Immanuel Kant Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ===Moral thought=== {{Main|Kantian ethics}} Kant developed his ethics, or moral philosophy, in three works: ''[[Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals]]'' (1785), ''[[Critique of Practical Reason]]'' (1788), and ''[[Metaphysics of Morals]]'' (1797). With regard to [[morality]], Kant argued that the source of the [[Goodness and value theory|good]] lies not in anything outside the [[human]] subject, either in [[nature]] or given by [[God]], but rather is only the good will itself. A good will is one that acts from duty in accordance with the universal moral law that the autonomous human being freely gives itself. This law obliges one to treat humanity{{mdash}}understood as rational agency, and represented through oneself as well as others{{mdash}}as an [[end in itself]] rather than (merely) as [[means (philosophy)|means]] to other ends the individual might hold. Kant is known for his theory that all [[moral obligation]] is grounded in what he calls the "[[categorical imperative]]", which is derived from the concept of [[duty]]. He argues that the moral law is a principle of [[reason]] itself, not based on contingent facts about the world, such as what would make us happy; to act on the moral law has no other motive than "worthiness to be happy".<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' A806/B834</ref> ====The idea of freedom==== In the ''Critique of Pure Reason'', Kant distinguishes between the transcendental idea of freedom, which as a psychological concept is "mainly empirical" and refers to "whether a faculty of beginning a series of successive things or states from itself is to be assumed",<ref name="Kant, CPuR A448/B467">Kant, ''CPuR'' A448/B467</ref> and the practical concept of freedom as the independence of our will from the "coercion" or "necessitation through sensuous impulses". Kant finds it a source of difficulty that the practical idea of freedom is founded on the transcendental idea of freedom,<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' A533β34/B561β62</ref> but for the sake of practical interests uses the practical meaning, taking "no account of ... its transcendental meaning", which he feels was properly "disposed of" in the Third Antinomy, and as an element in the question of the freedom of the will is for philosophy "a real stumbling block" that has embarrassed speculative reason.<ref name="Kant, CPuR A448/B467"/> Kant calls ''practical'' "everything that is possible through freedom"; he calls the pure practical laws that are never given through sensuous conditions, but are held analogously with the universal law of causality, moral laws. Reason can give us only the "pragmatic laws of free action through the senses", but pure practical laws given by reason ''a priori''<ref name="Kant, CPuR A448/B467"/> dictate "what is to be done".<ref>Kant, ''CPuR'' A800β02/B 828β30</ref> Kant's categories of freedom function primarily as conditions for the possibility for actions (i) to be free, (ii) to be understood as free, and (iii) to be morally evaluated. For Kant, although actions as theoretical objects are constituted by means of the theoretical categories, actions as practical objects (objects of practical use of reason, and which can be good or bad) are constituted by means of the categories of freedom. Only in this way can actions, as phenomena, be a consequence of freedom, and be understood and evaluated as such.<ref>[[Susanne Bobzien]], 'Die Kategorien der Freiheit bei Kant', in ''Kant: Analysen, Probleme, Kritik'' Vol. 1, 1988, 193β220.</ref> ====The categorical imperative==== Kant makes a distinction between categorical and [[hypothetical imperative]]s. A ''hypothetical'' imperative is one that we must obey to satisfy contingent desires. A ''categorical'' imperative binds us regardless of our desires: for example, everyone has a duty to respect others as individual ends in themselves, regardless of circumstances, even though it is sometimes in our narrowly selfish interest to not do so. These imperatives are morally binding because of the categorical form of their maxims, rather than contingent facts about an agent.<ref>Driver 2007, p. 83.</ref> Unlike hypothetical imperatives, which bind us insofar as we are part of a group or society which we owe duties to, we cannot opt out of the categorical imperative, because we cannot opt out of being [[rational agent]]s. We owe a duty to rationality by virtue of being rational agents; therefore, rational moral principles apply to all rational agents at all times.{{sfn|Johnson|2008}} Stated in other terms, with all forms of instrumental rationality excluded from morality, "the moral law itself, Kant holds, can only be the form of lawfulness itself, because nothing else is left once all content has been rejected".{{sfn|Schneewind|2010|p=261}} Kant provides three formulations for the categorical imperative. He claims that these are necessarily equivalent, as all being expressions of the pure universality of the moral law as such.<ref>Kant, ''G''. 4:420β421, 436.</ref> Many scholars, however, are not convinced.