, in its preliminary stages, has already began". The issue of a world empire "will be decided, and in our day. In the course of the decision, both of the present antagonists may, it is true, be destroyed, but one of them must be."<ref>James Burnham, ''Struggle for the World'', (New York: The John Day Company, 1947), pp. 33, 50, 53, 55; 134–135, 143.</ref> The next year, world historian [[Crane Brinton]] similarly supposed that the bomb may in the hands of a very skillful and lucky nation prove to be the weapon that permits that nation to unify the world by imperial conquest, to do what Napoleon and Hitler failed to do. Combined with other "wonders of science," it would permit a quick and easy conquest of the world.<ref>Brinton, Crane, (1948). ''From Many, One: The Process of Political Integration, the Problem of World Government'', (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1971), pp 88-89, 94.</ref> In 1951, [[Hans Morgenthau]] concluded that the "best" outcome of World War III would be world empire: {{Blockquote| Today war has become an instrument of universal destruction, an instrument that destroys the victor and the vanquished ... At worst, victor and loser would be undistinguishable under the leveling impact of such a catastrophe ... At best, the destruction on one side would not be quite as great as on the other; the victor would be somewhat better off than the loser and would establish, with the aid of modern technology, his domination over the world.<ref>''In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy'', (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p 58.</ref>}} Expert on earlier civilizations, Toynbee, further developed the subject of World War III leading to world empire: {{Blockquote| The outcome of the Third World War ... seemed likely to be the imposition of an ecumenical peace of the Roman kind by the victor whose victory would leave him with a monopoly on the control of atomic energy in his grasp ... This denouement was foreshadowed, not only by present facts, but by historical precedents, since, in the histories of other civilizations, the time of troubles had been apt to culminate in the delivery of a knock-out blow resulting in the establishment of a universal state ...<ref>''[[A Study of History]]'', (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), vol. IX, p. 524.</ref>}} The year this volume of [[A Study of History]] was published, US Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] announced "[[Massive retaliation|a knock-out blow]]" as an official doctrine, a detailed [[Single Integrated Operational Plan|Plan]] was elaborated and ''[[Fortune (magazine)|Fortune]]'' magazine mapped the design.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.fulltable.com/vts/f/fortune/xf/34.jpg|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170312072919/https://www.fulltable.com/vts/f/fortune/xf/34.jpg|title=Max Gschwind, "Massive Retaliatory Power", map, ''Fortune'', 51, May 1954: p. 105|archive-date=March 12, 2017}}</ref> Section VIII, "Atomic Armaments", of the famous National Security Council Report 68 ([[NSC 68]]), approved by President Harry Truman in 1951, uses the term "blow" 17 times, mostly preceded by such adjectives as "powerful", "overwhelming", or "crippling". Another term applied by the strategists was "Sunday punch".<ref>[[Michio Kaku]], & Daniel Axelrod,<!--- not the redirect to the botanist ---> ''To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon Secret War Plans'', (Boston: South End Press, 1987), p. 195.</ref> A pupil of Toynbee, [[William H. McNeill (historian)|William McNeill]], associated with the case of ancient China, which "put a quietus upon the disorders of the [[warring states]] by erecting an imperial bureaucratic structure ... The warring states of the Twentieth century seem headed for a similar resolution of their conflicts."<ref>''[[The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community]]'', (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 807.</ref> The ancient "resolution" McNeill evoked was one of the most sweeping universal conquests in world history, performed by [[Qin's wars of unification|Qin]] in 230–221 BC. Chinese classic [[Sima Qian]] (d. 86 BC) described the event (6:234): "Qin raised troops on a grand scale" and "the whole world celebrated a great bacchanal". [[Herman Kahn]] of the [[RAND Corporation]] criticized an assembled group of [[Strategic Air Command|SAC]] officers for their war plan ([[Single Integrated Operational Plan|SIOP]]-62). He did not use the term [[bacchanalia|bacchanal]] but he coined on the occasion an associating word: "Gentlemen, you do not have a war plan. You have a ''war orgasm''!"<ref>Emphasis added, cited in [[Fred Kaplan (journalist)|Fred Kaplan]], ''The Wizards of Armageddon''. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991, pp. 223, https://books.google.fr/books?id=RSwVBgAAQBAJ&printsec=copyright&redir_esc=y#v=snippet&q=gentlemen&f=false.