Logic Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.Anti-spam check. Do not fill this in! ====Ampliative==== Ampliative arguments are arguments whose conclusions contain additional information not found in their premises. In this regard, they are more interesting since they contain information on the depth level and the thinker may learn something genuinely new. But this feature comes with a certain cost: the premises support the conclusion in the sense that they make its truth more likely but they do not ensure its truth.{{sfnm|1a1=Hintikka|1a2=Sandu|1y=2006|1pp=13-6|2a1=Backmann|2y=2019|2pp=235β255|3a1=IEP Staff}} This means that the conclusion of an ampliative argument may be false even though all its premises are true. This characteristic is closely related to ''[[Non-monotonic logic|non-monotonicity]]'' and ''[[Defeasible reasoning|defeasibility]]'': it may be necessary to retract an earlier conclusion upon receiving new information or in the light of new inferences drawn.{{sfnm|1a1=Rocci|1y=2017|1p=26|2a1=Hintikka|2a2=Sandu|2y=2006|2pp=13, 16|3a1=Douven|3y=2021}} Ampliative reasoning plays a central role for many arguments found in everyday discourse and the sciences. Ampliative arguments are not automatically incorrect. Instead, they just follow different standards of correctness. The support they provide for their conclusion usually comes in degrees. This means that strong ampliative arguments make their conclusion very likely while weak ones are less certain. As a consequence, the line between correct and incorrect arguments is blurry in some cases, as when the premises offer weak but non-negligible support. This contrasts with deductive arguments, which are either valid or invalid with nothing in-between.{{sfnm|1a1=IEP Staff|2a1=Douven|2y=2021|3a1=Hawthorne|3y=2021}} The terminology used to categorize ampliative arguments is inconsistent. Some authors, like James Hawthorne, use the term "[[inductive reasoning|induction]]" to cover all forms of non-deductive arguments.{{sfnm|1a1=IEP Staff|2a1=Hawthorne|2y=2021|3a1=Wilbanks|3y=2010|3pp=107β124}} But in a more narrow sense, ''induction'' is only one type of ampliative argument alongside ''[[abductive reasoning|abductive arguments]]''.{{sfn |Douven |2021}} Some philosophers, like Leo Groarke, also allow ''conductive arguments''{{efn|Conductive arguments present reasons in favor of a conclusion without claiming that the reasons are strong enough to decisively support the conclusion.}} as one more type.{{sfnm|1a1=Groarke|1y=2021|1loc=4.1 AV Criteria|2a1=Possin|2y=2016|2pp=563β593}} In this narrow sense, induction is often defined as a form of statistical generalization.{{sfnm|1a1=Scott|1a2=Marshall|1y=2009|1loc=analytic induction|2a1=Houde|2a2=Camacho|2loc=Induction|2y=2003}} In this case, the premises of an inductive argument are many individual observations that all show a certain pattern. The conclusion then is a general law that this pattern always obtains.{{sfn |Borchert |2006b |loc=Induction}} In this sense, one may infer that "all elephants are gray" based on one's past observations of the color of elephants.{{sfn |Douven |2021}} A closely related form of inductive inference has as its conclusion not a general law but one more specific instance, as when it is inferred that an elephant one has not seen yet is also gray.{{sfn |Borchert |2006b |loc=Induction}} Some theorists, like Igor Douven, stipulate that inductive inferences rest only on statistical considerations. This way, they can be distinguished from abductive inference.{{sfn |Douven |2021}} Abductive inference may or may not take statistical observations into consideration. In either case, the premises offer support for the conclusion because the conclusion is the best [[explanation]] of why the premises are true.{{sfnm|1a1=Douven|1y=2021|2a1=Koslowski|2y=2017|2loc=[https://www.taylorfrancis.com/locs/edit/10.4324/9781315725697-20/abductive-reasoning-explanation-barbara-koslowski Abductive reasoning and explanation]}} In this sense, abduction is also called the ''inference to the best explanation''.{{sfn |Cummings |2010 |loc=Abduction, p. 1}} For example, given the premise that there is a plate with breadcrumbs in the kitchen in the early morning, one may infer the conclusion that one's house-mate had a midnight snack and was too tired to clean the table. This conclusion is justified because it is the best explanation of the current state of the kitchen.{{sfn |Douven |2021}} For abduction, it is not sufficient that the conclusion explains the premises. For example, the conclusion that a burglar broke into the house last night, got hungry on the job, and had a midnight snack, would also explain the state of the kitchen. But this conclusion is not justified because it is not the best or most likely explanation.{{sfnm|1a1=Douven|1y=2021|2a1=Koslowski|2y=2017|2loc=[https://www.taylorfrancis.com/locs/edit/10.4324/9781315725697-20/abductive-reasoning-explanation-barbara-koslowski Abductive reasoning and explanation]}}{{sfn |Cummings |2010 |loc=Abduction, p. 1}} Summary: Please note that all contributions to Christianpedia may be edited, altered, or removed by other contributors. If you do not want your writing to be edited mercilessly, then do not submit it here. You are also promising us that you wrote this yourself, or copied it from a public domain or similar free resource (see Christianpedia:Copyrights for details). Do not submit copyrighted work without permission! Cancel Editing help (opens in new window) Discuss this page