<ref>Wood, Allen. (2017) ''Formulas of the Moral Law''. Cambridge University Press, pp. 74β78</ref> The formulas are as follows: * ''Formula of Universal Law'': **"Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you at the same time can will that it become a universal law";<ref name="Kant, G 4:421">Kant, ''G'' 4:421</ref> alternatively, ***''Formula of the Law of Nature'': "So act, as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature."<ref name="Kant, G 4:421"/> * ''Formula of Humanity as End in Itself'': **"So act that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means".<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:429</ref> * ''Formula of Autonomy'': **"the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal law",<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:431; cf. 4:432</ref> or "Not to choose otherwise than so that the maxims of one's choice are at the same time comprehended with it in the same volition as universal law";<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:440; cf. 4:432, 434, 438</ref> alternatively, ***''Formula of the Realm of Ends'': "Act in accordance with maxims of a universally legislative member for a merely possible realm of ends."<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:439; cf. 4:433, 437β439</ref><ref>Wood, Allen. (2017) ''Formulas of the Moral Law''. Cambridge University Press, p.6</ref> Kant defines ''maxim'' as a "subjective principle of volition", which is distinguished from an "objective principle or 'practical law.{{'"}} While "the latter is valid for every rational being and is a 'principle according to which they ought to act[,]' a maxim 'contains the practical rule which reason determines in accordance with the conditions of the subject (often their ignorance or inclinations) and is thus the principle according to which the subject does act.{{'"}}<ref>Caygill, Howard. (1995) ''A Kant Dictionary''. Blackwell Publishing, p. 289, citing ''GMM''.</ref> Maxims fail to qualify as practical laws if they produce a contradiction in conception or a contradiction in the will when universalized. A contradiction in conception happens when, if a maxim were to be universalized, it ceases to make sense, because the "maxim would necessarily destroy itself as soon as it was made a universal law".<ref>Kant, ''G'' 4:403.</ref> For example, if the maxim 'It is permissible to break promises' was universalized, no one would trust any promises made, so the idea of a promise would become meaningless; the maxim would be [[Self-refuting idea|self-contradictory]] because, when it is universalized, promises cease to be meaningful. The maxim is not moral because it is logically impossible to universalize{{mdash}}that is, we could not conceive of a world where this maxim was universalized.<ref>Driver 2007, p. 88.</ref> A maxim can also be immoral if it creates a contradiction in the will when universalized. This does not mean a logical contradiction, but that universalizing the maxim leads to a state of affairs that no ''rational'' being would desire. ===="The Doctrine of Virtue"==== As Kant explains in the 1785 ''[[Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals]]'' (and as its title directly indicates) that text is "nothing more than the search for and establishment of the ''supreme principle of morality''".<ref>Kant, ''GMM'' 4:392.</ref> His promised ''Metaphysics of Morals'', however, was much delayed and did not appear until its two parts, "The Doctrine of Right" and "The Doctrine of Virtue", were published separately in 1797 and 1798.<ref>Gregor, Mary J. (1996) "Translator's note on the text of The metaphysics of morals". In ''Practical Philosophy''. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, p. 355.</ref> The first deals with political philosophy, the second with ethics. "The Doctrine of Virtue" provides "a very different account of ordinary moral reasoning" than the one suggested by the ''Groundwork''.{{sfn|Wood|2006|p=68}} It is concerned with ''duties of virtue'' or "ends that are at the same time duties".<ref>Kant, ''MM''. 6:382β391.</ref> It is here, in the domain of ethics, that the greatest innovation by ''The Metaphysics of Morals'' is to be found. According to Kant's account, "ordinary moral reasoning is fundamentally teleological{{mdash}}it is reasoning about what ends we are constrained by morality to pursue, and the priorities among these ends we are required to observe".{{sfn|Wood|2006|p=69}} More specifically, <blockquote>There are two sorts of ends that it is our duty to have: our own perfection and the happiness of others (''MS'' 6:385). "Perfection" includes both our natural perfection (the development of our talents, skills, and capacities of understanding) and moral perfection (our virtuous disposition) (''MS'' 6:387). A person's "happiness" is the greatest rational whole of the ends the person set for the sake of her<!--Kant, Wood????--> own satisfaction (''MS'' 6:387β388).{{sfn|Wood|2006|p=70}}</blockquote> Kant's elaboration of this teleological doctrine offers up a moral theory very different from the one typically attributed to him on the basis of his foundational works alone. Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page