</ref> History did not completely repeat itself but it passed close. ===Circumscription theory=== {{Main|Circumscription theory}} According to the circumscription theory of [[Robert Carneiro]], "the more sharply circumscribed area, the more rapidly it will become politically unified."<ref>Robert Carneiro, "The Circumscription Theory: Challenge and Response", ''American Behavioral Scientist'', 31/4, (1988): p 499.</ref> The Empires of Egypt,<ref>O'Connor, D. B. & Silverman, D. P., ''Ancient Egyptian Kingship'', (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1995), p XXI.</ref><ref>Amelie Kuhrt, ''The Ancient Near East circa 3000–330 BC'', (London & New York: Routledge, 1995), vol. I, pp. 123–124.</ref> China<ref>Yuri Pines, ''Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Era'', (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009), pp. 8–9.</ref> and [[Yamato Dynasty|Japan]] are named the most durable political structures in human history. Correspondingly, these are the three most circumscribed civilizations in human history. The Empires of Egypt (established by [[Narmer]] c. 3000 BC) and China (established by [[Qin Shi Huang|Cheng]] in 221 BC) endured for over two millennia. German Sociologist Friedrich Tenbruck, criticizing the Western idea of progress, emphasized that China and Egypt remained at one particular stage of development for millennia. This stage was universal empire. The development of Egypt and China came to a halt once their empires "reached the limits of their natural habitat".{{Sfn|Tenbruck|1994|pages=84, 86–87}} [[Sinology]] does not recognize the Eurocentric view of the "inevitable" imperial fall;<ref>Yuri Pines, ''Envisioning Eternal Empire: Chinese Political Thought of the Warring States Era'', (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009).</ref><ref>Yuri Pines, The ''Everlasting Empire: The Political Culture of Ancient China and Its Imperial Legacy'', (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2012).</ref> Egyptology<ref>D. B. O'Connor & D. P. Silverman, ''Ancient Egyptian Kingship'', (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1995).</ref><ref>Aidan Dodson, ''Monarchs of the Nile'', (London: The Rubicon Press, 1995).</ref> and [[Yamato Dynasty|Japanology]] pose equal challenges. Carneiro explored the Bronze Age civilizations. Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and [[William Wohlforth]] researched the next three millennia, comparing eight civilizations. They conclude: The "rigidity of the borders" contributed importantly to hegemony in every concerned case.<ref>Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, ''The Balance of Power in World History'', (London: Palgrave, 2007), p. 237.</ref> Hence, "when the system's borders are rigid, the probability of hegemony is high".<ref>Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History", ''European Journal of International Relations'', 13/2, (2007): p. 178.</ref> The circumscription theory was stressed in the [[Comparative studies of the Roman and Han empires|comparative studies of the Roman and Chinese Empires]]. The circumscribed Chinese Empire recovered from all falls, while the fall of Rome, by contrast, was fatal. "What counteracted this [imperial] tendency in Europe ... was a countervailing tendency for the geographical boundaries of the system to expand." If "Europe had been a closed system, some great power would eventually have succeeded in establishing absolute supremacy over the other states in the region".<ref>Stuart J. Kaufman & William C. Wohlforth & Richard Little, ''The Balance of Power in World History'', (London: Palgrave, 2007), pp. 45–46.</ref> {{Blockquote| The ancient Chinese system was relatively enclosed, whereas the European system began to expand its reach to the rest of the world from the onset of system formation... In addition, overseas provided outlet for territorial competition, thereby allowing international competition on the European continent to ... trump the ongoing pressure toward convergence.<ref>Victoria Tin-bor Hui, ''War and State Formation in China and Early Modern Europe'', Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 141.</ref>}} In the 1945 book, ''The Precarious Balance'', on four centuries of the European power struggle, [[Ludwig Dehio]] explained the durability of the European states system by its overseas expansion: "Overseas expansion and the system of states were born at the same time; the vitality that burst the bounds of the Western world also destroyed its unity."<ref>(tr. Fullman, Charles, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 50, 90, 279.</ref> In a [[The Anatomy of Peace|more famous 1945 book]], Reves similarly argued that the era of outward expansion is forever closed and the historic trend of expansion will result in direct collision between the remaining powers.<ref name="auto1">Reves 1945: pp 267-268.</ref> [[E. H. Carr|Edward Carr]] causally linked the end of the overseas outlet for imperial expansion and World Wars. In the nineteenth century, he wrote during the Second World War, imperialist wars were waged against "primitive" peoples. "It was silly for European countries to fight against one another when they could still ... maintain social cohesion by continuous expansion in Asia and Africa. Since 1900, however, this has no longer been possible: "the situation has radically changed". Now wars are between "imperial powers."<ref>''Conditions of Peace'', (London: Macmillan, 1943), p 113-114.</ref> [[Hans Morgenthau]] wrote that the very imperial expansion into relatively empty geographical spaces in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, in Africa, Eurasia, and western North America, deflected great power politics into the periphery of the earth, thereby reducing conflict. For example, the more attention Russia, France and the United States paid to expanding into far-flung territories in imperial fashion, the less attention they paid to one another, and the more peaceful, in a sense, the world was. But by the late nineteenth century, the consolidation of the great nation-states and empires of the West was consummated, and territorial gains could only be made at the expense of one another.<ref>''Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace'', 1948, (New York: McGraw Hill, revised 2006 edition), p 354–357.</ref> [[John H. Herz]] outlined one "chief function" of the overseas expansion and the impact of its end: {{Blockquote| [A] European balance of power could be maintained or adjusted because it was relatively easy to divert European conflicts into overseas directions and adjust them there. Thus the openness of the world contributed to the consolidation of the territorial system. The end of the 'world frontier' and the resulting closedness of an interdependent world inevitably affected the system's effectiveness.<ref>[[John H. Herz]], "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State", ''World Politics'', 9, (1957): p. 482.</ref>}} Some later commentators{{Who|date=January 2019}} drew similar conclusions: {{Blockquote| For some commentators, the passing of the Nineteenth century seemed destined to mark the end of this long era of European empire building. The unexplored and unclaimed "blank" spaces on the world map were rapidly diminishing ... and the sense of "global closure" prompted an anxious [[Fin de siècle|fin-de-siècle]] debate about the future of the great empires ... The "closure" of the global imperial system implied ... the beginning of a new era of intensifying inter-imperial struggle along borders that now straddled the globe.<ref>Michael Heffernan, "The Politics of the Map in the Early Twentieth Century", ''Cartography and Geographic Information Science'', 29/3, (2002): p. 207.</ref>}} The opportunity for any system to expand in size seems almost a necessary condition for it to remain balanced, at least over the long haul. Far from being impossible or exceedingly improbable, systemic hegemony is likely under two conditions: "when the boundaries of the international system remain stable and no new major powers emerge from outside the system."<ref>Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, ''The Balance of Power in World History'', (London: Palgrave, 2007), p 229, 237; Idem., "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History", ''European Journal of International Relations'', 13/2, (2007): p 159.</ref> With the system becoming global, further expansion is precluded. The geopolitical condition of "global closure"<ref>Gerry Kearns, "''Fin de Siècle Geopolitics'': Mackinder, Hobson and Theories of Global Closure", ''Political Geography of the Twentieth Century: A Global Analysis'', (ed. Peter J. Taylor, London: Belhaven Press, 1993).</ref> will remain to the end of history. Since "the contemporary international system is global, we can rule out the possibility that geographic expansion of the system will contribute to the emergence of a new balance of power, as it did so many times in the past."<ref>Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, ''The Balance of Power in World History'', p 21.</ref> As [[Quincy Wright]] had put it, "this process can no longer continue without interplanetary wars."<ref>Quincy Wright, ''A Study of War'', (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p 92-93.</ref> One of leading experts on [[world-system theory]], [[Christopher Chase-Dunn]], noted that the circumscription theory is applicable for the global system, since the global system is circumscribed.<ref>{{cite web| url = http://irows.ucr.edu/papers/irows1.txt| title = "World State Formation: Historical Processes and Emergent Necessity", ''Political Geography Quarterly'', 9/2, (1990) |pages=108–130}}</ref><ref>{{cite web| url = https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=osoLn_xoBvQ| title = Robert Carneiro, "Are We Circumscribed Now?" 2012| website = [[YouTube]]}}</ref> In fact, within less than a century of its circumscribed existence the global system overcame the centuries-old [[balance of power (international relations)|balance of power]] and reached the [[unipolarity]]. Given "constant spatial parameters" of the global system, its unipolar structure is neither historically unusual nor theoretically surprising.<ref>Kaufman & Little & Wohlforth, "Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History", ''European Journal of International Relations'', 13/2, (2007): p. 179.</ref> [[Randall Schweller]] theorized that a "closed international system", such as the global became a century ago, would reach "[[entropy]]" in a kind of [[Second law of thermodynamics|thermodynamic law]]. Once the state of entropy is reached, there is no going back. The initial conditions are lost forever. Stressing the curiosity of the fact, Schweller writes that since the moment the modern world became a closed system, the process has worked in only one direction: from many poles to two poles to one pole. Thus unipolarity might represent the entropy—stable and permanent loss of variation—in the global system.<ref>Randall L. Schweller, "Entropy and the Trajectory of World Politics: Why Polarity Has Become Less Meaningful", ''Cambridge Review of International Affairs'', 23/1, (2010): pp. 149–151.</ref> ===Present=== {{Main|American imperialism}} {{See also|Pax Americana}} [[File:Combined Air Operations Center 151007-F-MS415-019.jpg|thumb|[[Al Udeid Air Base]] in [[Qatar]]]] [[Chalmers Johnson]] argues that the US global network of hundreds of military bases already represents a global empire in its initial form: {{Blockquote| For a major power, prosecution of any war that is not a defense of the homeland usually requires overseas military bases for strategic reasons. After the war is over, it is tempting for the victor to retain such bases and easy to find reasons to do so. Commonly, preparedness for a possible resumption of hostilities will be invoked. Over time, if a nation's aims become imperial, the bases form the skeleton of an empire.<ref>''The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic'', New York: Henry Hobt and Company, (2004), p 187.</ref>}} [[Simon Dalby]] associates the network of bases with the Roman imperial system: {{Blockquote| Looking at these impressive facilities which reproduce substantial parts of American suburbia complete with movie theatres and restaurant chains, the parallels with Roman garrison towns built on the Rhine, or on Hadrian's wall in England, where the remains are strikingly visible on the landscape, are obvious ... Less visible is the sheer scale of the logistics to keep garrison troops in residence in the far-flung reaches of empire ... That [military] presence literally builds the cultural logic of the garrison troops into the landscape, a permanent reminder of imperial control.<ref>Simon Dalby, "Imperialism, Domination, Culture: The Continued Relevance of Critical Geopolitics," ''Geopolitics'', 13/3, (2008): p 425.</ref>}} [[Kenneth Pomeranz]] and Harvard Historian [[Niall Ferguson]] share the above-cited views: "With American military bases in over 120 countries, we have hardly seen the end of empire." This "vast archipelago of US military bases … far exceeds 19th-century British ambitions. Britain's imperium consisted of specific, albeit numerous, colonies and clients; the American imperial vision is much more global…"<ref>Kenneth Pomeranz, "Empire & 'Civilizing' Missions, Past & Present, ''Daedalus'', 134/2, (2005): p 43, 45.</ref> {{Blockquote| Conventional maps of US military deployments understate the extent of America's military reach. A [[United States Department of Defense|Defense Department]] map of the world, which shows the areas of responsibility of the [[Unified Combatant Command|five major regional commands]], suggests that America's sphere of military influence is now literally global ... The regional combatant commanders—[[Pax Americana|the 'pro-consuls' of this imperium]]—have responsibility for swaths of territory beyond the wildest imaginings of their Roman predecessors.<ref>Niall Ferguson, ''Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire'', (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), p 17.</ref>}} Another Harvard Historian [[Charles S. Maier]] opens his ''Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors'' with these words: "What a substratum for empire! Compared with which, the foundation of the Macedonian, the Roman and the British, sink into insignificance."<ref>(Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press, 2006), p 1.</ref> One of the most accepted distinctions between earlier empires and the American Empire is the latter's "global" or "planetary" scope.<ref>[[Neil Smith (geographer)|Neil Smith]], ''American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization'', (Berkeley & Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 2003), p XIII.</ref> French former Foreign Minister [[Hubert Vedrine]] wondered: "The situation is unprecedented: What previous empire subjugated the entire world...?"<ref>Hubert Vedrine & [[Dominique Moisi]], ''France in an Age of Globalization'', (tr. Gordon, Philip H., Washington: Brookings Institutions Press, 2001), p 2.</ref> The quests for universal empire are old but the present quest outdoes the previous in "the notable respect of being the first to actually be global in its reach."<ref>{{cite web| url = http://bev.berkeley.edu/ipe/readings/American%20hegemony%202005.pdf| title = David C. Hendrickson, "The Curious Case of American Hegemony: Imperial Aspirations and National Decline," ''World Policy Journal'', 22/2, (2005): p 5}}</ref> Another historian [[Paul Kennedy]], who wrote [[The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers|prediction]] talks of the imminent US "imperial overstretch," in 2002 acknowledged about the present world system: {{Blockquote| Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power. The Pax Britannica was run on the cheap. Napoleon's France and Philip II's Spain had powerful foes and were part of a multipolar system. Charlemagne's empire was merely western European in stretch. The Roman Empire stretched further afield, but there was another great empire in Persia and a larger one in China. There is ... no comparison.<ref>{{cite web| url = http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2002_spring/kennedy.html| title = "The Greatest Superpower Ever," ''New Perspectives Quarterly'', 19/2, (2002)}}</ref>}} [[Walter Russell Mead]] observes that the United States attempts to repeate "globally" what the ancient empires of Egypt, China and Rome had each accomplished on a regional basis.<ref>"America's Sticky Power," ''Foreign Policy'', 141, (March – April 2004): p 48.</ref> Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Leeds, [[Zygmunt Bauman]], concludes that due to its planetary dimension, the new empire cannot be drawn on a map: {{Blockquote| The new 'empire' is not an entity that could be drawn on a map... Drawing a map of the empire would also be a pointless exercise because the most conspicuously 'imperial' trait of the new empire's mode of being consists in viewing and treating the whole of the planet ... as a potential grazing ground...<ref>''Europe: An Unfinished Adventure'', (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p 55-56.</ref>}} ''Times Atlas of Empires'' numbers 70 empires in the world history. Niall Ferguson lists numerous parallels between them and the United States. He concludes: "To those who would still insist on American exceptionalism, the historian of empires can only retort: as exceptional as all the other 69 empires."<ref>"The Unconscious Colossus: Limits of (Alternatives to) American Empire," ''Daedalus'', 134/2, (2005): p 20-21.</ref> [[Fareed Zakaria]] stressed one element not exceptional for the American Empire—the concept of [[American exceptionalism|exceptionalism]]. All dominant empires thought they were special.<ref>{{cite web| url = http://www.newsweek.com/arrogant-empire-132751| title = "The Arrogant Empire," ''Newsweek''. (March 24, 2003)| website = [[Newsweek]]| date = 23 March 2003}}</ref> ===Future=== In 1945, Historian [[Ludwig Dehio]] predicted global unification due to the circumscription of the global system, although he did not use this term. Being global, the system can neither expand nor be subject to external intrusion as the European states system had been for centuries: {{Blockquote| In all previous struggles for supremacy, attempts to unite the European peninsula in a single state have been condemned to failure primarily through the intrusion of new forces from outside the old Occident. The Occident was an open area. But the globe was not, and, for that very reason, ultimately destined to be unified... And this very process [of unification] was clearly reflected in both World Wars.<ref>Ludwig Dehio, The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle, 1945, (tr. Fullman, Charles, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p 234.</ref>}} Fifteen years later, Dehio confirmed his hypothesis: The European system owed its durability to its overseas outlet. "But how can a multiple grouping of world states conceivably be supported from outside in the framework of a finite globe?"<ref>Ludwig Dehio, "Epilogue," The Precarious Balance: Four Centuries of the European Power Struggle, 1960, (tr. Fullman, Charles, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p 279.</ref> During the same time, [[Quincy Wright]] developed a similar concept. Balance-of-power politics has aimed less at preserving peace than at preserving the independence of states and preventing the development of world empire. In the course of history, the balance of power repeatedly reemerged, but on ever-wider scale. Eventually, the scale became global. Unless we proceed to "interplanetary wars," this pattern can no longer continue. In spite of significant reversals, the "trend towards world unity" can "scarcely be denied." World unity appears to be "the limit toward which the process of world history seems to tend."<ref>Quincy Wright, ''A Study of War'', (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p 92-93, 228, 234.</ref> The same "interplanetary" motif is present also in the [[The Anatomy of Peace|Anatomy of Peace]]: The era of outward expansion is forever closed. "Until and unless we are able to communicate with another planet, the theater of human history will be limited to geographically determined, constant and known dimensions." The historic trend of expansion will result in direct collision between the remaining powers. Multiplied by modern technology, the centripetal forces will accomplish what the greatest empires of the past failed. "For the first time in human history, one power can conquer and rule the world."<ref name="auto1"/> The "Father of American Anthropology," [[Franz Boas]], known for his [[historical particularism]] and [[cultural relativism]], outlined the "inexorable laws of history" by which political units grow larger in size and smaller in number. The process began in the earliest times and has continued almost always in the same direction. In the long run, the tendency to unification has been more powerful than of disintegration. "Thus the history of mankind shows us the grand spectacle of the grouping of man in units of ever increasing size." The progress in the direction of unification has been so regular and so marked that we must needs conclude that the same tendencies will govern our history in the future. Today the unity of the world is not less conceivable than the modern nations were in the early history. The practical difficulties that stand in the way of the formation of still larger units count for nothing before the "inexorable laws of history."<ref>Boas, Franz, (posthumous publication). ''Race and Democratic Society'', (New York: Biblo ad Tannen, 1969), pp 99-100.</ref> Five later scholars—[[Hornell Hart]],<ref>"The Logistic Growth of Political Areas," ''Social Forces'', 26, (1948): p 396-408.</ref> [[Raoul Naroll]],<ref>"Imperial Cycles and World Order," ''Peace Research Society'', 7, (1967): p 83-101.</ref> Louis Morano,<ref>"A Macrohistoric Trend towards World Government", ''Behavior Science Notes'', 8, (1973): p 35-40.</ref> [[Rein Taagepera]]<ref>"Expansion and Contraction Patterns of Large Polities: Context for Russia." ''International Studies Quarterly'', 41/3, (1997): 475–504.</ref> and the author of the circumscription theory [[Robert Carneiro]]<ref>"Political Expansion as an Expression of the Principle of Competitive Exclusion", ''Studying War: Anthropological Perspective'', (eds. Reyna, Stephen P. & Dawns, Richard Erskine, Gordon and Breach, New Hampshire, 1994).</ref><ref>"The Political Unification of the World", ''Cross Cultural Survey'', 38/2, (2004), p 162-177.</ref>—researched expanding imperial cycles. All argued that these cycles represent an historical trend leading to world empire. Naroll and Carneiro also found this outcome "close at hand," c. 2200 and 2300 respectively. The founder of the [[Paneuropean Union]], [[Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi]], writing yet in 1943, drew a more specific and immediate future imperial project: After the War America is bound "to take over the command of the skies." The danger of "the utter annihilation of all enemy towns and lands" can "only be prevented by the air superiority of a single power ... America's air role is the only alternative to intercontinental wars." Despite his outstanding anti-imperialism, Coudenhove-Kalergi detailed: {{Blockquote| No imperialism, but technical and strategic problems of security urge America to rule the skies of the globe, just as Britain during the last century ruled the seas of the world... Pacifists and anti-imperialists will be shocked by this logic. They will try to find an escape. But they will try in vain... At the end of the war the crushing superiority of American plane production will be an established fact... The solution of the problem ... is by no means ideal, nor even satisfactory. But it is the minor evil...<ref>{{Cite book |author-link=Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi |first=Richard |last=von Coudenhove-Kalergi | title=Crusade for Pan-Europe |publisher=G. P. Putnam's Sons |date=1943 |pages=297–298}}</ref>}} Coudenhove-Kalergi envisaged a kind of [[Pax Americana]] modeled on "Pax Romana": {{Blockquote| During the third century BC the Mediterranean world was divided on five great powers—Roma and Carthage, Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt. The balance of power led to a series of wars until Rome emerged the queen of the Mediterranean and established an incomparable era of two centuries of peace and progress, the 'Pax Romana'... It may be that America's air power could again assure our world, now much smaller than the Mediterranean at that period, two hundred years of peace...{{Sfn|von Coudenhove-Kalergi|1943|page=299}}}} This period would be necessary transitory stage before [[World State]] is eventually established, though he did not specify how the last transformation is expected to occur. Coudenhove-Kalergi's follower in the teleological theory of World State, Toynbee, supposed the traditional way of universal conquest and emphasized that the world is ripe for conquest: "...Hitler's eventual failure to impose peace on the world by the force of arms was due, not to any flaw in his thesis that the world was ripe for conquest, but to an accidental combination of incidental errors in his measures..." But "in falling by so narrow a margin to win the prize of world-dominion for himself, Hitler had left the prize dangling within the reach of any successor capable of pursuing the same aims of world-conquest with a little more patience, prudence, and tact." With his "revolution of destruction," Hitler has performed the "yeoman service" for "some future architect of a ''Pax Ecumenica''... For a post-Hitlerian empire-builder, Hitler's derelict legacy was a gift of the Gods."<ref>{{Cite book |author-link=Arnold J. Toynbee |first=Arnold J. |last=Toynbee |title=[[A Study of History]] |location=London |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |date=1954 |volume=IX: Contacts between Civilizations in Time (Renaissances); Law and Freedom in History; The Prospects of the Western Civilization |page=502}}</ref> The next "architect of a Pax Ecumenica," known more commonly as [[Pax Americana]], demonstrated "more patience, prudence, and tact." Consequently, as President [[Dwight Eisenhower]] put it, the NATO allies became "almost psychopathic" whenever anyone talked about a US withdrawal, and the reception of his successor [[John F. Kennedy]] in Berlin was "almost hysterical," as Chancellor [[Conrad Adenauer]] characterized it.<ref>{{Cite book |first=Marc |last=Trachtenberg |author-link=Marc Trachtenberg |title=A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 |location=Princeton, New Jersey |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |date=1999 |pages=152–153, 394}}</ref> [[John Ikenberry]] finds that the Europeans wanted a stronger, more formal and more imperial system than the United States was initially willing to provide. In the end the United States settled for this "form of empire—a Pax Americana with formal commitments to Europe."<ref>{{Cite journal |first=John G. |last=Ikenberry |author-link=John Ikenberry |title=Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony |journal=[[Political Science Quarterly]] |volume=104 |issue=3 |date=1989 |page=399|doi=10.2307/2151270 |jstor=2151270 }}</ref> According to a much debated thesis, the United States became "empire by invitation."<ref>{{Cite journal |first=Geir |last=Lundestad |author-link=Geir Lundestad |title=Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952 |journal=[[Journal of Peace Research]] |volume=23 |issue=3 |date=1986 |pages=263–267|doi=10.1177/002234338602300305 |s2cid=73345898 }}</ref> The period discussed in the thesis (1945–1952) ended precisely the year Toynbee theorized on "some future architect of a Pax Ecumenica." Dissociating America from Rome, Eisenhower gave a pessimistic forecast. In 1951, before he became President, he had written on West Europe: "We cannot be a modern Rome guarding the far frontiers with our legions if for no other reason than that these are not, politically, our frontiers. What we must do is to assist these [West European] peoples." Two years later, he wrote: When it was decided to deploy US divisions to Europe, no one had "for an instant" thought that they would remain there for "several decades"—that the United States could "build a sort of Roman Wall with its own troops and so protect the world."{{Sfn|Trachtenberg|1999|pages=147-148}} Eisenhower assured [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Soviet first secretary]] [[Nikita Khrushchev]] on Berlin in 1959: "Clearly we did not contemplate 50 years in occupation there." It lasted, remarks [[Marc Trachtenberg]], from July 1945 to September 1994, 10 months short of 50 years.{{Sfn|Trachtenberg|1999|page=401}} Notably, when the US troops eventually left, they left eastward. Confirming the theory of the "empire by invitation," with their first opportunity East European states extended the "invitation."<ref>{{Cite book |first=Geir |last=Lundestad |author-link=Geir Lundestad |title=The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From 'Empire' by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |date=2005 |page=3}}</ref> [[Oswald Spengler]] envisaged the "Imperial Age" for the world in both senses of "empire," spatial (as a world-wide unit ruled by one center) and governmental (as ruled by Emperor). Published in 1922, ''[[The Decline of the West]]'' predicts the triumph of the strongest race in the fight for the whole world within "two generations" and of "Caesarism" over democracy "within a century."<ref>Spengler, Oswald (1922). ''The Decline of the West: Perspectives on World-History'', (tr. Atkinson, Charles Francis, (London: George Allen & Unwin LTD), vol II, p 416, 428-432, 464-465, 506-507, https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.264078/mode/2up?view=theater</ref> In 2022, the Spenglerian century ended short of global "Caesarism," albeit two years before its end [[Donald Trump]] had been advised to [[Crossing the Rubicon|cross the Rubicon]].<ref>Lemon, Jason, (December 20, 2020). "Arizona GOP Chair calls for Trump to 'cross the Rubicon' in tweet shared by Michael Flynn," ''Newsweek'', https://www.newsweek.com/arizona-gop-chair-calls-trump-cross-rubicon-tweet-shared-michael-flynn-1556232</ref> Chalmers Johnson regards the global military reach of the United States as empire in its "initial" form.<ref>''The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and the End of the Republic'', (New York: Henry Hobt and Company, 2004), p 187.</ref> [[Dimitri Simes]] finds that most of the world sees the United States as a "nascent" imperial power.<ref>{{Cite journal |first=Dimitri |last=Simes |author-link=Dimitri Simes |title=America's Imperial Dilemma |journal=[[Foreign Affairs]] |volume=82 |issue=6 |date=2003 |pages=91–102 |doi=10.2307/20033759 |jstor=20033759 }}</ref> Some scholars concerned how this empire would look in its ultimate form. The ultimate form of empire was described by Michael Doyle in his ''Empires''. It is empire in which its two main components—the ruling core and the ruled periphery—merged to form one integrated whole. At this stage the ''empire'' as defined ceases to exist and becomes ''world state''. Doyle examplifies the transformation on the case of the Roman Emperor [[Caracalla]] whose legislation in AD 212 extended the Roman citizenship to all inhabitants of the Mediterranean world.<ref>{{Cite book |first=Michael |last=Doyle |title=Empires |location=London |publisher=[[Cornell University Press]] |date=1986 |page=12}}</ref> Doyle's case of the Roman Empire had also been evoked by [[Susan Strange]] in her 1988 article, "The Future of the American Empire." Strange emphasized that the most persistent empires were those which best managed to integrate the ruling core and the peripheral allies. The article is partly a reply on the published a year earlier bestseller [[The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers]] which predicted imminent US "imperial overstretch." Strange found this outcome unlikely, stressing the fact that the peripheral allies have been successfully recruited into the American Empire.<ref>{{Cite journal |first=Susan |last=Strange |title=The Future of the American Empire |journal=[[Journal of International Affairs]] |volume=42 |issue=1 |date=1988 |pages=9, 11}}</ref> Envisaging a world empire of either the United States or the Soviet Union (whoever is victorious in World War III), [[Bertrand Russell]] projected the Roman scenario too: "Like the Romans, they will, in the course of time, extend citizenship to the vanquished. There will then be a true world state, and it will be possible to forget that it will have owed its origin to conquest."<ref>{{Cite magazine |first=Bertrand |last=Russell |author-link=Bertrand Russell |title=The Future of Man |magazine=[[Atlantic Monthly]] |date=April 1951 |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1951/03/the-future-of-man/305193}}</ref> International Relations scholar [[Alexander Wendt]] supposes world empire by universal conquest and subsequent consolidation, provided the conquering power recognizes all conquered members. For his example he also invokes the Roman Empire.<ref>Wendt, Alexander, (2003). "Why the World State is Inevitable: Teleology and the Logic of Anarchy," ''European Journal of International Relations''. 9 (4): pp 54–56, https://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/03wendt.pdf</ref><ref>Wendt, Alexander (2005). "Agency, Teleology and the World State: A Reply to Shannon". ''European Journal of International Relations''. 11 (4): p 595.</ref> To the case of Caracalla, Toynbee added the [[Abbasid Revolution|Abbasid cosmopolitan reformation]] of 750 AD. Both "were good auguries for the prospect that, in a post-Modern chapter of Western history, a supranational commonwealth originally based on the hegemony of a paramount power over its satellites might eventually be put on the sounder basis of a constitutional partnership in which all the people of all the partner states would have their fare share in the conduct of common affairs."{{Sfn|Toynbee|1954|page=554-555}} [[Crane Brinton]] expected that the world empire would not be built instantly but not as slowly as Rome, for much in the modern world has been speeded up.<ref>Brinton, Crane, (1948). ''From Many, One: The Process of Political Integration, the Problem of World Government'', (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1971), p 95.</ref> [[Charles Galton Darwin]], a grandson of the [[Charles Darwin|father of Evolution Theory]], suggested that China, as an isolated and enduring civilization, seems to provide the most relevant model for the global future. As the Chinese Empire, the regions of the world, periodically albeit more rarely, will be united by force into an uneasy world-empire, which will endure for a period until it falls.<ref>Darwin, Charles Galton, (1950). "The Next Million Years," [https://archive.org/download/fateofman00brin/fateofman00brin.pdf ''The Fate of Man'']. (New York: G. Braziller, 1961), pp 499, 501.</ref> Along China, Ostrovsky mentions Egypt as a model for the future but, by contrast, estimates that the intermediate periods of the global empire will be shorter and rarer.<ref>Ostrovsky 2007: pp 352, 362, 367.</ref> Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page